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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to investigate the representation of politics as a cartoon in Thomas Pynchon's 
Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland, and to apply what we find to Bret Easton Ellis's controversial 
American Psycho. This investigation will also hold implications for other postmodemist 
literature, and for the possibility of constructing a "postmodem" politics capable of opposing the 
political order depicted in Pynchon's novels. Pynchon hints at such a politics, but tends to focus 
his writing on diagnosing reasons for their failure rather than prescribing for their success. 
Pynchon and Ellis both depict late, "postmodem" "spectacle" capitalist cultural environments as 
being in important respects "totalitarian" and "fascist". At the same time, the novels associate 
"fascism" with cartoons. 
After initial chapters describing the place of both cartoons and politics in the novels under 
discussion, the three following chapters explore the three novels' politics in more depth and seek 
to justify a reading of their environments as being an amalgam of totalitarianism and fascism, or 
what I will call "(totalitarian) 'fascism"'. These chapters identify and apply the concept of 
"Liminal Processes Favouring Totality" as an explanation for the existence of fascist structures 
and personalities in a late capitalist environment. Over the course of the final six chapters, the 
argument changes direction to explore the signification of "cartoons", which are found to support 
a cultural meaning wider than that of drawings or animations. 
This wider metaphoric meaning is, broadly, the diminishment of representation to below three 
dimensions. The attachment of this signification to "cartoons" allows me to show that a 
"democratic" "postmodem" politics which is able to resist "Liminal Processes Favouring 
Totality" emerges from a reading of both Pynchon's and Ellis's texts. Ironically, in order to 
energize this sort of political response, both Gravity's Rainbow and American Psycho in 
particular are designed to affect the reader outside the world of the text they are reading, that is, 
in that very reality many critics say postmodemism denies. 
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!'mjust staying home tonight, 
getting lost in that hopeless little screen. 
But I'm stubborn as those garbage bags 
that time cannot decay 
I'm junk but I'm still holding up 
this little wild bouquet: 
Democracy is coming to the U.S.A. 
No more absolutes, 
No more absolutes, 
-Leonard Cohen 
Stick your penitentimy clothes inside the vent 
And run along 
-Pavement 
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Chapter one 
Preliminary: Cartoons 
This thesis theorises an aspect of postmodernism, one of its fragments. As a 
cultural, aesthetic and academic phenomenon, postmodernism has proved to be 
spectacularly successful. So successful, in fact, that the concepts and language captured 
by the term are now considered to have become a new orthodoxy in the academy (see for 
example, Bauerlein 2001). Both high art and popular culture increasingly play with such 
postmodern concerns and techniques as endless irony, self-reflexivity, "hyperreality", the 
fate of the subject, the free play of the signifier, the end of the large cultural 
"metanarratives" and the consequent or causative fragmentation of discourse, including 
the collapse of generally assumed hierarchies (Lyotard 1984; Foster 1983, and many 
since). Despite this, some fundamental questions about postmodernism have yet to be 
satisfactorily explored. 
Throughout its career, many claims have been made on behalf of postmodem 
concepts. The ones I wish to focus on here are claims, sometimes made for or against 
postmodemism that broadly fall under the category of politics. Many practitioners of 
postmodem art and commentators on postmodern culture have regarded the 
fragmentation of the power of universalised "metanarratives" as a positive event for 
"progressive" politics (represented by feminist, indigenous people's, gay rights, 
environmental, and anti-capitalist movements, for example). This is because these 
"metanarratives" have hitherto supported dominant discourses that have oppressed 
marginal sections of the population and enabled the unchecked power of elites. Their 
diminished status - postmodemity transforms them, supposedly, into narratives that have 
no superior claim to privilege - has understandably excited politicised groups on the 
, 
margins, who identified the opportunity to advance the standing of their own identity-
narratives into an equal position, one neither privileged or marginal. As Lyotard 
trumpeted in his important early essay The Postmodern Condition, "let us wage a war on 
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totality" (1984, 82). (Others to take a similar stance include Laclau 1985; 1995; Butler 
1990; Jencks 1987; Hutcheon 1988). 
Another set of commentators pursue a set of arguments that say these claims are 
misguided. These can be divided into several subgroups, such as those who reject the 
existence or importance of postmodernist concepts, or who believe that modernity is still 
a relevant concept (Habermas 1983; Morawski 1994); those who regard postmodernism 
as an expression of capitalism and therefore incapable of serious resistance to it, 
(Jameson 1983; c1991; Eagleton 1988, among others including many conservative and 
traditional thinkers who may have no interest in postmodern concerns), and those who 
see in the postmodernist questioning of "metanarratives" the end of united resistance to 
the dominance of capitalist concepts in discourse and society (Waugh 1992; the 
Transformation group; Wood 1995; Anderson 1984 and others). These arguments 
overlap, and the groupings of them are in no way pure. However, one thing that emerges 
from the many sides of the debate, and on the left especially, is a widespread (although 
not universal) neo-Marxist belief that the capitalism that produces a postmodern spectacle 
is a system that has tendencies toward producing itself as a totality that leaves nothing 
unaccounted for (for example Debord 1967; Jameson c1991; Horkheimer and Adorno 
1993). 
A related issue is that of how those postmodern artists whose political instincts 
seem to tend toward democratic openness are to respond to a world living its 
postmodernity in totalitarian conditions. Is there in fact a democratic experience of 
postmodernity to be theorised? If postmodern conditions can lead to democracy, why, 
then, does the totalitarian version appear to have won out? If the answer to this has 
something to do with a general nostalgia for a centre and stability, then how might these 
concerns be addressed without reintroducing authoritarian or totalitarian conditions? 
These are some of the questions the postmodernism of Thomas Pynchon's and Bret 
Easton Ellis's novels invite, if one can read these novels as both postmodern texts and 
political tracts with a corresponding relationship to a broadly defined reality or set of 
signifieds. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore these issues in two of Thomas Pynchon's 
novels, Gravity's Rainbow (1973) and Vineland (1990), and in Bret Easton Ellis's 
9 
American Psycho (1991). All three of these texts, I believe, approach this problem 
aesthetically, because they all assume that the politics of a postmodem environment is 
aestheticised. An aesthetic category they privilege, I will contend, is the cartoon. All 
three novels flaunt cartoon references, but in addition, the books are to a large extent 
written as cartoons. If they can be read as a type of cartoon themselves, I may be able to 
generalise a little about such references, allusions and representations in postmodernism 
and popular culture in general, because they have become an increasingly common 
representational tactic. My contention is that in these books, the presence of cartoon 
references and representations each inform the political project of the author. All three 
novels, Gravity's Rainbow, Vineland and American Psycho, are political novels as well 
as aesthetic objects; both authors, I believe, wish their art to have a political impact in the 
actual world, the worlds of the reader and the writer rather than merely the characters. 
The cartoon psycho 
Clearly this is not an unproblematic concept, and nor is it treated as such in the 
texts themselves. It is also an aspect ofPynchon's writing that is hardly ever considered 
by commentators, perhaps because he largely intends his novels to function rhetorically, 
even though there is little doubt that rhetoric can affect action. But it is also never 
mentioned in regards to Ellis's book, at least not in a political context. It seems to have 
taken some time for commentators to be comfortable with the idea that American Psycho 
could represent an argument against 1980s capitalism and its social effects, or even just 
its excesses. Many instead assumed the novel was merely an exploitation of 1980s 
capitalism, likely to create negative social effects itself. One of the reasons for this 
confusion is that for Ellis to case a critique oflate 1980s "yuppie" culture in such extreme 
terms suggests that he wants to affect the way people view that culture and their position 
in relation to it. As a result, the novel produces what Laura Kipnis calls "reaction 
formations" (see Freccero 1997, 50n8): a feminist group in the U.S., the National 
Organisation of Women, described it as a "how-to manual for the torture and 
dismemberment of women" (Freccero, 50; see also Young 1992, 86). 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the Psycho, Patrick Bateman, is not 
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only dangerous to women. The arbitrary nature of Bateman's killings in the novel, 
coupled with the impunity he enjoys when he commits the murders, suggests that any 
character in the book is potentially his victim. However, Bateman is constructed as being 
"representative" of the culture which has produced him: Elizabeth Young has suggested 
that "Bateman" might in fact be the consciousness of several of the novel's stockbrokers, 
or may not exist at all except as a cipher (see Young, 117-19). As Carla Freccero 
suggests, the lack of psychological depth to Bateman's character deprives the reader of 
comfort: most murderers in serious fiction have psychologically cased motives that 
provide a narrative that will enable readers to "understand" them, whereas "Ellis refuses 
us a consoling fantasy, a fetish for our disavowals; instead he returns us to that history 
and to the historicity of violence" (56). By widening the meaning of Bateman beyond the 
agency of a person to that of a cultural signifier, Ellis suggests that the sort of system 
Bateman kills on behalf of extends to the one the reader lives in as well. Although the 
world of American Psycho is a cartoon of the one actually experienced in that world, 
readers are nonetheless included in Bateman's set of potential victims. 
Pynchon does something similar with his characterisation of Gravity's Rainbow's 
rocket, representing all the "rational systems" criticised in the novel and the "real" 
consequences of potential nuclear war they have lead to, about to fall upon the head of 
not just the novel's cast, but its readership as well. At the end of Gravity's Rainbow, the 
rocket, which had been safely contained within an historical narrative and location, 
suddenly explodes rhetorically out of the book's pages and into the "reality" of the 
book's present. It becomes, instead of a device used by a fictional character (Major 
Weissmann, who fires the rocket at the end of the novel, is also rhetorically "fired" into 
the present "real" world of the reader), all the world's warheads, and the "system" that 
created the need for them, and they target, suggests the book, us all. Readers who lived 
under the threat of intercontinental nuclear war knew this was true, and it is in many 
ways no less true today. 
Laura Tanner suggests that Ellis constructs his readership as victims in another 
way. The book's repetition, banality, gruesome detail, and lack of realistic 
characterisation means that it acts on a reader in a similar way to Bateman acting upon 
one of his victims, when he forces her to watch a video of a previous murder. Bateman's 
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"goal is not only to torture and murder [a victim] but to make her see that torture and 
murder as inevitable, necessary conclusion. Insofar as the novel terrorises the reader, it is 
because it denies the reader's subjectivity in just such a way" (1994, 111). She calls for 
"oppositional reading ... [opposing] the very terms of readership implicit in the text" (114) 
Indeed, such a strategy is called for. The need for this strategy is also implicit in the text, 
by way of what readers can discern of the satirical project of the novel's implied author: 
the narrative appears to be encouraging readers who are not masochists to develop 
strategies to resist Bateman's logic as well, even if some of them take Bateman and Ellis 
to be the same figure, and call for the book's suppression. 
One possibility for achieving this may lie with the way Ellis attempts to give the 
book a physical impact that will affect readers in a way that might influence their politics 
(or cause them to acquire some). (I should here make a warning about the graphically 
violent and sexualised nature of American Psycho's content, some of which is quoted in 
this thesis). Such a physical impact is demonstrated most dramatically in American 
Psycho, in the way Ellis manipulates his readers, particularly his male ones. He does this 
by exploiting the intent of most pornography, which is to arouse the reader sexually. 
However, having done this, Ellis strategically inserts a shocking juxtaposition: 
... while Christie lies on her back Elizabeth pushes [a dildo] easily into her cunt. 
During this I lick Christie's tits and suck hard on each nipple until both of them 
are red and stiff. I keep fingering them to make sure they stay that way. During 
this Christie has kept on a pair of thigh-high suede boots from Henri Bendel that I 
have made her wear. 
Elizabeth, naked, running from the bedroom, blood already on her is 
moving with difficulty and she screams out something garbled. (American 
Psycho, 289) 
During the sexual part of the episode, Bateman keeps reminding readers of his 
power: he "makes" Christie wear a costume, he "makes" Elizabeth suck on a dildo (ibid). 
These coercions pass nearly unnoticed. (This is a highly personalised readingl, I realise, 
I The opposing view is provided by Steven Hill (undated internet page), who criticised Ellis for "[writing] 
long passages that begin as sexual turn-ons for male heterosexual readers, and end in a bloody orgy of 
murder and torture", The reviewer goes on to assert "this subconsciously conditions the reader to 
experience sexuality linked with brutal, sexual violence", Few reviewers went as far as this, however, as 
Hill's review fails to provide any context for the excerpts it presents, and therefore conveys a widely 
misleading picture of the novel, while the psychological assertion he makes remains unsubstantiated. 
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but I hope it will enable me to hint at the mechanics of Ellis's tactic). The coercions are 
half-hidden partly because of the intensity of the pornography, which can distract readers 
from the power issues involved, and partly because both women are acting, and hence are 
merely following Bateman's "script". Elizabeth is playing sexual games which she 
seems to be enjoying (Bateman, however, has laced her wine with Ecstasy), while 
Christie is a prostitute. These male power tactics hint at the coercion of the spectacle, 
which is all-pervasive in the novel. Then, without warning, comes the violent episode, 
rendered in the same affectless language as the sexual one. This crosses a line - the 
aroused male reader is not, I believe, supposed to remain aroused, but to become deeply 
shocked, and perhaps to experience guilt. The juxtaposition here functions in the way 
outlined by Susan Buck-Morss in an article on Walter Benjamin; we suddenly recognise 
our daily culture, our assumptions, to be continuous with Bateman's (Buck-Morss 1992, 
41), a point I will take up again in Chapter eleven. The sexual episode seems suddenly 
not so opposed to the violent one; the mechanics of control and power that are subtly 
introduced in the first are let loose in the second. The aroused reader will feel this 
complicity physically, his or her body reacting to the change. 
The juxtaposition here camouflages briefly another one just as significant: that 
between the actual reality of the contrasting physical reactions the text provokes, and the 
opposite of these, an element of the obviously not-real in the world of the text and of the 
reader experiencing Ellis's manipulation. This is because the manipUlation itself is just 
that, a trap constructed by the author. In this sense the reader is drawn into the world of 
the book; their physical response becomes a part of the artwork, and so joins the realm of 
the cultural in a way that makes it very clearly cultural. In terms of the text itself, it is at 
the same time clearly not real, and, as some critics have complained, it is not even a 
particularly good imitation. 
Consequently, one of the first things many commentators note about American 
Psycho, either directly or by implication, is how cartoonish it is. Elizabeth Young, author 
of an early piece on the novel, describes it as "comic-book hyperreality" (86), a 
description others have concurred with. Another group of reviewers and critics, most 
typically represented by Norman Mailer, chide Ellis for not giving Bateman sufficient 
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"inner life" for us to "apprehend him" (ibid)2. Cartoons are often assumed to be all 
surface, to have no depth or inner life. Bateman is never "apprehended" in this novel: not 
only do the police never catch him, but his personality is so ephemeral it becomes a 
"cipher" (103), the essential Bateman forever elusive. He is like an exhibit in a chamber 
of Horrors, one who escapes the consequences of his actions time after time. Bateman's 
impunity to the law, despite being incredibly careless in the commission of some of his 
crimes, brings to mind cartoons such as South Park, in which the same regular character 
dies in each episode. 
Indeed, the novel's self-referentiality, ably examined by Young, adds to its aura of 
cartoon-ness, at the same time as it marks the novel's retreat from realistic 
characterisation. Bateman is an example of the "death of the subject" that some 
postmodernist discourses claim is a condition of postmodernity. Bateman appears to 
have little or no SUbjectivity beyond the culture he recycles, be they rules of etiquette, 
restaurant reviews or biographies of famous serial killers. The killer himself appears to 
know this, and rationalises his violence by way of this explanation: 
I simply am not there. It is hard for me to make sense on any given level. Myself 
is fabricated, an aberration. I am a non contingent human being. My personality is 
sketchy and unformed, my heartlessness goes deep and is persistent. My 
conscience, my pity, my hopes disappeared a long time ago (probably at Harvard) 
if they ever did exist.. .. My pain is constant and sharp and I do not hope for a 
better world for anyone. In fact I want my pain to be inflicted on others. I want 
no one to escape. But even after admitting this - and I have, countless times, in 
just about every act I have committed - and coming face to face with these truths, 
there is no catharsis. (American Psycho, 377) 
Ellis writing Bateman as a cartoon, sketchy and unformed, links Ellis with a far 
more complex predecessor, Thomas Pynchon, and Bateman with some of Pynchon's 
more cartoonish creations. In Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland, Pynchon also depicts 
worlds in which a culture of totality successfully dominates democratic elements, and in 
Pynchon too these worlds have a substantial cartoon presence. In these novels of 
Pynchon's, however, a purpose behind the cartoons is more easily discernible. This is a 
2 Despite this, Mailer does understand much of what Ellis attempts to do in American Psycho. For a 
discussion, see Freccero, 51-2. 
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purpose Ellis shares, perhaps instinctively rather than rationally. Both writers know that 
late capitalism tends to produce cartoon-like effects in real life, but Pynchon expands this 
knowledge into a political critique. This critique of Pynchon's, however, allows us to 
read Ellis's novel in a more politically informed way, as resonances of meaning in 
Pynchon's cartoons can in tum inflect Bateman's meaning. 
The cartoon rainbow 
Readings of Gravity's Rainbow's "cartoon" elements remain rare, despite the 
academic industry that has been built up around Pynchon in recent years. This is also 
despite the fact that the novel itself openly invites such readings. In Raymond 
Olderman's words, "[the] book is, among other things, a terrific comic book for synthesis 
freaks" (1983, 223). From the book's opening sequences, its narrative is presented in a 
cartoonish way. The initial scenes involving British officers at Pirate Prentice's house 
are pure slapstick. After awaking from his apocalyptic dream of the Gennan V2 rocket 
striking London during World War Two, Pirate saves a plummeting Teddy Bloat by 
kicking his wheeler-bed across the room for Bloat to land safely on. Not much later, 
Bloat slips, Chaplain-like, on a discarded banana peel. such hints recur throughout the 
narrative. In the company of apprentice witch Geli Tripping, A WOL American GI 
Tyrone Slothrop is fearful of her lover Tchitcherine's rage should he discover them 
together. His fantasy of Tchitcherine's entrance is that of a cartoon super-hero: 
"Tchitcherine comes roaring through the window, a Nagant blazing in his fist. 
Tchitcherine lands in a parachute and fells Slothrop with one judo chop. Tchitcherine 
drives a Stalin tank right into the room, and blasts Slothrop with a 76rnrn shell. Thanks 
for stalling him, Liebchen, he was a spy, well, cheerio, I'm off to Peenemiinde and a 
nubile Polish wench with tits like vanilla ice cream, check you later" (Gravity's Rainbow, 
293). Similarly, in other episodes, Slothrop defeats his nemesis Major Marvy in a mid-
air custard-pie fight, and Tchitcherine hears of a subversive plot to throw a pie in Stalin's 
face (353). 
Recognisable cartoons chase the narrative about. Slothrop is always reading 
"Plasticman" comic books (Steven Weisenberger notes that Gravity's Rainbow "often 
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slides into the rhetorical mode of Plastic man" [1988, 114]). Later Slothrop becomes part 
of a Superhero parody set in a conjectural rocket state of the future, Slothrop playing a 
member of the "floundering Four", each of whom "lack a quality" (283). They are each 
flawed by their gift and so are "unfit by it for human living" (Gravity's Rainbow, 675). 
Late in the novel, Superman, Submarina and the Lone Ranger all try to stop the final 
firing of the 00000 rocket the novel provisionally centres around, but they are "too late" 
(752). 
Cartoon and comic-book creatures and objects such as Dumbo the elephant, 
Donald Duck, Hop Harrigan, the Cheshire Cat, Bugs Bunny, Wonder Woman and the 
Yellow Brick Road all make appearances. Characters sometimes fantasise cartoonish 
existences for themselves: one character, Geza R6zsavOlgyi, dissolves and imagines 
himself on a group of "comic-book orange chunks of island" (634), where it is safe -
paradise, in short. One thing that can be noted at this stage is that all of these characters 
are the pawns of the amorphous power structure referred to variously as "They", "the 
elect" or "The Firm", and as the black marketer Der Springer notes, pawns "are 
condemned to creep in two dimensions" (494), consigned to live in the realm of the 
cartoon. He has taken on the persona of the knight in chess - ''flight has been given only 
to the springer!" (494 Pynchon's italics) - a mark of his doomed-to-fail ambitions to 
become "elected" - to transcend the limited existence of preterite life, the lives of those 
passed over by the powerful. These two-dimensional pawns, then, do things such as 
enact "Keystone-cop" chase sequences, and break out into obviously-staged song-and-
dance routines, which are the sort of events Slothrop is constantly becoming involved in. 
By transgressing outside of "realistic" representation, they call attention to themselves as 
"actors", who act to the direction of Them in Their scheme against Slothrop, author 
Pynchon in the wider drama of the novel, and for choreographer of the musical comedy 
that continually breaks into the action. 
The slipperiness of Slothrop's identity throughout the novel also contributes to 
this feeling. He spends part of the narrative dressed in Wagnerian costume as 
"Rocketman" (366), a 1940s comic book character, according to Weisenburger (179), and 
another part dressed as a multi-coloured festival pig. He has several false identities 
forged for him, including war correspondent Ian Scuffing, and Max Schlepzig, which 
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turns out to be the stage name of an actor in one of the films Gerhardt von Gem made 
before he became Der Springer (Alpdriicken, important to several strands of the plot)3. 
He seems easily able to affect these changes in identity, and takes them in his stride for 
much of the narrative. This is because he has the trans formative power inherent in a 
cartoon. As Timothy Melley notes about him, "[Slothrop's] primary mode of interaction 
with others is impersonation" (Melley 1994, 732). Slothrop's impersonations are very 
thin representations, designed only to fool those who do not know the person. Before 
Slothrop fragments altogether in the last pages of the novel, his disguises become 
progressively more fantastic - although in Wagnerian costume, with the horns removed 
from the helmet "Rocketman" resembles a cartoon superhero more than a character from 
the world of high art. His fame is gained by performing a superhuman and yet lowly 
deed - he retrieves several pounds of hashish from a heavily guarded compound (the 
temporary residence of president Truman, no less), to furnish Saure Bummer's black 
market with product. 
His other disguise, Plechazunga, a tenth century German Pig Hero, is another 
super being. There are many references to pigs in the novel, and throughout they are 
associated with preterition, mirroring Peter Stallybrass and Allon White's (1986, 44-59) 
association of pigs with the carnival of Bakhtin. According to Bakhtin, carnival was a 
tradition where peasants spent several days revelling, and overturning established 
hierarchies, in particular mounting celebrations of bodily substances and impersonations 
of the gentry (see Bakhtin 1984, 1-58 for an overview). The association with preterition 
is also reflected in the fact that a character who upsets an elite social gathering with 
playful references to rotting food and bodily processes is named "Pig" Bodine. A 
preterite sympathiser at that gathering has Porky Pig tattooed on his stomach. Pig 
becomes a member of the Counterforce, where one of his comrades, Osbie Feel, also 
sports the Porky Pig tattoo. 
Actually, cartoons inform much of Pynchon's aesthetic. The cartoon he calls 
"Porky Pig and the Anarchist", which appears in both the earlier The Crying of Lot 49 
(1966) and Gravity's Rainbow, "gets at the bedrock of the novel's paranoia", according 
3 The film's pornographic nature is extremely powerful in the novel, responsible for the conception of both 
Bianca Erdmann (395) and lise Pokier (397). 
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to Mark Irwin (1991). Irwin has found that Pynchon alludes to a real Porky Pig cartoon, 
one called "The Blow Out" (1936). This cartoon is so apt that it might even be said that 
Pynchon's view of postmodernism is predicated upon it. In it, Porky has found that he 
can earn pennies by picking up things that people have left behind and then giving them 
back. One of these people turns out to be a "mad bomber", who Porky continually tracks 
down and returns his bomb to. The bomber finds that Porky "is always there". "You'd 
never see the little fellow get there ... he'd just be there" (56). Irwin says of this, "In its 
comic repetitions, manic zaniness, and apocalypticism, as well as its metafiction, pop 
surrealism and undergirding paranoia, 'The Blow Out' dishes up a pretty decent map of 
the rhetoric we encounter in The Oying of Lot 49 and Gravity's Rainbow" (56). By not 
seeing the pig arrive where the bomber is, viewers, and the bomber, are forced to make 
connections for themselves, to try to re-form a lost whole narrative, but one which cannot 
be simply explained with logic. Gravity's Rainbow, full of such leaps, often seems 
cartoonish, especially to those readers who "will want cause and effect" (663), as the 
narrator at one point acerbically puts it, because "cause and effect" explains things and 
satisfactorily covers these gaps over with information, and hence can make things seem 
more realistic. It is the act of covering these gaps, assuming an overarching logical order 
behind what appears, that Pynchon sees as a paranoid act. Pynchon's novel most 
vehemently opposes overarching orders of this sort that pretend to explain everything, as 
they overlook, or pass over, other possibilities in much the same way as the elect pass 
over the preterite. 
As if instinctively, Slothrop knows that cartoons have a power over Them and 
Their plots against him. He seems to associate cartoons and paranoia, although he 
remains unsure about exactly how they relate to one another. Upon being stripped of his 
identity when one of Their creatures steals all his clothes and papers, Slothrop whispers 
"fuck you" to Them, "the only spell he knows and a pretty good all-purpose one at that" 
(203). This profanity is associated with the power to escape Their power. But Slothrop 
wants something more permanent: "maybe he'll sneak in [ ... J sometime, with a bucket 
and brush, paint FUCK YOU in a balloon coming out of the mouth of those little pink 
shepherdesses there ... " (203). Not only does he want to inscribe an obscenity as a way of 
getting back at the grandness of Their scheme, he desires to do it in comic-book style. 
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The "spell" of the obscene utterance is thus associated with a form of cartoon. But here 
the cartoon itself is also brought into the realm of the obscene: the shepherdess he wants 
to deface is on one of "thousands of tiny rococo surfaces" (203); Slothrop thus defaces 
high art with low, the intricate with the crudely straightforward. 
However, cartoons are treated ambivalently by Pynchon in Gravity's Rainbow. 
The central conflict of the book is between the "elect", a massive, shady conspiracy with 
"metanarratives" so powerful they define reality, and the "preterite", the people who are 
usually overlooked by "Their" providential concepts of history, but who have to live with 
the material consequences. In among this conflict, cartoons are both a menace and a gift. 
As H. Brenton Stevens notes, there are many parallels between Rocketman and 
Superman, not the least of which is that they both ultimately fail (1997, 41; 47). 
S lothrop , as Jeffrey S. Baker notes, is too addicted to the "mindless pleasures" that 
comics and cartoons are often accused of promoting to actually challenge Them directly 
(1993, 107). But this failure of them both is not necessarily terminal for cartoons as a 
potentially resistant trope in the novel. As I have said, cartoons are associated throughout 
with preterition. As such, they belong to the same existential realm as the preterite 
generally: passed over, but sometimes useful to Them, often without knowing it. 
Although the Superheroes are "too late" to stop Blicero firing the rocket, it is still 
possible that in other circumstances these cartoons might have been able to help, but 
there has been something unspecified preventing them. Since these "Superheroes" have 
spent their time defending the sort of patriotic values Pynchon attacks as fascist (see 
Stevens, 39), as values of the very rocket they are now trying to stop, perhaps their 
change in consciousness is "too late". As Stevens says, "[t]he Rocket will be launched 
and the heroes, both preterite and elect, will be unable finally to oppose Their will (47). 
Slothrop's cartoon incarnation in the "Floundering Four" is similarly prevented from 
succeeding by Their control structures (Gravity's Rainbow, 674-80). But these failures 
take place in a cartoon-future, totalitarian "Rocket State". Cartoons are associated with 
resistance, with the preterite, and with spells against Them - as Their pawns, also, then, 
with the failure to resist. But the total, totalitarian city is somehow also cartoonish, as if 
cartoons are also an effect of Their power. So there seems to be some ambivalence in the 
text about cartoons. 
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Certainly cartoons can be co-opted by Them. Dumbo the Elephant, for instance, 
clutches the "feather" of Their system - the ultimately useless totem of reliance upon 
something outside of himself in order to "fly". He was taught all his life he could not fly, 
that he lacks the "physical grace" (741) to and so he believes he needs something to cling 
to - he cannot finally let go of the exterior crutch. Pig Bodine is out of Their control 
once he leaves his "Dumbo" stage, at which point he discovers that he is also a carnival 
animal who can fly on his own4• Pynchon accuses some cartoons of propaganda: "the 
lads in Hollywood telling us how grand it all is over here [in the war] how much fun, 
Walt Disney causing Dumbo the Elephant to clutch to that feather like how many 
carcasses under the snow tonight among the white painted tanks [ ... J" (135). The 
Superheroes who arrive "too late", for instance, represent Their system - they all take 
after the hero of the Fu Manchu novels, Sir Denis Nayland Smith, who, according to 
Steven Weisenburger, represents "a single-minded puritanical devotion to work and a 
chivalric devotion to battling the dangers of evil" (146). Superman, for instance, is "The 
Man of Steel", a total being with, notwithstanding the comic-book's American-Jewish 
origins, a more than passing resemblance to the Nazi ideal5• So, when they fail to stop the 
Rocket's launch, it was because "their programming" that never included "too late" 
(Gravity's Rainbow, 752) was from the totality - they faced themselves in the Rocket and 
were lost. It was at the impossible moment of absolute totalisation that their failure 
came; they faced their lack of control and hence their inescapable corporeality: 
Superman's "curls on his head begin to show their first threads of gray" (751), Philip 
Marlowe's alcoholism and lifestyle cause him migraine and homesickness, Plasticman is 
no longer "perfect" (he comes up against a plastic, 6Imipolex G, that is greater than he is), 
and the Lone Ranger's friend dies at the hanging tree (752). This hint at their own 
imperfection causes a crisis of confidence that ends up reinforcing Their system, leaving 
them clutching feathers of their own: 
4 Perhaps, for Them, the preterite might be allowed such independence "when pigs fly". 
5 The similarities do not end with Superman's physique. Kaplan (1986) pointed out that Nazis 
paradoxically desired the products of industrial technology without the labour of production (23). 
Superman incorporates many abilities such as flight, the ability to move very quickly, x-ray vision and 
impenetrable body armour that new technologies were enabling people to achieve at the time, but only with 
technologies produced by industrial society. Superman is thus a fantasy of an extended masculinity 
without the normal industrial processes normally required for people to be able to do these things. 
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[t]hey find instead a moment's suspending of their sanity - but then it's over with, 
whew, and it's back to the trail, back to the Daily Planet. Yes Jimmy, it must've 
been the day I ran into that singularity, those few seconds of absolute mystery ... 
you know Jimmy, time - time is a funny thing.... There'll be a thousand ways to 
forget. The heroes will go on, kicked upstairs to oversee the development of 
bright new middle-line personnel, and they will watch their system falling apart, 
watch those singularities begin to come more and more often, proclaiming another 
dispensation out of the tissue of old-fashioned time, and they'll call it cancer, and 
just won't know what things are coming to, or what's the meaning of it all, 
Jimmy .... (ibid; Pynchon's emphasis) 
Not all cartoons are as easily co-opted by the Firm. The more anarchic Warner 
brothers characters, for example, seem to gain more approval from the narrative. 
Although Pynchon clearly does not trust Disney, associating him with death (70), 
propaganda (135), and Slothrop's paranoia (392-3), Porky Pig represents a jovial 
imperfection and naivety. As we know, the pig is a preterite animal. Once again, failure 
is mixed up with this: as Stallybrass and White have argued, while the carnival, and 
hence the pig, seem to be on the side of the preterite, the carnival may in fact be a way of 
allowing the oppressed to let off steam, channel revolutionary desires harmlessly (13-14). 
Certainly, the Counterforce ultimately fails, and Slothrop's political stance, if it was ever 
one to begin with, ends up as a non-political personal hedonism. In this he is like one 
comic he is compared to: "The name of the hero-or being-was Sundial. The frames never 
enclosed him-or it-long enough to tell. Sundial, flashing in, flashing out again, came 
from 'across the wind', by which readers understood 'across some flow, more or less 
sheet and vertical', a wall in constant motion - over there was a different world, where 
Sundial took care of business they would never understand" (Gravity's Rainbow, 472). 
Although he cannot be contained, nor can Sundial be understood, so that his usefulness is 
limited. Nonetheless he must have seemed dangerous to Them: his book "was virtually 
uncirculated" (472), which usually happens because something contains information 
They want suppressed. Porky Pig and the group of cartoons he leads seem also to contain 
this dangerous potential. These other Warner Brothers characters appear in Vineland. 
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Vineland the toon 
Vineland continues Pynchon' s use of cartoons in both the senses that have begun 
to emerge in this discussion. These include many allusions, as well as the general sense 
that the entire environment of the novel may itself be cartoonish. Vineland has fewer 
moments of preposterous comic non-reality - the song and dance routines and cartoonish 
slapstick escapades have retreated (a little) - but references to cartoons are shifted 
slightly into the centre. This is partly a function of the proliferation of images and 
allusions from television and other popular culture in the later novel. If in Gravity's 
Rainbow, Pynchon can be relied on to invoke high culture at least as often as he does 
popular, in Vineland, because television steps into the nove1's thematic centre, a far 
higher proportion of allusion comes from TV and popular music instead. This may be 
because his latest book is set in 1984, when the popular image is exploited far more fully 
than even film was in Gravity's Rainbow. Hence television is seen as one of the major 
tools of social engineering supporting Reagan's "fascist" regime. It intrudes into 
people's everyday lives, so that in Vineland "reality" looks considerably different to how 
it looked to previous generations, even to Frenesi Gates' parents. Here, everybody is 
addicted to television, to the point where Frenesi' s daughter Prairie could sing the theme 
to Gilligan's Island as an infant before she could talk, and where a DEA agent, Hector 
Zuniga is committed to the detoxification centre for his television addiction. The very 
fact that there is a TV detoxification centre testifies to the Baurillardian "hyperreal" 
nature of its world. Pop-culture tends t6 pervade everything. Zoyd is a rock & roll 
musician; Frenesi is a film-maker turned bureaucrat. Isaiah belongs to a punk band 
called Billy Barf and the Vomitones. On top of this are the presence of Hell's Angels 
who masquerade as an order of nuns and a group of nuns who are an order ofNinjettes. 
Vineland, as Joseph Slade notes, seems lightweight compared to Gravity's 
Rainbow, because of the one-dimensionality of its references: "The question for many 
readers nevertheless remains whether a work so grounded in popular culture can support 
the themes that have earned Pynchon admiration in the past" (1994, 69). Here, also, not 
only are the characters often allegorical at best (sometimes they are drawn quite fully, 
others hardly at all), but they are often drawn explicitly in cartoon form. DL Chastain, a 
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friend of Prairie's, and a fonner friend of her missing mother, has become a professional 
Ninjette, having had a distinguished, if not exactly faultless career as a fighting prodigy, 
with profiles in such publications as Aggro World, and a runner-up medal in the 
"dangerous Miss Teen" pageant. A lot about DL's vocation is rendered cartoonish, 
exaggerated well beyond mere stereotypical borrowings from martial-arts movies. For 
instance, some of the "strategies excluded from the Kumi-Uchi, or official ninja combat 
system" (127) include "the Enraged Sparrow, the Hidden Foot, the Nosepicking of Death, 
and the truly unspeakable Gojira no Chimpira... some of the moves Inoshiro Sensei 
taught DL would only make sense ten years or more from now - requiring that much 
rigorous practice every day for her even to begin to understand ... " (127). As if to 
reinforce this cartoonish impression, DL's response to Prairie's quite innocent question 
about DL's partner Takeshi Fumimota is explicitly identified as cartoonishly overplayed: 
"Uh, so how'd you guys meet?" 
"Aauuhhgghh!" First time outside Saturday morning cartoons Prairie had 
ever seen anybody scream with such intensity. "Gee, thought it was a pretty 
innocent question .... " (129). 
Later, DL breaks Frenesi out of an FBI prison camp, and they move around "smooth as 
Daffy and Bugs" (255). Brock Vond, meanwhile, is channed with cartoon-like luck 
(Tabbi 1994, 96). After an attempt on Brock's life failed, gangster Ralph Wayvone 
mutters to himself, "Fucking Vond, he's the Roadrunner" (Vineland, 153). Joseph Tabbi, 
in an ambivalent critical article, calls Vond a "cartoon bad guy" (1994, 96). Takeshi 
(then an insurance quasi-agent investigating the destruction of a research facility 
apparently trampled into oblivion by Godzilla) resembles Brock, whose looks are "a 
stressed and malevolent cartoon of [Takeshi's] face" (Vineland, 148). When he first sees 
Brock, Takeshi "thought for a terrified second or two it was himself and something 
radical, like death, had just happened" (148). Takeshi, then, associates the cartoon 
version of himself with death - and, because Brock is continually identified in the novel 
with fascism, Takeshi's cartoon likeness is Takeshi-as-fascist. (This may be one way to 
approach Takeshi' s appearance in Gravity's Rainbow as one of the "Komical 
Kamikazes" [Gravity's Rainbow, 690].) In this description, fascism is therefore equated 
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with death at the same time. As well, this is a premonition: the attempted assassination of 
Brock actually catches Takeshi, ~ metaphorically, in the crossfire, and equally 
metaphorically it "kills" him. Takeshi's vision here foreshadows the moment DL "kills" 
him by applying the Ninja technique of "the vibrating palm", which takes up to a year to 
actually cause its victim to die. Having caught wind of the plan against him, Brock pays 
Takeshi to enter a red-light club in which Brock is expected. In a sense Takeshi 
impersonates Vond here, while DL impersonates not Frenesi, but Frenesi's type: "Mr 
Brock Vond likes American girl, looking just this way, always the same" (140), the 
make-up artist tells DL. At each point, the person is put at a remove from their "real" 
identity. Takeshi is figuratively "revived" later, but this cartoon does represent the 
moment of his death, because it is the moment when death becomes a part of Takeshi. 
He walks around for a year under death's spell, before he knows for sure that Sister 
Rochelle's "cure" for him has worked. In this, he is like the ghostly/not "Thanatoids", 
who we shall meet later. 
But his is not the only story where an encounter with a representative of the state 
apparatus makes the protagonist cartoonish. Hector's as-yet-unsuccessful "courtship" of 
Zoyd, trying to seduce him into infonning on his marijuana-grower friends, was "a 
romance, over the years, at least as persistent and Sylvester and Tweety's" (22), observes 
the narrator. Both Hector, with his "tubal" addiction and his over-ambitious attempts to 
produce a film of Frenesi' s life, and Zoyd, who is forced by Brock Vond and media 
convention to annually repeat a stunt at a remove from reality (it is to prove mental 
disability for his social security, and to help Vond observe him) act like cartoons at times. 
However, what this comparison does is not simply call the characters a cartoon, but to 
suggest that living in the sort of "FBI state" depicted in the novel, a totalitarian state of 
"snitch"-lead social control (Hayles 1994, 19), is similar to living within a cartoon. 
Once again here is an ambivalence about cartoons. Living in a totalitarian 
environment seems to be akin to living within a cartoon, and yet characters in which the 
narrative invests the most hope, such as DL, Prairie and Weed Atman, are identified with 
cartoons as well. This fact opens up a group of questions. Are cartoons, then, merely 
red-herrings, apparently rebellious identities that ultimately lead back to the "structure", 
the "system" they started out rebelling against? Or do "cartoons" enable a postmodernism 
24 
of the preterite, a demystification, a political tool and/or "identity" that can make the 
"system" "vanish[ ... J frightened, into the desert" (Gravity's Rainbow, 535). If they do, 
how do they achieve this while avoiding the pitfalls of the system's maintenance 
techniques? 
This is a major question this thesis will address, and comes out of the preceding 
demonstration that cartoons have both literary and political functions in Pynchon's 
novels. This combination opens out an interface between cartoons, postmodernism and 
politics, and does this in part by problematising the very distinction between literature 
and reality that cartoons of all things should reinforce. I gave some examples of the texts 
of two of the three novels directly referring to or attempting to affect the reality of the 
reader in the world. I also showed how the novels not only sport many references to 
cartoons, but support readings that claim they are cartoons themselves. At the same time, 
these novels, like the exemplary postmodern texts they are, undermine the possibility of a 
simple, non-aestheticised signified, the "reality" of the world they refer to however 
obtusely. At the same time, they appear to recognise that the elusive "real world" is the 
place in which political action takes place and needs to be located, and in some ways 
privileges it accordingly. There is a level upon which these are not endlessly self-
referring fictions, because the political content of these novels suggests that a change in 
"actual political conditions" is one of drivers of the texts' messages. 
Chapter two 
Preliminary: Politics 
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If cartoons provide an insight into the politics of these "postmodem" novels, 
why is that insight required? Why do Pynchon, Ellis and other postmodemist writers 
write cartoons into their texts? Clearly it is not a frivolous act for the writers under 
discussion: if they are merely incorporating references to cartoons and modes of 
characterisation likely to be considered cartoonish in order to blur the boundaries 
between high and popular culture, what is the purpose of this? Is it an entirely 
aesthetic act, a dialogue in fonn between themselves and other writers and academics 
(this is often seen as the purpose behind postmodem techniques - boundary blurring 
as a subversive act in itself), or does the problematizing of dichotomies have another 
purpose for some postmodem writers or effect for their readers? 
I suggest that the question is one of politics within a postmodem setting. 
Postmodemism has a reputation for being apolitical. However, a number of 
apparently politically-minded writers have written in the mode. I believe Pynchon 
and Ellis pose questions about the limits of postmodemism for political writing. By 
extension, they pose questions about how politics can effectively engage a 
postmodem subj ect in a postmodern environment. I will also contend that both 
writers refute the claim of Fredric Jameson that Postmodemism is nothing but the 
cultural logic of late capitalism (c1991). Both acknowledge that fragmented, 
textualised, "hyperreal" postmodem environments can resemble and aid the 
hegemony of late capitalism that Jameson argues exists, but they also seem to be 
positing the possibility of significant resistances among its ruins. It may appear an 
oxymoron to argue that postmodernist writers engage with anything other than their 
own and others' texts. However, both Pynchon and Ellis, despite, or perhaps more 
accurately because of, their use of postmodernist modes of representation, appear to 
hold a commitment to affecting a "reality" beyond the text at hand in the world of the 
reader. This "real world" may (or may not) be an extension of the textual world ofthe 
novel, and the lives we live as a part of our "real" day to day existence produced by 
acts of "reading" and "interpretation" in a broad sense. Even if it is not specified, the 
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spectacularised worlds both mam authors portray suggest that interpretation is 
important for the lives of the characters, however. But both writers are able to 
connect popular culture, including the cartoons I shall focus on, with the existence of 
non-democratic power in American society, and perhaps also with the possibility of 
resisting that power. 
If I said that Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho is unmistakably political, it 
would fly in the face of the book's history in society: many critics have failed to see 
the novel's politics in their initial rush to condemn (or often, defend) it. Obviously, 
this makes the book (the object) political, the object of political action of various 
sorts. However, even among the novel's opponents, some critics such as Laura 
Tanner (1994) appeared to recognise what Ellis was attempting to do, even ifthey felt 
he had failed 1, or that the risks inherent in his strategy outweighed the possible 
benefits, or that his attempt or approach to the problem of misogyny among the 
footsoldiers of high capital and privilege was simply wrongheaded. Opponents most 
typically felt that Ellis was aestheticising violence upon women, and making money 
from the act (see for instance Baxter and Craft, undated internet page). Defenders 
either cited the indetenninacy of the narrative to argue that its violence was a chimera, 
or defended Ellis's right to free speech. Few dared venture the possibility that Ellis 
was essaying a critical approach to American masculinity at a point during which a 
privileged (and in many ways very macho) capitalist class was ascendant, an approach 
with feminist applications even if it is unorthodox2. 
My own experience with American Psycho IS one of encountering an 
absolutely ambivalent implied author. On the one hand, the novel is, as Young puts 
it, "a classic text at the end of the high postmodern period" (122). In addition, there is 
considerable pleasure to be found in American Psycho'S black sendup of the mores of 
New York's stockbrokers of the late 1980s - it is a very funny book in places. On the 
other hand, the voice of the implied author is at the same time palpably angry. The 
tone of the novel's voice, and the savagery with which it ridicules its characters, 
suggests disgust at the characters and events the novel portrays. This bleeds through 
1 Tamler felt that any potential critique of 1980s capitalism and masculinity the novel offered was 
fatally undercut by the tyranny of a narrative that didn't allow sure grounds for an oppositional 
interpretation. 
2For an overview of the critical and public reception the novel was offered, see Young (1992); Freccero 
(1997). Price (1998) provides a welcome exception to my generalization. 
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at every tum: the implied author is perceptively outraged at his or her understanding 
of these mores, enough so that they create a grotesque version of the society they 
observe and then infuse that grotesque with a minute realism, one that penetrates 
down to the blood, bone and sinews. The readers' faces are rubbed in the gory details 
inside the exaggeration. The voice wants us to know that unchecked power by any 
class, but in this case a corporate one, tends to be exercised randomly on bodies in the 
most violent manner imaginable. 
Pvnchon's "counterculture politics" 
Although the congruence of cartoons and politics is vital to reading American 
Psycho, it is in the two Pynchon novels that a complex theoretical connection between 
these two worlds is made. However, before I explore the significance of cartoon 
references in Pynchon's novels, I think it would be helpful to discern Pynchon's basic 
political stance, or as much of it as is possible with a writer of such complexity and 
ambivalence. I can then place these speculations into a theoretical context that helps 
construct politically informed readings of the cartoon references. Throughout 
Gravity's Rainbow, Pynchon's implied author conspicuously sides with the "passed 
over" masses, ignored and/or exploited by "elect" economic masters of commodities 
and markets. In Vineland, these preterite elements are all the people persecuted for 
past political mis-affiliations and present marijuana usage in an America the novel 
accuses ofneo-fascism. But "preterition" here is implicitly extended to the citizens of 
America in general, people denied the democratic heritage they still believe exists 
there. Pynchon's politics can therefore be characterised as anti-fascist; indeed, his 
preferences seem to bear a resemblance to what has become known in recent political 
theory as "radical democracy". 
Pynchon seems to belong to what we may broadly describe as "The American 
Left", his politics stemming from the radical activism of the 1960s and before. David 
Seed, for instance, writes that "there is a clear bias through [Gravity's Rainbow] 
against exploitative systems" (1988, 186). John Dugdale comments, "The Pynchon of 
GR is a political dissident writing his novel while his country is at war" [sic] (1990, 
4), while Robert Sklar notes Pynchon's "revolutionary political inclinations", 
describing The Crying of Lot 49 as "an anarchist miracle" (1978, 95). M. Keith 
Brooker (1993) identifies Pynchon's interests in "leftist politics" (albeit reasons for 
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their failure) in America, but suggests that the writer is still committed to making a 
version of leftist politics succeed (98). And Jeffrey S. Baker (1993) explores 
Pynchon's advocacy of a participatory democracy based upon the political theories of 
John Dewey. James S. Hans believes that Gravity's Rainbow's "portrayal of the 
horrors of the system is more than enough to convince one that something is seriously 
wrong with the way our society constitutes itself' (1988, 267), but also that Pynchon 
"not only lays bare the viciousness and emptiness of our structures in wide-ranging 
clarity, but also points to the way out of the black hole we have created for 
ourselves ... " (267). Baker believes this way is democracy, in which provisional 
alliances are "knit and undone" (Gravity's Rainbow, 291) and "ad-hoc arrangements" 
are made (Baker, 105). Certainly this seems to tally with the stated aims of the 
Counterforce, "a nation... that will survive no longer than you or I, a common 
movement at the mercy of death and time: the ad-hoc adventure" (Gravity's Rainbow 
706). 
Pynchon does build a powerful case against the mysterious personnel who 
have power in the international economic system. This is because, despite the many 
flights of fancy Gravity's Rainbow indulges in, and whatever its departures from or 
allegiances with historical truth may be, Pynchon uses the cartel they form as an 
allegory for non-democratic ally-affirmed power, and sees its negative impact as being 
structural. The cartel, it should be noted, is an example of a "hegemony" as it is 
developed in Lauclau and Mouffe (1985 - see the discussion below [41-3 D. The 
existence of such a hegemony developing oppressive power shouldn't be read as a 
perversion of Laclau and Mouffe's ideas about radical democracy; they are clear, as I 
will show, about the possibility an "open political horizon" leading to totalitarianism. 
Pynchon's narrative of the "octopus" cartel has its basis in face, and is largely centred 
around the major German corporation, IG Farben, although it also traces IG's 
relationships with companies such as Ciba Geigy, ICI and Shell. The octopus's 
mission, it would seem, is to acquire new holdings, especially technological ones, and 
to grow until its power and influence outgrows the Earth itself. Those who control 
"IG" , which ultimately in Gravity's Rainbow is synecdochal for all multinational 
3Pynchon's main source for the information he presents is Richard Sasuly, JG Farben (New York: Boni 
and Gaer, 1947). See the various discussions in Weisenburger (1988). 
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corporate entities4, sit very much among Pynchon's "elect", the "massively moneyed" 
(713) "elite" (164), with links to the Nazi "corporate state" (ibid; 419). "Their" 
system requires a form of totalitarian control, has the same aims as capitalist corporate 
organisation, and is extremely destructive: "Taking and not giving back, demanding 
that 'productivity' and 'earnings' keep on increasing with time, the System removing 
from the rest of the World these vast quantities of energy to keep its own tiny 
desperate fraction showing a profit: and not only most of humanity - most of the 
world, animal, vegetable and mineral, is laid waste in the process" (412), the narrator 
tells us. 
"They" are responsible for the plummeting rocket. This is Weissmann's 
project, and he is rewarded by Them with a position among "the successful 
academics, the Presidential advisers, the token intellectuals who sit on boards of 
directors" (749). Pynchon comments that, in searching for Weissmann's fate, we 
should "[l]ook high, not low" (ibid). As a Jesuit Priest notes during a sermon in the 
Zone, "[0 ]nce the technolo gical means of control have reached a certain size, a certain 
degree of being connected one to another, the chances of freedom are over for good" 
(539, Pynchon's italics). Their absolute power will bring with it a "Rocket State": a 
form of "fascism" imposed as "structure" from a rarefied space high above, just like 
the rocket itself. The rocket itself, of course, stands for "system", a providential 
structure of lmowledge that assumes that events have a pre-destined end according to 
over-arching laws. Examples of how this thinking operates can be found in Nazi 
Germany and Stalin's Russia, where discourses about the destiny of the German 
people and the Russian proletariat respectively lead to highly destructive totalitarian 
politics, because the end of that destiny justified what means it took to achieve it (see 
Arendt 1963). 
Pynchon can be characterised as "anti-systemic", opposed to all closed 
systems but particularly in this context corporate capitalism, which he regards as 
potentially totalitarian in a similar manner to wartime Germany and the U.S.S.R. In 
Gravity's Rainbow, capitalist structures, as with fascism, are imposed from above for 
the benefit of untouchable interests who are out of the reach of their victims. This 
4Pynchon's observations increasingly have a contemporary corollary, as recent years have seen a 
proliferation of titles such as Korten (1995), and an emergent "anti-globalization" movement that 
seems to be organizing as Lac1au and Mouffe (1985) might have predicted. This also has affmities 
with the participatory democracy argued for by Baker (1993). 
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imposition seems to be total - there is no apparent escape from its logic. As such, the 
system is racked with dangers that the people living in it cannot change or avoid, as 
with other totalitarian systems. The implication in Pynchon is that all "closed" 
systems tend in this direction. "Living inside the system", his narrator tells us, "is like 
riding across the country in a bus driven by a maniac bent on suicide ... though he's 
amiable enough, keeps cracking jokes back through the loudspeaker [ ... J you catch a 
glimpse of his face, his insane, committed eyes, and you remember then, for a terrible 
few heartbeats, that of course it will end for you in blood, in shock, without dignity 
but there is meanwhile this trip to be on ... " (412-13). 
"Structure" is structured in binary fashion 
I will outline Jacques Derrida's philosophy here because it forms the basis of 
the radical democracy of Emesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe, and because it seems to 
make sense of Pynchon's own politics. This is based around Derrida's critique of 
dichotomies, or binary divisions. Much of Derrida's philosophy attacks what he 
describes as "the metaphysics of presence", which is the unproven assumption in 
Western philosophy that the only philosophically legitimate category of existence is 
that which is present. In a series of books in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Derrida 
developed and used what has come to be known as "deconstruction" to read major 
canonical philosophical works. Because canonical philosophy was very influential in 
setting out ideas about the nature of reality, and people's relationship to it, 
deconstruction also provides a way of understanding the way people construct reality 
itself. 
Very broadly, deconstruction is a method of reading whereby the structure of a 
text, invariably structured in binary fashion, is revealed, the hierarchy of its terms 
reversed, and then displaced, or made impossible to sustain. Thus meaning is 
revealed to be the pre-determined product of a structure rather than transparent and 
original communication from an author to a reader. To do this, the reader must find 
an aporia in the text. This is a point in a text where the grounds for its meaning 
become contradictory and its meaning becomes radically unstable. To Derrida, 
because meaning in a text is based on a set of metaphysical assumptions, each reading 
of a text has aporia. Here, the presence of the text, what it wants to mean, so to speak, 
comes to depend on the binary, hierarchical structure of language rather than a 
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relationship between language and the world. This means that the signifier and 
signified were not related in any necessary way. An aporia is similar to an 
unresolvable paradox, but differs from a dialectical structure because the tension the 
contradiction produces is not resolved by a synthesis of the two opposing terms. 
Instead, every claim to communicate truth is revealed to communicate a structure, to 
be a product of language. Derrida also claims that language exists prior to reality in 
human experience: while an extra-linguistic reality exists, there is no way of 
accessing it except through the mediations of language and interpretation. As such, 
all of our perceptions about reality are structured like language, that is, 
dichotomously, in binary fashion. This is because meaning privileges what is 
perceivable, what is present or "there", over what is absent. But, Derrida 
demonstrates, this privilege, common-sensical as it might seem, IS unsustainable. 
Jonathan Culler summarises the argument succinctly: 
[a]mong the familiar concepts that depend on the value of presence are: the 
immediacy of sensation, the presence of ultimate truths to a divine 
consciousness, the effective presence of an origin in a historical development, 
a spontaneous or unmediated intuition, the transumption of thesis and 
antithesis in a dialectical synthesis, the presence in speech of logical and 
grammatical structures, truth as what subsists behind appearances, and the 
effective presence of a goal in the steps that lead to it. The authority of 
presence, its power of valorisation, structures all our thinking. The notions of 
"making clear" "grasping", "demonstrating", "revealing", and "showing what 
is the case" all invoke presence. To claim, as in the Cartesian cogito, that the 
"I" resists radical doubt because it is present to itself in the act of thinking or 
doubting is one sort of appeal to presence. Another is the notion that the 
meaning of an utterance is what is present to the consciousness of the speaker, 
what he or she "has in mind" at the moment of utterance .... (Culler, 1983, 93-
94) 
Here the issue has been the hierarchical opposition presence/absence. A 
deconstruction would involve the demonstration that for presence to function 
as it is said to, it must have the qualities that supposedly belong to its opposite, 
absence. Thus, instead of defining absence in terms of presence, as its 
negation, we can treat presence as the effect of a generalised absence .... (95) 
A presence is structured by its difference to what could be but is not there 
(present) - it is structured by the trace of what it is different from. This is how 
something signifies or means: its meaning depends upon its difference from what it 
does not mean. As Culler explains, 
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If a cave man is successfully to inaugurate language by making a special grunt 
signify "food", we must suppose that the grunt is already distinguished from 
other grunts and that the world has already been divided into the categories 
"food" and "nonfood". Acts of signification depend on differences, such as 
the contrast between "food" and "nonfood" that allows food to be signified, or 
the contrast between signifying elements that allows a sequence to function as 
a signifier. The sound sequence bat is a signifier because it contrasts with pat, 
mat, bad, bet, etc. The noise that is "present" when one says "bat" is inhabited 
by the traces of forms one is not uttering, and it can function as a signifier only 
insofar as it consists of such traces. (96) 
Hence the meaning of the utterance is actually partly absent from that utterance: a 
fully-present meaning cannot exist, because in this way it would be "absent" as well. 
Presence, then, can be found elsewhere from where it is. To then assert such full 
presence is an act of the negation of those traces of absence that partially defines it. 
Traces, palimpsests and wrong paths taken 
In Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland, Pynchon examines "official history" and 
structure imposed from above, and finds that it deprives people and groups of their 
reality or even their existence. This deprivation is often systematic. In Vineland, 
Frenesi's family are "bumped off the computer" of the FBI "to make way for the next 
generation" of informers (352). In Gravity's Rainbow, the "preterite" are shown to be 
erasable, "poor human palimpsests" (50), those passed over by official history, or 
History, the Providence that oppresses them. Their life stories are rubbed out and 
written over by the stories of those whose power renders them significant, but because 
the preterite are "palimpsests", a trace remains of their whispered lives, In the 
passage this phrase comes from this trace is associated with nature, with living in real 
human bodies: "shivering under their government blankets, drugged, drowning in 
tears and snot of grief so real, tom from so deep it surprises ... " (50, my ellipsis). 
Hence Pynchon often tries to convey a sense of the "reality" of those considered 
unimportant to the elect and their structures and war; the dead matter of "thousands of 
old used toothpaste tubes" (130) in the midst of vast war construction, is given life 
through histories and memory of everyday existence: 
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[ ... ] thousands of children who pestled foam up out of soft mortars of mouths, 
who lost easily a thousand times as many words among the chalky bubbles -
bed-going complaints, timid announcements of love, news of fat or 
translucent, fuzzy or gentle beings from the country under the counterpane -
uncounted soapy-liquorice moments spat and flushed down to sewers and the 
slow-scumming grey estuary, the morning mouths growing with the day 
tobacco and fish-furred, dry with fear, foul with idleness, flooded at thoughts 
of impossible meals, settling instead for the week's offal in gland pies, 
Household Milk, broken biscuits at half the usual points, and isn't menthol a 
marvellous invention to take just enough of it away each morning ... ( 130) 
This trace is the trace of "real" lives, rendered "realistically" in Pynchon's 
text. Yet this realism, as with the paranoia inherent in Slothrop' s story, is not 
unmitigated. Contact with Them may have erased the preterite, but it also made them 
textual, palimpsests, so that even by rendering their stories and existence, Pynchon 
still only uncovers textual existences. But if They have reduced or even cancelled 
people's "reality" by making them textual (and by extension aesthetic) before 
covering them over completely, Pynchon seems to be essaying a text that gives space 
for their real, bodily existence once again. The recognition that within accounts of 
history are real bodies underpins Pynchon' s attitude toward history and the lost 
promise he sees in America, the existence of a "path not taken". 
In Pynchon' s work, alternative roads invariably steer history into the realm in 
which people lead lives dedicated to the here and now instead of to some overarching 
structure. The feminist Genesis myth that Sister Rochelle constructs in Vineland 
provides a good example of this (166). Rochelle imagines a Garden of Eden in which 
the "real" original humans, Eve and Lilith, once existed in a state of Utopia. It was 
only the arrival of Adam that introduced both sin and the providential plan. E. 
Shaskan Bumas makes the point that with this and other feminised masculinist myths 
in the novel, Pynchon suggests that Utopia ended with the transition from a 
matriarchal to a patriarchal society (166-7). As Sister Rochelle herself tells Takeshi, 
"It was sleazy, slippery man ... who invented 'good' and 'evil', where before women 
had been content to just be" (Vineland, 166). 
This myth has a counterpart in Gravity IS Rainbow: Puritan America's official 
rejection of William Slothrop's heresy. William, Tyrone's direct ancestor, argued that 
the preterite has as much of a place in the divine order as the elect. The structure 
They, the elect, have set up is one which contains two main categories, with no 
existence independent of them. The elect ascend to heaven. The preterite are passed 
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over, consigned to hell for the simple crime of not being among the elect, and from 
within the system, there is no recognition of their otherness: it is a totality - all those 
who lie outside the system altogether are considered preterite as well. This binary 
logic meant that someone was either one thing or another, even if, in life, they did not 
know to which category they belonged. However, in what was potentially a turning 
point in Puritan theology, Slothrop wrote a pamphlet entitled "On Preterition", for 
which he became something of an outcast. In this pamphlet he argued that the 
preterite were vital to the elect's ascension because without their presence, as 
precisely those othered by the elect, there would be no election at all. This had 
dangerous implications for Puritan thought, as Steven Weisenburger notes: "William 
Pynchon's argument implied that anyone might have access to divine grace, that 
Christ died for elect and preterite alike. And in thus opening the doors, it might even 
be necessary, as Thomas Pynchon writes three hundred years later, 'to love Judas 
too ", (Weisenburger 238, Gravity's Rainbow 555). His argument, broadly, recognises 
a trace of their respective other in both preterite and elect: he showed that, far from 
being clearly opposed to each other, these terms actually depend upon the existence of 
their opposite, rather than its rejection, for meaning. The elect could only have their 
divine status if they were "chosen" and another "passed over". Therefore those 
"passed over" are as vital to the functioning of the system as those "elected". Judas, 
for instance, enabled Christ's martyrdom, and so was fulfilling God's providential 
plan. William Slothrop's heresy needed to be suppressed by the Puritans because it 
suggested an alternative to the binary structure elect/preterite, and so was a threat to 
Their privileged status as beneficiaries of the political realisation of the structure. 
Slothrop argues for a reconfigured preterition to occupy a middle space of both/and. 
This argument depurifies the system because now each term in it is tainted by the 
trace of its opposite. This rejection of purity (and hence "Puritanism") is also a 
rejection of a systemic thinking that assimilates everything without exception. 
For Pynchon, in Gravity's Rainbow and The Crying of Lot 49 especially, 
binary thinking, the either/or of scientific, logical, and (frequently) political thought is 
the primary vehicle for the wrong-headedrtess that plagues twentieth-century power 
relations. It leaves the middle spaces that partake in both sides passed-over and 
unaccounted for. This is the "excluded middle" of The Crying of Lot 49, best seen 
when Oedipa Maas reflects on her confused state, her inability to discover the truth 
that keeps eluding her grasp of the "Tristero": 
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[s]he had heard all about excluded middles; they were bad shit, to be avoided; 
and how it had ever happened here, with the chances once so good for 
diversity? For it was now like walking among matrices of a great digital 
computer, the zeroes and ones twinned above, hanging like balanced mobiles 
right and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless. Behind the hieroglyphic streets 
there would be either a transcendent meaning, or only the earth .... Ones and 
zeroes. So did the couples arrange themselves .... Another mode of meaning 
behind the obvious, or none. (The Crying of Lot 49, 136-7) 
All of these middle paths, negotiating the terrain between two pure illusions, the 
totally structured or the totally unstructured, have been, for Pynchon, forgotten and 
excluded, passed over by culture. As Tony Tanner suggests, in Gravity's Rainbow it 
is this passed-over territory that Pynchon encourages us to escape into: 
[i]f we as readers try to win away one narrative "system" from the book, we 
are in danger of repeating mentally what They are doing in building the rocket. 
To put it in its most extreme form, They are trying to reduce all of nature's 
self-renewing variety to one terminal rocket; we must avoid the temptation to 
reduce the book to one fixed meaning. This is why our reading should be 
paranoid and anti-paranoid, registering narrative order and disorder, 
experiencing both the determinate and the indeterminate, pattern and 
randomness, renewing our awareness of our acts and interpretations as being 
both conditioned and free, and of ourselves as synthesising and disintegrating 
systems. In this way we can to some extent be released from the system-Zone 
bind which besets Pynchon's main characters .... (Tanner 1982, 82-3) 
This "paranoid/anti paranoid" reading employs the logic the system passes over rather 
than dominant systemic logic, for it is the latter which produces the bind Tanner 
speaks of. As a passed-over logic, the former is associated with preterition. Since 
preterition involves the system's other, it seems appropriate that the totalising system 
Pynchon depicts should pass over such muddy and blurred logic as both/and. The 
Preterite, of course, exist in this excluded middle. They are not zeroes, despite what 
the elect would prefer: Pynchon's descriptions of them give them a sombre reality. 
Systemic closure is given a spatial/geographic metaphor in Gravity's Rainbow. 
Here, the System inscribes over wild space by fencing it, erasing or expelling 
"preterite" wildness as it passes over it. This is set out most strikingly in the section 
backgrounding the group of Argentinean anarchists lead by Francisco Squalidozzi. 
This group align themselves with unfenced spaces. In their foundation myth, as 
Buenos Aires attempts to gain hegemony over Argentina's provinces, more and more 
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of Argentina's vast plainland became fenced, to allow the frontier of "society" to 
expand. This expansion was accompanied by the extelIDination of the plains' 
preterite elements, the Indians conquered or driven away as the fences moved 
outward. Thus, a process of territorialisation took place as the elect organisers of 
society expanded their influence. Squalidozzi's revolutionary project aims to restore 
Argentina's wild spaces, in all their wilderness, the "original clean sheet of paper" 
(Hans, 268), a project Hans describes as "naive" (ibid). He suggests that 
Squalidozzi's desired return to absolute nature is not something Pynchon would 
support: "Pynchon is not nearly naive enough to wish for the (impossible) 
unstructured world of anarchist freedom. People code the world as a matter of 
course ... " (270). This freedom is too impossibly purist, excluding the middle ground 
of provisional "ad-hoc" coding. 
As with William Slothrop's heresy, it is the middle space, seen by elect 
elements as somehow polluted or impure because it is a hybrid, that resists the 
structure of either/or because it is revealed as both one thing and its other, and for this 
Pynchon provisionally affords it preferential treatment. The Zone is associated with 
anarchism: it is a space the War has temporarily deterritorialised. This is what is most 
likely to have attracted Squalidozzi to it. Because of this, on the one hand, as far as 
They are concerned, the process of its official reterritorialisation must begin quickly-
hence, for instance, the annies and governments of all the major war participants, 
including GelIDany, desperately trying to neutralise a group ofHerero soldiers at large 
in the Zone. On the other hand, the fact that the borders are down so radically 
represents an opportunity to build an alternative society, take an alternative path, and 
reconstruct a world less dependent upon purity, and the opposites that define 
existence according to election and preterition. This opportunity to radically 
democratise the Zone and to prevent a return to Their dominance depends, though, 
upon the fonnulation of a way to overcome the tendency of structure to become an 
end in itself, for the "ad-hoc" and the provisional to become an institution that then 
defends its existence. 
An alternative to systems 
Gravity's Rainbow favours openness; enclosure of meanmg, even m 
accusation, partakes in the very systemic impulses it argues against. This is arguably 
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the driving assumption behind Pynchon's generation of postmodern writers. It begs 
the question, though, of whether he can say anything at all in response to a system that 
enforces closure and therefore makes closure and violence the same thing. How can 
there be a political critique that apparently eschews the tools it must use to form 
effective politics? 
In Gravity's Rainbow, there is always a sense that Pynchon is creating 
meaning while at once denying readers certainty in that meaning. For instance, 
paranoia is a major theme in the novel, but it also penetrates the narrative method: 
reading this novel and establishing meaning from it are, according to the frame of 
reference the novel sets up, paranoid actss. Paranoia is described by the narrator as "a 
puritan reflex of seeking other orders behind the visible" (188). Mackey (1981) 
suggests that "as preterition, language is innately paranoid" (27), and Siegel suggests 
that "[t]he narrator wants his participation in the fictional process to be recognised, 
because his narrative is an exercise in Creative Paranoia, a conscious construction of 
possible We- and They- systems" (21). By seeing reading this way, the novel's 
assertions are mitigated, and an alternative totality of meaning to the "official", 
"authorial" one is thwarted. Pynchon does not assert the "real truth", but tells instead 
a "truth ... not", a general direction framed by an unwillingness to close the play of 
meaning, clouding any closure with suspicion engendered by paranoia. Even when 
Pynchon seems to be saying things relatively directly, such as when he traces Their 
manipUlations of Slothrop (the scientific experiments on him as an infant and Their 
continued monitoring of him into adulthood) he undercuts the very plausibility his 
narrative builds. Sometimes he allows his narrator to go too far, to spill "irrationally" 
over into paranoia with his or her speCUlations. There is one such moment when 
Slothrop learns that president Roosevelt has died: " ... but Roosevelt was his president, 
the only one he'd known. It seemed he'd just keep getting elected, term after term, 
forever. But somebody had decided to change that. So he was put to sleep, 
Slothrop's president, quiet and neat..." (Gravity's Rainbow, 374). Narrative tactics 
such as this make a powerful political point in themselves, one implicit in the 
deconstructive critique of fully present n;teaning. They recognise that the act of 
reading is paranoid in a similar manner to this, that it involves leaps in the dark or in 
5 There have been a number of readings of paranoia as a theme and a method in Gravity's Rainbow. 
An early one, Seigel (1978) is excellent, and the best is possibly Bersani (1989). 
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the half-light. This is especially so in a difficult novel that rarely offers its readers 
transparent prose. These leaps are coupled in the novel with other tactics such as an 
apparently unquestioning acceptance of the supernatural and other "irrational" forces, 
and they lead readers to distance their absolute trust in the narrator, creating an 
implied injunction to never totally close down "other", even "irrational", possibilities. 
So, at the very least, Pynchon seems interested in the possibility of 
alternatives. In particular, Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland suggest the possibility of 
alternative Americas, a return to the promise of a land whose historical destiny did not 
have to lead down the road to the destruction of the multitude in the interests' of the 
few. Pynchon has identified some places in history where other possibilities might 
have been realised. William Slothrop's heresy and the Zone were two of them, but 
their opportunity was never realised. Perhaps there may be another in the future. 
A possible alternative might necessitate the abandonment of the structures of 
knowledge that contribute to the possibility of totalitarianism. The form of Gravity's 
Rainbow reflects the hope Pynchon sees in the Zone's clearance of the dichotomously 
structured ground of America: It resists the dichotomy of closed! open meaning, and 
instead posits "open closure" (or vice-versa) in an untrustworthy text that nonetheless 
seems to be saying something. Pynchon writes: 
[m]aybe for a little while all the fences are down, one road as good as another, 
the whole space of the Zone cleared, depolarized, and somewhere inside the 
waste of it a single set of co-ordinates from which to proceed, without elect, 
without Preterite, without even nationality to fuck it up ... (556) 
Pynchon's hopes for the Zone revolve around it being denuded of polarities and 
reverting to unstructured space. Although this means that the Zone holds a potential 
for anarchist freedom, the problem is that to claim this freedom is to re-structure the 
territory in an either/or, elect/preterite binarism, only with the terms reversed. 
"Structure", the tool of the Elect, would in these circumstances be passed over, and a 
barrier inappropriately set up (by barring structure one, ironically, reinscribes it). 
This would form the first part of a deconstruction: the reversal of the components in a 
binary structure. However, the existence of the Zone, and hence its revolutionary 
anarchist potential, is owed to a "celebration of markets" that forms the "true war" 
(105). To purify this non-structure, to fully inscribe the presence of non-structure, 
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would ignore the existence of an impurity: these enabling "markets", reliant on 
structure as they are. This is, therefore, structure that can never, despite all, be 
escaped. Hence this Zonal road, the alternative to the route that leads to death's 
providence, is neither totally structured nor completely unstructured. While there is 
no "destination" to this journey, (for this would imply an overarching plan), but there 
is, nonetheless, a place from which to start - there is "a single set of co-ordinates", a 
location, so that one is not totally lost. For this, structure is a necessity, but it is 
incomplete structure. Possibilities for freedom rely, ironically, on any new system 
remaining incomplete. 
Radical democracy 
The project of renewing America from a single set of co-ordinates bears strong 
resemblances to theories of participatory "radical" democracy, particularly ones that 
have emerged since the mid-1980s. These theories have utilised some important 
deconstructive tools. The discourses of "radical" democracy arose partly in response 
to the problems of orthodox political conflations of market capitalism with democracy 
(Mouffe 1992, 2-3; Lummis 1996, 17). It has been argued that Western Liberal 
democracy is too easily complicit in the reinscription of the power of capitalism, 
which itself is, at root, non-democratic, based as it is on the exploitation of "other" 
classes by capitalist interests, and the suppression of the exploited classes' aspirations. 
Societies in the Western Liberal democratic mould such as the United States are 
usually only democratic insofar as they extend limited democratic rights to their 
populations (Lummis, 18-19). (Events at the 2000 U.S. Presidential election exposed 
some of the limitations of the U.S. electoral process, for instance). As Baker says, 
quoting from Docherty, "democracy has come to be seen simply as the 'freedom to 
make a small hieroglyphic mark on a piece of paper some twenty occasions in a 
normal human lifetime'" (Baker, 124). Pynchon appears to have sympathy with these 
arguments. Certainly, he points fingers at United States governments in Vineland and 
Gravity's Rainbow, suggesting that they have participated in a severe nanowing of 
democracy; a part of this is their complicity in what Pynchon characterises as a 
totalitarian version of capitalism. 
To radicalise democratic life reqUIres radicalising the political economy's 
structure rather than its specific content: it involves not a political manifesto as such 
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(although these might be useful in the short tenn), but rather the enabling of a radical 
increase in democratic (political) participation by members of society. In contrast, 
most political systems are what might be called idealistic or utopian: they ultimately 
purport to end the necessity of poEtics and political conflict, settling difference in 
relation to a higher law, and therefore ending political agitation in favour of an 
administered relation to that law~ Such a metanarrative might be, for example, the 
providential Marxian law of historical progress, the fascist law of blood and nation, 
religious texts, the primacy of economics and the free market, or simply the ideal of 
"common sense" consensus politics, all of which provide authority for a system of 
administration. These metanarratives always have the potential to totalise. 
This illusion of a higher law is similar to the illusion of a "providential plan" 
characterising Their ideology in Gravity's Rainbow. Instead, radically democratic 
politics keeps contest and antagonism alive, so that the closure totality politics 
enforces is always thwarted by a constant legitimisation of various antagonisms 
within the system that must be suppressed to enact its closure. Derrida once wrote of 
"a democracy to come" (1991), as if it will never arrive, or does not exist. Simon 
Critchley made a similarly Derridian argument when he wrote that "democracy does 
not exist ... one must not restrict oneself to conceiving democracy as an existing 
political fonn (and, once again, certainly not as an apologetics for Western liberal 
democracy). Rather, one must begin to think of democracy as a task, or project to be 
attempted ... to extend the democratic franchise to all areas of public and private life" 
(1992, 240). Both these statements follow the logic of the "absent centre" that is 
typical of Derrida - democracy can never be made fully present, it can never be 
completed, or have the final answer, for once social antagonisms have been resolved, 
a negation of the political other, the opposition that democracy requires, has taken 
place. 
So, to assert the "arrival" of democracy is to conflate a non-, or only semi-
democratic system with "democracy" itself. "Democracy" remains elsewhere at each 
point it is made apparent, as any instance of empowennent negates, or as Laclau and 
Mouffe would put it, "sutures over" other instances of non- or dis-empowennent that 
themselves must be addressed. For radical democracy, the process of undennining 
full political presence can never end. An end to this process will be, by definition, 
outside the borders of democracy. Once the hierarchical opposition or binary 
structure has been deconstructed, it is not enough to simply privilege the fonnerly 
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suppressed term (democracy) over the formerly dominant one (non-democracy), 
because then "democracy" would attain full presence and suppress its other to do so. 
Instead, the binary structure itself must be displaced and reimagined, democracy a 
descriptor of the process of continually teasing out what is undecideable, what limits 
full presence, from the decision to favour one path over another. 
Poststructuralist theory such as Derrida's is used as a tool by some theorists of 
radical democracy. C. Douglas Lummis notes that radical democracy is "the end 
point of [the method of deconstruction as practised by Jacques Derrida and other 
postmodem theorists]. Similarly a follower of Michel Foucault would be adding no 
new information in revealing that radical democracy is "really" about power: of 
course it is about power. On the contrary, the Foucauldian critique of society as a 
system of reified power over the people is a critique (rather than simply the 
observation of a sociophysicist) only from the standpoint of radical democracy" 
(Lummis, 166-7n3). One of the most compelling theorisations of radical democracy is 
posited in Emesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(1985) (further elaborated and defended in Laclau's New Reflections on the 
Revolution of our Time [1990], The Maldng of Political Identities [1994], and 
Mouffe's Dimensions of Radical Democracy [ed, 1992] and The Return of the 
Political [1993]). Here, the authors identify a tradition latent within Marxism, based 
on the writings of Antonio Gramsci. In their formulation, Laclau and Mouffe 
provocatively detach the possibility of political action from its heretofore-essential 
locus, the working class. In Marxist thought, the working class is determined by the 
conditions of production, a determination which is at its base economic, and based on 
inevitable historical processes. In other words, Marxist discourse "objectively" 
identifies the destiny of the working class (the subjects of a revolutionary 
consciousness which will eventually overthrow the existing relations of production) in 
the working class because it is the working class. In such a claim, Laclau and Mouffe 
contend, Marxism is an essentialist discourse, closed to other analyses and competing 
claims (such as those from nuclear or feminist criticism). 
Contrary to the orthodox meaning of the word today, which implies a bland 
social sameness, in Laclau and Mouffe "hegemony" refers to a connection between 
discourses, which then opens out a discursive field. One possible hegemonic 
relationship, for instance, might be between a political group agitating against the 
impact of industrialised food production on the third world and a group protesting 
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genetic engineering in food. Although the overall aims of the two groups may differ, 
they coincide on some fronts, and at these points a hegemony can be constructed. 
This does not cancel out the points of difference between the groups, however, and so 
the discursive field remains open (those differences remain in play), rather than closed 
(where the differences are covered up). Essential and hierarchical social systems 
presupposed what they call a "sutured" social space, a space sewn together around 
privileged points of political action. This would happen if the anti-genetic engineering 
group was to be subsumed into the larger anti-food industry group, even though the 
former is not necessarily opposed to food industrialism per se. Similarly, if it were 
assumed that food industry opponents were the inevitable locus of anti-industrial 
activity generally (we all have to eat, after all), and that the fulfilment of all this 
group's aims would settle other antagonisms (such as an anti-genetic engineering 
concern) then the discursive field would become a closed one, all its antagonisms 
sutured over, with politics gathered at this privileged point, and the remainder of the 
field resembling a solid, pristine front. Laclau and Mouffe believe that political 
action is best served by provisional, hegemonic relations rather than privileged, 
essential ones. Groups comprising this type of hegemony are neither totally 
indeterminate, nor are they identifiable by way of any innate condition. 
To Laclau and Mouffe, current official democratic practices should be 
deepened toward plurality, "an expansion of the democratic revolution in new 
directions" (1985, 158), where radically democratic practice can take hold. This 
allows for relationships between different groups geared toward specific goals. Once 
those goals have been achieved, however, the difference between them will allow 
them to retain their own identity. If, for instance, a revolutionary movement made up 
of a hegemony of various preterite interests were able neutralise Their influence in the 
Zone, then at that point the direction of the new society would be radically open. One 
possibility is that the hegemony will harden into a finn body that begins to suture over 
its internal antagonisms and differences, thus closing the political field as it 
consolidates its power. The Zone would then have rulers, who might silence 
opposition using repressive tactics. The cartel of corporate entities comprising 
"Them" or "The Firm" in Gravity's Rainbow are exactly such a hegemony in power. 
On the other hand, from the open field, the hegemony may then revert to its 
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constituent parts, keeping differences and antagonisms III play and therefore 
potentially leaving room for the influence of other groups and hegemonies6. As such, 
labour would be required to keep necessary differences in operation: "'once more an 
effort', as Derrida has recently noted, this is the germ of democracy" (Critchley, 240). 
Social and political relations would remain in changing states of hybridity, as this 
labour would aim at maintaining social identifications that survive yet never complete 
themselves. 
What use is postmodernism? 
These concerns confront "postmodern" political theories on several fronts. 
The first point Ernesto Laclau confronts himself: "since there is ultimate 
undecidability", he writes, "and, as a result, no immanent tendency of the structure to 
closure and full presence [the enabling factor for radical democracy since it negates 
the truth of historical "laws"], closure has to be artificially brought about from the 
outside. In that way a case for totalitarianism can be presented starting from 
deconstructive premises. Of course, the totalitarian argument would be as much a non 
sequitur as the argument for democracy: either direction is equally possible given the 
situation of structural undecidability" (1995, 93). This, too, would appear to be the 
case in Gravity's Rainbow. That totalitarianism and radical democracy can both be 
formed from deconstructive premises is the most important point to note here. 
Democratic hegemonies open out political spaces, clearing ground for oppositional 
discourses. The moment the political ground is cleared sufficiently by democratic 
labour to deepen the democratic tradition, though, the possibility re-emerges of 
essentialist discourses re-establishing themselves around the vacuum that results. 
Depending on the tolerance of the ascendant essentialist discourse to the inessential, 
totalistic and even totalitarian politics can result. Gravity's Rainbow's Zone plays this 
spatial metaphor out exactly. The loss of the certainties provided by a central, guiding 
essentialism could produce a state of chaos, whereupon a strong, essentialist (for this 
is stronger than anti-essentialism, in the traditional sense) politics could easily reassert 
itself as a response to the "crisis" of chaos. It would do this by appealing to the 
6 This should not be taken to imply that behind "Their" cartel's mysterious surface contestation over 
position and influence don't occur. They are merely irrelevant to the preterite because whoever is in 
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nostalgia for strong fonns created at the confusion and terror caused by their loss. 
This essentialist politics could become totalitarianism if the chaotic "democratic" 
space is repressed fully wherever it is fonned. In this sense, totalitarianism is 
stronger than democracy, and in times of crisis strength can easily become seen as a 
greater virtue than freedom. 
This relates to another major charge levelled against the political potential of 
postmodemism, that the radical potential of cultural fragmentation is illusory. 
Instead, postmodemism has become or has always been the domain of corporate 
interests because, to use Fredric Jameson's definition, postmodemism is "the cultural 
logic of late capitalism" (c199l). What postmodem fragmentation does instead is 
fragment the forces opposed to the dominant system, weakening them (Le Blanc, 
1995; Zavarzadeh, 1995). Hence, the argument might conclude, postmodem notions 
of "difference" have ultimately weakened any basis for emancipatory activity because 
rather than all fonns of advancement being achieved under the same banner - the 
working class - struggles are now proceeding under many banners: race, gender, 
class, sexual orientation, and so forth, each of these fragmenting into sub-groups of 
difference as well. The traditional, Marxist notion is that the interests of the working 
class are universal, and so once it overthrows bourgeois ownership and takes the tools 
of labour back, thus undoing the alienating effects of capitalism, the false 
consciousness of ideology which characterises existence under capitalism will fall 
away, and the kind of ideological pressures that have come to oppress groups such as 
workers, women, gays and lesbians, people of colour and so forth will cease to exist. 
If, on the other hand, a hegemony of these interested groups were to prompt a 
revolution, its inherent fragmentation, and hence its non-universal character, would 
prevent it from transcending ideology. 
The supposedly radical postmodem notion of unlimited play has similarly 
been criticised for undennining the possibility of political resistance. Radical freeplay, 
the continued slippage of discourse involving the "play" of language, allows no 
grounds upon which to fight, and thus renders itself impotent. Critchley notes about 
Derrida that "there is an impasse of the political in Derrida's work" (236). 
Beardsworth (1996) disagrees, however, and Critchley himself sees "a way out of this 
impasse by following the moment from ethics to politics in Levinas' work (Critchley, 
control of Their hegemony will continue to pass over the interests of the preterite, by defmition. 
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ibid). Nonetheless, the argument that postmodernism and deconstruction's political 
impasse is terminal is popular. According to it, any anti-capitalist grounding is 
immediately undermined, deconstructed and made impossible because the politically 
interested party cannot legitimately make a decision and enforce it. According to the 
"radical" position they take up, its critics charge, meaning is so transient (and linked 
to "bourgeois" notions of pleasure and playing) that they cannot come to any 
legitimate and practical understanding of their opposition (Zavarzadeh). The 
opponents of postmodernism reduce its position to one of moraUpolitical relativism. 
If there are no grounds for anything, this position would argue, how can we say 
exploiting people is wrong? How can we condemn Patrick Bateman's acts of torture 
and murder in American Psycho? The temptation to say "murder is wrong" would 
have to be accompanied by an exploration and a demystification of the politics of that 
statement: it is the assertion of a power position in which ideas of rightness are 
contingent on moral, historical and ideological constructs rather than any sort of truth. 
How would the power we exercise condemning Bateman be any more moral than the 
power Bateman exercises over his "other"? 
Pynchon makes equivalent criticisms III Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland. 
J ames Hans has already noted that Pynchon does not favour Squalidozzi' s anarchist 
purity, one of the novel's equivalents to unlimited play (270). Slothrop's quest is a 
warning, as Baker notes, against the "mindless pleasures" of the novel's working title 
(106). Because of those pleasures, and Slothrop's susceptibility to them, his escape 
from the Firm is entirely personal, and has no wide political import. They are not 
effected by Slothrop's isolated scattering; the Counterforce are divided over what 
Slothrop's role should be, but as far as they are concerned, it will not be until many 
more people have set aside their They-induced structural identities that the 
Counterforce can succeed. Gravity's Rainbow makes each criticism of various 
resistances to Them that have been levelled against "radical" postmodern politics. 
The Counterforce's failure is partly due to their fragmentation; a consensus is never 
reached over the symbolic meaning of Slothrop. It is suggested that this ambiguous, 
contested space, which is akin to various deconstructive terms such as difference or 
the trace, reinforces or even enables the totalitarian elect. Vineland's Brock Vond 
easily undermines the novel's democratic movements, and puts their members to 
work for a neo-fascist establishment instead. He recognises the "desire for order" 
among his enemies, their fear of unstructured space. And the failure of Slothrop's 
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resistances against the Finn is a result of his addiction to "mindless pleasures", to a 
free-play of identity rather than a stable but oppositionai political identity. 
All of this seems only to offer a choice of structure, if the politics opposed to 
the totalitarian system are to be successful, or the weakness of de constructed identity. 
It is to address this double-bind that Pynchon introduces cartoons into the novels, and 
at times seems to write the narratives as cartoons. The mode-of-existence of cartoons 
provides Pynchon with a theoretical knowledge of how to effectively establish a 
democratic politics in the face of a totalitarian system without that force being either 
far too weak to be of any consequence beyond isolated acts of kindness, or being co-
opted and integrated by and into the system itself. This way out is related to a politics 
of the "excluded middle" rather than the inside/outside, preterite/elect politics of the 
System. This, I believe, may answer concerns regarding the political effectiveness of 
postmodernist or poststructuralist politics. 
Both of Pynchon's novels address the failure of resistant strategies thus far. In 
Gravity's Rainbow the Counterforce becomes structured and fails (as we shall see). 
In Vineland the new generation that could fonn a revolutionary consciousness seem 
more interested in commercialising their punk anarchism - Isaiah plans to build an 
amusement park with violence as its theme - than realising the revolutionary potential 
of punk. Nonetheless there is potential, there are paths of resistance that have not yet 
been taken. In both books that potential lies in an unrealised radically democratic 
revolution - projects that They cannot corrupt because they remain dangerous. The 
students at College of the surf made "the basic revolutionary mistake" (229) and 
invested in Weed Atman as leader and father figure. Their need for such a centre is 
one such desire for order that Vond exploits. Weed, in addition, was not a perfect 
leader. But Weed was originally chosen for a reason: he was one of the people, a 
figure of the "out-of-control" that characterised the revolt. He preached humane 
revolution, and this attitude was never corrupted. It is only exhaustion (perhaps 
coupled with Weed's lack of focus) that reduces his answer to the constant question 
he's asked, "how about picking up the gun?" (229). Initially he says it is "because in 
this country nobody in power gives a shit about any human life but their own. This 
forces us to be humane - to attack what matters more than life to the regime and those 
it serves, their money and their property" (229), but later the answer has become "it's 
wrong because if you pick up a rifle, the Man picks up a machine gun, by the time 
you find some machine gun he's all set up to shoot rockets, begin to see a pattern?" 
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(229). He may have thus regressed from attack to self-preservation, from theories of 
principle to those of power, but he still refuses the gun. The more "correct" and 
theorised revolutionary, Rex, was to "sell out" and take the gun when it was offered. 
Weed was the one, of course, killed by the official powers - for all his personal faults 
he represented the democracy that those in control cannot abide instead of the 
authoritarianism ofRex7. 
In Gravity's Rainbow, the democratic hope is also unfulfilled rather than 
necessarily unfulfillable. The Counterforce did begin as a genuine resistance, and 
they had victories, however brief or ultimately inconsequential. When active, it was 
associated with preterition, and so stood for the emancipation of the oppressed. But 
such triumphs are always limited, they are never such that They cannot bounce back 
and assimilate the rebellious element into the system, using the "guy [in the] branch 
office in each of our brains" (712) to do so. This "guy" ultimately engineers our 
response to a situation which is undecidable, one in which ideology has temporarily 
lapsed: he knows we'd rather be comfortably ensconced in a situation of power: our 
ego would rather us whole and together, as a personality, separate from others. The 
chaotic, undecideable, "Zonal" moment blurs this separateness undermining the ego's 
sense of itself as a totality. However, this "Zonal" moment of the Counterforce's 
existence remains a token of possibility, if only it can avoid total closure, retain 
provisional structure within an open, democratic space. That is the "we" system the 
Counterforce theorises. 
The "we" of Gravity's Rainbow is a response to one of the ultimate victories 
of the forces of totalisation. The rocket of humanity's extinction really was poised to 
strike in 1973, and to a lesser (or perhaps just more complicated) extent it still is. 
This has the potential to unite all of humanity. Pynchon here makes a similar point 
about revolutionary consciousness to Ellis's - that under a system approaching 
totality all of us are its potential victims. As victims of the Rocket-state, "we" are 
feminised, in opposition with the phallic Rocket: "the Rocket's purely feminine 
counterpart" is "the zero point at the centre of its target" (223). As the audience of the 
Orpheus theatre at the end of the novel, we are thus gathered around the feminine 
7 It would, indeed, be quite wrong for the democracy to come to be represented by anything other than 
someone with personal faults; Slothrop is another instance. The fact that they are human beings who 
cannot entirely take control of their own lives (and over their own desires) contrasts the absolute 
control (over self and others) required by non-democratic people in power. 
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"zero point"; this puts us in a similarly prone position to the feminised, child-like herd 
creatures of Vineland. This is demonstrated in American Psycho as well: Bateman's 
victims, for he is the rocket, are seen as suspiciously "feminine". As we will see later, 
by taking on these "feminine" significations, "We" represent what those in power fear 
within themselves. 
This is a meeting ground at which a community of interest is formed, one like 
Vineland's ghostly Thanatoids, all having been killed unjustly. All the preterite, the 
victims and potential victims of the system, can form a "we" system. If that field 
contains enough of "us", the revolution will succeed. Beyond this point, though, such 
a universalising "we" seems less justifiable, as, although useful tactically in a 
confrontation with totalitarian dominance, such a "we" does deny difference within 
the system, freezing it inside a hardened systemic exterior. As Pirate Prentice says, in 
a conversation with a baffled Roger Mexico, 
"I mean what They and Their hired psychiatrists call 'delusional 
systems.' Needless to say, 'delusions' are always officially defined. We don't 
have to worry about questions of real and umeal. They only talk out of 
expediency. It's the system that matters. How the data arrange themselves 
inside it. Some are consistent, others fall apart. Your idea that Pointsman sent 
Gloaming takes a wrong fork. Without any contrary set of delusions -
delusions about ourselves, which I'm calling a We-system - the Gloaming 
idea might have been all right" 
"Delusions about ourselves?" 
"Not real ones." 
"But officially defined." 
"Out of expediency, yes." 
"Well, you're playing Their game, then." 
"Don't let it bother you. You'll find you can operate quite well. 
Seeing as we haven't won yet, it isn't really much of a problem." 
[ ... J 
It's a little bewildering - if this is a "We-system," why isn't it at least 
thoughtful enough to interlock in a reasonable way, like They-systems do? 
"That's exactly it," Osbie screams[ ... J "They're the rational ones. We 
piss oli their rational arrangements. Don't we ... Mexico?" 
"Hoorah!" cry the others. Well taken, Osbie. (638-9) 
The major implication of this, of what Molly Hite calls "communally defined We-
systems and paranoically conceived They-systems" (c1983, 141), is picked up on 
page 706: "The dearest nation of all is one that will survive no longer than you and I, 
a common movement at the mercy of death and time: the ad hoc adventure." The 
nation of "we", out of expediency playing Their game in order to free ourselves of 
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Them, must change the game once "we" have won. Politics, much of it not 
interlocked with greater aims, will have to be allowed expression, or it will become 
"much of a problem". 
In some ways, the remainder of this thesis is dedicated to coming to terms with 
these two quotes from Gravity's Rainbow. The manifesto that they combine into 
takes into account the formulations of incompleteness that infiltrate the novel (both 
scientific, like Godel's theorem, or colloquial, like Murphy's law). These stipulate 
that just when the end is in sight, and closure and perfection seems attainable, 
something will go wrong. The assumption behind this type of law - that total closure 
is actually impossible - is one that totalitarianism resists strongly. By accepting 
rather than resisting provisionality, the Counterforce has sketched a political position 
which resists extreme dichotomies and hence what I will come to call, in the context 
of these novels, (totalitarian) "fascism". While the rocket has yet to strike, "we" still 
have the opportunity to prevent it from doing so, and this opportunity has everything 
to do with acceptance of difference within the system. If the Counterforce plays Their 
game and forms a universalising system, out of the expediency of forming 
revolutionary consciousness from the threat They pose, somehow this universalisation 
has to remain absolutely provisional, and yet at the same time prevent the sort of 
chaos, totally unstructured space, that might establish a general nostalgia for strong 
forms to form in reaction to it. 
The question is, as Pirate well knows, what do "we" do to retain this 
provisionality, and not become a "They" (hence separating They and We from the 
both-They-and-We the Counterforce becomes if it is provisional) "after we have won" 
(638). The Counterforce, like the citizens ofPR3, make a basic revolutionary mistake 
here, and so they fail; they are able to be assimilated into "the Firm's" system, 
become part of the totality. That is, they make "they" separate from "we" - they 
assume they can exist on the outside of the system - a tactic which plays into Their 
hands because, as Pynchon points out, the war is more over structure and 
commodities than national allegiances and territory. In other words, the 
Counterforce's tactics (as opposed to their ideals) yearn for a totality of their own, 
they eventually favour a structure that assumes "we" and "they" are separate, that they 
can get outside the "They" system. Such a move requires rules to keep the structure 
of that separation in place. It is therefore no longer an "ad-hoc adventure". 
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But perhaps it once was. Perhaps they were once able to assimilate the fact 
that their project was expedient, and hence was delusional, into their own politics. 
The "we-system" only sells out to "the Firm" when it loses its sense of its own 
delusionality - when the Counterforce has "spokespeople" who talk to the Wall Street 
Journal (an icon of not only respectability but of markets), saying "We were never 
that concerned with Slothrop qua Slothrop" (738). This statement is from someone 
who proffers a delusional system and has forgotten it is delusional. This thread of 
ideas, identifiable in other contexts in Pynchon, will be picked up on in Chapter nine. 
In Chapter nine also, I will connect this with the category of images Pynchon 
chooses to associate with Weed and other figures of hope not only in Vineland but 
also Gravity's Rainbow. These images may be of "we", but they are also of "they" -
corporate properties, products of the film and television industries. Weed, Pynchon 
observes, wears Daffy Duck's image on his jeans. He is thus associated with cartoons 
in the same way that Osbie Feel is, boasting a Porky Pig tattoo, in Gravity's Rainbow. 
Seaman "Pig" Bodine, the only member of the Counterforce capable of retaining a 
sense of the fading Slothrop by the end of the novel, is continually associated with 
Dumbo the Elephant. Weed is also "a character in a movie", and "fucks like a porn 
star"; in addition, the most positive characters in Pynchon's fiction are always 
associated with low culture. The later chapters of this thesis, after I unpack Pynchon 
and Ellis's characterisation of contemporary society as having (totalitarian) "fascist" 
elements, will investigate this tendency by focusing on the anti-fascist potential of 
cartoons; that is, I will suggest that cartoons can stand in for delusional "we" counter 
systems that do not forget they are delusional and hence do not give in to the sort of 
rationality that characterise fascist They systems. 
Chapter three 
Totalitarian Control 
Control structures in Pynchon 's novels 
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Pynchon appears to question whether many of the attributes of postmodernism 
that appear in his novels will necessarily counteract the power of systemic thinking, even 
as he posits the suggestion that they might. In Gravity's Rainbow, Tyrone Slothrop's 
hedonism and confusion, as well as his eventual dispersal, nullify any genuine threat he 
may have posed to "the System" even as he is apparently personally able to escape it. It 
has contained this threat, just as it was able to eventually contain the threat posed by a 
Counterforce unable to keep to its "ad-hoc" ideals. The Counterforce's assimilation, after 
initially positioning itself in the margins of official discourse, came about by its inability 
to sustain the provisionality called for in the conversation that ended the previous chapter. 
Eventually the Counterforce's energies became directed toward conserving the system, 
even as they remained officially opposed to it, because its structure and survival of the 
institution overtook the "ad-hoc adventure". 
This can be seen if we contrast the early Counterforce with the late. One 
significant (if local) early triumph involves an ambush of one of Their social and business 
functions by Roger Mexico and Pig Bodine. These two subversives momentarily disrupt 
official discourses by confronting them with toilet language, the discourse of body waste. 
They put the well-to-do diners off their dinner by announcing an impromptu menu of 
"pus pudding", "snot soup", "smegma stew" and other such preterite delicacies (715). 
The function thereafter collapses among vomiting, sobs, threats, and chaos. As such, it 
exposes a vulnerability in the elect personality, and by extension Their system, a space 
the preterite might exploit, if it were to organise itself appropriately to do so. 
The decline of the Counterforce, however, is signalled even before this episode: 
Well, if the Counterforce knew better what those categories [of world 
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economics and "Albatross nosology"l] concealed, they might be in a better 
position to disarm, de-penis and dismantle the Man. But they don't. Actually 
they do, but they don't admit it. Sad but true. They are as schizoid, as double-
minded in the massive presence of money, as any of the rest of us, and that's the 
hard fact. The Man has a branch office in each of our brains, his corporate 
emblem is a white albatross, each local rep has a cover known as the Ego, and 
their mission in this world is Bad Shit. We do know what's going on, and we let 
it go on[ ... ] (712-713) 
The desire for personal wealth and power, the seductiveness of the possibility of 
power (and along with it a sense of possible immunity from death) and the charisma 
assumed of those who possess it ("As long as we can see them, stare at them, those 
massively moneyed, once in a while. As long as they allow us a glimpse, however rarely. 
We need that. And how they know it - how often, under what conditions ... " [7l3]) 
activate the ego and disarm the utopia of the kind of anarchism the Counterforce stood 
for, one that is steadfastly material and hence mortal. Unconsciously or not, we all desire 
election: the presence of the elect's totalised ego in us seems to be at the root of this 
desire. Eventually we revert to the ego, and when we do, we've begun playing the game 
of "the Man". This is exactly what the Counterforce is doing by the 1970s, when a 
"spokesman" is interviewed in The Wall Street Journal: 
"We were never that concerned with Slothrop qua Slothrop", a spokesman 
for the Counterforce admitted recently in an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal. 
Interviewer: You mean, then, that he was more a rallying point. 
Spokesman: No, not even that. Opinion even at the start was divided. It 
was one of our fatal weaknesses. [I'm sure you want to hear about fatal 
weaknesses.] Some called him a "pretext". Others felt he was a genuine, point-
for-point microcosm [ ... ] A Raketen-Stadt Charlie Noble, you might say ... [Yes. 
A cute way of putting it. I am betraying them all ... the worst of it is that I know 
what your editors want. I am a traitor. I carry it with me. Your virus. Spread by 
your tireless Typhoid Marys, cruising the markets and the stations[ .... ]] (738-9 
Pynchon's square brackets, my ellipses in square brackets) 
I "Nosology is the study and classification of diseases" (Weisenburger, 297). Albatrosses appear to be a 
constant symbol of the relationship between the self and governing control structures over the ego - they 
appear in Gravity's Rainbow on pages 261, 354, 623, 661, 701 and 712-13. Could "Albatross Nosology" 
be the disease of the "self' (according to an officially categorised notion of both a disease and a proper 
self), e.g. a "diseased self' diseased precisely because it has to some degree escaped Their control? 
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This "virus" is a human need to lean on "structures favouring death", as one of the 
characters puts it, inherent in the markets and networks of industrial development, the 
need for a "System". Eventually this member of the Counterforce reverted to a pre-
existent pattern, a pattern or structure that he understands, because it represents the re-
emergence of the structured ego. This ego tries to cut down on "fatal weaknesses" and 
outlive its moment - the Counterforce sacrificed its anarchism to become an institution. 
Similarly, Vineland is set in an America in which The System there has contained 
any effective resistance. In Vineland, television, characterised in the novel as "the Tube", 
acts as a kind of parent-figure of an "extended national family" (Vineland, 269), and 
appears to get some of Pynchon's blame for America's inability to resist increasing 
political domination over their lives. It may seem out of character for Pynchon, who is 
often regarded as a writer who favours low culture over high in his writing, to attack a 
popular cultural medium wholesale, but here it is worth keeping in mind Pynchon's 
ambivalence about cartoons that I outlined in Chapter one. While television appears to 
perform the postmodem tasks of producing fragmentation, favouring popular (preterite) 
over high (elect) culture, and thus undermining Their system with the VUlgar, ad-hoc 
stories and the obscene, in actuality it does the opposite by keeping the p~ople from 
taking the action they need to take to free themselves from political domination. It acts 
as "mass" culture imposed from above rather than a popular culture created and/or co-
opted from below by the people. In Vineland, television is being used to mould a 
"timeless, defectively imagined future of zero-tolerance drug-free Americans all pulling 
their weight and all locked into the official economy, inoffensive music, endless family 
specials on the Tube, church all week long, and, on special days, for extra good 
behaviour, maybe a cookie" (221-2), a description that states directly the narrator's belief 
that America is approaching a totalitarian state. That this strategy is already working is 
confirmed by the fact that, according to DEA agent Hector Zuniga, "since about '81 kids 
were com'n in all on their own ask'n about careers, no need for no separate facility 
anymore ... " (347). Rather than the clumsy manual "re-education" methods practised 
under Nixon, and exemplified in the novel by Brock Vond's PREP camps, the Reagan 
presidency is characterised as the era of the official use of the image. The image is 
proving, for the characters of Vineland, to be a cleaner and more effective method of 
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achieving a society that conforms totally with what the elect want of it than mere terror 
ever could. 
Pynchon directly links official television with political domination in a similar 
manner: 
... when the cable television companies showed up in the county, got into 
skirmishes that included exchanges of gunfire between gangs of rival cable 
riggers, eager to claim souls for their distant principles, fighting it out house by 
house, with the Board of Supervisors compelled eventually to partition the county 
into Cable Zones, which in time became political units in their own right as the 
Tubal entrepreneurs went extending their webs even when there weren't enough 
residents per linear mile to pay the rigging cost. ... (319) 
The link here between TV zones and political units, of course, pertains to 
officially sanctioned television watching (the passive sort, like Hector's compulsion to 
"bathe in rays, lap and suck at the flow of image" [335]). This flow is one-way, and 
feeds into an increasing reliance on spectacles, and on characters behaving as if they were 
involved in spectacles. The content of the Tube functions ideologically. For instance, 
drugs are re-cast as evil (342) and police shows are "propaganda message[s] of cops-are-
only-human-got-to-do-their-job, turning agents of government repression [in aid of 'the 
state law-enforcement apparatus which was calling itself America' (354)] into 
sympathetic heroes" (345). But the medium itself has begun to dominate the way people 
think and behave. Isaiah suggests an awareness of the political power of "the Tube", 
when he tells Zoyd, who wants a way to stop Brock Vond harassing him periodically 
about Frenesi, 
"Whole problem 'th you folks's generation ... nothing personal, is you 
believed in your Revolution, put your lives right out there for it - but you sure 
didn't understand much about the Tube. Minute the Tube got hold of you folks 
that was it, that whole alternative America, el deado meato, just like th' Indians, 
sold it all to your real enemies, and even in 1970 dollars - it was way too 
cheap .... " 
"Well I hope you're wrong", Zoyd breezed on, "'cause plan B was to try 
and get my case on '60 Minutes', or one of them." (373) 
The "Tube" has caused a deadening of America's political consciousness. In The 
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Society of the Spectacle, French social critic Guy Debord (1967) posits the "spectacle" as 
a totalising manifestation of commodity capitalism. It creates the conditions whereby 
people live their lives as if they are cinema patrons or television watchers and their lives a 
film or show they are viewing. The spectacle can be said to dominate when all aspects of 
life become mediated or infected by images. Debord writes: "In societies where modem 
conditions of production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of 
spectacles" (#1). These conditions occur when the commodity has infiltrated all aspects 
of existence (#42), because commodity fetishism, "the domination of society by 
'intangible as well as tangible things,' which reaches its absolute fulfilment in the 
spectacle, where the tangible world is replaced by a selection of images which exist 
above it, and which simultaneously impose themselves as the tangible par excellence" 
(#36) is universalised, and allows for the change in consciousness needed for the image 
to dominate the real. Thus the spectacle is the fulfilment of commodity capitalism - "The 
world at once present and absent which the spectacle makes visible is the world of the 
commodity dominating all that is lived." (#37, Debord's italics) - and marks the arrival of 
post-industrial capitalism, where commodities needn't be concrete objects. Certainly, 
Baudrillard (1984) and Jameson (1983; c1991), among others, have noted that 
"postindustrial" or "late" capitalism opens increasing areas of existence to the process of 
commodification. This has reached a point, for instance, where people are expected to 
project an "image" in order to "sell themselves" as employees, lovers, and friends, a fact 
apparent to anyone with a television set. 
"Itself a product of rationality" (Debord, #27), the spectacle has therefore arrived 
in an age when representation is waxing prevalent. Debord refers, of course, to the mass 
media in all its manifestations. The commodified image is helIDaphroditic and 
narcissistic, reproducing itself and presenting itself as pleasing and good to the beholder-
"that which appears is good, that which is good appears" (#12), says Debord of the 
spectacle's logic. The viewer is coerced into the desire for spectacular images, and 
spectacular things in general. Debord regards this as life abstracted: where "being", and 
then "having" were once socially privileged, now "appearing" is (#17). 
The commodity and the spectacle are narcissistically self-referential, ultimately 
rendering the spectator passive - the spectator becomes shut out of the spectacle's closed 
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system. The spectacle is "the existing order's uninterrupted discourse about itself, its 
laudatory monologue. It is the self-portrait of power in the epoch of its totalitarian 
management of the conditions of existence" (#24). Because reality has, under the gaze of 
the spectacle, become mediated, the media screen constitutes the only reality available for 
the viewer. The spectacle constitutes its subj ects as consuming spectators because the 
commodified image is now all-pervasive. 
Such totalisation alters people's relation to time and history, as now life itself is 
viewed passively as if it were mere appearance. The spectacle hypnotises, urging its 
subjects to consume both images and products. The spectator becomes trapped as the 
non-privileged component of a spectacle/spectator, active/passive dichotomy, because the 
spectacle demands "passive acceptance which in fact it already obtained by its manner of 
appearing without reply, by its monopoly of appearance" (#12). Hence, although it 
seems to break down borders and their mortar, hierarchies, it does so only to set up yet 
more rigid ones. Seeing this, Debord comments that "the success of the economic system 
of separation is the proletarianization of the world" (#24). In this totalitarian 
environment, all the citizens become equally subject(ed) to the will of the prevailing 
ideology. 
In Vineland, many people are addicted to television in one way or another. Hector, 
for instance, who spent much of his federal career trying to tum Zoyd informer, is 
frequently committed to a "Tubal detox" centre. Moreover, there is an entire community 
called the Thanatoids, souls who deny that they are dead, and who ghost away their time 
in front of the television. The Thanatoids are seen as being asleep, in a narcotic state, not 
able to die properly. They are, for James Berger, "symptoms - physical marks on the 
social body - of the traumatic 60s now haunting and contributing to the traumas of the 
80s" (1995). In this they are similar to Zoyd, lying passive, akin perhaps to the "Glozing 
neuter" figure Pynchon criticises in Gravity's Rainbow. This is seen as sinister, as 
Hector's "Tubaldetox" centre's "house hymn" testifies: 
THE TUBE 
Oh ... the ... Tube! 
It's poi-soning your brain! 
Oh, yes .... 
It's driv-ing you, insane! 
It's shoot-ing rays, at you, 
Over eV'ry-thing ya do, 
It sees you in your bedroom, 
And-on th' toi-let too! 
Yoo Hoo! The 
Tube .... 
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It knows, your ev'ry thought, 
Hey, Boob, you thought you would-
T'n get caught-
While you were sittin' there, starin' at "The 
Brady Bunch," 
Big fat computer jus' 
Had you for lunch, now Th' 
Tube -
It's plugged right in, to you! (336-7) 
Pynchon suggests that our lives are similar to those of the novel's Thanatoids in 
that we have been deadened by the flows of trivia that the television offers us. Like 
them, people are "not living but persisting" (173), and "in wandering mazes, lost" (Safer 
1994, 52). We have been distracted into a sleepy numbness by the mediated world, and 
this accounts for the ultimate failure of the radical left of the 1960s, and the failure of the 
1980s to mount any sort of equivalent revolt. For Berger, television has helped discredit 
the 1960s, because for the Reagan-era 1980s the promise of the 1960s is dangerous: 
the Thanatoids are also ridiculous, another absurd remnant (like Zoyd at the 
novel's opening) of the psychedelic 60s. And in this tension, between a serious, 
portentous return of historical trauma and its representation as a comic schtick 
enacted under the aegis of mass media, we see a crucial feature of Pynchon's 
literary technique in Vineland, his representation of history, and his version of 
nostalgia. A ghost of the 60s can return in the 80s only as its own simulation: a 
ghost playing a ghost, a "Thanatoid," a ghost expressed in technical jargon, a 
mediated, postrnodern ghost of the Reagan era with an alarm watch that beeps out 
"Wachet Auf." Yet, the 60s continued to return, albeit in these ridiculous, 
ideologically tinted, "fetishized" forms, because of their traumatic, indeed 
apocalyptic, place in American history. (1995, internet page) 
The continued and unavoidable "return" of the 1960s in the body of the 1980s, as 
a ghost, causes the "system" in power to find a way of defusing them. Television enables 
them to hide the 1960s in plain sight, re-cast it as entertainment so that the people stand 
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to one side of it, remain passive. 
In addition to this, Pynchon regards television as a kind of drug. While TV is thus 
linked in some ways positively with the counterculture, drugs are also seen as being 
controlled by big government forces - FBI agent Roy Ibble has an epiphany, late in the 
novel, during which he identifies George Bush as a drugs overlord2• Ibble is suspicious 
of "how cheap coke has been since '81... I say that whosoever the CIA putteth in its 
meathooks upon the world, there also are to be found substances which God may have 
created but the U.S. code hath decided to control. Get me? Now old Bush used to be 
head of CIA, so you figure it out" (353-4). The characters here have been rendered 
utterly passive by television. The confusion and loss it causes them puts them in a state 
of anaesthesia - it is as if they are on drugs, as the comparison with secret government 
cocaine peddling makes clear. 
Totality, totalitarianism 
I will be arguing that post-industrial capitalism, as it is described by Pynchon in 
Vineland, and indeed Gravity's Rainbow, as well as Ellis in American Psycho, fonns a 
new development of mass totalitarian society. In this fonn of totalitarianism, it is not the 
Party that extends its power throughout all of society, but a specific economic system of 
relations, based around the commodity and the spectacle. Structurally, however, its 
similarity to older forms of totalitarian society is striking: it is not merely the political 
institutions of society that have been captured by the dominant ideology, as would be the 
case in an authoritarian government, but the entirety of society. 
Carl J. Friedrich characterised totalitarianism with six general points (Friedrich, et 
al 1969, 126). The first of these is that a totalitarianism has an official ideology imposed 
without exception upon the popUlation. This ideology appealed to an over-arching law 
which would lead to a "perfect final state of mankind" (Schapiro 1972, 18). Also, there 
was a single party with a single leader, which, as Leonard Schapiro put it, was "organised 
hierarchically and either superior to or intertwined with the state bureaucracy" (ibid). 
2 President George H.W. Bush, just to clarify, who was Reagan's Vice President in 1984 when the bulk of 
Vineland is set. 
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The ideology was imposed by "a technically conditioned near-complete monopoly of 
control, by the party and the bureaucracy subordinate to it, of the effective use of all 
weapons of armed combat; a near-complete monopoly similarly exercised over all means 
of effective mass-communication; and a system of physical or psychological terroristic 
police control" (18). 
Claude Lefort notes that totalitarianism was not a form of the state but more 
properly "a form of society", in which "the political ceases to exist as a separate sphere" 
(1986, 79). The totalitarian party was a political organisation that monopolised not just 
the usual organs of political control such as the police, the army, the secret service and 
the state bureaucracies, but in addition, all political, economic and social organisations 
from the church, schools, local bodies, outdoor education groups. The result is that the 
political, monopolised by the one official party, becomes identified with society as a 
whole: "[t]he party embodies in bureaucratic society an historical function of an 
absolutely new type. It is the agent of a complete penetration of civil society by the state. 
More precisely, it is the milieu in which the state changes itself into society or society 
into the state" (80). 
Lefort suggests that it is this identification of the party with society, coupled with 
the technological means to enforce it, which sets totalitarianism apart from previous 
despotisms. Identification of the political sphere with the social leaves no room for any 
alternative: the ideology of the ruling elite here enacts closure by permeating throughout 
every sphere of existence. According to Hannah Arendt, whose The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1953; 1967) is a classic if not universally accepted study, Hitler's and 
Stalin's regimes were able to achieve their control by means of tactically deploying 
chaos, paradoxically guaranteeing absolute obedience to the official ideology. They do 
this by "set[ting] everything around them in motion" (306); both set up a confusion of 
rival bureaucracies in their respective civil services, with very little guidance as to lines 
of command or demarcation (see 400-4; also noted in Gravity's Rainbow, 421). The 
resulting competition to best carry out the wishes of the leader produced absolute focus 
on the task at hand and on the wishes of the leader, a focus reinforced by the ever-present 
threat of the "liquidation" of failed bureaucracies (Arendt, 404). In this way, the 
"destiny" of the movement, linked ideologically to an overarching law, dogma or truth, 
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seemed to fulfil itself as ifby magic (349-50). 
What justification is there, then, for considering late capitalism to be a fonn of 
totalitarianism? At first, it seems something of an absurdity: late capitalism operates 
under the conditions of political choice: there is no single party that has monopolised the 
ideology of society. Nor do the police and other state power apparatuses exercise 
excessive control by force of anns - although they frequently do exceed their powers, 
even Yond's squadron does not operate at the extremes of the SS or Stalin's secret police. 
Indeed, one of the central themes of Vineland is that such tactics are now obsolete, and 
are no longer so much supported by those in power, so that Reagan's budget cuts 
ironically save Prairie from Brock at the end. Nor is it necessary for the state to 
monopolise mass communication, or plan the economic direction of the state centrally. 
However, Vineland suggests that the U.S. has been governed by a totalitarian 
movement in power since at least the 1960s, although it is one that has changed character 
over that time. The episodes set in the 1960s (and before) depict repressive use of state 
violence, and it is suggested that this continues into the present of the novel. By Reagan, 
the need to have a leader, a single "man", backed up by secret police, has become 
obsolete for totalitarian-like conditions to nonetheless prevail. Reagan continues to rule, 
but he now has a far more effective means than Brock's PREP camps at his disposal to 
suppress disruptive elements: the spectacle (which nonetheless existed during the 1960s 
but has become even more dominant since), which Debord describes as totalitarian. The 
possibility of totalitarianism in Western democracies is suggested by Lefort: 
[totalitarianism] is beginning to be felt in the United States, even though 
democratic institutions have not ceased to operate there. This is because, at the 
deepest level, it is linked to the structure of modem production and to the 
requirements of social integration which correspond to it. The expansion of 
industry, the progressive invasion of every domain by its methods while 
increasingly isolating producers in their own particular spheres, brings about, as 
Marx indicated, a socialisation of society, placing each individual in a state of 
dependence on all others and rendering necessary the explicit recognition of the 
ideal unity of society. (Lefort, 79-80) 
In Reagan's Vineland, Althusser's conception of ideological interpellation has 
extended itself into every area of life (1971). For Althusser, ideology "calls", as it were, 
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someone to it (48). Here, the term has two separate senses: there is the specific term used 
to refer to this or that ideology (he's a fascist, she's a free-market capitalist, he's an 
imperialist), and there is a more general use, one which is applied to ideology generally, 
or to "overarching ideology" (7). In the bourgeois state, there is no escape from ideology 
(44), which is a "representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence" (36). This is because bourgeois societies deploy a variety of 
"ideological state apparatuses" (16-17), which complement "(repressive) State 
Apparatuses" (16). Ideological state apparatuses include the education systems, religious 
systems, the family unit and others, all geared as an unconscious function to interpellate 
people as subjects of ideology, and so to subject them to ideology and make them 
ideological subjects (49). Ideology, in this sense, functions somewhat like a mirror: 
people see an image of themselves in the ideology reflected back to them (54). This 
process functions in a similar way to that of Jacques Lacan's "Mirror Stage" of 
psychological development (see below, 74). The ideology provides a whole and socially 
cohesive identity, and so their subjectivity becomes rooted in a misrecognition of 
themselves as naturally belonging to this ideology (56-7). In this way, the pleasing 
nature of the ideology can reinforce the ego. It is through ideology generally and 
ideologies in particular that certain things are read in certain ways, and that common 
sense becomes common - "it is a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes (without 
appearing to do so, since these are obviousnesses) obviousnesses as obviousnesses" (46). 
Lefort notes a similar thing about late capitalist society, although he resists 
labelling it totalitarian. Instead, he prefers to conceptualise it as sui generis, a 
supercession of a form of totalitarianism that has become obsolete. But if we look at the 
way he theorises Stalinism, and apply it to the cultural situation that emerges in the texts 
we will read here, the comparisons are quite striking. To Lefort, Stalinism is a stage of 
the totalitarian party. It "appeared when the party succeeded in concentrating all power 
in its hands, identified itself with the state, and, as the state, subordinated all other 
institutions in society to itself and freed itself of all social control, while at the same time 
seeking to eliminate all opposition within its ranks," as John Thompson puts it in his 
introduction (Lefort 1986, 5). In the case of late "spectacle" capitalism, instead of 
concentrating all power in the hands of a party, which is obsolete in ideological terms, 
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everYthIng in society makes assumptions that are based on the spectacle's logic. This is 
more or less Althusser's definition of ideology; it is that which makes obviousnesses 
obvious. The spectacle identifies, not with the state, which again is growing obsolete, but 
with society and also with democracy - with something greater than the state. All 
institutions are subordinated to it because everything is based upon looking, and upon 
commodification. The spectacle, as Pynchon and Ellis will depict it, has freed itself of all 
social control, and while (American Psycho notwithstanding) it uses violence less 
commonly to eliminate the forces opposed to it than Stalinism did, as Pynchon notes, it 
negates opponents both by the dominance of the spectacle ideological apparatus (in 
Vineland characters cannot think outside the parameters of "the Tube") and by its power 
to delegitimise and select. 
Implicit in this is a deliberate breaking down of differences, a feature of 
postmodernity, so that totalitarianism can claim that "the separation between different 
domains of social life is negated" (Lefort, 6). Society has metamorphosed, then, so that 
"the political ceases to exist as a separate sphere" (6). This homogenisation is a 
deliberate strategy of the ideology. Lefort calls the "new society" of the Western 
Democracies the "invisible ideology" (see 224-36). As with totalitarianism, this 
ideology's purpose is the homogenisation of society, only with totalisation implicit, 
whereas before it was explicit, seen as a good (225). Mass-media and advertising, and the 
discourse of consumption, create a closed universe, which in effect is a modem mutation 
of the totalitarian fonn. Postmodern and post-structuralist ideas about resistance to 
closure and endless freeplay of the signifier add to a sense of things being set in motion 
in a similar way to the methods of the totalitarian movements (Baudrillard's depictions of 
postmodern environments in "The Precession of Simulacra" [1984] and "The Ecstasy of 
Communication" [1983] provide an excellent sense of this). This suggests that late 
capitalism's totalitarian tendencies, in which the commodity colonises every conceivable 
aspect of existence, are well-suited to some postmodern concepts and phenomena. 
Gravity's Rainbow is similarly about totalitarian conditions. Early on, it is 
explained about Slothrop that "They [have] busted the sod prairies of his brain, tilled and 
sown there, and subsidised him not to grow anything of his own ... " (210, my ellipsis). 
The System is so effective at this sort of control that, as we have seen, even strategies of 
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resistance can be pulled into the service of the system. Ultimately, this total control leads 
to ideas of transcendence, because the belief is there that everything can be captured by 
the system, and so the system itself must have a definable shape, one that can be seen if 
you fmd a certain purity, a "high" enough position above it. 
However, history shows that this sort of transcendence has a downside: it 
establishes itself by violence, because it can never be fully realised in the world. Once 
totalitarianism developed, such action could be taken against any group that had been 
consigned to statelessness (Arendt, 290); in other words, those that did not "belong". 
Stateless people exist outside the system of legal identity, and are therefore problematic 
for the nation state itself. Thus, the totalitarian regimes she investigates (Nazism and 
Stalinism) were able to perpetrate a "calamity of the rightless" (295), whereby no legal 
protection was given to whole communities of disenfranchised people, who had no 
country to go to when they were deported. The Jews are the example par excellence of 
this tactic: Hitler did not immediately declare their extermination, rather, despite his 
absolute powers to commit arbitrary acts, he carefully cleared the ground first by 
depriving them of citizenship. Such treatment is typical of totalitarian regimes. Founded 
on self- or propaganda-produced mythologies, totalitarian regimes have no enemies, only 
victims. Only innocent people, people who the state holds in no regard whatsoever, could 
lose rights so completely. They are first constructed as "other", and then removed 
absolutely from the totality. Since nothing can exist outside the totality, they are turned 
into nothing. 
It is actually better to be a criminal in a totalitarian regime than to be innocent, 
because then, with the legal identity criminality provides you with, you are at least 
entitled to legal rights (295). The state recognises you, and so must identify with you to 
an extent. The totalitarian citizen is kept mobilised by the constant social change the 
leader keeps imposing on the people. It is as if the construction of an other, coupled with 
its extermination, or "liquidation", acts as the engine of the totalitarian party's power: the 
arbitrariness of the project provides terror that creates the means for absolute social 
control and obedience, an obedience that nevertheless does not increase the citizen's 
chance of being saved. 
The violence of a binary structure can help explain why totalitarianisms create 
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victims in such a way. It should be noted that it is only in the totalisation of a binary 
structure that such extreme effects are felt. As with the presence of meaning in a text, the 
full presence of a political ideology never "arrives", in Derridian terms, because it is 
always shadowed by "difference". The trace of the other ideologies haunts the structure, 
and so the system contains within it the aporia that would undo it. This could explain 
Stalin's famed paranoia, for instance: the system could not bear the pressure of its own 
maintenance - there always was an other, which to a system diffused totally throughout 
society meant something not of it. Since the system had no outside, as it was total, this 
other made no sense to it; it couldn't recognise it as being part of itself, and so sought to 
eliminate it, to "suture over" the difference within. Because this act never resolves the 
aporia, this process could logically continue until the system had devoured all of society. 
As Molly Hite notes, the transcendence that allows one to "see the whole shape at 
once" is, in Gravity's Rainbow, "inseparable from death" (cI983, 103). Hence attempts 
at transcendental, or total, control rely on "structures favouring death" (Gravity's 
Rainbow, 167). Death shadows our century, as the 00000 rocket shadows the Orpheus 
theatre at the end of Gravity's Rainbow. It does so when totalisation, be it fascist 
ideology practised by Blicero/Weissmann, the paranoia of a structure where "everything 
is connected" (703), or the corporate totalisation of Walter Rathenau ("structures 
favouring death" is his ghost's term) becomes a dominant impUlse in cultural relations 
and activities: 
"But this is all the impersonation of life. The real movement is not from death to 
any rebirth. It is from death to death transfigured[ ... ]. You think you'd rather hear 
about what you call 'life': the growing, organic Kartell. But it's only another 
illusion. A very clever robot. The more dynamic it seems to you, the more deep 
and dead, in reality, it grows. Look at the smokestacks, how they proliferafe, 
fanning the wastes of original waste over greater and greater masses of city. 
Structurally, they are strongest in compression. A smokestack can survive any 
explosion - even the shock wave from one of the new cosmic bombs" - a bit of 
a murmur around the table at this - "as you all must know. The persistence, then, 
of structures favouring death. Death converted into more death. Perfecting its 
reign." (166-7) 
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Totalisation and the aestheticisation of politics 
Rathenau has come to understand that as control becomes more widespread, to the 
point of being nearly absolute - as Their cartel spreads its net - death itself becomes 
dominant. Thus only when you are actually dead can you "see the whole shape at once" 
(165): absolute totalisation of vision can only take place from the perspective of death 
itself. 
Bite outlines the ways that Gravity's Rainbow faces this problem. The paranoia 
that Slothrop experiences throughout, forced by his relationship to Them, is just one 
example of totalisation (he too feels that "everything is connected"). Slothrop toys at one 
point with "anti-paranoia", the possibility that "nothing is connected to anything" (434), 
but Pynchon admits that "not many of us can bear [this] for very long" (434). This is, of 
course, a form of totalisation too, because everything is thus connected (and accounted 
for) in its essential unconnectedness. Slothrop quickly reverts, though. The novel's 
encyclopaedic reach, making just these Slothropian connections between such diverse 
areas of discourse as Tarot readings, the invention of mauve-coloured dyes, and the 
extinction of the dodo, for instance, add to the notion that such totalising connections can 
in fact be made. But often it seems that the point of all the learning that Pynchon shows 
offin these 760 pages is to demonstrate its own ultimate failure: as Bite says, 
[the] marked diffusion of the narrative energy so near the conclusion suggests that 
the text is thematically committed to incompleteness. The fact that ostensibly 
central concerns fail to achieve any sort of resolution reinforces this suggestion. 
Fundamental enigmas - the nature of Slothrop's relation to the mystery stimulus, 
the direction and target of Blicero's last firing, the purpose of the Bereros' rocket 
- are either left ambiguous or dropped entirely. (Bite, 97) 
The novel remains on the side of incompleteness, tempted but unable, or 
unwilling, to take a final step towards totalisation. While you cannot say that nothing in 
here is connected to anything else, neither can you say Pynchon connects together all the 
plot strands. 
The parabola is also a metaphor for control and structure. It represents the kind of 
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conceptual system that human beings use to circumscribe and rationalise their 
experiences in order to take charge of it. The irony that Pynchon explores in 
Gravity's Rainbow is that such a system always betrays its creators by claiming 
autonomy for itself. The more comprehensive the structure, the more likely it is 
to look like fate, so that humanity finds itself serving an antihuman Higher 
Purpose when it is seduced by the clarity and coherence of its own explanations. 
The implicit model for all such totalising systems is the myth of the providential 
plan, which purports to account for all aspects of human . life by directing history 
to a predetermined end. With the development of science and technology, this 
myth has become increasingly ironised: historical processes remain inevitable, but 
the goal of the system is its own destruction. By unifying experience within a 
controlling vision, humanity has arrived at a model of universal coherence that 
makes freedom impossible and annihilation imminent. (98) 
This refers to a structure favouring death, but it also suggests something else, 
Walter Benjamin's insights into the mechanisms of fascism. Seduced into admiring "the 
clarity and coherence of [our] own explanations", we members of humanity enjoy, 
aesthetically and perhaps even sexually (Gravity's Rainbow, 738), the shape of our own 
collective death: by being such an aesthetically pleasing structure, the aesthetics of the 
parabola - gravity's rainbow itself - mask or transfigure the death they promise. By 
learning to enjoy the coherence of a total system, we learn to enjoy the process that will 
result in our own death. After all, what is on the movie screen at the end of the novel? 
The parabolic path of a "bright angel of death" (Gravity's Rainbow, 760), prevented from 
falling the entire way only by Byron the Bulb's brave but useless sacrifice ("a projector 
bulb has burned out" (ibid), giving the audience a disturbingly white screen, or page). 
We have "not learned to see" (ibid) the real film. The audience therefore treats its 
collective death as spectacle - "corne-on! Start - the - show!", we rhythmically clap 
(ibid). 
In "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" (1970), Benjamin 
traces the history of what he calls the aura of artworks, and links the breakdown of that 
aura created by technologies of artistic reproduction with the fascism that had recently 
gained power in his horne country of Germany. For Benjamin, in the era of mechanical 
reproducibility, a work of art's very aesthetic ontology - its mode of being as an aesthetic 
object - changes (221). A work of bourgeois high art has an "aura", which provides the 
sense of high art's invincibility. People and institutions in power can hide behind this 
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aura, turning artworks into cult items that are only available to the initiated. By the 
twentieth century, this power has dissipated somewhat, because mechanical reproduction 
has democratised access to art (220). For the first time, reproduction techniques have 
created mass art, so that the power of the authentic object no longer holds its sway so 
much. Auratic art still retained traces of its original ritualistic function - ritual is the 
"location of its original use value" (224), but now, with reproducibility, "the instant the 
criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of 
art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice 
- politics" (224). Film and photography are modem artforms which are privileged in this 
regard. Because the aura is irrelevant to these artforms - in these "exhibition value for 
the first time shows its superiority to the ritual value" (226), and so in the debates over 
whether photography was to be classified as an art, there was a clear fissure, a clear 
epistemological break to be observed, as "the primary question - whether the very 
invention of photography had not transformed the entire nature of art - was not raised" 
(227). 
Benj amin claims that there had indeed been such a transformation. In order to 
accommodate this, new cults were developed by capitalist institutions such as the movie 
studios. These were cults of personality manifest in the "star system", and their function 
was partly to offset the potential of mechanically reproducible art to produce 
revolutionary consciousness in a Marxian sense. So there was a breakthrough in the 
potential of art for revolution, and in response capital moved to limit this new potential of 
mass art. The mechanical reproduction of art also created changes in human perception, 
changes which were produced by the loss of aura in art, and it has also given the 
spectator, the proletarian spectator in the case of film, access to a closeness never found 
in art before (233). Closeness comes when the aura shrivels away; the aura which used to 
create distance between the artwork and the viewer (223). In film, closeness also allows 
for extensions of human potential, in sight, where slow-motion shots might reveal new 
structural formations behind straightforward (and therefore mystified) actions. The Dada 
movement shocked people out of their intellectual complacency; film shocks physically 
as well (238). It is the newly found closeness to the work, caused by the disappearance 
of the aura, which is responsible for this shock. As the artwork is relieved of its cultic 
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origins, so is the recipient (240). This creates masses where, once, auratic mystification 
created classes. Lonely, passive contemplation is replaced by a collective audience of 
distracted viewers, viewers who are also, in the era of mechanical reproduction, forced to 
get close enough to a work of art to adopt a critical stance in relation to it (228). 
But what emancipatory potential modernisation of the arts holds, fascism 
organises for its own benefit. Industrial capitalism's ability to increasingly proletarianize 
the masses is organised by fascism without altering the property structure of society 
(241). Such a change .should have followed the awakening that technological growth 
provides the masses in their relationship to the arts, if fascism was to become a genuine 
socialist mass movement. But instead it became, in Germany, a totalitarian one. The 
withdrawal of the aura is compensated for by the mass cult of the Fuhrer, a totally 
attractive, non-auratic leader. As a defence against the newly-opened possibilities for 
revolution, rather than being given the opportunity to overthrow existing property 
relations, the newly-conscious mass is "given a chance to express themselves" (ibid). 
This renders politics aesthetic: "the violation of the masses, whom fascism, with its 
Fuhrer cult, forces to their knees, has its counterpart in the violation of an [aesthetic] 
apparatus which is pressed into the production of ritual values .... All efforts to render 
politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war. War and only war can set a goal for mass 
movements on the largest scale while respecting the traditional property system .... Only 
war makes it possible to mobilise all of today' s technical resources while maintaining the 
property system" (ibid). As one can see in the writings of the Italian Futurists, 
particularly Marinetti, the aesthetic justification for war was in place at the beginning of 
the century. "Unemployment and a lack of markets" (242) is responsible for the 
terrifying nature of modern imperialistic warfare, because technology can thus not be 
mobilised totally within the existing system of property relations. "Fascism ... expects 
war to supply the aesthetic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by 
technology" (ibid). Humans have become self-alienated to the degree that we can enjoy 
our "own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order" (ibid). We are alienated 
from ourselves and from our senses. This is at the heart of the aestheticisation of politics; 
fascism does not create these conditions, but manages them so that their effect is this 
alienation. The way to counteract this movement to aestheticise politics is to politicise 
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art (ibid), Benjamin says. 
Politics throughout Gravity's Rainbow are seen as being aestheticised. One 
example of this is the mythologising of the Rocket. The Rocket represents "any system 
which cannot tolerate heresy" (747) - heresy being, as Hite points out, "unorthodox 
interpretation" (Hite, 140). Thus it represents that very total system that created it, the 
bringer of death. Slothrop has a sexual connection with it, and hence "with his, and his 
race's death" (Gravity's Rainbow, 738). Others have a spiritual connection, as "a new 
dispensation" of the Earth is "brought into being by the great firing" (753). Inevitably 
this is expressed aesthetically, such as in the episode when Katje Bourgesius witnesses a 
Schwarzkommando dance, her own part in the rocket's "life" mythologised as the centre 
of it (657-8), or when members of the preterite perform a spontaneous rose-dance to 
represent the mushroom cloud hanging that very moment over Hiroshima (594). 
In addition, Slothrop, and his opposite Blicero, share an obsession with the rocket, 
that hypermasculine totem that Slothrop and Enzian both seek, and that Blicero used as a 
sacrificial vessel. It materialises Blicero' s fears, which operate on the level of race. The 
rocket represents the fullest extent of the totality that comes from fear of the liminal - the 
inbetween and indistinct "Zonal" middle. It is pure structure, associated with malevolent 
technology and the parabola, which represents logical certainty. It is also the erection, 
the blood-gorged steel hypermasculine figure of fascism, standing at attention. And like 
all such systems, as Hite says, its goal is its own destruction - it favours death. This 
rocket contains its human "other" within it; in a "womb" made of the new plastic 
Impolex G lies Gottfried, a feminised masochist and Blicero's underling. In this way, the 
explosion of the rocket will destroy what he represents. And, as Hite points out, in regard 
to his sacrifice of Gottfried in the rocket 00000, 
characters committed to totalising structures would rather erase [an "unsettling 
blackness"]. Blicero's murder of Gottfried is such an erasure, for Gottfried is 
sacrificed on the altar of the rocket, the principle of totalization and thus of 
hierarchy and subordination. The rocket dictates that the sweep of history arches 
over trivial human lives. As he careens towards death, Gottfried witnesses the 
whiting-out of his own personal experience as he is assimilated to the providential 
trajectory . 
... what is this death but a whitening, a carrying of whiteness to ultrawhite, what is 
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it but bleaches, detergents, oxidisers, abrasives - Streckefuss he's been today to 
the boy's tonnented muscles, but more appropriately he is Blicker, Bleicherode, 
Bleacher, Blicero, extending, rarefying the Caucasian pallor to an abolition of 
pigment, ofmelanin[ ... ] (Rite, 153, Gravity's Rainbow, 759) 
Aestheticised politics in Vineland 
Film and television in Vineland produce effects in both its politicised and non-
politicised characters. Frenesi's treachery against her comrades is in fact linked directly 
by Pynchon to her complicity with the Spectacle, even when she believed she was acting 
in the interest of Revolution. While she was with the radical film collective "24fps" she 
documented government atrocities, feeling safe in the belief that her films would tell the 
truth and hence participate in the Revolution itself. After having met Brock Vond on one 
of these film missions, she was slowly turned around, eventually working as a 
government bureaucrat, very much still at Brock's disposal. That Frenesi is vulnerable to 
this all along is suggested by a note Pynchon included in a copy of Vineland he sent to an 
old college teacher. "This is what you get for asking, a third of a century ago in class, 
'How about a story where the parents are progressive and the kids are fascists"', he 
wrote. "See, you never know when somebody might be listening" (see Hite 1994, 141). 
Frenesi's revolutionary film crew, named after the speed of the film, may be radical, but 
Brock is quick to notice that their use of their camera as a weapon might make their 
members susceptible to official power as they are already "turned on" to the exercise of 
power. The camera Frenesi is holding when she first sees Brock, according to Stacy 
Olster's analysis, contributes to her objectifying herself, while the camera techniques she 
favours, of course, are precisely those that objectify women in the 1930s and 1940s 
movies that compose what feminist critics call "dominant cinema" (Olster, 124). It is 
then logical that Prairie, watching Frenesi's old movies, has difficulty making an 
emotional connection with her mother because the films, already "mediated by projector 
and screen, afford no room for female spectatorship" (125). The camera people were also 
quite self-conscious about equating their cameras with guns, an analogy which provides 
them with some revolutionary rhetoric and quite a bit of their subversive raison d'etre. 
These techniques also, Olster points out, define the Tube in the 1980s (ibid), the medium 
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that killed the revolution "el deado meato". Television functions for Pynchon here as 
propaganda, and as an ideological brain-washing organ of the spectacle. A perception of 
things as spectacle is generally seen by Pynchon here as being fascist: when Frenesi is 
first turned by Brock, she exhibits her fascism by occupying a "world-next-to-the-world 
that not many would know how to get to, where she could kick back and watch the 
unfolding drama. No problem anymore with talk of 'taking out' Weed Atman, as he'd 
gone turning into a character in a movie ... " (237). As she perceives the world as total 
spectacle, she becomes immune to feelings of guilt. The distanced filmmaking of the 
24fps also becomes fascist precisely because the distance and contemplation it practices 
aestheticises the political, with the film-maker-shooters remaining safely out-of-the-
action (as Prairie notices when she can't find her mother in the films). They are 
detached, essentialising (the reality of the subject will be exposed by the act of filming 
it), "objective", and at-a-distance. Repressive impositions of purity are, as often, 
answered by doctrines of purity. Frenesi's vulnerability to fascist-type representation 
(she's sexually excited by men in uniforms, by superheroes, by Vond's power) is hence 
shown to be born of "progressive" aims. 
In addition, the "Tube's" totalitarian hold over the general public, rendering them 
passive far more effectively than force could, invites them into the sort of "extended 
national family" (269) the invocation of which is likely to bring Hitler into the reader's 
mind. Susan Buck-Morss (1992), reading Benjamin, posits an account of how various 
anaesthetising techniques have increasingly been put to political use. For her, spectacle 
may function as an anaesthetic, a drug that creates a distance from life as a protection 
from shock. This is achieved by creating the conditions in which narcissistic reactions 
against shock, which reinforce pleasing images of wholeness, are routinely produced 
under fascist rule, so that its subjects identify with pleasing political structures as a 
protection against the dangers implied by shocks. 
Buck-Morss's essay begins by showing that the human sensorium (our entire 
sense apparatus) begins and ends in the world, in its perceptive apparatus. It is not 
identical to itself, but rather it needs its other, the world, to function (12). Gradually, as a 
strongly desensitised version of masculinity became privileged in Western culture - she 
cites Kant and Neitzsche - ways were found for our "synaesthetic system" (13) to close 
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off from perception and sensation, and hence the world. The nineteenth century brought 
an era of "manipulative experimentation with the elements of the synaesthetic system" 
(21). It was an age when people from all social strata became addicted to recreational 
drugs such as cocaine. This is in addition to tea, caffeine, nicotine and alcohol, narcotics 
which were culturally accepted years before. 
Walter Benjamin's analysis of modernity posits the battlefield - a limit-field of 
human shock; Freud studied its effects on the human psyche (16) - as instead merely 
analogous to conditions of living in industrial modernity. In short, the general condition 
ofmodemity is shell-shock, created by our exposing our perceptive apparatus to potential 
danger. Dangers of this sort might range from the perils of operating industrial 
machinery, to crossing the road (an example Benjamin cites [250n19]), to the temporal 
and physical dislocations and fragmentation watching film or television produces in us. 
In the mid-nineteenth century a new disorder, characterised by "'Shattered' nerves, 
nervous 'breakdown', 'going to pieces', 'fragmentation' of the psyche" (Buck-Morss, 
19), called "neurasthenia", was identified, "caused by 'excess of stimulation .... modem 
civilisation's ever-growing tax upon the brain and its tributaries ... '" (19). The 
fragmentation caused by the spectacle, insisting on exposing people to violence and 
accidents for entertainment, seems to fit neatly into this economy of shock. Spectacular 
effects are described by Buck-Morss (after Marx and others) as "phantasmagoria", "a 
narcotic ... made out of reality itself' (22). If I try negotiating all the potential dangers 
inherent in modernity without the aid of narcotics, then my sensorium will sustain lasting 
damage, as the trauma begins to impact on my memory (19-21). Or worse - "for a drug-
free, unbuffered adaptation to shock can prove fatal" (21). Hence drugs are used to numb 
the sensorium by closing off the drug-taker's synaesthetic system from the world, 
because this world continually promises their system its downfall. Phantasmagoria also 
act as a narcotic, 
... not through numbing, but through flooding the senses. These simulated 
sensoria alter consciousness, much like a drug, but they do so through sensory 
distraction rather than chemical alteration, and - most significantly - their effects 
are experienced collectively rather than individually. [Because "the goal is 
manipulation of the synaesthetic system by control of environmental stimuli" 
(22)], [e]veryone sees the same altered world, experiences the same total 
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environment. (22-23) 
Few people would deny that drugs such as cocaine and heroin are a potential 
threat to the wellbeing of the organism that takes them. The possibility that living in a 
modem world necessitates their use to prevent death represents a very claustrophobic 
double-bind. "Drug addiction is characteristic of modernity. It is the correlate and 
counterpart of shock", Buck-Morss says (21). Spectacular phantasmagoric narcotics 
produce similar dark alleyways. Phantasmagoria (the example Buck-Morss gives is 
Adorno's reading of Wagner's Gesammtkunstwerk [25]) "hide[s] the alienation and 
fragmentation, the loneliness and the sensual impoverishment of modem existence that 
was the material out of which it is composed" (26). The spectacle is identical to this: it 
masks alienation with distraction, absorbing the subject into a total environment. This 
environment both produces shocks and provides the material for the sensorium's survival, 
its closure against shocks. The spectacle offers continuous shock. Its phantasmagoric 
effects numb or flood the subject's sensory apparatus, which becomes anaesthetised. 
Buck-Morss herself suggests the applicability of postmodernity to Benjamin's analysis, 
especially "the twenty-odd years I've been reading [the artwork essay] - a period when 
politics as spectacle (including the aestheticised spectacle of war) has become 
commonplace in our televisual world" (3). 
The net result of this is fascism. To make this point, Buck-Morss draws upon an 
argument Hal Foster makes while discussing surrealist sculpture. In "Annor Fou", 
Foster's aim was "to relate several works of Max Ernst and Hans BeHmer to a psychic 
apprehension of the body as armor", "an apprehension I want[ ed] to consider tentatively 
in terms of fascism" (Foster 1991, 65). One of the things he found was that Lacan's 
reformulation of the mirror stage related "to a fantasy of 'the body in pieces' (le corps 
morcele)" was "a retroactive effect of this imaginary unity of the mirror stage". 
Accordingly, if there is a breakdown of imaginary unity, a cnSlS in narcissistic 
identification, the subject feels threatened by this bodily 'chaos'. For Lacan this threat 
renders the ego not only paranoid but also aggressive, and this in tum compounds the 
aggressivity already immanent to its fragile foundation in the field of the other" (82, 
Foster's emphasis). Buck-Morss goes further and suggests that Lacan's Mirror Stage 
74 
makes a suggestive theory of fascism. She is struck, she says, by the temporal proximity 
of Benjamin's now-classic essay to Lacan's original formulation of the mirror stage. 
Lacan, in 1936, had been to see Hitler's Olympics, and Buck-Morss thinks that both men 
might have picked up on psychological realities prevalent at the time because the rise of 
various fascist movements might have brought hardening against modern danger to a 
point of crisis (Buck-Morss, 37). 
In the mirror stage, to summarize, a child aged between six and eighteen months 
identifies with the image of itself in the mirror. This image is reflected back to the child 
as more perfect than it is in reality: a child that age has not yet gained the motor control 
that this image-ideal seems to be exhibiting. Nevertheless, this experience, and others 
after it, is a crucial stage in formulating the "I", SUbjectivity. The child sees itself as 
whole and separate, pleasingly so, even though its identification is a mis(re)cognition of 
this wholeness (see Lacan, 1977, 3-7). As Susan Buck-Morss says, "the subject identifies 
with the image as the 'fonn' (Gestalt) of the ego, in a way that conceals its own lack" 
(37). The establishment of the "I" is therefore a process situated specifically in the 
imaginary. Once this imaginary wholeness is established, the subject will experience a 
retroactive fantasy of corps morceli ("body in pieces"), as a result of the repression of the 
body's non-perfection implied in the child's identifying with the image. 
Foster "situated this theory in the historical context of early fascism, and pointed 
out the personal connections between Lacan and the Surrealist artists who made the 
fragmented body their theme" (37). The point is the theory's retroactivity. "The 
recollection of this infant fantasy", the body in pieces, "is triggered in the memory of the 
adult by something in his or her present situation. Thus the significance of Lacan's 
theory emerges only in the historical context of modernity as precisely the experience of 
the fragile body and the dangers to it of fragmentation that replicates the trauma of the 
original infantile event.... Lacan himself recognized the historical specificity of 
narcissistic disorders, commenting that Freud's major paper on narcissism, not 
accidentally, 'dates from the begimling of the 1914 war ... '" (37). The fragmentation 
implied in the physical dangers of technology's mobilization has the potential to trigger 
such a narcissistic crisis, as does the obvious danger of fragmentation posed by war itself. 
Hence, as Foster suggests, Fascism thrived on a cult of a physical body armoured against 
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fragmentation and against pain (see Foster, 80-90). As Chapter five will show, under the 
spectacle too, the advance guard of the ideology armour themselves against the 
fragmentation suggested in the environment, while the rest of the population, such as 
those in Vineland who are ruled by the "Tube", are numbed into submission, and are able 
to enjoy the process of their numbing. 
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Chapter four 
A Total Fascist: Liminal Processes Favouring Totality 
Engineering conformity in Vineland 
Vineland, then, goes further than depicting an America pacified by the spectacle 
as totalitarian. It also characterises the U.S. Government, both before the spectacle 
became an effective tool of rendering the population inert, and after, as fascist, an 
accusation with its own set of connotations attached to it. Although Vineland continues 
the most political themes of Gravity's Rainbow, it pushes politics unmistakably into the 
centre, possibly because by 1990 Pynchon realised he was writing for an audience 
distanced from the highly politicised context of late 1960s radicalism. The themes that 
the later novel address include the idea that America is the result of a "wrong path" taken, 
that this path away from the possibilities of a "Vineland the Good" (Vineland, 322) 
necessarily involves the suppression of democracy, and that this suppression, imposed by 
an unseen "elect" element by way of its "creatures" (Gravity's Rainbow, 237), who do 
their bidding to advance their own interests and ambitions, requires a mechanics of 
thinking (or ideology) that turns people toward totalistic, systemic thinking. 
This argument is one that Gravity's Rainbow posits. What Vineland adds to it is 
specificity. Pynchon accuses America of using fascist techniques to control its 
popUlation, and in doing so locates the pacification of America as an issue related to the 
attractions of fascism. The fascism of agents like Brock Vond succeeded in turning the 
threat the late 1960s democratic movements posed into an opportunity to suppress future 
significant opposition to the "system" altogether. By 1984, then, Reagan had found a tool 
to totally impose official ideology on the popUlation. Invoking Nazi Fascism, as a 
specific type of totalitarian ideology, intensifies the political project of Vineland. 
Pynchon illustrates this by showing how the democratic movements of the late 1960s fell 
victim to their own contradictions - their belief in utopia led to the idealisation of a state 
of democracy, which introduced a systemic element to the democratic movement that 
worked against the ad-hoc project, as the early Counterforce recognised it, and 
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reintroduced the possibility of authoritarian power. Members and fellow-travellers of the 
radical movements apparently needed to envisage a perfect society that contrasted with 
the deficient one they revolted against. This allowed the Government to tum "radicals" 
back to membership of a system that is more solid and so seems more comfortable to 
them. By 1984, that need for stability had enabled the government to render much of the 
popUlation docile. This does not necessarily mean the production of fascist-like, 
personalities like Vond's will cease under the new form of fascism Reagan has 
successfully imposed. Pynchon does not explore the violence the spectacle's total 
presence in society might contain; Bret Easton Ellis certainly does, only, as is not the case 
with Vond, the victim of this personality in American Psycho is random and arbitrary. In 
Vineland this is only hinted at, with America described (in toto) as a "law enforcement 
apparatus" (354). On the whole, though, Vineland is more interested in how America got 
to this point. 
While it would seem on the surface quite enough to demonstrate that America has 
become a totalitarian society merely at a more technologically advanced state to those 
represented in Gravity's Rainbow, where the systems of the West, Russia and Germany 
all rested on the logic of systemic thinking and were all consistent with Their aims, 
describing the phenomenon as fascism adds an emotional resonance and directness: it 
provides a shorthand for political comment. It also opens the novel to a field of study, 
which applied to the signifiers of fascism in the novel can produce the possibility of a 
future democratic resistance to Their world. I will explore this set of counter-meanings in 
later chapters. 
Set in 1984, Vineland is ostensibly the story of a young girl's rediscovery of the 
mother who left her in infancy. The mother, Frenesi Gates, abandoned Prairie in order to 
go into witness protection. Now, prompted by the sudden and unexpected return into 
their lives of FBI agent Brock Vond, Prairie's father Zoyd Wheeler entrusts his daughter 
to an escape with her boyfriend, punk rocker Isaiah Two Four. While on the run, Prairie 
is able to find out why Vond is important to her parents (he and Frenesi were lovers, and 
he persuaded her to betray the revolutionary movements she belonged to); This partly 
explains why Vond is coming after Prairie now. Vond's latest activities eventually lead 
to a reunion between Prairie, her mother and Zoyd. 
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Vond, it turns out, is the agent not only of official and right-wing state control, but 
also of fascism itself. In this book, the battle is specifically a retrenchment of the right 
against the left. The novel contains a pocket allegorical history of twentieth century 
American radicalism and its failure. This failure, Vond himself theorises (albeit using 
some questionable tools), comes about because of a nostalgia, or a need for order: 
What really got his attention was the Lombrosian concept of 'misoneism'. 
Radicals, militants, revolutionaries, however they styled themselves, all sinned 
against this deep organic human principle, which Lombroso had named after the 
Greek for 'hatred of anything new.' It operated as a feedback device to keep 
societies coming along safely, coherently. Any sudden attempt to change things 
would be answered by an immediate misoneistic backlash, not only from the State 
but from the people themselves - Nixon's election in '68 seemingly to Brock a 
perfect example of this. (272-3) 
Lombroso's "undeniably racist spinoff from nineteenth-century phrenology" 
(272) suggests that their desire for order is a prerequisite to "society" as we understand it: 
society as a coherent entity that sutures over the differences it necessarily contains. 
Vond's own place in the novel, however, places racism and fascism into the centre of 
social life. 
Pynchon can be uproariously unsubtle about Vond's fascism - at one point 
Brock's FBI limousine takes off from his PREP camp leaving tire-marks in the shape of 
the SS insignia (274)! Frenesi herself is quite aware that her attraction to Vond is 
actually attraction to the power of fascism: "since her very first Rose Parade up till the 
present she's felt in herself a fatality, a helpless tum toward images of authority, 
especially uniformed men ... As if some Cosmic Fascist had spliced in a DNA sequence 
requiring this form of seduction and initiation into the dark joys of social control" (83). 
The best way to understand Vond is by using a construct of Klaus Theweleit, the 
"Soldier Male". Vond is a figure of reactionary masculinity; Theweleit sees fascism as a 
radicalised construct of male separation. In Thewe1eit's study, the fascist psyche is 
defined by its fear of femininity (1989a, 70-84; 183-204). This phobia is structured in 
binary fashion: symbolically, a solid, unchanging rock is masculine, while chaos, 
fragmentation and corporeality are gendered female. And the metaphors that pervade this 
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symbolic structure are hierarchical: masculinity is an ideal that is developed in high 
culture, which to the fascist is the only sort of culture there is. To a fanatical fascist, 
culture is a rarefied thing that exists in a pure state somewhere above. Below resides the 
feminine - real life with its floods of bodily fluids and chaotic desires (1989b, 45-52). 
Below too, exist the body's nether regions, the sites of sex and defecation, of pleasure 
and animality. Culture raises the fascist above this baseness, denying the nether regions 
and their functions. The fascist sees a chaotic softness in the world. Everything floods, 
washes and oozes around him, whether it be the proletarian, unsculpted masses, or soft-
bellied democracy; all this reflects the out-of-place substances from within his own body 
(which secretly disgust him). The disgust he feels about the inner chaos of his body is 
"hallucinated" onto the external world, so where there are groups of people interacting 
with the world, the fascist sees streams, torrents, wash, oozing flows of waste, of softness 
he associates with femininity. So he constructs his body as a dam, and hardens it. He 
darns two sorts of internal flow, his body fluids, and the undifferentiated flows of his 
desire, all to protect him from the "mire" of the outer world. He compares himself with a 
rock in a stream, impervious to its soft surroundings, or to a locomotive ploughing 
through a flood. When his body is combined in military formation with other bodies of 
the same type "totality machines" result - the unit, the army, the nation (223). The 
hardened fornlation defines culture, and it's the only beauty the fascist recognises. ill this 
way, the arrangement of the soldier's political body is aestheticised to the farthest extent. 
An ego construction based on (mis)recognition is resultantIy under huge amounts of 
strain, and its release is inevitable. 
Such a release, as the above suggests, is played out as a release by a male against 
femininity. Theweleit examines the considerable literature produced by the men of the 
proto-fascist Freikorp "soldier males" and notes the fantasies they indulge in of 
penetrating and. killing sexual women. These women disgust the soldier male: their 
sexuality is perceived as an abject flow that has the potential to envelop and drown him. 
These are in fact his own repressed sexual desires since his sexual desires, if they were 
allowed to be channelled outward toward normal libidinal resolution, would preclude the 
martial psychic arrangement that makes him a soldier male. He attempts to create and 
change his world in a way that makes this disgusting "other" no longer exist - his 
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masculinity depends, narcissistically, on a radical closure from an other which it does not 
recognise and which is therefore utterly foreign and threatening. Why this is so can be 
easier to see if we look at how European males were conditioned by their cultural milieu 
to associate categories such as fragmentation, mortal bodies, chaos and base substances 
with femininity. 
There was a major trend at the beginning of the twentieth century for writers and 
scientists to regard femininity as a dangerous threat to men. They advocated men close 
off from "others", "others" usually cased in the terms of race or gender. Bram Dijkstra 
(1998) shows how members of the Western masculine elites in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries came to believe that sexual contact with women drained them of 
their manhood. Through a detailed (if selective) study of the period's popular culture, 
and its popular interpretations of Darwinian biology, Dijkstra shows how male fears of 
femininity actually constructed perceptions of threats from other races (261-309). 
Scientists hypothesised that semen was the male essence, a pure form of blood, and that it 
provided not only for reproductive potential but intellectual and physical health as well. 
They concluded that the production of semen was aligned to the production of brain-
matter, and that semen that was not ejected from the body would be recycled by it, with 
physically and intellectually beneficial effects (55-62). This, of course, would only 
happen if the semen was retained to be recycled, and so there was a widely understood 
prohibition against ejaCUlation in some circles (72). (This provides history with a literal 
ideology of the sort of fluid control and damming Theweleit talks about). Women who 
were sexually aggressive, therefore, became threatening to them - to men their mission 
was to drain them of masculine power (90-96). Hence any group that seemed to desire 
the power of the male elites seemed to them to be like sexually aggressive women. 
Dijkstra explains the tendency for "others" to be represented as feminine in the culture of 
the time (he shows how the Jewish people were increasingly feminised in the 1920s by 
German and American film-makers): that this was so common suggests how precarious 
traditional patriarchal interests felt their position to be. 
In Vineland, Vond's dreams reflect the cost to him of a very similar masculine 
construct. In one dream, Brock has to secure a mansion he is charged with guarding, a 
fortress easily seen as a hypermasculine construct: "it was his job to make sure that all 
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doors and windows, dozens of them everywhere, were secure, and that no one, nothing, 
had penetrated" (275). This construct echoes the importance of the castle to the 
Freikorps (Theweleit 1989a, 86). In his dream, Yond becomes aware, or always was 
aware, of the "madwoman in the attic" of the mansion, which happens to be his 
"watchful, never quite trustworthy companion personality, feminine, underdeveloped" 
(275), a repressed femininity which Brock imagines will fall on him and rape his 
masculinity, killing "him" if given any freedom (275). 
Importantly, the feminine threat here comes from within the masculine construct. 
Brock's masculinity comes at the price of repressing his feminine interior, and also at the 
price of his own fear of sex, and hence his desire to tum sex into power. Brock uses sex 
throughout the novel to manipUlate people, usually Frenesi, but other lovers as well, and 
he has a fantasy of forcing Frenesi to perform fellatio on him at gunpoint in front of an 
entire compound of left-wing political prisoners. These prisoners are feminised: "the 
long-haired bodies, men who had grown feminine, women who had become small 
children[ ... ] ... the sort of mild herd creatures who belonged, who'd feel, let's face it, 
much more comfortable behind fences" (269). These people are thus Brock's 
"companion personality", just as the uniformed fascist is Frenesi's - the forbidden desire 
for dissolution into the feminine left haunts the fascist just as the desire to be contained 
by the masculine fascist haunts the radicals. For Brock this desire, to be raped by the left-
wing/feminine interiorised other, is so forbidden that he must defeat it by absolute control 
over that other - the parameters of sex, for instance, must always be drawn by its being 
an assertion of Brock's power. This mix is familiar: sex as murderous penetrative act; 
fear of sex, fear of femininity are all attributes of the Freikorps in Theweleit. The act of 
rape/fellatio here would be an equivalent to the soldier's act ofpenetrationlannihilation of 
a woman leading a demonstration, this act of violence forcing the others in the crowd to 
flee, or in this case, to accept re-education. The results are the same too: order under the 
creative gaze of the soldier, and his absolute mastery of the situation once his borders re-
form. 
Yond's confrontation with the feminis,ed members ofleft-wing movements in the 
novel comes when he subverts a fictional 1960s uprising at a California college. 
Provoked by a violent police crackdown on some marijuana smokers, the students seize 
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control of the campus and secede from the United States, naming their fledgling state the 
"People's Republic of Rock & Roll" (PR3). Although this state of affairs is tolerated for 
a time by the government, this is more so they can rehearse the revolutionary movement's 
collapse, organised by Vond, than because they were prepared to tolerate the republic. 
PR3 was founded at the "College of the Surf', a university that served the 
moneyed families of two of California's most conservative counties. Quite accidentally 
initiated during the raid by mathematician "Weed" Atman, who was tall enough to see 
what the police were doing to some of the students and so had a "law-enforcement 
epiphany" (207), the republic was soon in the grip of a cult of personality. Its declaration 
of independence piqued the interest of Frenesi Gates and "24:fps". Its arrival, though, 
represented the beginning of the end for PR3, because by then Frenesi was already in the 
process of being "reconditioned" by Vond. 
The people of the revolution unwittingly aided Vond and Frenesi by committing 
"the basic revolutionary mistake" (229) and retaining hierarchy (and hence structure) in 
the fonn of a leadership principle, "a classically retrograde cult of personality" (205). 
They were "more devoted the louder [Weed] screamed at and insulted them. 'Yes, my 
guru! Anything - chicks, dope, jump off the cliff, name it! '" (229) - they were "like 
ducklings looking for a mother" (229). Rather than committing themselves to the labour 
of extending their democratic enclave, they submit to their desire to be ruled, something 
Vond seizes upon to destroy the fledgling repUblic: 
Brock Vond's genius was to have seen in the activities of the sixties left 
not threats to order but unacknowledged desires for it. While the Tube was 
proclaiming youth revolution against parents of all kinds and most viewers were 
accepting this story, Brock saw the deep - if he'd allowed himself to feel it, the 
sometimes touching - need only to stay children forever, safe inside some 
extended national Family. The hunch he was betting on was that these kid rebels, 
being halfway there already, would be easy to tum and cheap to develop. They'd 
only been listening to the wrong music, breathing the wrong smoke, admiring the 
wrong personalities. They needed some reconditioning. (269) 
Hence, in its unconscious desires for order and for a father-figure, the left was quite 
closely connected to the right. The example of Frenesi's attraction to uniformed men is a 
case in point. These desires are for her "repressed double," characterised by self-
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alienation, of a similar kind to that found in fascism. As she approaches a revolutionary 
"ideal", an ideal absolutely other to fascism, unconscious desires for order start to 
manifest themselves. "24fps", being a purist organisation, installs an ideological belief in 
purity in its members. From there it is only the content of that totality that needs to be 
decided, and this is what Vond is able to work on, to "recondition". 
Liminal Processes Favouring Totality 
Vond has discovered a way of exploiting the "fascist longings in our midst" 
(Chow, 1995) so that social control of this sort can be engineered. This is analogous to a 
process the Soldier Males in Theweleit's study experience, and will form a vital 
component in my discussion about how Pynchon and Ellis suggest resistant strategies 
within a postmodem context, because the flux of a postmodem environment is able to 
produce this as a survival strategy among its sense-flooded sUbjects. As Theweleit puts 
it, "the monumentalism of fascism would seem to be a safety mechanism against the 
bewildering multiplicity of the living" (1989a, 219). This bewildering multiplicity has 
the effect in a fascist personality of causing them to harden like a monument, a statue or a 
rock or an ice block. These processes are the ones I alluded to in Chapter two, where the 
"Zonal" "chaos" might produce in people an unconscious nostalgia for strong forms. I've 
provisionally called these phenomena "Liminal Processes Favouring Totality". 
These are phenomena that can be observed when a subject encounters something 
"other" to him or her in ways that make the borders between them dissolve so that the 
subject loses his or her sense of stable selfhood. However, when this process is complete, 
the subj ect is found to have formed or reinforced a defensive armour against that very 
other. This is because of a culturaJIY produced fear of this "other", based upon a belief 
that it has the power to fragment and contaminate the self (or to drown it or wash it away 
on tides of desire). Subjects of these processes thus come to resemble total systems 
themselves, systems with no connection to or recognition of their "others". In 
contemporary culture, encounters with "liminality", a state of hybridity that radically 
opens the borders of the self, often seem to favour totality. This is due to the Spectacle's 
promotion of narcissistic conceptions of the ego. 
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The ego, when it is formed upon narcissistic lines (such as those described by 
Lacan in "The Mirror Stage"), encounters the "other" as a totem of narcissistic crisis, and 
the usual reaction to this is for the subject of such a crisis to increase their defences 
against it. This is because the narcissistic ego recognises no "other": any presence of the 
other threatens the integrity of the self, and so presents itself as a crisis, an "agency 
panic". A narcissistic personality produced by a (totalitarian) "fascist" culture is a total 
selfhood politicised aesthetically as whole and pleasing and superior in every way to a 
foreign other it does not recognise. Hence the formation of the "I" as it occurs in the 
mirror stage is characterised by Anthony Easthope and Kate McGowan as a paranoid 
structure: 
[i]n the I, as in the specular image, the subject seems perfectly to master its own 
lack. But the apparent solidity and permanence of the ego [its totality] must be 
constantly maintained against all that risks making it come to pieces. As Freud 
noted that in dreams a building may mean the dreamer, so Lacan suggests that the 
I is like a fortress which must constantly defend itself through denial... of 
everything that threatens to undo it. But then everything does. The I, then, is a 
paranoiac structure, likely to release aggression against whatever reminds it of its 
own unreality. (1992, 244) 
In this conception of the ego's origin, such a result seems inevitable. The formation of 
the ego is dependent upon the mistaken identification of the surface (a reflection or 
representation of the surface, in fact) for the whole. This means that the "ideal" "whole" 
self depends upon an image of a part (a fragn1ent that is "out there"): the very opposed 
"others" that "threaten to undo" the ego are what holds it together in the first place. 
Hence, forming a stable self brings the ego into proximity with an other the self desires. 
Totalistic ideologies, as we shall see, manage this event to produce conditions for 
their own success. A Liminal Process Favouring Totality re-channels desire away from 
any potential a liminal subject has to accept its connection with the other. Instead, this 
desire forms into a desire for totality, for the ego to be strengthened and extended by a 
social totality. This helps the individual ego feel both connected with something other 
(libidinal cathexis is exercised toward the higher ideal of the social totality, and hence the 
tension all this causes can be controlled) and remain narcissistic. While the tension may 
appear to have been eased, in fact it has merely been sublimated into a narcissistic 
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totality. It will continue then to build, making its future release necessary. This release 
comes about in the form of aggression against the other. With the Freikorps, this 
aggression is sublimated into aggression against official enemies - the soldiers are 
conditioned so they will explode into battle. Confronting an enemy, the soldier 
"dissolves" into them while killing, displacing the discharge or release normally reserved 
for sex (which expresses a dangerous libidinal attachment to the other) into the act of 
annihilating the other (1989a, 204, 1989b, 176-85). This represents a victory against the 
other, and so adds another brick in the wall of the total castle. The tension is thus 
restored, able to be used again when a victory over an enemy is required. 
So, as the process runs, a subject is (or feels) confronted by an other, which 
narcissistic construction renders threatening. Boundaries break down between the self 
and the other (this is the liminal stage of the process), whereupon the other is defeated 
and annihilated, or cancelled out in some other way (the self disconnected radically from 
the other). This is a liminal structure as it was identified by the anthropologist Victor 
Turner in the 1960s. The process he described was a ritual process in which social 
transformations took place by a participant's surrendering of the boundaries of their self, 
so that it was, once the ritual concluded, re-established in a new social configuration 
(1967). The word "liminal" refers to this transitional period, the point at which borders , 
blur as the one and the other thing intertwine. 
Nazi Fascism and other totalitarian systems use liminal processes and the fear of 
fragmented states they encourage, to reinforce existing social configurations and armour-
plate them 1. The (totalitarian) "fascist" subject merges identity with its other because it 
provokes narcissistic crisis, and is then able to allow the (totalitarian) "fascist" to 
radically reinforce its own integrity, rather than become reconfigured socially. It is for 
this reason that totalitarianisms are often regarded as extreme forms of conservatism. 
This process of armouring, however, unalterably changes the social, as any inherent 
flexibility it had as a conservative configuration is eliminated. Thus, as well as extreme 
conservatism, (totalitarian) "fascisms" are radical in their attempt to preserve the 
structure of social control, and as a result they look very different from what came before 
IGeorges Bataille's essay "The Psychological Structure of Fascism" also appears to support this structure: 
for Bataille it was the "heterogeneous" elements of society that produced the fascist movements, but once 
in power, they became exemplars of social "homogeneity" (see Bataille, 1985). 
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the "crisis" that inaugurated them. This crisis is one brought about by teclmology and the 
effects it can have upon the body. 
Vineland: (totalitarian) "fascism" 
As I have indicated, Vineland's accusations of fascism range wider than merely 
the personality of Brock Vond. Vond and his drug-enforcement cohorts are explicitly 
identified as fascists, the government and Brock are seen as a continuum by the left-
leaning Ditzah and DL, as they explain to Prairie: 
"Why would he [Brock] come after us? Is he trying to roll back time? 
What is it that's so hard for him to live with?" 
"Tum on his past like 'at, don't know, Ditzah, sounds too weird even for 
Brock." 
"Then again, it's the whole Reagan program, isn't it - dismantle the New 
Deal, reverse the effects of World War II, restore fascism at home and around the 
world, flee into the past, can't you feel it, all the dangerous childish stupidity - 'I 
don't like the way it came out, I want it to be my way.' If the President can act 
like that, why not Brock?" 
"You always did look at things more historically. What I just figure is is 
he's a mean mother fucker, that's a technical term, and a lot of these MMF's as 
we call 'em tend to be spoilers which if there's something they can't have, or they 
know they've already lost, why, they'll just go try and destroy as much as they 
can anyway, till it's over." (265) 
Ditzah's comment here explicitly labels the American government fascist, and the 
narrator would appear to support this. America's anti-democratic impulses can be seen in 
the novel's continued government harassment of "alternative lifesty1ers", in the ease with 
which the FBI is able to entrap citizens in order to manipulate them, and in its desire to 
control the spread of certain ideas ("the wrong music" for example). The overthrow of 
PR3,s democratic revolution (it was democratic for an euphoric while anyway, until it 
was turned authoritarian) is, for instance, compared to CIA interference in Chile, where 
the U.S. helped overthrow a democratically elected Marxist government by sponsoring a 
.coup by a military/neo-fascist regime. This comparison is introduced surrealistically: 
during one of their last nights together, Frenesi awakens to hallucinated voices emanating 
from Weed's sleeping face. In what might be called "predictive guilt", Frenesi hears the 
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sounds of a card game, one she didn't know at the time (it was still in the 1960s, perhaps 
four years before America supported fascism in Chile), but one "years later" (238) she 
was able to identify as "pinochle", a name that suggests a pun on Augusto Pinochet's 
CIA-supported rule over Chile, beginning in 1973. Not only are the American 
government "restoring fascism at home" by turning America into a giant "law-
enforcement apparatus"(354), but overseas as well, in places such as Chile (and, of 
course, Vietnam, which is nonetheless conspicuous by its absence in Vineland). 
Also belonging to the first category are the methods of control displayed by this 
new wave of American fascism, the "machinery" that Nixon set up and Reagan has at his 
disposal (264). At first this machinery was traditional to totalitarian regimes: Brock runs 
a "PREP" (Political Re-Education Program), where the ex-hippies and political dissidents 
from the left are seen (in the words of N. Katherine Hayles) as "en-ant children" (1994, 
19). This recalls the fascist mechanism of removing the role of parenting from the 
family, and thus making the family itself redundant. Theweleit showed how children in 
the Third Reich were often beaten by fathers who had lost their parenting role (and 
authority) to the Party (1989b, 252-3). Hence, because Pynchon sees this America as 
fascist, he makes families problematic throughout Vineland - alienation between children 
and parents is one of the novel's themes. Brock has broken up Prairie's family and has 
put systems in place to make sure they do not reunite - this is the function of Zoyd's 
"public display of madness" which opens the novel: it earns him a government cheque 
and allows Vond to monitor Zoyd's whereabouts. Late in the novel, Brock even tries to 
convince Prairie that he is her father. Vond's control over Frenesi also breaks her away 
from her left-wing parents Sasha and Hub, and hence, politically, away from the left, 
while DL and Prairie's friend Ch6 both come from and periodically escape their violent, 
argumentative parents. 
Vond capitalises on the naivety of the students of PR3 and manipulates them into 
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betraying their friends, lovers and leaders, before using them to help America manipulate 
a generation into betraying its ideals. Ifin Vineland, as Eric Solomon argues, 1930s left-
wing struggle and innocence, represented by Frenesi's parents and grand-parents, is 
betrayed by the anti-Communist blacklists of the 1950s, then the perhaps flimsier 
idealism of the 1960s was betrayed by the 1980s (Solomon 1994, 164). At least, by 
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1984, any semblance of left-wing radicalism seemed to have disappeared and to Pynchon 
it was undermined by the 1960s, so that the sixties in a sense betrayed its own. This is 
the vital difference, in fact: Hub Gates might have been assaulted by company goons on 
the picket lines, but at least he was able to retain his integrity: they took his body but not 
his "soul", so to speak. Sixties betrayal was more insidious because it turned 
revolutionaries of the left into, not defeated revolutionaries, but into revolutionaries for 
the right. 
Hence Pynchon is able to produce an historical understanding of how the 
revolutionaries of the 60s generation might become "fascists", and by analogy how other 
revolutionary movements in the past have transmuted into repressive, amloured regimes. 
Here, a narcissistic crisis is managed to create a fantasy of the body in pieces, so that a 
desire for safety, for order, is felt. The citizens of PR3 display their susceptibility to 
Liminal Processes Favouring Totality in their own naivety, by seeking to name their 
republic after "the one constant they knew they could count on never to die" (Vineland, 
209), and by choosing a father-figure (Weed Atman), an act displaying a need to follow 
and admire someone. Hence they have betrayed a fear of disorder, of decay and death -
of the personal and social body in pieces - and have addressed this by putting themselves 
in the hands of a protector who can keep them together. 
However, when it was made to seem that Weed betrayed their trust (after being 
framed by Vond and Frenesi), he was murdered, and this unrest causes the end of the 
revolutionary ideal. The republic has "come apart" - their worst fears are realised, and 
they are susceptible to an alternative and stronger (and hence ultimately more attractive) 
totality, official America. The other leaders of PR3, such as Rex (Weed's actual 
murderer) a revolutionary idealist, have already retreated from the ideal of power for the 
people into a contempt for the people. While Rex is never actually turned, his predictably 
authoritarian behaviour is easily used by Vond. Frenesi sums up his thoughts when she 
describes what ought to be a democratic movement as something that instead demands 
absolute confomlity from its participants to the ideal of the revolution: 
You've been living on the same planet as all of us - every night they pick 
us up, and they beat us, and they fuck us, and sometimes we die. Don't any of 
you kiddies understand, we either have 100% no-foolin' -around solidarity or it 
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just doesn't work. Weed betrayed that, and it was cowardly because it was easy, 
'cause he knew we can't shut anybody out, down the end of that road is fuckin' 
fascism, so we take 'em all, the hypocrites and double agents and summertime 
outlaws and all that fringe residue nobody else will touch. That's what PR3 started 
out as - so did we for that matter, remember? The All-Nite Shelter. The lighted 
doorway out in the Amerikan dark where nobody gets refused? Weed remembers. 
(235) 
She manipulates the naivety of the group for the purposes of exactly what she 
argues against: shutting out. Her evocation of the myth of "America" is therefore apt: she 
is working for Brock here, as America closes its doors on democracy in all but name. 
Hence she pinpoints the fear of the other in the revolutionary grouping: when it becomes 
a bordered state with leaders and orthodoxies, it requires conformity, and the other is 
regarded as a danger to the community. Frenesi convinces Rex's friend Howie that Weed 
is "one of them"; has already convinced Rex (he already harbours personal enmity 
towards Weed), and so they naturally conclude that this other in their midst must be 
purged or they will all be destroyed. The students at PR3 don't understand it yet, but they 
have revolted into a form of fascism themselves, they've closed that door. Weed, 
meanwhile, starts to be seen as feminine by Frenesi and Rex: rather than being fully 
committed to the cause, he, "practising humane revolution" (229), was scattered, 
preaching, "wallowing in the everyday" (229), a softness which disappoints Rex. Weed 
is also defined by his sexuality (which is wild, not "in control" [237]) and by his tendency 
to become "hysterical" (237). Frenesi, meanwhile, as she becomes more "fascist", loses 
touch with "the everyday": "as if on some unfamiliar drug she was wallcing around next 
to herself, haunting herself, attending a movie of it all" (237). Frenesi is losing her 
feeling, becoming anaesthetised: "even sex was mediated for her now - she did not enter 
in" (237). 
Weed, Frenesi assures Brock, will be condemned "whether he lies or whether he 
confesses" (240), and he receives what amounts to a show-trial (Frenesi and 24fps will be 
filming it) worthy of Stalin's Russia. And Rex wants nothing short of a lynching: "We're 
in sudden-death overtime" (235), he says. This confirms what Brock said to Frenesi: 
"sooner or later the gun comes out" (240), confirmation of Brock's insights into how the 
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revolutionaries are prone to favour order and confonnity. Brock, of course, is all too 
happy to provide the weapon, and to make Frenesi, as an irreversible act of betrayal, plant 
it for Rex to find and use. After the murder, Nixon's anny invades and PR3 is destroyed, 
with most of its fonner citizens "re-educated" into becoming "useful citizens" - their 
psychic need and desire for order exploited, so that they can be assimilated back into a 
national family, led by a powerful father (first Nixon, then Reagan, in cahoots with the 
demands of the spectacle itself). That this eventuality is inevitable is signalled from the 
start by the daunting presence of a statue of Nixon at the fledgling republic's border. 
Here, it might seem, Liminal Processes Favouring Totality allow the fascists to 
WIll, to subjugate the population, so that the passive ones spectate while power is 
accumulated away from them and they eventually become victims of the need for that 
power to be exercised. An arbitrary, violent exercise of power against groups and 
individuals by the footsoldiers of the system on behalf of those who occupy the positions 
of power is one characteristic of (totalitarian) "fascist" systems. In the next chapter, 
Pynchon's and Ellis's depictions of the actions of these footsoldiers suggest that for them, 
this arbitrary violence is the case with America as well. 
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Chapter five 
Armoured Egos on the Rampage 
I saw a Werewolf 
Drinking a pina colada at Trader Vic's 
And his hair was perfect 
-Warren Zevon 
Psychic armouring in Gravity's Rainbow 
Liminal Processes Favouring Totality appear to have two distinct types: those that 
render subjects passive and unable to fonn a political response or even see the need to do 
so, and those that induce subjects, such as Brock Yond and Patrick Bateman, to fonn a 
defensive annour around the "system". Theweleit describes how a Soldier Male regards 
the interior of his body as frozen matter which he unconsciously cannot recognise 
because it represents the "other", an other he instead recognises in the environment 
(l989a, 198) 1. Here, an annoured (totalitarian) "fascist" system might fonn a similar 
structure: a population frozen, as it were, into place, surrounded by an annoured skin of 
footsoldiers, both sides of the dichotomy equally created by the same system. As 
(literally) the repressed material of the system, the pacified population might become an 
enemy to be disposed of if the system comes under sufficient threat of dissolution; Yond 
and Bateman, despite being members of the "annour" that fonns the outer edge of the 
system, actually battle members of their own population, not an external enemy. This 
chapter describes how these annoured personalities behave. 
That fascism is an important theme in Gravity's Rainbow appears obvious, and as 
with Vineland, its portrayals of fascist consciousness are not restricted to Nazi Gennany. 
Raymond Oldennan described Gravity's Rainbow as "at least, in part, a history of Nazi 
consciousness and a demonstration of how that consciousness is potentially common to 
everyone" (Hite c1983, 110). It is set during and just after World War Two, and the 
narrator takes pains to make sure readers. realise that the historical forces of this 
lTheweleit rejects the Freudian term "projection" as being inadequate to describe this phenomenon, 
because what the soldier-males experience are not fantasies but "hallucinatory object-substitution[s]" 
(1989a, 155) that create a reality experienced by the soldier males. 
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consciousness that lead up to the war were certainly not resolved by the Allied victory. 
Fascist Germany is described as a "corporate state" (Gravity's Rainbow, 419), the 
implication being that its underlying political and social systems are thus not much 
different from the allies', who integrate corporate structures into their economies. In fact, 
a direct comparison between the cultures of America and the Nazis is made when AWOL 
Slothrop hides from some American MPs. Slothrop "for possibly the first time is hearing 
America as it must sound to a non-American. Later he will recall that what surprised him 
most was the fanaticism, the reliance not just on flat force but on the rightness of what 
they planned to do ... he'd been told long ago to expect this sort of thing from Nazis, and 
especially from Japs[ ... ] but this pair outside the door now are as demoralising as a close-
up of John Wayne (the angle emphasising how slanted his eyes are, funny you never 
noticed before) screaming 'BANZAI!'" (256). 
Elsewhere Pynchon notes that the war was fought, not for a victory of right over 
wrong, or for freedom, but for "commodities" and "technology". "Technology as a 
source of power" (578), as in Fritz Lang's Metropolis (ibid), is identified as a fascist 
dream people have of a perfect society. This is brought up to date, where beneath the 
surface of the postindustrial, seductive mediascape (the "Rocket State"), in a late, future-
set episode, "it can get pretty fascist in here, behind the candy-colored sweet stuff is 
thennodynamic elitism at its clearest" (678). In Gravity's Rainbow, Liminal Processes 
Favouring Totality enable the advance of the ideology of structure, and of the totalising 
interests of the elect. They ensure violent responses to the unstructured other, and cause 
paranoia in general among the novel's characters. 
There are a number of examples of Liminal Processes Favouring Totality that lead 
to violence evident in Gravity's Rainbow. One, involving the fascist Major Weissmann, 
AKA Captain Blicero, is related by a peripheral character, Thanatz. Blicero "had become 
a screaming maniac", according to Thanatz. "Things were falling apart, and he reverted 
to some ancestral version of himself' (465). His eyes had become "the colour of a 
statue" (465). Later, from Greta Erdmann, Thanatz's wife, we learn that Blicero "had 
grown on into another animal... a werewolf... but with no humanity left in its eyes" (486). 
This is W eissmannlBlicero' s reaction to the fragmentation of his control - things were 
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"falling apart". He hardens, becomes less of a human, more statue-like, or like a 
werewolf (possibly when he was exploding as he would in battle). 
Of course readers of V will remember that Weissmann worshipped the proto-
fascist von Trotha, the instigator of that novel's account of German genocide. This 
episode recounts a massacre of Hereroes, an event which is also summarised in Gravity's 
Rainbow, as it forms background to the "Zone Hereroes'" place in the novel. This 
massacre, which Pynchon suggests was the holocaust in rehearsal (V, 245), exemplifies 
the creation of an ordered public space by the annihilation of the other within it, a process 
resulting from a Liminal Process Favouring Totality and which is described by 
Theweleit: "What the forces of terror aim to create is an empty square, an empty space .... 
With one fell swoop, [the soldier] eradicates the 'odious demon', the dangerous mass in 
which monsters lie waiting. Nothing remains to shower the soldier with spittle, to 
threaten him or rip him to pieces. The world is clean again: an empty space, untrod 
territory, a virginal body. The swarthy rabble gives way to a white totality. The man is 
whole again" (1989b, 34-5, Theweleit's italics). As Theweleit has it, this white totality is 
"a desire reach[ing] its destination" (34): the fascist purifies himself of the polluting 
other, the otherness he displaces onto the masses, onto sexual females, that his armour 
has caged inside him. In describing the soldier's reaction to the other, Theweleit 
describes a Liminal Process Favouring Totality: 
In [FreikOlps memoirist Ernst von Salomon's] texts there is no such thing as an 
open enemy, an open front, an open street; a boundary. The battle is internal. 
Three times, Salomon locates the sites of battle "within" - within the body of "a 
single gigantic city" (the region is "bleeding"); within the body of the earth (the 
crater); and within the man himself, as his body armor - the "respect for the 
law" ... "hammered" into him - dissipates and crumbles. Precisely because it has 
been "hammered" into him, and remains external, his body armour can now be 
cast off to allow his emotions to erupt with all their true intensity. His body armor 
crumbles in confrontation with "the wild, primitive instincts of the earliest hunters, 
the hunted animal." Initially, the fighting man himself is both hunter and hunted 
animal; he inclines toward self-mutilation; he is always at war with elusive 
enemies. But the moment the enemy comes within his grasp, the boundaries 
between his two personae lose their fluidity. The devils of hell have been gnawing 
at his liver, mashing his entrails to a pulp, but the moment the devils enter the 
open, his enemy is as good as dead. The blood of his victims must be made to 
flow free; how can they know that he rediscovers his boundaries only as a killer 
94 
wading in blood? He bathes and purifies himself in blood; to call battle a 
"bloodbath" is then clearly appropriate (at least for the man who takes it). (38) 
For the fascist soldier, the interior of the body is, as we know, corrupt, associated 
with the dead matter of the lower bodily stratum. This includes his '''inner life', the state 
of his inner drives" (20), which he experiences as "a separate entity, completely divorced 
from him" (ibid), or totally other. Weissmann, of course, has typically Nazi reactions to 
his body: "I want to break out", he tells Gottfried, "to leave this cycle of infection and 
death. I want to be taken in love: so taken that you and I, and death, and life, will be 
gathered, inseparable, into the radiance of what we would become ... " (Gravity's 
Rainbow, 724). He would rather abandon his polluted earthly body in favour of a 
transcendence into a radiantly pure "one" - a "blinding one", one without other. 
Similarly, Tchitcherine's enmity toward his half-brother Enzian comes from a fear of the 
other within: as Geli Tripping tells Slothrop, he "thinks of Enzian as ... another part of 
him - a black version of something inside himself. A something he needs to ... liquidate" 
(499). Tchitcherine's desire to liquidate suggests a desire to purge or remove this "dead 
matter" - Hereros were supposed to have been destroyed by Germans, not become them -
an enemy other he associates with his interior. This is a part of him he feels he'd be 
better off without: it is not really a part of him at all, it is something else. 
The opposition between self and other in these fascists corresponds to two others: 
"the 'mass' against 'culture', 'high' against 'low'. 'High culture' is seen to be threatened 
from 'below'" (Theweleit, 1989b, 43). 
In the writings of the soldier males, the concept of culture becomes a rock against 
which to break the feminine, contagious lust, dissolution - all the threats the mass 
contains. It is assumed as a matter of course that the Jews are not a "cultured 
people." For that "individual," a number of truths thus become self-evident. The 
man of culture believes, for example, that he can never be a "barbarian": he has a 
sense of existing at a great height above the ground, of having no connection to 
the depths of femininity. So vastly superior does he consider himself to be to the 
depths below that even mass human slaughter cannot make him a barbarian. It 
remains an act of culture. Such an act would demonstrate lack of "culture" only if 
he were to defect to the "mass", to become, say, another democrat in the crowd, 
the rabble. Mass murder is in no sense considered antagonistic to the 
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soldierly/masculine concept of culture (nor indeed does the latter surface only 
under fascism); on the contrary, if the world is to be formed as a landscape of 
culture, then it is seen as necessary to erase anything uncultured from the face of 
the earth - one way or another. (46) 
Relations of domination are stabilized through the encoding of our thought with 
the antitheses "masculine/feminine," "controlled/uncontrolled," "Precise/vague," 
"externallinternal," "conscious/unconscious." Anything "low" is seen as wrong, 
simply because it occupies a subordinate position. The individual of "higher 
culture" demands something "down below" that he can oppress as a means of 
actually redeeming totality and bodily wholeness. (52) 
This process and its attendant relations of cultural domination can be seen in Frans 
Van der Groov's mania for killing dodos on Mauritius in the 16th century, in a dream 
episode quite early in Gravity's Rainbow. The dodo was a bird that the imperialist 
European settlers could not find a divine use for; for them it fell outside culture. Because 
of this, they acted upon their desires to kill the birds until their extinction. The hunters 
themselves could not quite understand this impulse, but this is because the impulse came 
from a psychological need to destroy evidence that their divine world might not have 
total purpose. As Douglas Keesey notes about this episode, "The Dutch 'make sense' of 
these seemingly umecognisable animals by treating them as enemies of sense; the 
unknown other is 'understood' as a threat to be eliminated, a threat to the order of the 
Christian universe and to every individual Christian dependent on that order ... " (1986, 
86). The quote Keesey chooses to illustrate this brings Pynchon's concerns here back 
into terms we understand from Theweleit: 
To some it made sense. They saw the stumbling birds ill-made to the point 
of satanic intervention, so ugly as to embody argument against a Godly creation. 
Was Mauritius some first poison trickle through the sheltering dykes of Earth? 
Christians must stem it here, or perish in a second Flood, loosed this time not by 
God but.by the Enemy. The act of ramming home the charges into their musketry 
became for these men a devotional act, one whose symbolism they understood. 
(Gravity's Rainbow, 110) 
To those with investment in such a worldview, one breach opens the way for chaos (in 
the form of a heaving mass). This gives the enemy living space (the enemy always 
occupies the place of the other - in Theweleit it is represented by proletarian/Jewish 
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women (1989a, 70-79), here by dodos). Both are threatening because they might engulf 
the soldier male, whether fascist or Dutch Christian; as such the threat must be liquidated. 
This is actually a fear of the enemy within hallucinated onto the environment, something 
Pynchon appears to understand well. 
Another early episode in the novel concerns a proxy fantasy of Pirate Prentice's. 
This fantasy is of a giant adenoid, a delusion which had been obsessing one Lord 
Blatherard Osmo. Osmo is temporarily required elsewhere in the interests of British 
imperialism, and so Pirate, blessed with the ability to experience other people's fantasies 
in their place, has taken on the adenoid assignment. For Osmo to do his imperialist duty, 
and hence be of use to Them, he must first be relieved of his desires to connect with this 
abject interior. Osmo's interior is melting - the repressed is returning. The adenoid in 
Osmo' siP irate ' s fantasy grows out of control for a while, but is eventually stabilised (at 
the cost of several historic and government buildings) although it throws communications 
within government into chaos. Having drawn a circle around London, and become "as 
big as St Paul's" (Gravity's Rainbow, 14), the adenoid is related to "a new preterition 
abroad in England here that throws the Home Office into hysterical and painful episodes 
of indecision" (15) so that "no one knows what to do" (15). Hence the other within is 
again associated with the "Enemy", the preterite, and so this other falls on the side of the 
negatives in Theweleit's equation: "uncontrolled", "vague", "internal", "unconscious". 
The Adenoid's snotty noises act with the full horror of abject substances on those present, 
so the army is brought in to deal with this amorphous, hyper-corporeal and proletarian 
threat. Unfortunately, it defeats the army in its "full battle gear" (15) by "wip[ing] out 
the entire observation post with a deluge of some disgusting orange mucus in which the 
unfortunate men are digested - not screaming but actually laughing, enjoying 
themselves .... " (15). These men are considered "unfortunate" because they have failed to 
remain above the pleasures of the low. The anxiety felt by the narrator, possibly speaking 
from Pirate's point of view, at the prospect of being engulfed by the enjoyable, 
delightfully low substances of both the corporeal and social body is tangible. Here a 
group of soldier-males are engulfed by a flooding, oozing other, an internal substance 
which is associated with an external enemy. It is the anxiety at this that pushes the 
liminal moment of the adenoid's border-crossing into a need for totality and control. The 
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adenoid, even when "stable", represents "uncertainty" of communication and hence of 
control, an uncertainty shared by the authorities with regard to the people or the preterite. 
Finally, it is controlled by means of cocaine by some neo-Freudianists, who shovel the 
drug "into the germ toxins bubbling nastily inside its crypts" (16). 
Of course, this is all a fantasy, but it is a fantasy that needs to be controlled by 
those in power. Osmo is swallowed up, assimilated by this other, and, despite his fantasy 
being eventually managed so he can still work at his interventions in Balkan affairs, the 
"Firm" eventually have no further use for him. In the end, then, they allow him his desire 
for the feminine other; finally he is "discovered mysteriously suffocated in a bathtub full 
of tapioca pudding, at the home of a Certain Viscountess" (16). The (totalitarian) 
"fascist" elect thus arranges to prove that dalliances with the feminine-identified other 
result in engulfment - death by drowning. Here the distance and proximity of the ruling 
classes to their "other" plays itself out: Osmo's unconscious fantasies are deadly yet 
seductive, while the emergence of the creature from the aristocrat's nose (and its 
association with how his speech sounds "adenoidal" to "preterite ears" [Weisenburger, 
22]) suggests that the aristocracy retains an indefatigable association with the unclean and 
uncivilised. Not that the aristocracy is identical to the elect in Gravity's Rainbow - Osmo 
is a pawn just as Slothrop and his friends in the Counterforce have been. But Osmo's 
aristocratic heritage provides an instance where Pynchon shows how the other that has 
been passed over on the way to power will always come back to haunt those who try to 
discard it in their lust for power. The genuine elect are as affected by this as their 
ambitious pawns. 
Everything can be consumed 
Set in New York during the late 1980s, American Psycho's depiction of a late, 
spectacle capitalist environment amplifies the spectacle totalitarianism of Vineland, 
which was published shortly before and set a few years earlier. In American Psycho the 
commodity overtakes identity: there are quite literally no people in this book, only brand 
names. Ellis uses this depiction to show how (totalitarian) "fascist" consciousness, alive 
and well in the world of the stockbrokers that populate the novel, even if it has no 
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specific ideology or program to take hold of, is not divergent from the ideologies of 
capitalist success. In many ways, American Psycho is about a class of privileged males 
who feel that to survive, they have to assert a strong, competitive identity. They must 
become like this to be the vanguard, as the highly "successful" are the new "armoured" 
class in this environment. Because commodification has literally infused itself into every 
area of life in this environment, the commodity has become the best place the "I", the 
identity of the men in the book, has to establish itself and its right to survive. As such, 
identity rests upon something very flimsy, commodities and commodified images, things 
able to be bought and sold, that may be merely image and nothing more, and that are 
subject to radical change. This makes reinforcement in a strong (ideological) mirror a 
necessity for them. It is why, I will argue, the (totalitarian) "fascism" of the stockbrokers 
in American Psycho is located at the heart of this late-capitalist environment: this 
environment, produced by capitalism, in tandem with the totalistic ideologies of capital 
and spectacle, produces Liminal Processes Favouring Totality. The way Patrick Bateman 
behaves, it is either that or drift into a radical negation. The fear he has of this negation 
explains why he is not passive as the Tube's subjects in Vineland are - negation to him is 
equivalent to Vineland's sort of preterition. Bateman is privileged and sees himself as 
elected, as superior, and so to defend his position, he must defend the system that puts 
him there. 
He has thus totally internalised the logic of the commodity. Whenever someone 
enters a room Bateman describes what they are wearing, according to brand-name. Here 
is a random example: 
Dibble is wearing a subtly striped double breasted wool suit by Canali Milano, a 
cotton shirt by Bill Blass, a mini-glen-plaid woven silk tie by Bill Blass Signature 
and he's holding a Missoni Uomo raincoat. He has a good-looking, expensive 
haircut and I stare at it, admiringly .... I am wearing a mini-houndstooth-check 
wool suit with pleated trousers by Hugo Boss, a silk tie, also by Hugo Boss, a 
cotton broadcloth shirt by Joseph Abboud and shoes from Brooks Brothers. (63-4) 
Descriptions of this type are offered almost every time someone is pointed out by the 
narrator. It doesn't matter whether this person actually takes part in the action, or 
whether they are merely sitting at a bar, or standing alongside a Wall-Street broker 
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Bateman thinks he knows. These descriptions are in lieu of the narrator actually 
describing the person wearing the outfit. Rarely is Bateman interested in doing this, 
because everyone who is important to him looks the same anyhow: they all wear 
expensive suits and shoes, usually in accordance with complex rules and grammars of 
dress (discussed at great length whenever Bateman and his colleagues are socialising, 
which is frequently. These discussions must be attended to, and homework done, 
because the stockbrokers are prone to bouts of knowledgeable one-upmanship and 
testing). Also, they all have the same expensive haircut, they are all young and white, 
and they all wear designer-rimmed glasses, whether they need them or not. They all keep 
meticulously clean. They all work out extensively. The only times the narrator actually 
describes what someone looks like is when they fail to meet these norms, and even then 
we get only snatches of description: a homeless "bum's" eyes (which Bateman blinds), 
some grey hair, a beard, Blackness, Iranian-ness, Armenian-ness, Jewishness, Chinese-
ness, or slightly-overweight-ness (especially if Bateman is describing a threatening 
woman). 
This sort of commercialised detail also prevails when Bateman tells us of his day-
to-day activities. The health club he belongs to is typical: 
In the two years since I signed up as a member, it has been remodelled three times 
and though they carry the latest weight machines (Nautilus, Universal, Keiser) 
they have a vast array of free weights which I like to use also. The club has ten 
courts for tennis and racquetball, aerobics classes, four aerobic dance studios, two 
swimming pools, Lifecycles, a Gravitron machine, rowing machines, treadmills, 
cross-country skiing machines, one-on-one training, cardiovascular evaluations, 
personalized programs, massage, sauna and steam rooms, a sun deck, tanning 
booths and a cafe with a juice bar, all of it designed by J.J. Vogel, who designed 
the new Norman Prager club, Petty's. Membership runs five thousand dollars 
annually. (67) 
In a similar vein (I'll stop doing this soon) Bateman describes his getting-up routine: 
Then I squeeze Rembrandt onto a faux-tortoiseshell toothbrush and start brushing 
my teeth ... and rinse with Listerine. Then I inspect my hands and use a nailbrush. 
I take the ice-pack mask off and use a deep-pore cleanser lotion, then an herb-
mint facial masque which I leave on for ten minutes while I check my toenails. 
Then I use the probright tooth polisher and next the Interplak tooth polisher (this 
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in addition to the toothbrush) which has a speed of 4200 rpm and reverses 
direction forty-six times per second; the larger tufts clean between teeth and 
massage the gums while the short ones scrub the tooth surfaces. (26) 
And on it goes - quite literally: the paragraph this quote is taken from doesn't 
finish until most of the way down page twenty nine. Consumption is, for this man, 
emphatically, conspicuous. Bateman is never slow to boast to others about what he owns, 
nor is he slow to purchase things he feels he needs to own, even if they are profoundly 
redundant: "I buy two copies of my favourite compact disc, Bruce Willis, The Return of 
Bruno" (151); he buys Playboy from the news-stand even though he's already received 
his subscription copy; at another point he buys "the new Stephen Bishop" album in all 
three formats, "the compact disc, the cassette, and album" (98). He does this to prove to 
us how powerful he is in a world in which consumption is everything: he has more and 
better possessions than we all do, and has the ability to purchase - it does not matter what 
so long as he can immediately establish a superior position to us by doing so. 
In fact, Patrick Bateman indulges here in what might be called a pornography of 
ownership. His domain extends from the Toshiba TV and video equipment and crystal 
ashtrays and other things he doesn't need, to his ownership of people's images - he is a 
viewer of pornography; he tapes and stores the scenes of his torture-murders - to people 
themselves, particularly women. He objectifies women in the traditional sense, reducing 
people to comments about their bodies. Moreover, he assumes physical ownership of the 
prostitutes he hires, to the point of reserving the right to "damage" them. And he has a 
ownership-relationship with his secretary, Jean, over whom he can assert power because 
he is her boss, and because he exploits her feelings of affection for him. Bateman 
believes that he ought to have everything within his grasp, which is why he brutally 
murders a colleague, Paul Owen, in a fit of calculated jealousy because Owen "owns" the 
esteemed "Fisher Account" that Bateman covets. This belief of Patrick's extends to the 
text itself, as Tanner has pointed out: "value is established by a narrator who owns the 
means of representation in much the same way that the capitalist owns the means of 
production" (107). 
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American Psycho: postmodern novel 
American Psycho is at every level about living with and in the postmodern 
spectacle. As in Ellis's earlier Less Than Zero, the spectacle is all-pervasive: Bateman 
gazes interminably - at women, at the homeless, at posters, at television, at videos, 
pornography, magazines, clothes, food (he actually eats very little of the nouveau cuisine 
he orders), consumables. His presentation is cinematic; he presents his torture-murders in 
cinematic/pornographic mode too: Tanner points out that when Bateman kills one of his 
victims, Bethany, she turns around "like in a movie", and she is presented with "the 
gloved hands", rather than "my" gloved hands (American Psycho, 245), an effect which 
places Bateman himself into the mode of spectator to his own actions (Tanner, 109). This 
is something he can be at will anyway, as he films his murders and can play them back 
for his own pleasure. It is even possible that we are being narrated through the video of 
Bethany's murder during this scene, rather than the murder itself. If this were the case, 
and if the murders are fantasies, then Bateman tends to fantasise video images. In fact, 
the scenes of his worst tortures tend to have been set up for just such representation, as he 
frequently lights them up with halogen lamps to simulate the set of a pornographic film. 
In this book's environment the orthodox descriptions of postmodernity apply. 
The book is filled to brimming with commercial images, with simulacra, with playful 
hybridisations (an "Italian-Thai" restaurant [63], for instance, exemplifies the cultural 
borrowings and playful juxtapositions of postmodernism), with such a rich sensual 
environment that a kind of schizophrenic distraction is caused, in the way that Fredric 
Jameson describes. This can be seen in the way time loses track of itself in the novel. 
Chapters called "Breakfast" or "Morning Meeting" are followed by "Lunch" or 
"Afternoon", but it soon becomes clear (by what Bateman is wearing, or who he has with 
him at the time) that the "Lunch" that follows "Breakfast" might be on another day 
(Young, 101). Time passes in circles here: there is no progress in the stockbrokers' lives, 
just rounds of restaurants, bars, night-clubs, drugs and tired sex. 
This, too, is postmodernity combined with rabid corporate capitalism. The gap 
between the rich and the poor is continually being emphasised, with the stockbrokers 
always tormenting the homeless on the street (Bateman's first act of "on-screen" violence 
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is to blind and beat a beggar). All of the principal characters are connected with the 
young urban elite in the corporate world. Status, to this sect, is bound up in conspicuous 
consumption - in the public act of ownership. That this is so important to these people 
can be seen in the amount of psychological investment they all have in possessing the 
best things: Bateman becomes childishly jealous when he finds that several people have 
more impressive business cards than he has; he becomes childishly vindictive when a 
social inferior turns out to have a superior brand of stereo unit to his, and so on. 
The confusing environment Bateman exists in represents the fragmentation of his 
psyche. Several times he loses himself in a state of commodity distraction: 
J&B I am thinking. Glass of J&B in my right hand I am thinking. Hand I 
am thinking. Charivari. Shirt from Charivari. Fusilli I am thinking. Jami Gertz I 
am thinking. I would like to fuck J ami Gertz I am thinking. Porsche 911. A 
sharpei I am thinking. I would like to own a sharpei. I am twenty-six years old I 
am thinking. I will be twenty-seven next year. A Valium. I would like a Valium. 
No, two Valium I am thinking. Cellular phone I am thinking. (81) 
I make no comment, lost in my own private maze, thinking about other 
things: warrants, stock offerings, ESOPs, LBOs, lPOs, finances, refinances, 
debentures, converts, proxy statements, 8-Ks, 10-Qs, zero coupons, PiKs, GNPs, 
the IMF, hot executive gadgets ... Inc1usivity, envying somebody's life, whether 
someone could survive a fractured skull, waiting in airports, stifling a scream, 
credit cards and someone's passport and a book of matches from La Cote Basque 
spattered with blood, surface surface surface, a Rolls is a Rolls is a Rolls. (342) 
Bateman's "ego maintenance" 
Ellis, though, suggests strongly that this "typical" ludic postmodern environment 
contributes to the development of an overtly (totalitarian) "fascist"-type personality. In 
the above description, the mixture of distraction, a suggestion of real-life danger, and its 
connections to the conditions of modem life feed into the schema for fascist management 
Buck-Morss has outlined. These people are anaesthetised, undergoing ego-hardening 
against the chaotic environment they are in .. They belong to social totalities, which are 
like exoskeletons, more protection against a world that constantly threatens their 
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disintegration. And the Liminal Processes Favouring Totality they experience can cause 
them to commit appalling atrocities. 
Characters continually see and hear reports of danger through the media. Tim 
Price reads from a newspaper: "In one issue - in one issue - let's see here ... strangled 
models, babies thrown from tenement rooftops, kids killed in the subway, a Communist 
rally, Mafia boss wiped out, Nazis... baseball players with AIDS, more Mafia shit, 
gridlock, the homeless, various maniacs, faggots dropping like flies in the streets ... kids 
who broke into a zoo and tortured and burned various animals alive... building collapses 
on baby ... bridge collapses - "(4). Here even the privileged classes are proletarianized: 
Price and Bateman are subjected to psychological shock through the media just as 
workers encounter it in factories, or (in Walter Benjamin's example), as anyone might 
feel when confronted with crossing a busy city street (with the potential for death or 
serious injury registering in the brain with every passing car [1970, 250]). These 
newspapers imply that everyone is vulnerable to the play of violent and dangerous forces 
in New York. The sensationalism of this media barrage makes it seem that danger is all-
pervasive, that death or dismemberment might be around any comer, taking the form of 
"maniacs", "Nazis", "AIDS", or collapsing buildings. 
As if to confirm this impression, all of Bateman's group hire videocassettes -
returning them is everyone's stock excuse for leaving somewhere early - in abundance. 
If even a percentage of his colleagues have a similar taste in films to Bateman (he's 
rented The Body Double, which depicts a woman drilled to death, thirty seven times) then 
they will watch a feast of on-screen carnage as well. This type of entertainment registers 
yet more shocks to the synaesthetic system, as violations of the human body are presented 
as spectacle. The eOlps moreele, or fantasy of the body-in-pieces, is right there on the 
screen in front of them. If a narcissistic episode results from these shocks, it leads to the 
sensorium numbing, and retreating from the world into the self, effectively armouring the 
borders ofthe self against the outside: a Liminal Process Favouring Totality. 
Additionally, hyperreal spectacles act as accelerated phantasmagoria, presenting 
the subject with too much information, too much sensory data to comprehend, numbing 
them by distraction. This sense of numbness comes across in Bateman's narration, where 
the syntax distances himself from his actions (the narration of his actions while he 
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commits murders is often a simple recount of events, 'this and then this and then this'). 
Such techniques represent Bateman's retreat from the world, the closure of his 
synaesthetic system on its external circuitory components. Just to complete Buck-
Morss's schema, the stockbrokers in American Psycho indulge in narcotics as well, 
particularly cocaine and its derivatives ("Bolivian Marching Powder"[200J). Their drug-
taking can be seen as a relatively understandable reaction to the culture they are 
immersed in, for when the sensorium is sUbjected to this many shocks, it must numb 
itself in defence or it could suffer considerable damage. 
No wonder, then, that Tim Price finds several stories regarding Nazis in his 
newspaper. The environment he and the paper exist in produces numbed and hardened 
subjects, ones analogous to the (totalitarian) "fascist" subjects discussed by Foster, Buck-
Morss, Theweleit and others. The dangers present in the environment, coupled with a 
wash of phantasmagoric media imagery, create a need for subj ects to protect themselves 
against them. The fragmentation and wash of postmodern life are analogous to 
Theweleit's conception of the Freikorps' forbidden desires, externalised into the 
environment. This "feminised" "soft" environment promises a dissolution of the subject 
which the Nazi must absolutely, violently refuse. During his periods of "madness", 
Bateman often gets the feeling that he is in some senses "not there", that there is 
something indefinite about himself. This lack of definition is resisted brutally by 
Bateman, who asserts his own reality by imposing terribly upon the reality of "others". 
In behaviour comparable to that of Theweleit's Freikorps, Bateman compulsively opens 
his victims up, revealing their interiors, and revealing the reality of the interior the fascist 
tries to deny in himself. The fascist tries to conquer the "miasma" inside him by reducing 
his "other" to miasma, and by surviving this process intact himself - he remains hard and 
intact, while the "soft" "feminine" "other" is reduced to pulp, proving the fascist's 
superiority because he is still whole, still alive. 
This is only the most extreme of Bateman's "ego-maintenance" techniques 
(Theweleit, 1989b, 210-25). Another is his continued return to the mirror phase, enforced 
by the culture's continually throwing people situations of narcissistic crisis. Not long 
after Price reads from his newspaper, Bateman finds reassurance of his wholeness in a 
mirror at Evelyn's place - "'Hi. Pat Bateman,' I say, offering my hand, noticing my 
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reflection in a mirror hung on the wall - and smiling at how good I look" (American 
Psycho, 11) - but he doesn't need a literal mirror. Mostly Bateman finds reassurance in 
other stockbrokers. He mentions them whenever he sees them, and tries to work out who 
each of them is, because they all tend to look the same. If they are dressed according to 
Bateman's rules and they are in safe territory, such as Uptown New York, or in a trendy 
restaurant or nightspot, they provide him with a reassuring image of his own wholeness, 
and he becomes more confident as a result. 
Thus Bateman forms part of what Theweleit calls a "social totality" (1989b, 223). 
The fascist cannot live in the real, feminine world for long, or he finds himself 
disintegrating. To avoid this, he becomes part of an armoured social grouping that helps 
to protect him. Bateman and his near-identical colleagues admit no others into their 
social sect: when Evelyn invites the miist Stash and his girlfriend Vanden to dinner, 
Bateman and Price are appalled by their looks, dress, behaviour, and relieved when the 
two of them leave. They and Evelyn find it exciting that Stash has HN and is likely to 
pass it on to Vanden, their deaths thus being assured. The stockbrokers remain together, 
annoured against outside influences. They are all white, all young (in their twenties), all 
wealthy. They are all what Bateman and Price call "hardbodies". 
"Hardbodies" literally means what it says, hard of body. Usually in American 
Psycho it is a term which comes under the sign of the gaze to describe women who have 
worked on their body and ironed out everything soft and "imperfect" about it. But it also 
describes the stockbrokers themselves. Literally, they are armoured subjects: they work 
out with weights at their health clubs, keep aerobically fit, do stretches, all to chisel their 
body into something that resembles the Aryan ideal to be found in fascist ali. The 
stockbrokers' bodies and psyches are moulded and hardened to perfection; all the better 
to resist the softness of their environment (Theweleit's image of a steel locomotive 
charging through choppy water comes to mind here [1989a, xviii]). Discipline is insisted 
upon: they must appear immaculate, and this is achieved with a set of almost military 
disciplines of the self. They dress according to a set of rigorously enforced rules -
enforced by peer pressure (Luis Curruthers tends to be ignored or treated with contempt 
when he breaks these rules, which amounts to "breaking rank"). This can be seen as a 
move to aestheticise a broadly political organisational imperative: the aesthetics of the 
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hardened body and its appearance establishes the social group's identity as a totality with 
its own politics of inclusion and exclusion and set of prescribed behaviours. This totality 
itself fonns an elite which has as part of its interest the continuation of post-industrial 
capitalism, the postmodern spectacle, and the conservation of structures of domination in 
its society. 
It is at this intersection between postmodernity and capitalism that (totalitarian) 
"fascism" is re-energised. People are interpellated into a (totalitarian) "fascist"/late 
capitalist ideological schema which effectively ensures the survival of domination 
through rigid power hierarchies. The prevailing culture creates a general need for people 
to continually return to the mirror phase so that they feel themselves autonomous 
subj ects, their ego maintained. The noise of culture is one aspect of this. Alice Yaeger 
Kaplan explained how the aural mirror phase, "echolalia", can be a seduction into 
fascism (1986, 9-11). In media-saturated cultures voices always whisper at people; 
advertising continually talks to you. This vocal environment is one aspect of Kaplan's 
argument that "oceanic" "mother-bound" feelings, ones that wash over you, are as 
important to understanding the attractions of fascism, the desires that led to the 
establishment of (fascist) totalitarian bureaucracies in government, as "straight-edged" 
authoritarian "father-bound" ones are to how they operate once in power (23-4). In 
Bateman's case, because the spectacle is a single-directional medium, there is never the 
chance for him to say no, as Patrick needs to (he tells Jean to "Just say no" [American 
Psycho, 64] several times), meaning that mirror stages are never quite left behind 
(Kaplan, 9), and thus the maturity the characters should have moved into (Young, 94) is 
never achieved because identity away from the maternal voice is never established. 
Similarly, the Lac ani an mirror phase is returned to, as we have seen, making the 
ego confront the pre-symbolic maternal and reject it over and again. This is why the 
wash of postmodern imagery is constantly seen by (totalitarian) "fascism" as feminine, 
and why the borders and hierarchies differentiating the masculine and the feminine, and 
more generally self and its other, and privileging the first tenn of each binarism, are re-
established in the most emphatic manner possible. The postmodemist return to the 
"feminine", to softness and indetenninacy; its blurring of borders and its freeing-up of 
"other" voices, is managed with the result that the opposite of these things comes to be: 
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hardened egos, hardened meta-discourses, social totalities. The hard ego is forced to 
confront its repressed other through the retroactive fantasy of a body in pieces and in 
order to survive this possibility, the ego hardens, strongly reinforcing its borders. 
This is like the moment of abjection for Kristeva, where the abject substance (a 
Kristevan reading of Theweleit might have the Soldier male "ab-jecting" all that is not in 
their schema of totalities) causes a moment of fascinated ego-loss in which the pre-
symbolic is "visited", before borders get re-established with a physical jolt - you pull 
back from the abject substance as you are establishing your radical otherness to it 
(Kristeva, 1982, 2-3, see 192 below). This is despite the fact that abject substances 
usually come from within (3). This Liminal Process Favouring Totality is what happens 
to the soldier male as he confronts the proletarian other in a public space. He is seduced, 
fascinated by this demonstration of his potential fragmentation (the masses represent the 
inner disorganisation of the soldier's body [see 1989a, 385-405]), and experiences 
blackout, as his ego becomes dissolved momentarily by his proximity to them. It is 
during this time his killing takes place as he re-establishes his boundaries with his body-
armour and its extensions. The structure is the same in each case: seduction-
fascination/loss/emphatic identity re-establishment. It is (totalitarian) "fascism's" 
survival mechanism that its imperatives of denial (of the "soft feminised other") are 
impossible to achieve, for this means that there will always be an enemy to confront, 
always be a fantasy of the body in pieces, and thus it will always be necessary to armour 
the body and ego, setting ideological splitting into concrete. This keeps going until there 
is nothing more to destroy. 
The system dines out 
The first time readers witness Bateman out of control it is over a trivial incident. 
Bateman has just been defeated in a contest of business-card aesthetics. Worse, he has 
been beaten by David Van Patten, someone who he considers a social inferior within his 
group. When he realises that even Price thinks Van Patten's card is better, he becomes 
"dizzy" (American Psycho, 44). Not long after, he is still experiencing a state ofloss (his 
turns out to be the most mediocre of all the cards proffered) and his sure sense of self is 
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clearly threatened by this state of affairs, to the point where he feels compelled to strike 
out and re-harden his ego: 
" ... snapper pizza... red snapper pizza ... " Then McDermott slams his 
hand on the table, rocking it. "Goddamnit, isn't anybody listening to me?" 
I'm still tranced out on Montgomery's card - the classy coloring, the 
thickness, the lettering, the print - and I suddenly raise a fist as if to strike out at 
Craig and scream, my voice booming, "No one wants the fucking red snapper 
pizza! A pizza should be yeasty and slightly bready and have a cheesy crust! The 
crusts here are too fucking thin because the shithead chef who cooks here 
overbakes everything! The pizza is dried out and brittle!" (46) 
Bateman strikes out using the rules that his social totality follow, which act as an 
extension of his egolbody annour. Unless these rules are followed when producing the 
object, it is "brittle", which means that it is subject to fragmentation. Such brittleness has 
connections with the abject - the cook is a "shithead" - and so threatens Bateman. By 
shouting at McDermott, he strikes out and destroys in response to a threat to his stability, 
re-establishing that stability with his emphatic enforcement of law. Immediately after 
undergoing this Liminal Process Favouring Totality, Bateman is once again assured of his 
physical wholeness and social standing: he describes himself as "handsome" (47) while 
calmly bribing a waitress to ignore other customers' complaints if the stockbrokers 
decide to smoke cigars. 
Like the proto-fascist Freikorps analysed by Theweleit, Bateman experiences 
blackout as he kills. He recounts what he does to one victim, "rip [ping] open her 
stomach with my bare hands. I can't tell what I am doing with them but it's making wet 
snapping sounds and my hands are hot and covered with something" (305). This 
description is followed by a gap in the text: what happens next is only described from the 
point of view of "The aftennath" (305), the next day: 
What's left of both bodies is in early rigor mortis. Part of Tiffany's body - I think 
it's her even though I'm having a hard time telling the two apart - has sunken in 
and her ribs jut out, most broken in half, from what's left of her stomach, both 
breasts having been pierced by them. .A head has been nailed to the wall, fingers 
lie scattered or arranged in some kind of circle around the CD player. One of the 
bodies, the one on the floor, has been defecated on and seems to be covered with 
teeth marks where I had bitten into it, savagely. (306) 
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Here Bateman has no actual memory of his actions. Even when he claims he 
performed an action, it is an assumption based on the appearance of tooth marks. He 
comes to with "no fear, no confusion" (305), very clear-minded, even to the point of 
covering his tracks by writing "I'm back" on the wall ofthe apartment he broke into so he 
could murder these prostitutes. Before meeting these women, Bateman was "having a 
difficult time containing my disordered self' (301). During the "tryst", one of the girls 
disturbs Bateman even more by telling him a bizarre story about a job she had once 
taking care of a client's monkey who would only watch The Oprah Winfrey Show. By 
the end of this story, Bateman can hardly talk, and his self has become so diffuse that 
even sex with the prostitutes takes on an aura of irreality, which is the state where one is 
unsure if events are real or not: he describes it in the language of pornography ("The two 
of them come, yelling simultaneously, in a sixty-nine position. Once their cunts are wet 
enough I bring out a dildo and let the two of them play with it. Torri spreads her legs and 
fingers her own clit while Tiffany fucks her with the huge greased dildo, Torri urging 
Tiffany to fuck her cunt harder with it, until finally, gasping, she comes" [303]), and as if 
it were pornography - "Sex happens - a hard-core montage" (ibid). Bateman's lack of 
presence before the murders have taken place is quite at odds with his self-assurance after 
he has come to. The structure of his violence here is very similar to his breakdown over 
the "brittle" pizza: his self recedes from him; he feels fragmented, not quite all there, so 
he gets close to his "other", commits violence upon it, strikes out exposing its abject 
status, close enough to it to black out with an abject reaction as he loses himself 
momentarily, whereupon his borders are reconstituted and his self settles. The American 
psychosis that forms the subtext of Ellis's title is that the culture portrayed in the book is 
one of violence, and that subjects of this culture "find themselves" through committing 
violence against "others". 
A rogue element 
Bateman is a part of a social totality that defines itself by its ability to consume. 
As a cog in its machine, Bateman, and the totality as a whole, is inexorably connected 
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with consumer capitalism. They are part of its machinery in that as stockbrokers they 
enable the exchange of capital among the bourgeoisie, the creation of wealth out of 
nothing but wealth, the magical processes that happen at the top-end of capitalism. As 
individuals within this system, they continually consume. They buy clothes and 
electronics, concert tickets and art (often as an investment - these men have no idea about 
aesthetics, but they know the monetary value of all their possessions). Their consumption 
of food in restaurants allows two senses of the word to come into play: they both buy and 
eat the food, without paying attention to its production. Bateman literally consumes 
humans too. In the world of American Psycho, there is nothing you cannot buy. He buys 
sex from prostitutes, and in doing so, lures them to his apartment where he can kill them. 
Unwittingly, they have sold their lives to him. Towards the end of the book, some of his 
victims are consumed by him physically as well: 
I spend the next fifteen minutes beside myself, pulling out a bluish rope of 
intestine, most of it still connected to the body, and shoving it into my mouth, 
choking on it.. .. In the kitchen I try to make meat loaf out of the girl but it 
becomes too frustrating a task and instead I spend the afternoon smearing her 
meat all over the walls, chewing on strips of skin I ripped from her body .... The 
head in the microwave is now completely black and hairless and I place it in a tin 
pot on the stove in an attempt to boil any remaining flesh I forgot to shave off.. .. I 
decide to use whatever is left of her for a sausage of some kind .... Maggots 
already writhe across the human sausage, the drool pouring from my lips dribbles 
over them, and still I can't tell if I'm cooking any of this correctly, because I'm 
crying too hard and I have never really cooked anything before." (American 
Psycho, 344-6) 
Bateman's cannibalism has its correlative in his ability to buy women to satisfy 
other appetites such as sex and scopophilia, the consumption his social totality of 
stockbrokers defines itself by, and by extension the originary consumption of humans in 
Marx's schema - under capitalism the workers become something other to themselves as 
human agents: they become commodities, forced to sell themselves on the labour 
markets. An all-consuming logic runs from this point to this outrageous caricature of 
Ellis's, the literal consumption of human flesh as meat. In the episode outlined above, 
Bateman begins by not remembering how the "girl" got to be scattered around his 
apartment like this - he was blacked out at the time - and his explosion outward, his 
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drive to annihilate his "other", had not been completed when he regained consciousness, 
still not "himself' (he's sobbing "These are terrible times" [346], and "I just want to be 
loved" [345] in a "disembodied voice" [346]). The pressure on his subjecthood from the 
culture has become too overwhelming for him at this point in the book. His armour has 
cracked open; for the time being, maybe for good, his ego has fragmented, and he is 
vulnerable to the flowing "other" he fears. He is damaged and keeps threatening to 
dissolve completely, and so his violent defence mechanisms, his explosions and ego-
maintenance techniques, continue. 
It is while in this state that Bateman has his one real encounter with the law. He 
only becomes visible to the police now his armour has been weakened and while he is 
halfway loose from his social totality. When his ego-maintenance is working well, they 
leave him alone, unable to see him. The first time the police are mentioned in American 
Psycho, there is something amiss with them: "a police car cruises silently the wrong way 
down a one-way street" (5). Indeed the clues the murderer leaves amount to a one-way 
street of detection. Bateman seldom destroys the clothes he commits murders in; instead 
he has a dry-cleaner remove the blood. His dry-cleaner complains to him about the 
stains, and is presumably suspicious of them (these are professional cleaners - only 
Bateman's racism, surely, can make him think that a Chinese cleaner cannot recognise a 
bloodstain when they see one). However, the fact Bateman asks a cleaner to remove 
large bloodstains never results in the police investigating. 
Similarly, Bateman has his cleaner scrub his apartment and clean away blood, 
guts, bodyparts and brain after some of his murders. Bateman has another apartment 
where he dissolves bodies in lime, but this is never discovered. He takes bodies there 
wrapped in sleeping bags, catching cabs for transport. After he has killed Paul Owen, 
Bateman is stopped on the sidewalk while dragging away his victim's remains (once 
again in a sleeping bag). His friends fail to notice his suspicious behaviour, asking him 
for "the general rules of wearing a white dinner jacket" (219). What's more, Bateman 
knows he cannot be touched, he knows that the police are going "the wrong way" in 
regards to him. In the act of torturing his former girlfriend Bethany, he opens all the 
windows to his apartment and invites her to "Try to scream, scream, keep screaming ... 
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no one cares. No one will help you ... "(246). Bateman is aware he can be careless, for 
he is invisible. 
The police, of course, are an armoured social totality themselves. Bateman's 
abject status at this point in the narrative, his inbetween-ness as he drifts away from his 
social totality, makes him become visible. Normally Bateman chooses his victims from 
inside the capitalist machine: "restaurant whores", prostitutes, business associates and so 
forth. There are exceptions to this general rule, but these victims - a "bum" who he 
blinds, a Japanese delivery boy he mistakes for Chinese, a small child - are in various 
ways minorities, marginal, and the attacks are executed with a certain amount of cunning. 
They are also attacked while Bateman still exists largely within his totality. (The 
exception to this, of course, is when Bateman kills the young boy at the zoo. At this time 
he is "unable to maintain a credible public persona" [297], but his cunning leads him to 
be careful in this situation [he isn't always] to avoid bloodying himself, and he pretends 
to be a doctor, thus managing to align himself with high-society long enough to escape. 
Bateman slaps the boy's mother, who is in hysterics - "for this I am given no 
disapproving looks" [300] - and a cop pushes him away as if he were just another 
member of the crowd.) 
As the end of the novel approaches, though, Bateman finds he needs to explode 
with greater force than private killing might allow him and this makes him clumsier. 
Additionally, as we have seen, his ego-maintenance has failed him - he has been unstable 
for far too long by now - and this has caused him to become isolated from his social 
totality. Rather than attending restaurant or board meetings, or going into work, Bateman 
has at this stage "flipped" totally, spending his time prowling and killing. This is why the 
violence seems to accelerate during the second half of the novel: it is at this point that the 
pressure has become too constant for Bateman to bear. Bateman has become abject -
between two social totalities, to one of which he would be a subject, to the other an 
object. Here, then, he is other to himself. It is always a response to evidence of his abject 
interior, or his ultimate affiliation to his abject "other" which gives him the imperative to 
explode outwards and annihilate. 
In response to this need, he instigates the "Chase, Manhattan" chapter by shooting 
a young saxophonist playing on a streetcomer. For once things don't go as Bateman 
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plans: his silencer fails and he is seen in the act by a squad car. The pelice chase him, so. 
Bateman hijacks a cab, killing the driver, befere mere pelice arrive. Bateman (in third 
persen) engages in a gunbattle, several pelice shet er dying in an explesien, befere he can 
run away, into. (first) the wreng building, where he kills a night-watchman, and then 
making it into. his ewn effice building, signing in. During all this, Bateman cannet 
understand hew he get into. so. much treuble; he dees net understand that because he 
killed a yeung man, prebably white, in public, he became visible fer the first time: "I 
have no. idea what I've dene to. increase my chances ef getting caught, I shet a 
saxephenist? a saxophonist? who. was prebably a mime tee? Fer that I get this?" (350). 
By beceming iselated frem his secial tetality he becemes visible in his crimes. 
The secial tetality is abeut pewer, which eperates best while its precesses are hidden, and 
it has many techniques to. hide these processes within its cellectivity. Bateman makes the 
mistake ef exercising pewer while he is separated frem his group, his unit. This is shewn 
in the narrative by Bateman's privileged first persen viewpeint being taken away frem 
him - he's lest the right to. it - and given ever to. a third persen emniscient narratien, the 
eye ef Ged and the law. Bateman has made his unfair affinity with pewer tee ebvieus, 
threatening his greup's privileged place in relation to it. This act of Bateman's lies at 
pewer's berderland - it is a place where his and his greup's "natural" right to pewer may 
wither under question. It becemes up to. the law, normally the pretecter (threugh silence) 
ef Bateman's pewer, to. pretect the status ef the tetality and pewer generally by remeving 
the regue element that Bateman has beceme. This enceunter, theugh, prevides him with 
a genuine battle, which allows his self the velume ef explosien it needs to. restore its 
beundaries. This is anether explanatien fer the sudden intrusien ef a third-persen veice: 
Bateman has blacked eut at this point, and cannot tell the stery "himself'. With his 
armeur re-fermed, he can re-join his secial totality: by the end of the "Chase, Manhattan" 
chapter, Bateman has perpetrated a massacre, but is ence again beyend the reach ef the 
pelice, tucked up in his effice building, one ef the armeur extensiens ef his secial tetality. 
With this his place as the narrater ef the nevel is returned. Bateman is no lenger a regue: 
he has vindicated himself through vielence. 
Much of the grimmest satire in the nevel is set around this tetality pretecting 
Bateman. During one such instance, Bateman, having used Owen's apartment fer a 
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subsequent torture-murder, wonders why he has never read about the bodies being found, 
so he goes back to the scene of the crime. He discovers that the apartment was simply 
cleaned up and prepared for sale by real-estate interests - an example of Bateman's social 
totality absorbing and covering up his crime. In this way, the novel presents the high-
capitalists as being complicit in Bateman's crimes - simply by perpetuating their own 
interests they help him escape. This is because Bateman's self, his ego, is paradoxically 
theirs as well. Theweleit sees that the ego of the soldier-male, in the words of Mark 
Seltzer, "might be shifted in the direction of the radicalised experience of 'social' 
organisation in the subject of violence" (Seltzer, 1997, 148). Seltzer then quotes this 
passage from Male Fantasies in relation to the serial killer: 
The "ego" these processes seem to produce is admittedly a particularly peculiar 
formation: it can certainly not be conceived as a psychic agency pertaining to the 
person. It has, rather, to be understood as a social ego, a muscle-armor that is 
merely borrowed, painfully drilled into and fused onto the individual. An ego of 
the kind described . seems likely to be incapable of escaping the danger of 
immediate fragmentation on contact with living life, unless it is inserted into some 
larger social formation that guarantees and maintains its boundaries. Any social 
organisation, from the family to the army, might fulfil this function, as long as it 
functions as... a "totality."... The "ego" described here is unremittingly 
dependent on external support; if it breaks down, the ego in tum disintegrates. 
(Seltzer, 148; Theweleit, 1989b, 222-3) 
Seltzer notes that it is this ego, one he terms the "social ego", that is typically described 
in accounts of serial killers. It is like an exoskeleton on an insect, forming from the 
outside in. The serial killer, in Seltzer's study, '''fades back', chameleonlike, 'into 
society'" (148) by way of this exoskeleton, providing "a kind of behavioural skeleton -
much like an insect - to provide an architecture for their fantasies and a structure for the 
violence that informs their conscious experience" (ibid). This is a killer "with a 
machinelike or devivified periphery: the man whose interior has lost its meaning in its 
utter dependence on the mechanical drills relentlessly binding him to external and social 
forms" (ibid). These are drills which create out of the late capitalist this hardened 
periphery, the structure of challenge and strengthening through violence which both 
forms and strengthens the ego-layer, the apparently endless series of narcissistic crises 
which are these men's correct response to their environment. 
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Bateman disintegrates quickly when he becomes separated from his social totality, 
from his exoskeleton. While he is a part of it, though, he has the dazzling ability to 
disappear, to perform public acts of violence and then fade back into the crowd. Bateman 
covers his back when he kills Owen, pretending to be Marcus Halberstam, a colleague. 
When a private detective calls on Bateman, inquiring about Owen's disappearance, he 
informs Bateman that he (Bateman) was one of Halberstam's alibis for that night. 
Bateman's frame-up mistook somebody else for Bateman, just as Owen mistook Bateman 
for Halberstam. There are many other instances of mistaken identity among the 
stockbrokers throughout the novel. They all look identical because they all have the same 
social or behavioural "exoskeleton": it is the rules that they adhere to about look, and 
fitness, and grooming, and dressing, and the rules they adhere to about their masculinity, 
which bind them together as a totality. These rules come from myths which are either 
formed for the convenience of the structural continuation of late consumer capitalism, or 
are older than that but exist because they are convenient for the system. 
Seltzer notes that the "motivation of stranger-killing becomes inseparable from 
the possibility of absolute 'ownership'. But this is an ownership that, in tum, becomes 
inseparable from the terrifying pleasures of an endless replication" (149). Hence the 
postmodern capitalism that American Psycho functions among provides the public space 
that a killer like Bateman can vanish into. He conforms perfectly, and so he vanishes. 
Further weight is given to this suggestion by the fact that Bateman frequently confesses 
his crimes, but is never believed - he left Harold Carnes a long message "admitting 
everything, leaving nothing out [!], thirty, forty, a hundred murders ... " (American Psycho, 
352), but later finds Carnes thought he was joking. "Jesus, Davis", he says to Bateman 
"Yes, that was hilarious ... Bateman killing Owen and the escort girl? ... Oh that's bloody 
marvellous. Really key, as they say .... I'm not one to bad-mouth anyone, your joke was 
amusing. But come on, man, you had one fatal flaw: Bateman's such a bloody ass-kisser, 
such a brown-nosing goody-goody, that I couldn't fully appreciate it" (387). Bateman is 
an "ass-kisser" to the late-capitalist "yuppie" ideology that lies behind his social totality, 
he is not an alien monster other to the society in which he lives. He kills to own, and he 
videos these killings to play back to his subsequent victims, victims who too are 
replications in that they are denied the subjectivity to be any different from the others, as 
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Tanner points out. The American psychosis thus works by reducing people to the level of 
the same, an "absolute identification" which can only be played out tyrannically (Seltzer, 
149). They are the end point of an age of "mechanical reproduction", where the 
aestheticisation of politics produces replicants defending the system against the latent 
potential of the passive masses. This is a violent hegemony that radically denies 
difference, and equally radically posits systems of domination and exclusion, so that only 
those who conform have a right to exist at all. It is this ability to split and bind that 
Kaplan noted about fascism (24; 33). Bateman's hypermasculinity is a part of the 
binding process of a totality that can split from others and fortify itself. These 
(totalitarian) "fascist" subjects form an empty castle made of empty castles, a show of 
awful and utterly vacant strength against the undifferentiated matter of all "others". 
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Chapter six 
Cartoons: Diminished Representations? 
I want a photo-opportunity 
I need a shot at redemption 
Don 't want to end up a cartoon 
In a cartoon graveyard 
-Paul Simon 
From now on, the argument presented in this thesis will take a new direction. It 
turns just as the political problems the novels thematise are at their most extreme and 
their consequences at their most violent. Instead of pushing further into the carnage 
created by Liminal Processes Favouring Totality, I will instead focus on these processes' 
relationship to the cartoons that are also evident in the novels under discussion. This will 
be done by way of exploring the place of "cartoons" in current ideas and assumptions 
about representation. This change of direction is designed to be a tactical retreat rather 
than a surrender to the difficult material encountered in the last chapter. As I indicated in 
the opening chapter, an exploration of the almost abject aesthetic category of the cartoon, 
and how it functions both in the novels and as a metaphor for the world beyond them, can 
allow for a new reading of the political philosophy of the novels. In short, while the 
political problems are made comparatively explicit, the question of how to respond 
adequately is far more difficult to answer from the novels. Cartoons suggest one possible 
"we" system that has the potential to resist forming as a totality. 
The method of constructing a political philosophy for Gravity's Rainbow, 
Vineland and American Psycho I will employ is akin to deconstruction. This is because I 
will undertake a discussion of the central issue - of how a politics can be constructed 
from these novels that resists the extreme conditions they set out - by considering an 
aspect of these novels that appears to be utterly peripheral to their politics. Hence, in this 
reading the centre is to be found elsewhere from itself: its appearance and presence are 
separate from one another. However, as a deconstructive reading, it will collapse the 
opposition between the central topic and the peripheral one altogether - the opposition 
between politics (reality/high) and cartoons (aesthetics/low) will be shown to be 
118 
impossible to sustain. The operation of a politics that resists the political situation 
outlined in the previous chapters will come to depend upon its own representation in 
cartoon form, and cartoons will no longer be innocent of political or realistic 
significations. 
In the following chapters, I will explore the representation of cartoons in 
Pynchon's novels, and also in postmodem culture generally. I will extend this, though, 
into an exploration of "cartoons", of what is often regarded as "cartoon" representation 
and "cartoon" narrative in general: the presence or citation of recognisable cartoons and 
more generally cartoonish elements, as well as being important in their own right, also 
form a kind of "preterite code", a code which suggests to readers that a certain "paranoid" 
reading of events might be in order. This would be a "cartoon" reading of the novels 
beneath the apparent reading. This code is similar to the one Katje recognises in 
Gravity's Rainbow when she views Osbie Feel's filmed invitation to her to join the 
Counterforce. In Feel's outrageous allegory, Their "scheme", which is played by a 
dwarf, is exposed as a construction, as being not-necessary to the world. Upon this 
demystification, "it vanishes, frightened, into the desert" (535). Feel believes that once 
people are shown that the majesty of Their world is an illusion, its power will collapse. 
Any encoded "cartoon" reading of these novels must be highly unofficial because 
cartoons are "preterite" forms of culture, existing below the dignity of Their gaze. Thus, 
while over many years of academic reading, Gravity's Rainbow has been tamed enough 
for it to be admitted into the literary canon, readings of its "cartoon" elements remain 
comparatively rare. However, a "cartoon" reading, and "cartoon" readings generally, 
provide a method by which the "necessity" of Liminal Processes Favouring Totality can 
be eroded. This may not be the only set of metaphors capable of leading to a similar 
political destination in Pynchon's highly complex novels, but it is one gateway through 
which the texts appear to invite us. 
What I want to do now is less to develop a definition of "cartoon" than suggest a 
series of senses in which the word is deployed. These will range from historical to 
modem descriptive (banal) usages of the word. By tallying what experts and dictionaries 
say about cartoons with what the word signifies today, we can see that "cartoon" is now a 
highly flexible, if loaded, term. Literally it signifies what we all know a cartoon to be, a 
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particular type of line drawing. Metaphorically, it signifies a reduced representation, 
something that is easy enough to ignore if it is kept in its place, but which becomes 
somehow dangerous if it transgresses into the domain of realism. Although this view is 
clearly limited, and defined by a bias toward realism, it is also highly infonnative for our 
purposes: the adjectives used to describe or denounce books and films with cartoon 
elements enable me to mount a demonstration of the importance of the cartoon as a way 
to understand culture and subjectivity in general. 
Since Pynchon specifically evokes and alludes to cartoons, this definition will 
help us see how they may be meant to signify, as well as allow us to identify "hidden" 
cartoons in the texts. It will also clarify American Psycho's status as a "cartoon", and the 
reason why the postmodem, metafictional literature I mentioned in the last chapter can 
also seem cartoonish. This work can then be put to use exploring the ways in which 
some of the obsessions of this thesis - (totalitarian) "fascism", hypennasculinity and 
postmodemism - are elucidated in connection with this group of representational 
phenomena. Hence, the chapters to follow will be explorations of the politics of 
"cartoons" and of the cartooning of character. To an extent this will be justified as being 
an (ironically) realist response to a postmodemist environment. As a part of this, some 
reasons for the ambivalence we saw in Pynchon's use of cartoons will emerge - in fact 
this ambivalence will eventually sort itself into an ironically cased opposition which can 
infonn the political responses we can construct from the novels under discussion. 
Historical meanings o(cartoon 
"Cartoon" has several related meanmgs, which together cover considerable 
ground: 
1 a humorous drawing in a newspaper, magazine, etc., esp. as a topical 
comment. 2 a sequence of drawings, often with speech indicated, telling a story 
(strip cartoon). 3 a filmed sequence of drawings using the technique of 
animation. 4 a full-size drawing on stout paper as an artist's preliminary design 
for a painting, tapestry, mosaic, etc. (Concise Oxford, 172; Oxford Encyclopaedic; 
226) 
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This is pretty typical of the meanings you can find in the major modem dictionaries. In 
addition to this, we can add the sense of "cartoon" as it is used in popular critical 
discourse, and discussed more fully below - that is, two-dimensional, flat, or inadequate 
representation. Hence, a cartoon can be written as well as drawn, if this broader sense is 
considered. Indeed, the complaint that a character is a "cartoon", by way of being a 
"cardboard-cutout character" reflects the root of the word, cartone, which is seventeenth-
century Italian meaning "pasteboard" (New Collins Concise, 170). "Pasteboard" itself 
also has a second sense related to this usage, "flimsy or fake" (827), a connection which 
will become more obvious when we look directly at some book and film reviews that 
employ "cartoon" in this way. This sense can also be found in the word's original use. 
While the original meaning of "cartoon", dating from the Renaissance, does not of 
necessity imply the inadequacy of the object (collectors of Renaissance art sometimes 
favour the cartoon of a painting over the finished work), nonetheless its relation to later 
senses of the term is discernible. The Renaissance cartoon is preliminary, an unfinished 
drawing. It was used to help painters "[transfer] a design to a large rigid surface", 
according to David Kunzle, author of an exhaustive history of early strips (1973, 2n4). 
All other forms of cartoon are in some way "unfinished" or transitional as well, in that 
dimensions are missing in the same way a Renaissance cartoon is missing paint. Hence 
they can be seen as "flimsy or fake". This is because cartoons simplify an issue or 
exaggerate a limited number of features which can "type" the personal object of 
caricature or the situation in a cartoon. Although it is a preliminary drawing, though, that 
is not to say that the Renaissance cartoon is totally unformed: rather it represents the last 
stage in preliminary preparations for a painting in Renaissance studio practice. Hence 
while the cartoon is unfinished, it still has some sense of form. This too is the case with 
the modem cartoon: while not mimetically accurate, these representations should still be 
recognisable. 
The modem usage of "cartoon" dates from last century. Winslow Ames and 
David Kunzle (1978), link modem cartoons to the category of caricature. As the use of 
"cartoon" in its Renaissance sense was declining along with Renaissance studio practice 
last century, it acquired the new meaning of "pictorial parody, almost invariably a 
multiple-reproduced drawing, which by the devices of caricature, analogy, and ludicrous 
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juxtaposition sharpens the public view of a contemporary event, folkway, or political or 
social trend" (909). Not that the phenomenon this word had come to describe was itself 
totally new - drawings with similar properties had appeared in various forms since at 
least the Renaissance (910). The modem cartoon developed, according to Ames, 
gradually out of caricature from the fifteenth century, (although Kunzle suggests that 
caricature did not exist before 1780 [1973, 426]). Other types of cartoons, such as panel 
drawings, similar to modem comic strips, can be dated back even further. (These were 
often not comic; usually they were drawn for instructional, political or religious purposes, 
and were sometimes extremely violent and highly serious). Before they were named 
"cartoons", they were variously known as caricatures, lampoons, satires, mockeries, and 
broadsides. The newly-named cartoon contained elements of satire - as with caricature, 
which we will come to soon - the supposition was that the picture's audience was 
sufficiently acquainted with its subject matter to associate this generalised distortion back 
to the original reference. Cartoons are also separated historically from caricatural satire 
because caricature deals with individuals, while cartoons lampoon groups and social 
trends and follies. Before long these distinctions became muddied and lost to the general 
public, and the term "cartoon" came to refer to a range of phenomena sometimes 
including strict caricature. 
Caricature is the "distorted presentation of a person, type or action" (Ames and 
Kunzle, 909). In its orthodox usage, it is usually a line drawing. However, caricatures 
also have a history in the higher art of painting. Some caricatures that are canonical in 
the history of Western painting include, for instance, the grotesqueries of Hieronyrnous 
Bosch, as well as those of Agostino Carracci and Giuseppe Arcimboldo, who made 
recognisable faces up of painted arrangements of fish, birds, and books (910). The word 
itself is thought to derive from the Italian verb "caricare", which means "to load, to 
surcharge, as with exaggerated detail" (909). Hence, caricature exaggerates features by 
which the subject is associated, or presents the subject as animal-like or vegetable-like. 
As with cartoons, caricatures exist in writing - the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
satires of Dryden, Swift and Pope, for example, are rich with them. Although not entirely 
new - the type of exaggerations or deformations we now regard as caricatural can be 
found in Ancient Egyptian, Greek and Roman artefacts - caricature came into its own in 
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the Renaissance, as a counterpart to the Renaissance's emphasis on the individual (910). 
Cartoons, in their strict sense (and before they were named as such) also were 
reactions to Renaissance beliefs: they lampooned its emphasis on "order, symmetry and 
fixed canons of beauty" (ibid), developing grotesque types and travesties of Renaissance 
omamentality. However, there is no way that the paintings of Bosch or Arcimboldo can 
be recognised as cartoons. Cartoons, although they may very well exaggerate in the 
manner of caricature, also economise, simplify, and encapsulate - they are more like 
sketches than fully worked paintings. Of course, some cartoons were still so detailed that 
they could pass for mimetic drawing - in the "cartoons of manners" from the sixteenth on 
into the nineteenth centuries, as practised by such figures as Brueghel, Callot, Gallot and 
Watteau, and described by Ames as "decorations", the two-dimensionality lay in the 
comment, as Ames and Kunzle imply, rather than the drawing technique (914). In the 
case of Hogarth, even this was hard to ascribe. His cartoons were sophisticated satire 
barely related to the notion of the cartoon as it is now generally known. From these 
heights, it is little wonder that the modem cartoon is so often used as a metaphor for 
disappointment and regression. But what Hogarth did for the cartoon was to bring 
humour into social satire, and this paved the way for the genuinely funny drawings 
produced by such figures as Edward Lear and the cartoonists in Punch and similar 
publications of the nineteenth century and beyond. It is here that the features of the 
modem cartoon can be found. The drawing styles progressively became more 
economical and simpler, and regression of subject to type became the norm. 
In the twentieth century, cartoons have become one of the most prevalent cultural 
forms. Strip cartoons and animated cartoons both derive from the previous forms of 
cartoon and caricature in that they tend to be line drawings that contain exaggeration and 
distortion, and can also contain social satire. In fact the comic strip is a very old form of 
cartoon, recognisable (although they weren't comic strips per se) in pre-1550s German 
woodcuts (917). The comic strip itself came into being late in the eighteenth century 
when the broadsheet was fused with the comic in the form of satire (918). True comic 
strips retain their integrity as drawings, so that words, although they can be present in the 
forms of captions or speech balloons, should, according to convention, never dominate 
the drawings, or the strip becomes instead not a series of cartoons but illustrations. For 
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this reason, the drawings themselves must be linked into some sort of progressive 
structure, most commonly a narrative. In the case of the comic strip, this introduces the 
illusion of movement into the cartoon. 
This feature is extended with the animated cartoon, which is essentially an 
animated comic strip. Both forms of cartoon have cells which, put together, form the 
illusion of movement. Of course, not all forms of animation are specifically cartoons: 
there is animated sculpture or painting. However, one of the important features of 
animation suggests that the cartoon may be immanent to animation generally. If this is 
the case, then it goes some way to explaining modem critical (often-banal) uses of the 
word. Here "cartoons" become a category describing a certain type of simplified 
representation or narrative in artforms often apparently unrelated to drawing, such as live-
action cinema and the novel. This extension of meaning is suggested by Edward Small 
and Eugene Levinson in their essay, "Toward a Theory of Animation" (1989). The 
animator Norman McLaren used to like telling people (it was one of his mottoes): 
* Animation is not the art of DRA WINGS-that-move but the art of MOVEMENTS-
that are drawn. 
*What happens between each frame is much more important than what exists on 
each frame. 
* Animation is therefore the art of manipulating the invisible interstices that lie 
between the frames. (68) 
Of course, McLaren was interested here in animated drawings, but the same principles 
apply also to animated paintings, sculptures, photographs and cartoons. As well as being 
drawn, these are movements that are painted, sculpted or photographed. The animation 
itself, the mechanism that makes it move, lies in the gap between the cells, and hence, as 
Small and Levinson point out, the montage - cuts in live-action film (70). 
It is the act of editing that makes an animation animate. What the animation has 
is the illusion of continuity, and hence the possible illusion of realistic movement and 
continuity. What animation is predicated upon, though, is a lack: the lack of "real" 
movement. The hidden truth is that animation is a fragmented process: movement is built 
through fragmentation, and the illusion is predicated upon what is not there. Cartoons too 
are predicated upon such a lack of realism, as we shall see, particularly cartoons as they 
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are now known. Take, for instance, the original meaning of "cartoon", the preliminary of 
a Renaissance painting. This is a cartoon by virtue of its lack of being the finished 
painting: it lacks paint, or it lacks the context of the larger structure. It is the gap in the 
middle, the gap between the drawn lines where the paper shows, that distinguish it. It has 
form, and yet its form is not fully figured. Similarly, with more modem cartoons, what 
they lack is the real, or "the reality effect". Caricatures and editorial cartoons are not 
only predicated upon the identifiable similarity between the drawing and its target, but on 
the distortion, the lack of similarity. It is at once formed and not formed in this way - it 
is formed enough to give the illusion of form, of similarity. But it is the difference that 
creates the effect of being-cartoon: it is not realistic in the literal sense, although the 
distortion may be apt, is apt - the whole point of the existence of the "cartoon" is the 
distortion, the not-real: this is where the meaning lies. 
Similarly, the animated film is a cartoon, for it lacks absolute literal realism. It 
exists because of the editing involved, an editing which distorts real movement into an 
illusion of movement and linear continuity, in the case of classical realist cinema, where 
the montage cuts, the point at which the film becomes an animation, to Small and 
Levinson, are hidden as much as possible to preserve the illusion of continuous action. 
Editing provides a distortion, a "sutured over" space where there is an unfilled gap, and 
hence a place where the detail is not known. A cartoon must be defined in its relation to 
realism or realist drawing (we will see this clearly soon). Perfect mimesis attempts to 
capture a scene in all its detail - so much detail, no less, that it takes on the third 
dimension which is literally impossible on flat canvasses. This of course is impossible; 
representation is not identical with real life. Plato believed it was an inferior imitation of 
the world, which is itself an imitation of true nature as it exists in essential forms. So 
realism uses techniques to provide the effect of reality in its absence. One such technique 
is to amass sufficient detail, both physical and psychological, to produce the effect or 
illusion of the real, and hence of three dimensions (but without amassing so much detail 
that the illusion once again fails). 
Cartoons have two dimensions. They are thus the failure of realism in this regard 
because they fail to make the final leap to the third dimension, instead remaining 
obviously flat and hence obviously representations. This too will be demonstrated when 
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we look at the way critics use the tenn "cartoon" in reviews. Cartoons are usually 
consigned to the low arts, partly because that is their place on the hierarchy of 
representational conviction. The real effect fails when caricatural satire is introduced, 
and when spaces are not filled with detail but rather are left unnaturally empty. 
Caricature leaves gaps in the same way: the selection of certain details to caricature and 
load with detail produces a gap in the features not selected for this treatment - these are 
empty in comparison. Also, the overdetennined part of the drawing suggests a gap 
between itself and its object, and makes no attempt to cover this gap. Both cartoons and 
animation generally, then, exist primarily in the gap, in the in-between. While one 
couldn't say, without losing all useful meaning from the term, that all animations are 
cartoons, one can say that cartoons have similar characteristics to animations. The fact 
that animations also produce a gap between themselves and the object they are 
representing, one that isn't covered over, suggests that the modem coinage of "cartoon" 
to cover animation is legitimate under certain circumstances. 
This is another sense, though, in which animation is a cartoon, and that is the 
metaphorical sense that it is a preliminary version of cinema generally. Alan 
Cholodenko, in the introduction to The Illusion of Life, a book of essays theorising 
animation, describes animation's treatment by the discourse of film theory: 
In neglecting animation, film theorists - whether they have thought about it at all 
- have regarded animation as either the "step-child" of cinema or as not belonging 
to cinema at all, belonging rather to the graphic arts. In the fonner case film 
theory still sees animation as a fonn of film, albeit its most inferior fonn, as a 
child to live action's adult fonn. In the latter case, it would no longer be possible 
to speak of animation as the most neglected fonn of film ... (Cholodenko, 1991a, 
9) 
In this sense, animation becomes to "film" what the Renaissance preliminary is to the 
painting: as Cholodenko adds, "a claim can be made that animated film not only preceded 
the advent of cinema but engendered it; that the development of all those nineteenth 
century technologies - optical toys, studies in persistence of vision, the projector, the 
celluloid strip, etc. - but for photography was to result in their combination/synthesising 
in the animatic apparatus of Emile Raynand's Theatre Optique of 1892; that, inverting the 
126 
conventional wisdom, cinema might then be thought of as animation's "step-child" (10). 
The "conventional wisdom" of this matter is quite similar to a logic that might 
have been developed in the pages of Gravity's Rainbow. Cartoons here are expressly 
"passed over" by the more powerful film studies; they are the "preterite" form of the film 
genre. They are illegitimate films, existing in two dimensions rather than the "real" three 
dimensions. Film thus establishes its identity by denying a part of itself that it 
nonetheless sees as "other", inferior, and by purifying itself of it, by neglect or by 
deportation into another discourse. And yet a William-Slothropian heresy applies: the 
"elected" discourse, without realising it, or wanting it to become common knowledge, 
depends upon the existence of the "preterite" discourse for its own status. 
Banal usages 
One of the features of a cartoon is that in it representation is predominantly an 
outline, so that in it, important life-like details are missing. An example of this might be 
the portrayal of President Clinton on an episode of The Simpsons (Michels 1999). The 
cartoon version of Mr. Clinton eschews complex details of the President's looks and (in 
particular) demeanour in favour of a simple outline and a wash of colour, featuring 
enough recognisable personal attributes (in this case the President makes an inappropriate 
suggestion to Marge Simpson) for people to be able to tell who he is supposed to be. To 
cartoon someone thus involves the reduction of their representation to a less-than-realistic 
form, while retaining the "outline" of the representation. 
The way this reduction functions in narratives can be seen in syndicated comic 
strips, which each day present their characters in selected situations to make a (usually 
comic) point, and which, over time, present the lives of their characters as consisting of 
long series of these peaks. Of course, nobody expects this to be otherwise: if non-peak 
time is ever suggested or presented it is only as a lead-in or in contrast to the more 
important business at hand which activates the characters. Moreover, a look at an 
animated cartoon like The Simpsons reveals a similar effect. On the micro-level, many of 
this programme's scenes are effectively comic strips in which characters find themselves 
in extra-ordinary situations for the sake of the thrust of the narrative or even simply to 
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prepare for a punch line. In one episode, Homer Simpson finds himself in a psychiatric 
institution with many of the characters from Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's 
Nest, the characters' appearances being based on the actors who played the roles in Milos 
Forman's 1973 film adaptation. But unlike the film, in which the character the Chief 
steadfastly refuses to talk, in the cartoon he immediately breaks type and years of silence 
by responding to Homer's first greeting. "I was just waiting for someone to reach out to 
me", he says (Moore 1991). 
It is the abrasion between our knowledge of the intertextual reference and its 
bathetic treatment in the events on-screen that produces the comic effect here. But this 
produces the cartoon effect also: the characters from the pre-text are wheeled on simply 
to fulfil a function - making a joke - and after the joke has been made they are discarded. 
It is as if they are but a functional component in a larger machine. Pynchon also gives 
this impression at a number of points in Gravity's Rainbow. In one example, Major 
Marvy and his sidekick Clayton "Bloody" Chiclitz discuss a crazy plan which involves 
having members of their illegal fur-trading operation go to Hollywood after the war. 
They hope the young men will star in Cecil B. DeMille's epic movies. To the objection 
by Marvy that DeMille would just cast the young men as extras, possibly galley slaves, 
Chiclitz roars, "Never, by God. For DeMille, young fur-henchmen can't be rowing!" 
(559). Steven Weisenburger comments: "The most elaborately staged pun in all of G.R. 
Camouflaged within it is the declaration 'Forty million Frenchmen can't be wrong' .... 
Note that Pynchon has fashioned an entire narrative digression about illicit trading in 
furs, oarsmen in boats, furhenchmen, and DeMille - all of it in order to launch this pun" 
(240). As with all cartoons the Simpson family, Marvy and Chiclitz are playthings on the 
page of the animator: their autonomy is limited by the vision of their creator and the 
power their creator has over their actions. The joke itself comes from the cartooning, 
from the editing of the characteristics of these characters, and the subsequent loss of the 
dimensionality of these characters due to editing and elision. It is a point at which comic 
attention is called to the construction of a fiction. In the case of more realistic narratives, 
the arbitrariness implicit in the actions of·characters is hidden, "sutured", in Laclau and 
Mouffe's terminology (1985). Where an author lacks the skills to do this, critics will 
often tell them that their characters lack motivation, or that the narratives seem contrived. 
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This would make them "bad" narratives. 
Meanwhile, at the level of the programme as a whole, The Simpsons, which 
structurally resembles a traditional American situation comedy, is also in effect a comic 
strip: every episode presents the lead up to and resolution of a crisis, an extraordinary 
moment. In this, virtually all situation comedies are like comic strips. Their characters 
tend to be comic functions rather than autonomous characters. By being cartoons, the 
Simpsons tend to call attention to this fact. Live-action comedies that also call attention 
to the artificiality of the environment (a good example is the metafictional1980s comedy 
The Garry Shandling Show, which exists within the prison of a series of conventions it is 
aware of but ultimately powerless to escape - just as with The Simpsons it is a prisoner of 
its genre) "look" cartoonish because the characters have no realistic believability. The 
fact that these are characters played by actors, and not "real people" makes them seem 
cartoonishly flat, just as Marvy and Chic1itz are flattened by their absolute submission to 
the comic desires of author Pynchon. This shows once again that cartoons represent a 
lack. The cartoon becomes noticeable as a cartoon because people perceive that a 
"realistic" third dimension is missing from it. 
This is something reviewers pick up on. In reviews of both novels and films, 
cartoons lack: engagement ("Peopled with cartoon characters, the book is intellectually 
interesting but not emotionally involving" [Pool 1987, 10]); individuality ("The main 
problem is with the characters who inhabit the novel- or rather, with the absentee tenants 
who sporadically show up in it, never able to escape the curse of generalisation in which 
they are imprisoned. For the most part, they are depicted as cartoon Germans ... who can 
yield satire or just plain silliness" [Morley 1996, 41]); humanity, ("What's remarkable 
about this book, however, is the very fact that she doesn't tum her parents into two-
dimensional stick-figures but instead makes them wonderfully palpable human beings, 
flawed, unreliable, even treacherous but also vulnerable and desperate to love." 
[Kakutami 1995, 28]); immediacy ("Violent acts occur at a remove, cartoon-like ... " 
[Somerville 1996, 48]); or complexity and "fullness" ("The movie starts viewing [Robert 
DeNiro's title character] Gil not as a human being but a symbolic one-dimensional 
monster who has to be tracked down and shot.... But with no character left to play, 
[DeNiro's] skilful mugging is to little avail. Diminished into the movie's garish fantasy 
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of a celebrity stalker.... As 'The Fan' turns into a horror cartoon, it loses track of 
subsidiary characters who gave its early scenes such a harsh satiric bite .... The film's 
elegantly tricky cinematography and ominous, pounding score... only underline the 
emptiness behind its technical flash" [Holden 1996, 3]). 
In general critical usage, when the term "cartoon" gets used metaphorically to 
compare something to a literal cartoon, the lack it constitutes is the lack of convincing 
life-like attributes. Hence I will take the liberty myself of using the term "cartoon" 
loosely, to describe this series of related phenomena. This is partly because this is how 
critics tend to use it in relation to various works of art, usually popular art, and partly 
because it is less the cartoon as an art form than "cartoon-ness" as a metaphor for 
representation in the postmodern era that seems the important trope here. In exploring 
the term's non-technical or non-historical, banal usage, we can perhaps discover some 
important attributes of the term. Thus I will conflate the cartoon as an art form with 
figures of representation which are "like a cartoon". 
If a political cartoon involves simplifying andlor exaggerating the features of a 
recognisable figure, then a written text, or a film with real actors which does the same 
thing - indulges in simplifications or caricatures - can be regarded as cartoonish. In 
short, the cartoon is perceived as a simplification, often accompanied by an exaggeration. 
In the case of stereotypes, the exaggeration and simplification may exist as exaggerated 
simplicity of representation - an exaggerated simplification of complex differences that 
exist in the type-subject group. Usually also, "cartoons" are associated with children, 
childhood, or childishness, or with things, genres or artistic forms associated with 
children. The general (cartoon) rule of thumb is that the more simple, or the more 
exaggerated a representation is, the more likely it is to be described as a cartoon, whether 
the representation's technical aspects invite such a description or not. 
This is from a review of the Sylvester Stallone vehicle, Judge Dredd. 
[Sylvester Stallone] is as pumped-up as Rambo. And his heroic, letter-of-
the-law character has all the power and stem authority of, say, Bugs or Mickey or 
Daffy. Based on the British cult comic books, "Judge Dredd" is evidence that 
there is such a thing as being too faithful to another genre. 
Like a comic book, the film is busy and flat.... Unlike Bugs or Daffy, 
though, Dredd has neither a good sense of humour nor a glimmer of how to bring 
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cartoons to life .... The young director, Danny Cannon, obviously knows what he is 
up to. Mr Stallone, hit on the head early in the film, walks through the rest of it 
with an unrealistic-looking swath of blood plastered to one side of his face, just 
the way a comic book character would. At one point, Mr von Sydow puts his 
head in his hands to express sorrow, assuming a comic-book pose. But live actors 
in comic-book poses aren't very interesting. Mr Schneider's performance is 
likeable and scene-stealing, simply because he is the only one who seems human. 
(James 1995, 3) 
As you can see, the reviewer here conflates comic books and animated films and suggests 
that cartoons are less interesting than "human" -seeming characters. The suggestion that 
the film is both "busy and flat" is another assertion of "cartoons'" lack of substance: the 
film, like comic books, has plenty of action, but very little significance or meaning can be 
attached to it. The film's violence thus occurs "at a remove, like a cartoon", which is a 
consequence of trying to inflate a flat form like a comic book into a supposedly three-
dimensional form like a live-action fihn. Caryn James, the reviewer, interestingly 
suggests the possibility of catioons coming, at some point, to life. But this can happen 
only if they remain cartoons, and so only if they keep in their place, and so exercise 
themselves in lively, amusing frivolities. Similar comments apply to Stephen Holden's 
review of The Fan, a section of which was quoted a few pages ago. Here the fault of the 
movie is, once again, that cartoons intrude into spaces they have no right to be. Once 
they have intruded, Robert DeNiro has "no character left to play", and so the film 
becomes "diminished", and there is an underlining of its "emptiness". The film also is 
seen as becoming less complex once it is contaminated by cartoon-ness, "losing track of 
subsidiary characters who gave its early scenes such a harsh satiric bite", and hence 
losing immediacy or life. 
Amongst criticisms of high art which complain of cartoons or "cardboard 
cutouts", the tragedy seems to be that the character or world under discussion has 
somehow been emptied. They certainly lack fullness. A comment from a review Meg 
Worlitzer wrote for the New York Times Book Review is typical in this regard: in a good 
novel (like the one she is reviewing), "Most of the characters in the novel are well-drawn, 
and interact convincingly" (1987, 10). These characters are hence "realised", or made to 
seem real. The term "cardboard cutout", found in some reviews, its meaning seemingly 
interchangeable with "cartoon", also suggests two-dimensionality (or one-dimensionality 
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if the reviewer is trying to be particularly cruel.) What they mean is that such creatures 
exhibit length and breadth, but lack depth. Cartoons plainly lack, and this "lack" is 
perceived as being a bad thing: "Not so Hellman", writes Terry Teachout in a review, 
"Her once-popular memoirs can no longer be taken seriously ... while her plays hardly rise 
above the level of political cartoons - one can almost see the captions printed in big block 
letters across the chests of the characters. What life they have, ironically, derives from 
their shrewd use of the fonns of bourgeois melodrama." (Teachout 1996, 34). Here once 
again cartoons are assumed to be-simplifications that only gain a semblance oflife if they 
keep to a cartoon world and avoid intruding into the "real" one. If they admit to being a 
simplified fonn ("Bourgeois melodrama", say) then they come alive a little. 
But cartoons using realistic conventions give the impression of stupidity: 
"Showgirls sounds too dopey to play like anything but a live-action cartoon" (Maslin 
1995,1), reads one review!. Another example: "Anyone who has followed [basketball's] 
meteoric rise over the last 15 years knows that to coach an NBA team is to be thrust into 
the middle of intense competition that can deteriorate to the level of cartoon." (Araton 
1996, 11). Once more, here in a report in the New York Times sports section, the 
intrusion of cartoons onto the territory of the real is read as deterioration. This can be 
extended to being understood as a kind of deterioration of health, or at least of that 
illusion of a life-force that characterises realism: "[The Hudsucker Proxy by Joel and 
Ethan Coen] was a send-up of corporate greed in which Paul Newman played the cigar-
smoking heavy .... But despite Mr Newman's marquee name, the film was a flop at the 
box office and generally got poor reviews. The main complaint: these aren't flesh-and-
blood characters, they're cartoons" (McDonald 1996, 1). To be a cartoon here is clearly 
to lack, to lack "flesh and blood", and hence an inside, muscle power, a heart, autonomy. 
What this reviewer demands is the corporeality that comes with being human, and not 
just a paper- or celluloid-representation of the outline of a human. 
The New Zealand Listener's film critic Jan Chilwell makes similar assumptions in 
her review of Natural Born Killers. Complaining that the film, nominally a hyperreal 
study in how the mediated image, to quote Jean Baudrillard, encourages "a kind of brute 
I As this example might suggest to anyone who has actually seen Showgiris, I don't want to suggest that the 
reviewers I'm citing are necessarily wrong about their subjects. It is the metaphors they choose to deploy 
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fascination unencumbered by aesthetic, moral, social or political jUdgement" (Baudrillard 
1987, 1), Chilwell tells us that " ... Oliver Stone has elected to sidestep pesky notions such 
as context, coherence, narrative and thematic development to ape what he claims to 
abhor ... " (Chilwell 1994,42). In the absence of the conventions that create the illusion of 
reality, the film becomes "derivative, devoid of emotional resonance, intellectually banal 
and morally questionable. It's also visually and viscerally exhilarating - a gut-churning, 
breakneck chamber of horrors ride" (ibid). This ambivalence is produced by "us and 
them: their debased superficiality and distortions; our appetite for it. .. it comes on more 
like an outbreak of symptoms than a diagnosis" (ibid). Like Pynchon, Chilwell (and 
Stone) seem to sense that the postmodem spectacle produces cartoons. But for Chilwell, 
there is little ambivalence about cartoons - they are firmly on the side of the media-
driven machine: characters are "too thinly drawn" (ibid), are outlines, cartoons. And 
"Tommy Lee Jones is wasted as a 'toon-type, chequerboard-suited prison governor" 
(ibid). Cartoons here are bad, a waste, symptomatic of a disease, useless politically. 
They are not, in short, real, and as such cannot preserve the human and moral from the 
intrusion ofthe inhuman. 
I have already mentioned how editing, or the presence of a lack, whether it be a 
lack of consequences of action or a sense of complex existence, contributes to a sense of 
cartoon-ness in discourses surrounding literature and film. The cutout is cartoonish 
because of its lack of complexity, or of depth of characterisation, and hence critics imply 
that a piece in which cartoon cutouts exist cannot adequately advance understanding of 
the world or the human condition. Cartoon characters are thus outlines of "real" people 
or realised characters: they lack a centre. Instead they may be black-on-white outlines, or 
shaded in with limited detail or colour (or both). Cartoons can even exhibit some 
complexity, just not enough. A bold outline seems to be important to a cartoon, to 
separate the character from its environment, and both it and the environment from the 
void of the page. It is as if a bold stroke is needed to differentiate the representation from 
nothing at all, so close is it to non-meaning and so outrageously does it flirt with invalid 
mImeSIS. 
Hence, Don DeLillo's Ratner's Star (1976) is just "Alice in Wonderland set at the 
regarding them that I am interested in. 
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Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies.... The book is in the end, as elegantly 
meaningless as a mathematical abstraction, though considerably more unnerving and far 
more entertaining" (Heller 1976, 86). The spectre of non-existence haunts the "cartoon". 
Its simple colours and shadings are indications and reductions where complex and 
"realised" imitations of life perhaps ought to be. Amanda Heller's invocation of Lewis 
Carroll's novel for children in this review sheds light on another assumption, that 
cartoons are identified with children. This occurs quite commonly, as can be seen with 
the metaphor Alan Cholodenko automatically grasps for in his discussion of animation's 
relationship to film studies: that of step-chi1d/step-parent. This metaphor aptly conveys 
the sense of a hierarchical relationship, a sense Cholodenko wants to put across -
cartoons are treated as if they are to be ignored, or at least barely tolerated. This 
conflation of cartoons with childishness is hardly new, either. Kunzle, in volume two of 
his history of early comic strips, notes that a sales-pitch for Gustave Dore's "Prophecies 
for the People of France", dating between 1848 and the 1860s, tells us that comics are 
"for children of all ages". Kunzle comments that this "points to a new audience of 
intersecting generations and social classes: the older (ten to sixteen years of age), 
educated child and the chi1d-in-the-adult. To these we must add the lower social classes, 
struggling, like children, into maturity. The burgeoning of the market for children's 
literature is a function of the expansion of a literate industrial popular culture. The 
"people", like the children they were supposed to resemble, wanted to look and laugh, to 
be entertained .... For [children's] literature, [there came] various styles of child-like 
drawing" (Kunzle 1990, 2). 
It is this conflation of the child-in-the-adult and the child-in-the-lower-class that is 
most interesting here, particularly in light of some of the banal usages of "cartoon" we 
have been encountering. "Maturity" is read here as the antithesis of the cartoon; it 
corresponds to adult reality. But it also corresponds to the dominant classes in a stratified 
"mature" society. The "cartoon", then, corresponds to immaturity and to lower classes 
and the "preterite"; to non-completion of social grace or of transformation into maturity: 
it is a liminal space. However, this has implications for the non-cartoon ruling classes. 
Jerry Herron's essay on cartoons and Fredric Jameson's concept of post modem nostalgia 
see the cartoon as culture's inner-child, usually hidden or disregarded, but capable of 
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emerging and colonising the adult fonn (Herron, 1993). Children can be seen as rough 
sketches of personality which require a touch-up into adulthood through parenting and 
good social authorship. If an adult becomes a child, he or she is seen as regressing, as 
lacking essential attributes of adulthood. Children are simpler, have fewer cares, play 
more, and so forth. But for Herron, who connects the notion of an inner child with the 
Jamesonian problem of a nostalgia for the present (see Jameson c1991, 279-296) in a 
world when history has disappeared so that the present cannot be anchored, it is not so 
much a matter of adults acting in a childish manner as the child actually colonising its 
parent culture. The rough sketch, then, colonises the painting and takes it over as it were. 
The low art fonn not only becomes high art, but high art is made low. Hence, the 
montage techniques of classic realist live-action cinema can make it seem instead 
animated (Small & Levinson, 69-70). Animation is a cartoon in this regard: in 
comparison to live action film it is a failure, because of its lack of a "reality effect". It is 
obviously-constructed and obviously-artefact, and hence is still growing, still developing 
maturity, a maturity that is the equivalent to realism. Its cartoon nature lies in the gap 
between itself and live-action, just as the Renaissance cartoon's lies in the gap between 
itself and the full-grown painting, and the modem cartoon's between itself and the full-
grown reality effect. However, it is capable of moving into the centre of discourse about 
its parent/opposite, which is why those discourses often exclude this unruly element. 
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Chapter seven 
Cartoons and Postmodern Discourses 
A cartoon, from the common denominator of the definitions we outlined last 
chapter, is a drawing, or a particular type of drawing. By drawing, I'm speaking 
metaphorically as well as literally. One definition suggests that a cartoon is often 
deployed for comic effect. It refers to topical or political newspaper cartoons, and 
defines them as humorous. In this case the suggested effect might be satiric, in fact, as it 
can be used for topical comment. This suggests that cartoons are not automatically 
devoid of political or moral reference points. Just because a politician, for instance, is 
represented as something else, (a potato, to dig up a random example), is not to say the 
reader is incapable of referring the image back to what they take to be a real person, the 
politician. The problem with this, though, is that knowledge of the politician as a potato 
is derived from a stereotype, often perpetuated through media treatment of him or her. 
So it in fact refers more back to an already-existing simplified representation of a real 
person. Another definition, referring to a cartoon strip like Garfield or Peanuts, also 
suggests affinities between cartoons and non-drawing-typebehavior. Speech is often 
attached, so there is a textual dimension to this type of cartoon. It is also capable of 
narrativity because it tells a story. The third definition suggests even more life-like 
attributes: a kinetic element is introduced through animation, and recording techniques 
can add sound, making the cartoon a potential simulation for human activity and 
behaviour. And the fourth suggests the incompleteness of this representation: the cartoon 
is a preliminary sketch of something that mayor may not eventually pretend to imitate 
life or reality. To use this fourth definition as a metaphor momentarily, then, Chilwell's 
complaint about Natural Born Killers suggests that perhaps the "thinly drawn" characters 
will become moral agents once "paint" is applied to them and the outline is filled in 
sufficiently. At some point, it is assumed, a representation becomes in some way human 
enough to allow readers to identify with it. At this point it stops being a cartoon in a bad 
way and starts being one in a good way, a way legitimated by the critic. 
The assumption is that because of its lack of realism, a cartoon is somehow of less 
value than "[the murderer] with enough inner life that we can apprehend him", or a 
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deeply, humanly-played Tommy Lee Jones character. Bad cartoons are thus completely 
textual, and are therefore not real: they are things which are so obviously fictional they 
carry only limited "truth" value or moral agency, but instead represent functions. As 
Alan Cholodenko points out, cartoons are "graphics"; and cartoon cinema is 
"cinematographic" (199lb, 214). His point is that both cartoons and cinema, and cinema 
cartoons, are forms of writing, by which he means they inscribe meaning. Hence, the 
fact that cartoons are textual reinforces the textuality implied by the dictionary's 
definition of "cartoon": figures capable of actual recorded speech, or which have captions 
or speech bubbles implying speech, or which have a narrative. Language always already 
informs the cartoon, making its status as a metaphor for underdeveloped characterization 
at once apt and enlightening. 
Obviously, because the cartoon is used as a metaphor, it is a text anyway: this is 
its third connection with language. As the metaphor we've been developing implies, it is 
often used to refer to underdeveloped characterization, characterization that is somehow 
less realistic than it ought to be. Here the fourth definition of "cartoon" - the cartoon as a 
preliminary sketch for a painting - can help. When a drawing becomes a painting 
(becomes more finished) it becomes more and more elaborate as colour, texture, perhaps 
perspective are added in later drafts. If our painting is a traditional realistic portrait, as 
these attributes are added it becomes a representation of an actual person. With the 
requisite skill level, the portrait painter makes the representation believable and lifelike. 
This seems opposed to its cartoon's lack of conviction, or obviousness of its constructed 
nature. The "photographic realism" of some post-Renaissance paintings testifies to this. 
Alternatively, impressionism and symbolism contribute to a sense of psychological 
reality, an obsession with uncovering complex hidden truths about the artist or the art 
object. Similarly, continuing with our metaphor, as a cartoon character adds dimensions 
- more characteristics; as it starts to act and behave like a "real" person - then critics are 
more inclined to treat the figure as a real person, and the character becomes "realized", 
an entity capable of moral agency. Is cartoon-ness then simply a matter of degree, the 
degree to which "colour" and "texture" are added to the sketch? If so, where does being 
a cartoon stop and being "real" begin? If a cartoon is an obviously fictional entity, an 
entity that fails to convince the viewer/reader that it stands in for something real, then a 
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border must define where the fictional stops and reality begins. Moreover, the art of 
realistic fictions must be in part a rhetorical art, the writer skillfully persuading readers or 
viewers that what they are reading or watching bears a privileged relationship with reality 
and everyday life. 
Turning cartoon 
Certainly this is Roland Barthes' view. In S/Z, he identifies five major rhetorical 
"lexias" of realist writing, to be found in Balzac's short story "Sarrasan", often regarded 
as a piece of canonical realism. They are the Hermeneutic code, which refers to the 
interpretation of the passage; the Seme code, which covers the web of connotations that 
metaphors, similes and allusions could suggest to readers; the symbolic code, structures 
of symbols arranged oppositionally (sea/shore, for instance); the code of action, which is 
plot, the logic of the events in the story; and the code of reference, which is how the story 
refers to or played upon cultural codes, common knowledges, and common senses that a 
story might contain (Barthes, 1974, 9-20). Character, for Barthes, here consists of the 
repetition of seme codes, using similar metaphors and allusions to compare the character 
in the narrative to outside sources, and to trust the reader's knowledge of symbol to set 
the correct impression of character. "Life, in the classic text" is, for Barthes, a 
"nauseating mixture of common opinions, a smothering layer of received ideas" (206). A 
single system of naturalistic reading, reading for true character, renders also the reader 
"plasticised by a singular system" (4-5). Characters can be said to be "cartoon-like" too, 
drawn up by a series of conventions. The realistic character is realistic only insofar as 
readers accept the conventions by which their realism is expected to be measured, 
conventions which Barthes would identify as constructed culturally. 
Postmodernist historiographic metafictions tend to problematise and demystify 
attempts to present naturalistic or totalised accounts of historical events, suggesting that 
historical discourse is concerned not with finding the truth of historical events, but rather 
the narrativisation of history itself. In other words, historical discourse forces the past to 
conform to narrative forms which have a beginning, a middle and an end, whereas the 
events themselves can be regarded as formless or plotless until cultural narrative 
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structures, which allow historians to interpret them, are imposed. Linda Hutcheon 
suggests that negative reactions to such metafictional demystification may come from 
inheritors of the "long tradition from Hegel to Marx through Lucacs to Eagleton that 
tends to see only the past as the site of positive values ... always in direct contrast to the 
capitalist present" (1988, 212). Seeing postmodernism in general, and historiographic 
metafiction in particular, as a discourse that paradoxically represents history and 
simultaneously challenges the possibility of that representation, she points out that novels 
like E.L. Doctorow's Ragtime and Robert Coover's The Public Burning make it clear that 
one 
never could ["set out to represent the historical past", as Fredric Jameson 
complained the historical novel no longer does] - except by means of seemingly 
transparent conventions. To [Jameson's] lament that all fiction today can do is 
'''represent' our ideas and stereotypes about the past" (71), these novels reply that 
this is all they have ever been able to do, and that this is the lesson of the entire 
crisis in contemporary historiography. The postmodern problematising of 
historical knowledge prevents statements such as: "The past, simpler than the 
present, offers a kind of model from which we can begin to learn the realities of 
history itself' (Jameson 1973, xiv). This, if anything, is nostalgia. The past was 
never "simpler"; it has only been simplified. (212) 
Jameson's tendency toward totalisation, in his attempt to find explanatory 
metanarratives and his lament that such explanations have become impossible because of 
the fragmentary nature of an advanced capitalist world, leads to history's "cartooning" 
through metonymic generalization. The idealizations of the "simpler" and more idyllic 
pasts that are a part of both the Marxist and conservative traditions reduces the 
dimensionality of the actual events which took place, which we can presume were as 
complex and contradictory as events today. And, I will suggest, it is nostalgia of the type 
that Jameson exhibits that makes this form of cartooning dangerous. 
Here "history", in the traditional sense of seeking a "closed" truth about an event, 
can be compared to "realism". Jameson accuses postmodern histories of not grappling 
with the real issues of the past. Hutcheon defends the postmodernists, suggesting that 
history, and "realistic" historical fiction, never did more than tell a narrative according to 
narrative convention, attempting to fit the past into a structure, in other words, when it 
139 
was essentially unstructured. The result was and is that structure itself became the truth, 
according to postmodemists: the conventions of historical writing were preserved, rather 
than the "what really happened" of the events themselves. It was nof a story of these 
events that the history told, it was a story of a privileged interpretation of those events, 
from a particular position that was universalized as truth - the events no longer existed 
outside of a representation of them. 
So, to Hutcheon, postmodem metafictional histories were, among other things, 
simply being honest about the limits of their knowledge. One of the methods of 
presenting these limits is to make characters and events seem cartoonish, by introducing, 
when presenting "real" events, "comic repetitions, manic zaniness, and apocalyticism ... 
metafiction, pop surrealism and undergirding paranoia" (Irwin), much as Pynchon does in 
his historiographic metafictions V. (1963), Gravity's Rainbow, Vineland and Mason & 
Dixon (1997). Often, although not always or necessarily, self-reflexive characterization 
comes to seem, and is accused of being, cartoonish. If this is the case, then a good deal of 
self-reflexive postmodemism should also have a cartoonish feel to it. In novels like Don 
DeLillo's Ratner's Star and End Zone (1972), realistic representation is regarded by the 
author as secondary to his exploration of how subjectivities are produced in culture and 
language. This postmodemist concern displays a lack of respect for realistic convention, 
giving both books the feel of a cartoon rather than of pieces of realism. 
Exposing the conventions of writing in this way, and reflexively suggesting that 
there is nothing "real" beyond them, distances the world of writing from "reality", and 
hence challenges the possibility of "realism". Metafiction in general suggests that 
realism reduces the "real" by closing it off from other possibilities - realism can, for 
instance, privilege the "bourgeois" reality Barthes identifies in Balzac's realism, at the 
expense of other methods of perception, knowledge and representation. In this sense, 
because realism is a reduction from "the real", a realistic narrative is always already a 
"cartoon". And, oddly, the more "real" the representation becomes, or attempts to be, the 
more difficult it is to sustain its illusion of "reality". As realism enacts closure, its 
conventions and artifices become a problem for it: as Mark Seltzer comments, in 
reference to nineteenth century realism and naturalism, 
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[t]he perfection of realism would be a perfect referentiality: bodies and matter 
writing themselves. But if the perfection of realism would be its perfect 
referentiality, the identification of technologies of writing and "the subject" of 
writing as two versions of the same thing would render the realist project purely 
tautological. The perfect referentiality of realist writing would thus be its perfect 
self-referentiality: the realist project of accounting for persons as effects or 
products of the machine, as typical and predictable functions of a social 
biomechanics, would be identical to accounting for persons and personation as 
effects of writing. (Seltzer, 1992, 108-9) 
lP. Stern too places the limits of realism at the point where its artifice becomes 
obvious: "Realism <t;l1ows for symbolical meanings, but it limits their range. Symbolist 
literature moves beyond that range, to the point where a break occurs between 'is' and 
'stands for', where shared knowledge gives way to intimation; symbolism begins where 
intimation ceases to be subordinated to a realistic purpose and becomes dominant, an 
open-ended vision" (1973, 84). This "shared knowledge" Stem appeals to is the non-
I 
polemical version of Barthes' "common opinions ... received ideas" (1974, 206). The 
cartoon, if it is to be seen in our context as the effect of this writing revealing itself, is 
only different from the realistic character in that the cartoon is obviously a symbol, 
whereas the realistic character is a symbol, a far more complex symbol, to be sure, 
masquerading as a mirror image. Or to put it in Seltzer's terminology, the cartoon is 
writing when its mechanical component is noticed, like the circuitry on Bongo-
Shaftsbury's hand in V. (80), while the realistic character is, like the Terminator in James 
Cameron's film (1984, invoked by Seltzer in his previous sentence), writing whose 
organic basis is there to cover over its mechanical componentry. Cartoons, then, are a 
form of realism, and exist according to the degree of closure the realism enacts. 
Cartoonness is a matter of degree. Its point of inception depends upon the reader's 
conviction, or the perception of the completeness of closure. Cartoon-ness does not 
depend (although it can) on the success of closure, because this assumes firstly that the 
writer always wants to close the narrative from alternative, non-realistic interpretations, 
and secondly that the writer can, even ifhe or she tries. 
The last passages of Gravity's Rainbow enact a peculiar connection between 
worlds, between the world of the book and the final separation from it, the world outside 
the book. Hence it is "us" that sit in the theatre: the novel opens radically outward to 
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include all of reality. The politics of the novel are hence the politics of an extra-literary 
reality in which the rocket and everything it symbolizes, whether it be (totalitarian) 
"fascist" systems, structures favouring death, the enlightenment project, apocalypse 
achieved through the acceleration of technologies of domination, the aestheticisation of 
politics, or any of its other significations, are deliberately extended to present (1973) 
reality. Since, following Benjamin, the nature of (totalitarian) "fascist" reality is an 
aestheticised reality in which the "ism" of realism and the "ity" of reality are forced into 
the same space, "real" people can, under certain circumstances, be read as 
representations. The mirror, which becomes the nexus of narcissistic and hence, at its 
extreme, totalitarian identity, acts as a screen upon which an aestheticised and perceived 
image is taken to be reality. In the wake of poststructuralist theories about the 
impossibility of a "reality" unmediated by culture (that is, reality exists, but there is no 
access to it without language and symbolization, which puts reality at one remove from 
what it is possible to totally know) the experienced, extra-novelistic world can be 
regarded as a "realism". This comes complete with a "reality effect" in which subjects 
misrecognise an ideological construct of reality as the "unchangeable" or "real" reality. 
Benjamin's reply to fascism, to "politicise art" seems fulfilled by Pynchon and Ellis. I 
will show in chapter eleven that with these novelists, politicising art involves 
undermining "reality's" "reality effect" (Barthes 1982) by their art's intrusion into the 
"real" world. (Totalitarian) "fascism", from this standpoint, is the author of an extreme 
form of realist writing; my argument is that Pynchon and Ellis show that its failure lies in 
the exposure of a "cartoon" element already within these extremities of realist form. 
Critical reviews, time and again, assume that cartoons represent the failure of 
realistic aspirations in a work of art. This manifests itself in two ways - the genuine 
cartoon is regarded as trivial because it seems irrelevant to realist representation, and is 
often excluded from discussions as a result; the presence of cartoons in otherwise realist 
forms is regarded as a failure of the perfection or realization of the form. It will be my 
contention, however, that (totalitarian) "fascist" conditions render the world cartoonish; 
cartoons, under such conditions, could be considered a realistic mode of representation. 
This argument is less a critique of realism, based on what realism has been over the years, 
than a critique of unthought critical assumptions about the nature of representation: as 
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lP. Stem, one of the strongest traditional defenders of realism notes, realism stands at a 
"complex relation to [reality] ... it too exaggerates and omits, that is, distorts" (56). Many 
writers of realism would, I'm sure, agree - to demand of realism that it "reflects" reality 
with the precision of an actual mirror is to demand too much of it. Its approximate 
nature, or its selective nature (provided its practitioners are not deluded into thinking it 
nonetheless, or thereby, captures "reality") prevents realism from attaining (totalitarian) 
"fascist" closure and actually masquerading as if it is reality. Nonetheless, the failure to 
attain a plausible realism seems to be grounds for aesthetic dismissal, to some critics. 
Robert Newsom sees this anxiety as a part of a moral problem: for "[most of the 
history of literary criticism], the worry about fiction ... has been a moral rather than a 
logical (or psychological) one: What is the moral effect upon us of our being entertained 
by representations of things that never happened?" (Newsom 1988, 108). The 
development of the category of the aesthetic allays this problem, so that only people 
outside the literary world itself still see it as a problem, and in the nineteenth century, 
"with the ascendancy at the same time of realism, that worry also begins to recede, for 
because realism seeks an accurate representation of the world as it really is, it is of the 
nature of realism that it veils the fictionality of fictions: fictions whose fictionality is 
plain are bad fictions. Thus critics skeptical of the merely aesthetic and very much 
concerned with the moral effects of literature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -
critics like Matthew Arnold and F.R. Leavis, for example - never worry about fictions as 
fictions, but only worry about whether particular fictions see things as they actually are" 
(108-9). Most critical concerns with cartoons occur in this sort of moral way: when 
cartoons remain in the appropriate place, they can be safely ignored by the realist critic; 
when, however, a form of representation that makes its fictionality plain transgresses into 
a form the critic believes ought to keep its fictionality veiled (so that it can "represent the 
world as it really is") there can be indignation. A cartoon's occurrence in a traditionally 
realist form, such as a novel or a film, usually troubles critics that have realist 
assumptions. 
Such assumptions are built around the realist commonplace that it is possible to 
"hold a mirror up to nature", to represent a possible world in a way that corresponds to 
the reader's or viewer's experiences of the world. This mimetic project is indeed possible 
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to the extent that writers throughout the history of realism have been convincing readers 
of the trueness to life of their fictions. They write fictions that nonetheless contain a 
sense of the extra-fictional. One of the most obvious justifications of life-like writing is 
that the events described and the characters portrayed could easily have lived next door, 
and thus their fictional experiences are able to be learned from. Fiction, despite not 
having actually happened (few works of fiction ever try to actually fool the reader into 
believing that depicted events "really" happened, only that they might be able to), can 
nonetheless provide the reader with an enriched understanding of the reality we all 
inhabit. 
Postmodernism as "cartoon" 
Postmodern and metafictional novels often eschew cause and effect, and often 
seem cartoonish as a result. Postmodern fiction is often characterized in the following 
terms: it is self-referring, or metafictional, because its underlying premise is that 
representation is a function of language rather than reality. It takes upon itself to 
"demystify" representation, denying the possibility of discovering "universal truths", 
because "truth" is a function of language and culture. Hence it refers instead, in theory 
endlessly, to itself, to the way the fiction itself produces meaning. Along with this it 
engages in the more radical premise that reality itself is a construction, a function of 
power and desire realized through power over interpretation (and hence language). 
Pynchon certainly exhibits this premise with his paranoid readings of "reality" as being 
an ideological construct of "the Firm", a system of meanings designed to conserve and 
increase the power of its elites. 
One of the major characteristics of postmodernism as it is usually defined is its 
privilege of surface. As Terry Eagleton wrote, "postmodernism, confidently post-
metaphysical, has outlived all the fantasy of interiority, that pathological itch to scratch 
surfaces for concealed depths ... " (1988, 394). Baudrillard also mentions how everything 
exists now at a surface level, obvious, like pornography (1983, 130-1). Baudrillard's 
description of postmodernity is of a totalitarian society, not engineered around the 
charisma of a leader/parent like previous examples, but around a monologic of surface, 
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simulacrum (a copy for which no original exists) and commodity. This may at first seem 
to be a universe which transcends binary logic, instead promoting a singular logic in 
which everything has equal presence (as Terry Eagleton says, "value is just that which is" 
[393]). However, this is just a measure of the success of the total environment 
Baudrillard describes 1. 
Like all total environments, this is a world in which the positive point of the 
binary construct has covered over and annihilated its "other". Here relationships with the 
other become detached and reattached to another binary relationship, one with absence, 
and particularly the absent real, or referent. The image here precedes reality. It has corne 
to colonize and take over reality by simulation. Therefore "the body", for instance, has 
corne to seem "simply superfluous" (1983, 129). This shows the lesser dimensionality of 
the economy of the sign: "All functions are abolished in a single dimension: that of 
communication" (131). This communication is cartoon-like and like (totalitarian) 
"fascism" as we conceive it here - the ideology Baudrillard describes practices "the 
forced extroversion of all interiority" (132). The surface is where communicable 
information resides, completing the job of the spectacle's colonizing project, for there is 
now no private space away from the gaze of others. This is like a cartoon in three ways: 
people become points of information, all of which reside on the surface - they become 
readable outlines; the body is rejected in favour of a less complex version of the self; 
there is a gap between the image of a person's self and an effect of their "real" self 
(reality is hidden away to the point where suspicion rages that it never existed.) 
From what we have been saying, (totalitarian) "fascism" can be read as the 
colonization of the real by cartoons. In writing about America, in his book of the same 
name, Baudrillard (1988) describes life in America as being like a desert, lived as if on a 
cinema screen. America here stands, in Douglas Kellner's view, for "the liquidation of a 
multi-dimensional and critical (European) culture, the desertification or one-
1 Baudrillard often cases his arguments in alarmist, apocalyptic terms, making assertions rather 
than arguments - his figuration of a simulated crime in "The Precession of Simulacra" is unconvincing for 
this reason [1984, 266-7]. But, because the Baudrillardan critique contains some important descriptions of 
postmodem tendencies, despite the science fiction aspects of his theory, even now we can leave aside the 
extent to which Baudrillard's conception of an economy of signs corresponds with lived reality for most 
people and just note that it may be an instance of theory slipping into cartoon. 
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dimensionalization of the social in the wasteland of the indifferent" (1989, 170). 
Postmodem America is thus a place without multiple dimensions. This must be the case 
in the spectacle, where the social becomes a matter for contemplation, and where, hence, 
all meaning resides on the surface. 
Fredric Jameson shows how in postmodemity the dimension of history becomes 
lost to individuals, who thus become like schizophrenics, and react to stimuli almost as if 
they are encountering them for the first time (1983, 119-20). This flattens them, as 
categories such as depth and individuality tend to be produced by differences in 
individual and cultural histories and the intersections of these. Jameson regards this as 
the highest form of capitalism so far, which creates and mobilizes its subjects as 
consumers, consuming disposable items. His schema for schizophrenia derives from 
Lacan, and it once again involves the failure of the subject to reach the Oedipal phase, in 
Lacan's case a phase of language-mastery posited in the phallic name-of-the-father. This 
makes schizophrenia an "inability of the infant to accede fully into the realm of speech 
and language" (118). Hence we have at this point too an example of the child colonizing 
the parent culture, as Jameson sees postmodernity as a period of generalized 
schizophrenia. The loss of history this involves also brings on a society of amnesia, and 
makes pastiche - an arbitrary amalgam of previous styles - the most prevalent artistic 
technique or genre. 
Hence, modem, or postmodem conditions, ones depicted by Ellis and Pynchon as 
being (totalitarian) "fascist", resemble cartoons as well. As with more traditional fascists, 
the people living in these conditions are also cartoonish outlines. Certainly, postmodem 
"reality", as it is presented in the writings of Baudrillard, Jameson, Pynchon and Ellis, is 
a very odd sort of "reality". Mediated by technology and representation, it is very much 
an aestheticised reality. However, it still presents itself as "real", as the true conditions of 
living in an advanced society, the "highest" stage of "advanced" capitalism so far. It still 
involves the suppression of a component in a binary structure, the suppression of a sense 
of corporeal reality for an image-as-ideal, and a sense that, in the words of Rey Chow, 
"we are not other" (1995, 45). 
Postmodem fiction often also denies coherence, refusing to tie plot-strands 
together into a coherent whole, instead often willfully fragmenting the narrative and 
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characters. The assumption behind this is that by refusing to tie meaning together, the 
narratives both reflect (paradoxically) the way things actually are - chaotic, non-coherent 
- and equalize meaning, so that one conclusion is not given priority over others. For 
instance, as with Gravity's Rainbow, American Psycho displays many of Irwin's 
categories of "comic repetitions, manic zaniness, and apocalyticism ... metafiction, pop 
surrealism and undergirding paranoia" (56), making this novel similar too to the Porky 
Pig and the anarchist cartoon "The Blow Out". Indeed, the novel's self-referentiality 
adds to the impression of cartoon-ness, and, as with other examples of postmodem 
metafiction, is accompanied by a retreat from realistic characterization. 
American Psycho'S postmodemism produces effects that strike at the heart of 
questions over reactionary co-option of postmodernist categories, and therefore the 
political potentials of postmodemism itself. The postmodern techniques Ellis uses 
cartoon the novel by reducing the realism of its descriptions of the world and its 
characters. Bateman functions as a demonstration of how postmodemism can be the 
cultural expression of late capitalism, and therefore how "realism" and "maturity" might 
be of some political benefit. The question that will need to be answered is about whose 
reality this realism would reflect. Bateman also demonstrates that a totally imposed 
environment also turns the imposed reality into a cartoon - that it both holds together and 
falls apart at the same time. And at the same time, the novel makes cartoons of its 
readers by imposing the total environment Bateman represents on us as well. 
For Laura Tanner, in American Psycho Ellis has created a protagonist who 
behaves much like Marx's version of the capitalist class: "Ellis attempts to unveil the 
machinery that creates the magical illusions of a psycho-capitalist world in which the 
wealthy and beautiful have the power to transform anything into anything" (Tanner, 98). 
Bateman's behaviour is a result of the alienation of the capitalist from the physical acts of 
labour, so that he conceives of bodies not as subjectivities, as people, but as being 
manipulable, mutable, transformable into other things (commodities, for instance), and 
"incapable of pain" (98). This alienation is embedded in the narrative of the novel, which 
Tanner sees as being ruled by Bateman to the point where even his victims' cries of pain 
actually deny them subjectivity, instead empowering Bateman, because their pain and 
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suffering is rendered in his own imaginative terms. Representation in the novel means 
being sUbjected to the depersonalising processes a total environment offers. 
Moreover, Tanner offers an explanation as to why this book in particular drew the 
ire of pro-censorship groups: Bateman apparently also offers the reader no escape from 
his psychoses. "The reader finds him- or herself forced to negotiate a text that asserts 
narrative omnipotence and seems to deny the reader even the power of resistance", which 
is why calls for the book's banning - why resistance was based on extra-textual issues, as 
Elizabeth Young complains (86-87). The text of American Psycho forces the reader into 
"the status of passive observer" (Tanner, 112), and hence into a presumably unwanted 
complicity with the acts Bateman commits, so that exploitation never stops and resistance 
to the totality of capitalism and spectacle is impossible. Tanner's call for "oppositional 
reading ... to the very terms of readership implicit in the text" (114), or to the relations 
between the reader and the text, sounds a little like revolutionary consciousness in this 
context. 
This is because the novel constructs its readers as victims. Weare, as Tanner 
suggests, like one of his victims, forced into watching Bateman's deeds while in a 
situation she cannot escape. As such, each of its readers has the potential for 
revolutionary consciousness - one no longer has to belong to the essential revolutionary 
classes. Even the system's policemen - its privileged - can become its victims, as the 
death of Paul Owen testifies. Guy Debord predicted this situation when he commented 
that the ultimate triumph of spectacle means "the proletarianization of the world" (#26), 
an absolute totalitarian social context similar to the one readers are presented with here. 
Upon first encountering the narrative, Bateman's voice is difficult to read past. 
Tanner is right: the book seems all Bateman; he obliterates everything else in here. The 
narrator shouts, dominating by sheer force of personality, and by the compounding layers 
of detail, with which he continually confounds the reader. But his narration is also 
profoundly unreliable, and Elizabeth Young sees this fact as opening the book up to 
resistance to its violence, to a deconstruction of Bateman's voice which defuses his 
violence, rendering it a representation of nothing, and thus giving readers a chance to 
reclaim their SUbjectivity from him. Her argument, though, only helps readers go so far: 
a very pessimistic account of life under the sign of the postmodem spectacle remains, and 
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this opens the book and Young's reading up to objections about the paralysis of action 
implicit in postmodernisms such as Ellis's. 
Young expresses surprise at how few critics of the novel realize that its narration 
is radically untrustworthy. She suspects that writers bring non-literary agendas to their 
criticism, agendas that blind reviewers to the elementary critical errors they make as a 
result. For instance, some writers try to equate Bateman with his author, and read 
American Psycho as a manifesto, or a work of "snobbery" (Tucker 1991), or as an object 
for people to possess so that they can increase their standing within a social clique 
(Young, 88). Un argued conflation of the author with his or her first-person narrator is, of 
course, an elementary error for high school students, let alone professional literary 
commentators. Needless to say that very few people actually read the book well. Mim 
Udovitch's Village Voice review, which is largely negative, at least manages to "finally ... 
gasp out: 'SLOW. UNRELIABLE NARRATOR WORKING.' This was actually an 
achievement considering how few other critics had even managed to reach this simple 
decision" (Young, 107-108). 
This confusion in critics' minds may have something to do with the power of 
Bateman's voice. Upon first reading it is hard to find a way of peeling back his narration, 
because everything is filtered through his consciousness; it is his way of claiming 
ownership of his world. However, as Young points out, Bateman very quickly 
undermines his own credibility, even as he shouts to establish it. One aspect of the 
disintegration of Bateman's fantasy space that Young focuses on is his references to The 
Patti Winters Show, a day-time talk show that Bateman and many of his colleagues watch 
avidly. From the beginning the topics of this show are bizarre but plausible: Juggling 
Nazis, Autism, "descendants of members of the Donner Party" (American Psycho, 107). 
However, as the narrative proceeds, the subjects get more and more bizarre (a talking 
octopus, a boy in love with a box of soap) - even for daytime TV - and by the end, some 
of them are clearly misleading: they interview Bigfoot; they interview a "cherio", a piece 
of breakfast cereal, for an entire hour! This needn't surprise anyone: Bateman is a 
madman, and by this stage in his narrative he's having conversations with his ATM, and 
being spooked because park benches have been following him through the city. And this 
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in itself does not necessarily displace the scenes of torture/murder into fantasy-space, for 
he occasionally seems to run into the consequences of these while apparently sane. 
But Young's argument is more sophisticated than this. The unreliability of 
Bateman as a narrator is presented as being related to the book's status as an object, a 
text. From the first chapter, where the first words of the novel, "ABANDON ALL HOPE 
YE WHO ENTER HERE" (3), are presented as being textual, "scrawled in blood red 
lettering" (ibid), to the last, which is a portentous sign ("THIS IS NOT AN EXIT" [399]) 
the text is presented as being at least partially a construct. Even the title of chapter one 
suggests this: "April Fools" might refer to the people in the chapter or to readers who 
take its contents at face value. Bateman changes scene by introducing film imagery: 
"Like in a movie" (3); "panning down to the sidewalk" (5); "[a] slow dissolve" (8); 
"[s]mash cut and I'm back in the kitchen" (11). Characters from other books walk 
through the narrative (including Bateman himself, who first appeared in The Rules of 
Attraction, Ellis's second novel, which had as a main character his brother Sean, who 
makes a cameo here), and Bateman works at the investment firm which centred Tom 
Wolfe's Bonfire of the Vanities. Right at the end of American Psycho, Bateman 
overhears someone saying, "But look what happened to Gekko" (387), the Michael 
Douglas character from Oliver Stone's movie Wall Street. All of this suggests a world 
with no border between reality and fiction. 
Farther along the road of self-referentiality is the case of Bateman's friend Tim 
Price, "the only interesting person I know" (22). His name itself suggests value (his 
colleagues frequently tell him he's "priceless"), which refers back to the obsessions of the 
novel. Price, however, also quite self-consciously disappears from the text, into the text 
by walking into a "tunnel" in one of the nightclubs. The only distinctive person in the 
text has been erased from it for the moment (he returns later "for the sake of form, or I'm 
pretty sure he does" [384]), leaving only identical personalities for Bateman to socialize 
with. The stockbrokers are also identical in their status as texts as well. For instance, 
Bateman lunches with a man who talks of his holiday in brochure-speak: "Travelers 
looking for that perfect vacation this summer may do well to look south, as far south as 
the Bahamas and the Caribbean Islands. There are at least five smart reasons for visiting 
the Caribbean ... " (l37). Like Bateman, most of the other characters define their lives by 
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the dictates of GQ or Stereo World, restaurant guides, etiquette guides, and other, textual, 
behavioural authorities. 
For Young, Bateman is a cipher, a site where the implicit violence of the culture 
he exists in is given expression. Bateman can only exist within the novel's bounds. His 
power comes from his sources, from true crime accounts of serial killers to Elegance: a 
Guide to Quality in Menswear (the name of whose author is mistaken for that of a serial 
killer by another character) and other similar fashion rule-books. He is the product of an 
insane demand that people choose between consumer items ("There are too many fucking 
videos to choose from!" [112] Bateman shouts in exasperation at one point), of the 
insanity of people being continually confronted with a rush of banalities. Young argues 
that the fact that Bateman's fantasy murders and tortures appear "onstage", presented 
with all the pornographic detail that he describes everything else he does, makes readers 
confront their own relationship to fictionality itself. Bateman, to Young, "in his role of 
ultimate consumer, someone who is composed entirely of inauthentic commodity-related 
desires cannot exist as a person. He is doomed to fragmentation and disintegration" 
(121). Ellis, Young suggests, is conservative, puritanical even. He seems to exhibit 
nostalgia for an authentic "personhood" which has since been corrupted by advancing 
capitalism, and which does not exhibit the kind of fetishistic violence Bateman displays 
(120). 
Young suggests that there are at least three separate Batemans in the narrative. 
Most notoriously, there is the one who breaks down and takes pleasure in killing. This 
Bateman feels undefined as a person, almost as if he is not there, a void that is filled with 
horror. There is also a Bateman who dates his secretary Jean, and who desires a better 
life, a life where connections between people can be made: he desires the maturity Young 
says is "other" to the book's world (94, 112). And there is yet another one: the Bateman 
who composes the three odd little sections each dealing with a 1980s pop music figure. 
This narrator seems similar to the second one in that his preoccupation is with growth and 
maturity, in this case over the length of a career. But that Bateman still finds it difficult 
to hold his thoughts and his personality together - he is the one who muses about the 
problems of existence. This Bateman is too coherent to be him: "Bateman [is]... not 
known for organized thinking" (112). 
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Another possibility Young explores is that, as there is so much confusion over 
who is actually who in Bateman's "yuppie" subculture, the narrative voice could contain 
whoever is being mistaken for him at the time. For instance, near the start of the book, 
"Bateman" complains that McDelIDott and Van Patten are being racist and anti-Semitic. 
Later he loudly calls a Jewish restaurant worker a "cocksucking kike" (j1merican Psycho, 
152). It is not until after Price disappears from the narrative that people start being killed 
"on stage", prompting the suggestion from Young that perhaps it is Price acting as 
Bateman, in a similar way to how "Bateman" takes the part of Marcus Halberstam to 
cover for killing Paul Owen, who is committing the serial murders (Young, 118). 
"Bateman" here is an empty signifier ("I simply am not there" [American Psycho, 377]), 
filled by the body in possession of that identity. Hence his confessions are never listened 
to or taken seriously, or, as with the phone message Bateman left with Harold Carnes, 
they are attributed to someone else. Bateman rather represents the general psychotic 
tendency of his ideology. 
Bateman's crimes are thus undecidable, impossible, much like the fact that he can 
be both serial killer and mass murderer. (The police were closing in on him for his 
killing spree at the time he left his confession, but, like Bateman's identity, he proved 
elusive and remains uncaught. But perhaps that "Bateman" was caught, and we are now 
in another's head .... ) American Psycho de constructs so that the violence within its pages 
is a set of textual devices. This remains true of Young's argument whether or not Ellis's 
critique can be heard around the edges of his narrator's shouting. And it, while perhaps 
gaining the book points for artistic merit against its censors, problematises Ellis's critique 
of capitalism and violence. On one hand, the fact that the narrative fails to make 
judgements about what it portrays gives the reader the chance to be a more active 
participant in the reading of the text: as Young says, "the reader is forced to scrutinize his 
own values and beliefs, rather than those being provided for him within a good-evil 
fictive universe" (100). On the other, it might also radically break fiction from its 
referent, rendering his critique impotent, because the reader is at once being encouraged 
to find a pure moral vantage point outside the borders of the text, and then relate what the 
text in light of that space, or the judgements it allows, says back to an outside-text. But 
why should they? American Psycho has already been divorced from its referent by its 
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overdetennined textual-ness and umeliability: it might be seen as a place to dip and play, 
not a place for precipitating political action, because it divorces itself from the reality it 
wants to make points about. Tanner argues that the very postmodem technique of an 
umeliable and undecidable narrative contributes to Bateman's domination of the reader-
like the detective investigating Paul Owen's disappearance, the reader has no grounds 
upon which to resist Bateman because postmodemism has made such grounding 
impossible. Postmodemism, in other words, protects and even enables Bateman. 
This is a common anti-postmodem argument, sometimes proposed on the behalf 
of historical materialism (see Anderson 1984 and the discussion here in Chapter one). 
Postmodemism, with its emphasis on textual practices, writing, play, is impotent. Its 
claim that the world is textual denies the impact of material forces within capitalism on 
the subservient and exploited classes. Because of this, nothing of material import can be 
done: political games are played, anti-capitalist in tone and perhaps intent, but ultimately 
conservative because postmodem discourses deny strong grounds upon which a 
materially strong anti-capitalist stand can be made (Anderson; Zavarzadeh 1995). Hence 
postmodemism, because of its anti-essentialism, and because it undennines meta-
narratives and claims to Truth, is perceived as an attack on the possibility of classical 
Marxism, and is hence regarded to be in cahoots with the capitalist nomenclature. 
Moreover, postmodem anti-essentialism, as the argument goes, fragments oppositional 
voices from a unified class position into those of smaller, less potent interest groups. The 
politics of difference, then, allow capitalism to advance, dividing and ruling. American 
Psycho, according to this, fragments its readers' objections because the novel's status as a 
postmodem text gives them no clear and stable ground upon which to object to Bateman. 
There is no clear enemy to target, and so Bateman once again is able to fade into the 
background, if Bateman is read as embodying the American psychosis the novel explores. 
It is, however, both the strength of this totality, and its vacancy, its impossibility, 
which may lead to strategies of opposition to the totalising voice, be it in American 
Psycho or in versions of capitalism generally, or any other (totalitarian) "fascism". 
Building totalities is ultimately impossible, based as they are on misrecognitions, 
fragmentation (a totality's need for its other), exclusions of that other and so forth. 
Hence, it remains possible to undo the paradigms of power and domination which assert 
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total systems. The processes which keep Bateman intact and dominant - strengthening 
his boundaries after he experiences a narcissistic crisis caused by an encounter with the 
other (suggesting fragmentation and death) - are not necessary processes at all. They are 
instead processes managed by fascism. Such management may channel the subject's 
streams of desire in particular directions (Theweliet 1989a, 210-28). These channels and 
dams need never be set up, or need never be set in concrete. In what is to come, I will 
propose some trajectories of meaning which could "catch out" hypermasculinity and 
divert it from the totalisations it supports, to lead instead to "other" alternative political 
stances, ones which tap into the radical emancipatory and democratic potentials of 
postmodernism, rather than its radical dominational potentials. 
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Chapter eight 
The Totalitarian Toon 
"Lisa, I am familiar with the works of Pablo Neruda." 
-Bart Simpson 
This chapter begins an exploration of the politics of "cartoons". In response to the 
ambivalence Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland display about cartoons (see Chapter one), 
we discovered that cartoons represented a loss of detail, of complexity in representation. 
This is often read as deterioration, or a denial of reality and of humanity. They are 
radically umealistic representations, not because they represent nothing realistic, but 
because they are representations that call attention to their nature as stand-ins rather than 
displaying realism's strategy oftrying to engender belief in their "reality". In this chapter 
I will suggest, though, that "cartoons" in the above sense, inhabit a space on the other 
side of reality - as well as being a totem of a failed realism (whether that failure is 
intentional or not) they also occur at the extreme end of realism, at the point at which 
realism becomes a totality and enacts closure. Just as the cartoon cannot exist without 
realism to playoff, so the opposite is true: if the cartoon exists on the realist spectrum, 
realism exists on the cartoon one. I will also suggest, following Derrida's deconstructive 
critique, that what we consider "reality" is always mediated textually. Further to this, as 
the closure of textual meaning is an act of suppression for Derrida, a violent act (1974, 
101-40), it is also an act that privileges a way of reading the text, and hence by extension 
"reality" itself. Thus it is an ideological act: "the trace [is] the necessary violence of any 
mark, and, thus, of any institution" (Beardsworth 1996, 50). This might explain an 
ideology'S ability to produce a unique "reality". But it also renders "reality" a form of 
writing, in that it is the product of the trace, the mark, in that a reality, as an ideology, is 
the product of institutions. Reality is also therefore a form of "realism", and hence it is 
also something that can be included on the spectrum of cartoons. There is a similarity 
here to the political discussion above: a (totalitarian) "fascist" ideology that attempts to 
establish an absolute "reality" aestheticises politics, so that the social becomes a beautiful 
piece of "realist writing". This writing is so good an example of its geme that people are 
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able to forget that the "reality" it produces is actually a function of power. 
I suggested during the previous chapter that the most cartoonish episodes in 
Gravity's Rainbow are the ones that call attention to the absolute control the author has 
over the actions of his characters, Marvy and Chiclitz being set up to enact a bad pun, all 
the silly song-and-dance numbers. (Of course he does not have this absolute control; he 
can only control to a point the meaning of what he writes. But he can treat his characters 
like puppets.) Despite appearances, these episodes are not completely frivolous. If you 
recall, der Springer has taken the persona of chess's Knight in order to gain a third 
dimension, thus bringing him closer to election; this helps his black-market enterprises 
establish a near-monopoly in the Zone. "Pawns", however, "are destined to creep in two 
dimensions" (Gravity's Rainbow, 494). Hence pawns of the author are two-dimensional 
cartoons. Pynchon's tyranny over his characters, though, is not as great as Their tyranny 
over the pawns of the preterite, the slave-labourers, the consumers, the exploited, those of 
us who sit in Richard M. Zchlubb's theatre as Their rocket thunders down upon us. All 
of "us" who live under Their (totalitarian) "fascist" systems, in other words, are rendered 
in some way two-dimensional by virtue of being subjects of (totalitarian) "fascist" 
ideologies. These ideologies, as we know, are "structures favouring death" (167), 
represented by the Rocket, and are systems that allow for no heresy, no difference. 
Living in a (totalitarian) "fascist" environment is equivalent to living in a cartoonish one 
because "reality" is aestheticised and hence "reduced" or diminished dimensionally. 
Fascists, therefore, are often represented alongside cartoons, and not only in critiques of 
fascism. There is a sense in which all totalitarian environments produce cartoon effects, 
and hence a sense in which "real" (totalitarian) "fascist" people can be shown to be 
cartoonish. 
The imminence of the extreme reality of death can create cartoon-like conditions. 
Kurt V onnegut' s novel Slaughterhouse Five (1969) represents a particularly useful 
fictionalisation of this idea: Vonnegut himself, intruding as an omniscient first-person 
narrator into his text, notes, "There are almost no characters in this story, and almost no 
dramatic confrontations, because most of thG people in it are so sick and· so much the 
listless playthings of enormous forces. One of the main effects of war, after all, is that 
people are discouraged from being characters" (Vonnegut 1979, 140-141). Vonnegut 
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hints that here in the face of the truly appalling traditional realism would not be 
"realistic". He spent years attempting to find a way to write about his experiences in 
Dresden during the firebombing of early 1945 without trivialising them. The method he 
finally settled upon involved what we can understand as cartooning. As well as 
transgressing onto the not-traditionally-realistic genres of fantasy and science fiction, the 
people in his book are mostly flat; the prose is childish and simple. The effect is 
staggeringly powerful, as powerful as the best realist treatments of inhumanity, and we 
are left in no doubt that Vonnegut's book is an anti-war treatment. 
Pynchon, Vonnegut's contemporary, also seems to understand that such extreme 
situations and moments flatten dimensionality. Gravity's Rainbow seems to suggest that 
dangers produce cartoon effects. After a particularly tender love scene between Jessica 
Swanlake and the statistician Roger Mexico during the London V-2 blitz, the life, and the 
convincing characterisation Pynchon temporarily grants them in the episode recedes: 
.. .J essica breaking down into a giggle as he reaches for the spot along her 
sweatered flank he knows she can't bear to be tickled in. She hunches, squirming, 
out of the way as he rolls past, bouncing off the back of the sofa, but making a nice 
recovery, and by now she's ticklish all over, he can grab an ankle, elbow-
But a rocket has suddenly struck. A terrific blast quite close beyond the 
village: the entire fabric of the air, the time, is changed-the casement window 
blown inward, rebounding with a wood squeak to slam again as all the house 
shudders. 
Their hearts pound. Eardrums brushed taut by the overpressure ring in 
pain. The invisible train rushes away close over the rooftop. 
They sit still as the painted dogs now, silent, oddly unable to touch. Death 
has come in the pantry door: stands watching them, iron and patient, with a look 
that says fly to tickle me. (59-60) 
Here the rocket, personified by the appearance of death, momentarily severs the human 
connection that the lovers had. They are silent where before they were talking and 
teasing; they are "oddly unable to touch", where before they were touching and tickling. 
More significantly still, David Seed notes of this scene, "Roger and Jessica are not simply 
interrupted by the rocket-blast, they are transformed into two-dimensional shapes. Their 
very reality changes" (160). Any structure favouring death produces such a flattening. 
The "armoured classes" of such a structure, including (totalitarian) "fascist" subjects 
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undergoing Liminal Processes Favouring Totality are also two-dimensional because of 
this. 
In fact, in popular culture, cartoons seem to constantly appear in conjunction with 
(totalitarian) "fascists". Later we will see that in Ii film starring another Roger and 
Jessica, Who Framed Roger Rabbit (1988), the presence of cartoons in the "real" world 
exists alongside the presence of (totalitarian) "fascism". The Simpsons occasionally 
points to this connection also. Although this programme's satire is wide-ranging, and 
therefore can be expected to mention Nazis and fascism occasionally, these references 
tend to increase in episodes where the show becomes self-reflexive and explores the 
ontology of cartoons. An example is "Itchy and Scratchy Land" (Archer 1994), in which 
the family visits a theme park dedicated to their favourite cat-and-mouse cartoon series, 
"The Itchy and Scratchy Show". Here, in "The Violentest Place on Earth", not only do 
the security guards display the signification (and accents) of Nazi paramilitary personnel, 
but a potted biography of the show's creator (seemingly modelled on Walt Disney) 
suggests that some of the central figures of the art were susceptible to fascism: "Meyer 
had only one lapse", the announcer tells the audience, "his 1938 film, Nazi Supermen Are 
Our Superiors". 
This conjunction is not new. Even such a serious critic of fascism as Alice Yaeger 
Kaplan notes how fascist myths can be very amenable to cartoon form. While discussing 
the influence ofF.T. Marinetti, and specifically his novel Mafarka lefuturiste (1909), on 
the French fascists she studies, Kaplan mentions that: 
Futurism travelled by cartoon. I discovered this when I tried to find French 
accounts of Italian futurism. They are conveyed almost exclusively in comics. 
The obscenity trial of Mafarka, noted in a 1910 issue of the French theatre 
magazine Comoedia illustre, is generously illustrated with the child-like cartoons 
of AndreWamod. In 1931, Comoedia features caricatures of a flying Marinetti to 
illustrate a "Futurist Manifesto of Aeropainting". These caricatures are the work 
of Ralph Soupault.. .. Indeed, Soupault makes the Italian futurist-French fascist 
connection for us. He recorded, on the one hand, the futurist banquets that 
followed the publication of the famous "Manifesto of Futurist Cuisine" (also 
known as the "Manifesto Against Pasta~'), but he also stylised the anti-Semitism of 
the 1930s with his grotesque caricatures of the Jewish millionaire, the shtetl bum, 
the hook-nosed parliamentarian .... (88,90) 
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This is borne out in Marinetti' s novel, and indeed his manifestos. In these, the 
characters can only be described as cartoons. "With laughable indestructibility, they are 
smashed and stretched in fantastic machines, bullied by natural forces, and ambushed, 
only to re-emerge for a new round of adventures: they beg to be cartooned" (90). 
Moreover, Kaplan's analysis of Marinetti ironically suggests that fascism and fascists 
themselves also conform to this cartooning, and hence in important ways actually 
resemble their own view of the "other". Mafarka's fantasies are very similar to the "male 
fantasies" identified by Klaus Theweleit. This cartoon allegory creates male progeny by 
way of male willpower without resorting to female biological processes. He undergoes a 
Liminal Process Favouring Totality while wandering in a threatening "uterine" 
environment. 
Cartoon (totalitarian) "fascists" 
Reproduced in Theweleit's Male Fantasies is a German propaganda poster 
protesting the stationing of Black French troops in Germany after the First-World-War. 
It depicts a black soldier towering naked over a village, holding several porcelain-white, 
naked women against his lower torso (Theweleit, 1989a, 94). Another poster, this time 
an Italian World-War-Two poster targeting the invading American army, is more 
cartoonish. In it, a black GI is represented as a human-ape. He grins widely, is stooped, 
his hat hiding his eyes so there is no possibility of viewers mistaking him for a human 
being. He grasps a half-naked, life-sized Venus-de-Milo-type statue with "$2" scrawled 
on its torso (96). The poster-makers have cartooned the GI so they can exploit several 
racial and cultural stereotypes at once. Firstly, the black man is depicted as being sub-
human. In addition, the poster suggests that blacks are closer to "nature" than Europeans 
(implying, by way of the canonical European sculpture, that white men have a privileged 
relationship to culture). Black men are also shown to pose a sexual threat to white men 
by stealing "his" women; the black man is a debaser, incapable of appreciating culture; 
the "other" is a capitalist threat; the American is a debaser of culture through capitalism; 
the black man is a dark, animalistic threat to pure, white (or European) womanhood, and 
so on. This cartoon stereotype is used aggressively against its object, suggesting that 
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fascist propaganda works by portraying the other as a cartoon. 
Rey Chow's article, "The Fascist Longings in Our Midst" (1995), is very 
enlightening in this regard. Fascism for Chow is a banality, something that through over-
or perhaps mis-use has become a floating signifier that stands in negatively for any act of 
over-zealous authoritarianism. Through these banal ways the word is used, however, she 
is able to formulate a more precise description: "a term that indicates the production and 
consumption of a glossy surface image, a crude style, for the purposes of social 
identification even among intellectuals" (24). One aspect of this description is that 
fascism is a technological structure, a "kind of demonstrative culture/writing whose 
magnitude - whose portent - can only be technological. The Japanese soldier did not 
simply use technological weapons; he was a murder machine that happened to take the 
form of a man" (26), that was engaged in "a search for an idealised self-image through a 
heartfelt surrender to something higher and more beautiful" (26). Chow shows how this 
technology is related to the technologies of film through a reversal of the Freudian notion 
of "projection" (the Freudian structure also altered by Theweleit). Instead of being a 
compensation for a lack, as projection is in Freud, fascism works by a movement 
forward, "the projection that is obviously 'out there' - the projection that is 'being 
perceived'" (31). This is because the differentiation between inside and outside make no 
real sense in this formation: the subject takes in the fascist ideal and projects it onto the 
leader at the same time. What is being taken in, Chow takes pains to make clear, is the 
technological apparatus of film: "the very projectional mechanism ofprojection" (30). 
Hence, in an Althusserian sense, interpellation into fascism involves the positing 
of fascist subjects as both spectators of film and as film itself. Film is, as we know, a 
two-dimensional medium, so such an interpellation will involve a giving-up of 
dimensions, and a retreat from "humanity". And, as Small and Levinson, and 
Cholodenko have pointed out, since all film can be seen as a form of animation, then it is 
not such a leap to regard such interpellations as interpellations as animations. Self-
knowledge here is as both audience and as spectacle. Fascism involves a sense that "to 
be is to be perceived" (and hence aestheticised in the older sense), and hence, Chow 
argues, "projection, instead of being preceded by 'being', is itself the basis from which 
'being' arises" (31). Here, visual technology "inhabit[s] the human shape" (32), 
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projection becoming a positing function rather than a negating one now that its premise is 
changed "from 'inside' to 'surface'" (32), the question of how this happens being Chow's 
major inquiry. Her suggestion is that "fascism's production of idealism is a projectional 
production of luminosity-as-self-evidence" (38): that to be seen as an ideal image proves 
that the ideal is true and attainable. 
Chow, by figuring the fascist as a piece of film, their projective mechanism 
situated on the surface, echoes Theweleit's observation that the proto-fascist soldier 
knows no interior: his interior is exterior instead, his actual corporeal inside holding no 
meaning for him. Here, in place of a corporeal, and hence "real" being, stands a two-
dimensional image, the real ideal structure belonging always out-there (30-31). Nothing 
is supposedly more banal or obvious in popular culture than the cartoon, and yet here 
fascists are characterised clearly as just this, cartoons, flat images, all surface, and having 
no interior or corporeal life. Although here the soldier's interior and exterior are made 
the same, this does not mean that there is no separating off of the self and the other in this 
equation; as Chow says, "[the] belief, which can be ... encapsulated as 'we are not other' 
is fascism par excellence" (44). Idealisation, which requires a difficult suspension of 
disbelief (this once again is a point of reactivation of a Liminal Process Favouring 
Totality, in that the obviousness of the illusion continues to shore up defences against 
disbelief) sees the subject not so much lied to as willing, desperately willing, to believe in 
an idealised illusion. This is a purification of their corporeality to the extent that the other 
- the very corporeality that is being purified - becomes negated and is rendered dead 
matter because it cannot stand up to the ideal illusion. This is truly an ideology of 
destroying in order to artistically create a society. 
In Theweleit's discussion, the fascist soldier male - the masculine figure who 
compulsively commits violence - provides us with a further example of childhood 
colonising the adult. These men, according to the psychological model Theweleit has 
improvised to accommodate them (they do not fit any canonical model of psychological 
development) never attain the Oedipal phase, where they would engage in rivalry with 
their fathers, and would be able to sublimate their original desires for socially acceptable 
ones once they realise that they cannot have their original libidinal object, their mother. 
Instead, the military academy intervenes, "breaking and remaking" them, so that they can 
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become a totality component in a totality machine. This breaking and remaking process 
is managed ideologically by the military academy, so that the process becomes a Liminal 
Process Favouring Totality; in other words, so that the re-making process is indelible, and 
hence so that psychological birth is never attained. 
This is where Theweleit's account of proto-fascism connects with Susan Buck-
Morss's account of how the masses, in Walter Benjamin's essay, come to be tricked into 
aestheticising their own political' existence. Her description of the Lacanian retroactive 
processes based around corps morcete also describes a Liminal Process Favouring 
Totality operating in similar fashion to the one Theweleit outlines. This time it is shock 
or flooding of the sense system of the brain which reminds the subject of the corps 
mprceii fantasy, literally the breaking down of the body to be remade. For Buck-Morss, 
this remaking might involve closure of the sensorium, the perceptive apparatus, from 
connections with the world and others. The postmodem spectacle, we can infer from 
Buck-Morss, plays a similar role in creating subjects "not fully born" to that of the 
military academy. Further, this fantasy is an infant fantasy, recalled by the adult 
retroactively. Recalled in order to strengthen the ego constantly in the fragmented 
spectacular environment of postmodemism (and in the shock-filled technological 
environment that Walter Benjamin wrote about in the 1930s), it keeps people subject to 
this process from attaining the sublimations and hence minimal satisfactions available to 
them only after their respective Oedipal stages. 
This is also an example of childhood colonising adult life. Of course, the mirror 
stage, which is the stage of development we are discussing, is initiated by a case of visual 
misrecognition, when the child mistakes his or her image in the mirror for their self, and 
so hides from themselves the still-fragmented nature of their body. They identify with an 
ego-ideal here, an idealised image which is, quite literally, an outline, in that it admits no 
interior. The image in the mirror conceals the fragmentation which "really" characterises 
the baby's body at this point of their life. The point at which the ego is armoured, 
through the retroactive fantasy of corps morcete, which posits the ego as outside the body 
and on the ego-ideal in the mirror, is hence the point at which subjectivity is invested in 
an exterior-the ego is posited as forming on the surface of the body, while its broken 
interior is resisted and denied. 
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Hence, another connection between cartoons and fascism can be found in the 
notion of cartoons as inner-children of culture. It is important to note that both of our 
major models of fascism feature the child wearing an adult body, in Theweleit's 
identification of the subject not-yet-completely-born, who Theweleit compares to a 
psychotic child (Theweleit, 1989b, 211), and in the Lacanian retroactive fantasy of corps 
morcete which returns narcissistic subjects to their pre-linguistic mirror-stage childhoods. 
Fascism also sought to reduce its subjects to a kind of childhood so that they could be 
subject to the guidance of the fatherly dictator, and be members of the unified family of 
the nation. This was the ideological rationale behind the Nazi government's undermining 
of the traditional family structure, effectively disenfranchising parents from their 
traditional roles in the development of their children, the many youth organisations doing 
it instead (see Shirer 1991,252-6; Theweleit 1989b, 252-6). 
Theweleit posits the FreikOlps ' ego as developing on the armoured surface of the 
body ("drawn from the outside" [1989a, 419]), and also on its martial extensions. These 
include equipment like guns and bayonets (1989b, 222-3). When the fascist kills by 
penetrating the "other", he experiences his self actually penetrating the desired and feared 
"other". The borders between them broken down momentarily, and his ego dissolved, the 
soldier's body re-forms more totally than before, and so also more powerfully, the space 
around the soldier empty and suddenly ordered, the "other" and the soldier's desire for 
her mastered, conquered, and annihilated. Ego-extensions also include the totality 
machines of the unit, the army, and the nation (ibid). These totalities all form externally, 
their outside borders dominating. They proj ect themselves outward, their borders 
stretching. But since in all these formations identity resides specifically on its borders, 
they remain whole and intact, while the "other" is figured as a part of the pulpy mess that 
masses against them in confrontations. Military formation of the body here dams the 
flow of their desire, a desire they conflate with the corporeal processes that disgust them. 
The exterior's function, then, is to control its interior so that it becomes as if empty. 
They project the repressed liquid form of the other inside them out onto the formations of 
others they perceive as threats. This is why the proletarians always seem like a pulpy, 
bloody mess and the undisciplined wash of desire the soldier has been taught to hate: it is 
because these are the aspects of his own existence he desires (226-8; 244-9). They find 
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expression, rather, "out there". Hence, these soldiers resemble cartoons: they are defined 
as outlines protecting an empty space, and are animated, or mobilised, from outside 
themselves. The fascist in Theweleit, Chow and Buck-Morss hence suffers a loss of 
dimensionality, as if they are a series of frames in a film, or interpellated as film. In these 
various studies, fascists are seen as purely visual, spectacular, flatly exterior beings, and 
children, all, I've shown, semiotics they share with cartoons. 
If (totalitarian) "fascists" are cartoonish, life under (totalitarian) "fascism" is 
cartoonish also. In Vineland, Pynchon comments that Vond's strength was to see in the 
left-wing rebels he's captured the desire for order, to be children safe within the national 
family presided over by a benevolent presidential father figure. As we have seen, 
Vineland puts a considerable amount of blame for the success of (totalitarian) "fascism" 
in contemporary America on the Spectacle, television in particular. This is an 
observation Susan Buck-Morss also makes, when she connects the Spectacle to the 
continuing relevance of Benjamin's characterisation of fascism as the aestheticisation of 
politics. Certainly Bret Easton Ellis in both Less Than Zero and American Psycho sees 
the Spectacle as a prime environment for engineering Liminal Processes Favouring 
Totality. It should not be surprising, then, in the context of the theoretical construct we 
have just been developing, that the spectacle can also be characterised as a cartoonish 
environment. 
Tooning the body through beauty standards 
In American Psycho, the powerful armoured cartoons such as Patrick Bateman 
render their others, particularly women, cartoonish. The potential victim is first made a 
cartoon and then eliminated. The corporate world is one of competition, action, power -
all traits conventionally gendered masculine. Men in this book are constructed as 
dominant oppressors, while women are constructed as victims. American Psycho is 
profoundly about what Naomi Wolf calls "The Beauty Myth" (1990), about the cult of 
beauty in consumer culture in the late 1980s and its effects on women. Wolf shows how 
corporate interests have identified the body as a site for selling women items and services 
such as clothes, cosmetics and cosmetic surgery. To maximise the potential of women's 
\ 
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bodies for marketing, strategies of control have emerged, installing a standard of beauty 
for women to aspire to. Naturally, to do this requires women to purchase the very items 
that the interests who have set up the standard wish to sell. Wolfs critique centres on the 
fact that the standard that's been set into place is impossible to reach. Women are under 
pressure to be thin, to have unblemished and unwrinkled skin, and to look youthful, no 
matter what their age is. Marks of individuality are thus discouraged. Hence, just as 
women were emerging as a force in late capitalist society (in the wake of the powerful 
feminist movements of the 1970s and the early 1980s) their economic power was 
undermined because it was channelled into buying consumer items, the "need" for which 
was manufactured out of thin air. Along with this, women's self-esteem is constantly 
undermined by the beauty myth because the unattainable standard it expects them to meet 
makes ordinary people feel unattractive and less worthwhile. (If women don't meet these 
standards, they have fewer opportunities for advancement in the corporate world, as 
prejudices against those who are rendered "ugly" and "old" are exercised by those with 
power. Hence the corporate interests who set the rules are able to enforce them by 
punishing people who don't abide by them yet still want to advance.) 
In American Psycho, Bateman and his colleagues unthinkingly buy into this 
standard of beauty for women, only ever desiring "hardbodies" who look like fashion 
models. They usually dismiss normal-looking people. Bateman meets a woman from his 
apartment block at his cleaners'; she is "older than me, late twenties, okay-looking, a 
little overweight, wearing a jogging suit-from where, Bloomingdale's? I have no idea-
and she's ... beaming" (84). A woman's body is only remotely attractive to these men if 
the woman is young - most are in their early twenties or younger - and physically 
perfect. Intelligent women are looked upon with mild suspicion. The slightest physical 
blemish puts the stockbrokers off: a group of them are initially taken by a waitress in a 
restaurant. "She is hot.. .. Hardbody .... Definitely" (47), they comment. But Price is not 
so impressed: '''Look at her knees' .... While the hardbody stands there we check her out, 
and though her knees do support long, tan legs, I can't help noticing that one knee is, 
admittedly, bigger than the other one. The left knee is knobbier, almost imperceptibly 
thicker than the right knee and this unnoticeable flaw now seems overwhelming and we 
all lose interest" (47-48). 
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This woman is defined by the harsh gaze of a male-imposed, impossible-to-meet 
beauty standard. She has been completely dehumanised: not only is she identified as 
simply "the hardbody", but she becomes monstrous for being in the slightest measure 
asymmetrical. Wolf points out that the standard by which beauty is judged now is arrived 
at by filters and tricks anyway - fashion photos are altered to make the models look 
thinner than they are; photos are altered so that anorexic models' rib cages don't show 
through their skin; models alter themselves through cosmetic surgery: liposuction, breast 
enhancement, facelifts, lip enhancement and so forth. Bateman at one point watches a 
Patti Winters Show on breast reduction surgery and simply cannot comprehend why any 
woman would want to have such an operation (68). 
The male characters in American Psycho are also subjected to a masculine beauty 
myth. This myth manifests itself in their exercise regimes, their cosmetics, their clothes, 
their desire for tans, for definition in their muscles and so forth - all the things which 
make the stockbrokers look the same as one another, in fact. It is interesting to note, 
however, that while the myth shapes both masculine and feminine behaviours for its ends, 
the pressure on women's bodies impels them to take up less space, while that on men's 
impels them to take up more, to expand, and to become harder and more muscular. In 
this novel, the bodies of each sex are analogous to ideal bodies under the sign of Nazism, 
and the same can be said for their respective social roles: the male is active - he is 
encouraged to eat, to fill up space with his muscles and his social role in business and 
elsewhere, while the woman is encouraged to be passive, to take up less social and 
physical space, even if it is at the cost of her not eating. 
Living the cartoon life 
Even if there is no escape from the signification "cartoon" in totalitarian 
conditions, all is not lost. While being a cartoon in the terms set up by American Psycho 
appears to necessitate taking part in the dichotomy of oppressor/victim (on one or the 
other side), the meaning of cartoons can also inflect in directions that escape this 
structure. These inflections of meaning are suggested by Pynchon, and also by the film 
Who Framed Roger Rabbit, and they lead to the possibility of erecting a provisional 
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structure of identity that has certain beneficial characteristics. In finding this structure, it 
is necessary to separate out for our purposes two types of cartoon, which I will present in 
the next chapter. 
What I've been outlining up to now is the way the term "cartoon" has been used 
III critical practices, the way cartoons can be regarded as secondary or wasted 
representations, ones that fail to connect with their audience in any high-art or "human" 
way, despite the fact that realism exists on the same spectrum as cartoons. This critical 
practice, then, tends toward hierarchised binarisms, in our case between a cartoon and a 
"realised" character. This duality comes from a more basic opposition, the one between 
fiction and reality, or between a representation of a subject and the subject him or herself. 
As "just" a representation, the cartoon is a fictional creation (a drawing) suggesting the 
existence of a fictional self which in turn implies the existence of a creator, a drawer. 
This creator exists on the outside; he or she is the cartoon's other. The cartoon cannot 
exist without this originary other: the existence of a cartoonist is a pre-condition for the 
existence ofthe cartoon. This person is assumed to be the artist, the writer, the animator, 
or all of the above. The real person, on the other hand, supposes him or herself to be an 
individual entity-three dimensional, stable, biological (natural), corporeal. As something 
natural, the real, stable (non-fictional) subject's existence is not subject to the pre-
existence of a creative mind: it is itselfs, not somebody else's. The language it speaks is 
its own words, not words placed on it by an artist to make a point, or to impose a set of 
characteristics from the outside. The real person has self determination; he or she is 
distinct from what is other to them, and so is not animated (given motion, given life) or 
controlled by that other. 
If the "real" subject is someone who exists in reality, a "real" person, then the 
constitution of "real" subjectivity problematises its own reality. This is because the 
stable self is always already something else, always already its own other. This is what 
Lacan reminds us of in the "Mirror Stage", when the infant's image of its own wholeness 
and self-consciousness is predicated on its identifying with an image, and taking that 
image as itself. The infant is mistaken, and so the image's promise of a stable body is 
empty. The Oedipal subject is grounded in an act of misreading, a mistaken 
interpretation. Thereafter, in times of narcissistic crisis, this mistake haunts the real 
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person in the fonn of a retroactive fantasy where the body is experienced in fragments. It 
is in the sense that the image is mistaken for reality but is an idealisation that the self is 
based on a fiction, the fiction, or idea, of satisfying wholeness, a wholeness that is 
impossible. Hence the fictional is associated with the fragmentation which haunts "real" 
people, and it is thus the myriad categories of "fiction" - the not-true, the not-real -
which threaten the wholeness and stability promised by the mirror. This stable wholeness 
requires that the self have borders to distinguish it from its other; otherwise it in no sense 
can be entirely whole and autonomous. Stability and autonomy run hand in hand. So the 
stable self, which has privileged this "pleasingly whole" account of itself, is in fact 
dependent on its "other" - that which is fragmented, malleable, dependent on its "other", 
not separate from it. The "other" of the self that is assumed from the mirror stage is the 
image that the child sees in the mirror: its self is based on something else, and so this self 
must have part of its existence elsewhere, not within the self s boundaries. The self is 
thus constituted outside its own boundaries; there could be no self without the other. 
If, then, the self is based on a fiction - the fiction of the "pleasingly whole" image 
it misreads from a glimpse in the mirror - if its boundaries are fictional, it becomes 
difficult for a real, stable, autonomous person to easily separate itself from its other, the 
fragmented, cartoon-representation person. In the Warner Brothers cartoon "Duck 
Amuck" (Jones 1953), Daffy Duck is confident of his boundaries and his role as the 
central figure of his cartoon. After all the cartoon is "starring Daffy Duck". He has a 
name; he speaks "I". He begins the cartoon with the confident swagger he reserves for 
shows of his maSCUlinity, but is perturbed when a cartoon pencil alters the background 
scene, making his costume anachronistic. Before long the duck is appealing to his 
creator, the cartoonist, to give him a steady set, and a role to play. This does not happen: 
instead, the set is erased altogether, and then Daffy himself is erased except for eyes and 
beak, and re-drawn in several highly comical new ways. At one point the film becomes 
stuck and Daffy finds himself "doubled", captured in two frames at once, each frame 
containing its own Daffy. Hence it is suggested that it is only by the intervention of the 
technologies that allow animation that thes~ multiple Daffies become the relatively 
consistent Daffy we are used to. This surreal and playful short film thus reveals for Daffy 
his fictional nature. He is a creature who exists in the symbolic order, and so he is open 
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to misreading and reinterpretation by forces beyond his reach. Daffy's malleable, 
fragmentary and contingent nature are parts of himself he doesn't want to admit to 
having. At one point he flies into a fit of temper when his mirror image is obviously "not 
right". But, you may object, isn't it the creator of the cartoon, the "real" person pulling 
, Daffy's strings, who is analogous to the author? And he or she is still set up in opposition 
to the cartoons on the screen: "Duck Amuck" retains, surely, the "real" person! cartoon 
person separation. Everyone already knows that the cartoon is a cartoon; they assume 
that the creator of the cartoon is not a cartoon. However, at the end of the film the 
camera pulls off cartoon space, and follows the (cartoon) pencil that has been tormenting 
Daffy, until we glimpse its user, none other than Bugs Bunny. 
The cartoonist here is a cartoon himself; the film seems to suggest that cartoonists 
have a part of their identity constituted by cartoons. Perhaps in order to create characters 
like Daffy Duck the adult animator must confront his or her "inner child", which is where 
the cartoonist comes from (see Herron 19-24). The "real" cartoonist remains hidden 
under a cartoon name in the credits: the only access we have to an assumed "real" creator 
is a textual signifier. In this case the director is Charles M. Jones, but here he is just two 
cartooned words. The "real" creators' own identity signifiers were occasionally subject 
to slippage as well. Moreover, Warner Brothers' animation was a team effort, something 
the credits only occasionally reflect accurately (in addition, the credits to "Duck Amuck" 
are in the style of the first scene of the film, when that scene is deliberately altered on 
Daffy Duck on a continuing basis). This cartoon demonstrates that there is no line to 
cross, no line over which you can say for sure that here is a fiction and here is reality. 
"Real" people may invent or construct a line which does make the distinction, but this 
line, like the fact that the mirror stage is based on a misrecognition, will be temporary 
because it is a "non-real" line, a frame, a metaphor, a reading act. As Derrida wrote, 
"there is nothing outside of the text [also translated as 'there is no outside-text'J" (Derrida 
1974, 158). 
"Real" people are all textual, fictions or cartoons. They are all "drawn" in some 
way, whether by themselves in identifying with an incompletely drawn image in the 
mirror, by others inscribing meaning on their lives and bodies, or by themselves in 
conjunction with others through the mirrors, after Althusser, of whole and pleasing 
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ideologies to which they become subject. The "real" person has difficulty keeping its 
boundaries intact because those boundaries are (real) fictions. Or rather they are real 
limits which are fictional too. Here, the surplus quantities of the other haunt the self. To 
set boundaries is to exaggerate: to exaggerate the seWs ability to remain stable, to dam 
out the other that it is constructed upon. Thus by setting (solid) boundaries the self 
necessarily privileges (exaggerates?) one feature of existence. To privilege or draw 
attention to a particular feature of a person is to caricature that person. So, by setting 
solid boundaries in order to establish our "reality" as separate from "non-reality", we 
become caricatures. 
The drawing oOines 
Boundary setting is an act necessary for human coherence; there needs to be some 
agreement on meaning or communication cannot take place. There has to be some 
closure - however arbitrary - to syntactical freeplay, or communication and thus social 
interaction would become simply impossible. Julia Kristeva recognises this by her 
refusal to privilege the semiotic - the feminine-identified pre-Oedipal and pre-lingual 
stage of the abject - over the symbolic, the masculine-identified systems of language. 
She recognises that to do so is to cut yourself off from the possibility of fonning a 
community and so effectively activates a radical solipsism (see Lechte, 130). Lyotard 
appeals to micronarratives, or belief systems which are provisional, local, fragmented, but 
which nonetheless are capable of being recognisable, of guiding us (Lyotard 78-81). 
Even the arch-sceptic Derrida admits that although language cannot close off syntactical 
freeplay, it can still posit meanings that can be understood. As Richard Beardsworth 
points out, "[a]n aporia demands decision, one cannot remain within it" (1996, 5). In his 
essay "Signature Event Context" (1977), Derrida concedes that language has effects in 
the world, although these don't exclude the effect of writing, which is the aspect of 
language which opens freeplay and puts the foot in the door of closure (17-19), so that 
"the category of intention will not disappear; H will have its place, but from that place it 
will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance" (18, emphasis 
mine). So, as Elizabeth Grosz notes in reference to Derrida and his relationship with 
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feminist discourse, "Derrida insists over and over that deconstruction must be understood 
as a mode of affirmation, indeed as a mode of double affirmation. In a feminist context 
this means that discourses influenced by or in some way involved in deconstruction are 
committed to both an affirmation, a saying-yes to patriarchy (the gesture of 
phallocentricism) and an affirmation of feminism, the overcoming of patriarchy" (Grosz, 
1995, 116). Derrida would be the first to admit that his own writings are as susceptible to 
deconstructive readings as any other, and hence that he is hardly himself telling the truth 
of any subject. He does, however, still write, and yet he does so whilst calling attention 
to writing's vulnerabilities, using puns and allusions, a disregard of traditional 
philosophic method, and other tricks so to affirm both the readability of his writing and 
the limits of that readability. 
In an essay of Julia Kristeva's on Roland Barthes, she makes the point more 
directly. She writes: "any sentence is both syntax and non-sentence, normative unicity 
and disorderly multiplicity; any sequence is both myth and the melting pot where it is 
engendered and dies through its own history ... " (1980, 99). The structure of both the 
thing and its structural opposite she offers here recalls Derrida's. Language may offer a 
myth, the myth of transparent communication (of reality, maybe), and that myth may be 
seen-through, revealed, and thus undermined at every tum. Kristeva's invocation of 
history recalls the idea of iterability, the repeatability of language which is necessary for 
it to be understood, but which makes understanding it a most precarious undertaking. 
Language's mythical status, opposed to its status as reality, cannot close that other off, so 
that the reality of a language that actually works, despite itself, is a precondition of its 
demystification as myth, is unreal. Hence a sentence is both unified and normal and at 
the same time disordered and multiple. It is impossible to pin down language, but people 
do, and do it so well so often that the myth of meaning and truth's closure through 
transparent language is able to continue to hold currency. 
So for language to be used, and thus for life to take place in the world - given that 
you cannot speak of or give any meaning to what is outside the text, because "nothing" is 
- boundary setting is a necessary act. And yet this is the act that fictionalises the subject, 
putting our identities on the continuum of cartoons. To live therefore is to caricature 
yourself. In other words, you can only live if you are a caricature, a cartoon, because 
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being so you are part of the symbolic order, the symbolic order which resides in a 
fictional construction, based upon a metaphysics which necessitates boundaries. As such, 
it is a "reduction". The inanimate, the drawing, is here genuinely animated into the 
necessary condition for real life. You cannot be a "real", stable subject without becoming 
a cartoon, without fictionalising yourself. The cartoon version of the person precedes the 
"real" person. This claim has its corollary in Cholodenlco's point that "live-action" 
cinema was preceded by and predicated on developments in animation, and William 
Slothrop's that "election" is preceded by and predicated upon "preterition". So, as the 
existence of a painting depends on its preliminary sketch, its cartoon, so sUbjectivity 
depends on the prior existence of a cartoon version of the self, a simplified representation 
with which the subject identifies. The cartoon, once marginalised, once secondary to the 
"reality" it represents, now claims the centre of this discourse of representation, it now 
precedes what it represents. 
But it is not enough to say that the outline, the preliminary, the cartoon is the 
privileged instance of life. That would be to say the cartoon person is more "real" than 
the real one, when such categories are clearly unsustainable. Within the symbolic order 
as it is currently constituted, the obvious cmioon is abjected. This can be seen in Jan 
Chilwell's implication that the cartooned character represents sickness and waste, and in 
the general tendencies of critics that we have looked at to dismiss or discount cartoon 
representations unless they are in their "place". Chilwell distrusts the visceral nature of 
Natural Born Killers, privileging the intellectual, cultural constructs of narrativity and 
coherence, stability, the "real" person. The cartoon is "passed over" by serious art 
because it provides a site where the stable "real" self falls into its own fictionality -
where the stable self s fictional nature can become revealed. It is a place where the ego is 
dispersed. It is in-between, an "excluded middle", a trace that haunts the privileged signs 
of presence .. Derrida names some of these tropes, ones he has discovered in philosophic 
and literary discourse, similar to one another, yet different too: parergon, writing, 
dijJerance, dissemination, the supplement, the hymen, the pharmakon, the gram, spacing, 
the incision, the spectre. Alan Cholodenlco, in light of his reading of Who Framed Roger 
Rabbit, proposes an addition to this list: the Toon (1991b, 12; 234). 
Hence much ofPynchon's novels and American Psycho are written as cartoons, in 
172 
the sense that they obviously (and deliberately) fall short of the standards of realism. 
This is partly to signify, as metafictional writers might, the reflexive and fictional (and 
hence contingent and relative) nature of identity. This reflexivity is politicised in these 
novels: because the cartoon aspect of postwar Western, and hence corporate capitalist 
identity is revealed in these novels, the "truth" of the ideology that produces and manages 
these identities is immediately put under question. In other words, where the prevalent 
ideology would establish its "truth" - that the world it creates is the "real" world - the 
presence of cartoons in this "real" world, impossible as they must be, reveals reality as an 
effect of ideology. They prevent the closure of an ideology into reality, when this closure 
is the aim of any (totalitarian) "fascist" ideology. The presence of a cartoon in the 
"reality" of a (totalitarian) "fascism", in other words, is an aporia at which the 
(totalitarian) "fascism" deconstructs. 
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Chapter nine 
Tooning Us On to Love and Laughter 
These pigs wanna blow my house down ... 
-Cypress Hill 
Roger's abnegatory and accepting toon types 
If a (totalitarian) "fascist" environment resembles a "cartoon", then the presence 
of "cartoons" in Pynchon's and Ellis's novels makes more sense l . This chapter asks if 
this is the end point to the critique such a fictional tactic implies, or is there more to the 
"cartoon" than this relative banality? There are aspects to "cartoons", however, that 
make their presence in such postmodern narratives more complex and more useful, 
explaining perhaps the ambiguity about cartoons we encountered in Pynchon's novels. 
Here, it is only a starting point to say that "spectacle capitalism reduces our humanity in 
the same way that totalitarianism does; both make life a cartoon." One can also say: 
"when life becomes a cartoon, we can tell that conditions are approaching the totalitarian 
(where a set of ideas and ideological assumptions dominate all aspects of society); life in 
postmodernity is cartoonish, so one could read it as totalitarian." What if, however, the 
condition of being "cartoonish" was not merely a diagnosis of a social malaise, but also a 
cure?2 
There is a certain irony in the apparent fact that the more a culture suppresses its 
"cartoon" image, the more that image insists, insinuating itself back into the centre of that 
culture. But this is no more "ironic" than any deconstruction: it is simply the trace of the 
other undermining full presence. "Cartoons" are the antithesis of the (totalitarian) 
"fascist" personality: where (totalitarian) "fascism" attempts to enact absolute closure, 
1 By implying inverted commas to this term, I hope to signify "cartoon" in a broad sense, meaning not only 
recognisable cartoon characters and motifs, but, as well, what Bruce Bawer disparaged as "diminishing 
fictions" (1988): reduced representation, thinly-drawn characters and plots, self-referring fictions, and self-
consciously constructed characters and situations, that fail to live up to "the promise of the novel". 
2 Readers of Derrida will find this idea familiar: the pharmakon, both a poison and a cure (see Derrida 
[1981]). Alan Cholodenko's discussion of Who Framed Roger Rabbit, which I refer to below, centres his 
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"cartoons" represent openness or at least a degree of non-closure. As incompletions, they 
do not limit possible outcomes, or even promise an ending or a completion to a 
representation at all. Also, as an incompletion, they signify the absence of completion -
the "cartoon"'s "cartoon-ness" exists in the gap between what is and what is perceived as 
what should or might be - between the representation as it is and perfect representation. 
As such, it partakes in the "feminine" as the (totalitarian) "fascist" experiences it - those 
"feminine gaps" that in Marinetti's novel the fantasy of Mafarka's perfect progeny is 
capable of covering over and making whole and complete (see Kaplan, 81). And, hence, 
from a masculinist or a (totalitarian) "fascist" viewpoint, the "cartoon's" impurity, its 
status as "waste" and as a "deterioration" as popular culture of the proletariat, links it also 
with the "feminine" forces the (totalitarian) "fascist" attempts desperately to keep at bay. 
This, then, represents a pessimistic reading of the presence of "cartoons" in a 
masculinist culture. They may be the antithesis of (totalitarian) "fascism", but they are 
also how we can recognise it - that when everything around you seems cartoonish, 
(totalitarian) fascism is a factor in the social environment. This is why the totalitarian 
"Rocket State" in Gravity's Rainbow is portrayed as a cartoon and identified as fascist 
(Gravity's Rainbow, 677). Their presence is important to the ideology'S survival, 
because all the semiotics of "cartoons" as incomplete, as "flow", may cause (totalitarian) 
"fascist" subjects to reinforce "body armour", their reaction to the chaotic forces of 
deterioration, waste, childishness and frivolity, armour that covers over "feminine gaps". 
Cartoons are figures which transgress boundaries. But instead of doing so in order to 
expand the boundaries of a "totality machine" they are part of (hence continually pushing 
the liminal "between states" to the exterior so it is always in front), they transgress over 
the border between the states, becoming in part one thing, in part its other. The 
(totalitarian) "fascist", colonising the other's space, remains on "his" side, but the cartoon 
is a hybrid. These figures tend to be abj ect quantities in Pynchon and Ellis's texts, 
located at "the place where I am not and which permits me to be" (Kristeva 1982, 3), the 
place Julia Kristeva ascribes to the feminine. The exclusion of abject substances enables 
the "I", and are the "primers of my culture" (2). In this sense "culture" refers to the 
argument around this concept, although I have marginalised it in my discussion of Cholodenko (and Roger 
Rabbit). 
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symbolic order, identified in Kristeva with the paternal law (1984a, 457). This culture is 
"primed" by a Liminal Process Favouring Totality, so that the "father" is the stem 
masculinist father of Freud rather than the amalgam of mother-father Kristeva posits. 
Under the traditional Freudian model the symbolic order will be as oppressive to women 
as critics such as Irigaray claim [1985]). As an abject quantity of representation, not 
"real" but permitting the "real", the "cartoon" is neither subject nor object. But it can be 
seen, perversely, as a stand-in for all those things that, negatively, enable the (totalitarian) 
"fascist" masculinist culture by fuelling the drive outwards that the Soldier Males 
analysed in Male Fantasies experience. On the other hand, "cartoons" show up a 
vulnerability in that system, should a way be found to exploit it. 
If "cartoons" represent a radically undecidable element in the Derridian sense, 
then the question for us is how this category can begin to favour a non-(totalitarian) 
"fascist" politics of the sort that Pynchon advocates. How can one take the decision to 
privilege the incompletion of cartoons over their solid outlines without once again closing 
the "lighted doorway" (Vineland, 235), and recreating the structure of totality, only with 
its categories reversed? This will be the key with which we will try to unlock Pynchon's 
ambivalence about "cartoons". After all, the strength of totalistic systems is their 
insistence upon clear, enforceable decision making. If an opponent of (totalitarian) 
"fascism" sustains undecideability because the absolute decision is a (totalitarian) 
"fascist" construct, they are at a significant tactical disadvantage because it will be hard 
for them to work toward objectives. What is more, such undecideability will make this 
opposition seem like a chaotic rabble to those in power. The (totalitarian) "fascist" will 
perceive them as a lowly-cultured "flood", and will, as a reflex, build armoured dams 
against them. They will be the object of their opponents' Liminal Processes Favouring 
Totality, in a sense fuelling the dominance of the dominant paradigms while remaining a 
fragmented and weak force themselves, somewhat like the Counterforce. 
A way forward lies in a closer look at one construction of difference within the 
category of "cartoons". That is the possibility that there are different states of existence 
for cartoons, in our case ones linked to (totalitarian) "fascism" and ones capable of 
opposing it. At the end of Chapter two, I suggested that a vital point of difference 
between resistant and co-optable strategies in Pynchon's novels may lie in the degree to 
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which the "system" of each is delusional. Here I have suggested that there is a kind of 
"delusional" element to realism not shared by reflexive fiction. Reviewers sometimes 
unconsciously reinforce this by suggesting that cartoon elements have no place in 
realism, but are appropriate if they keep within their own realm (cartoonish texts), where 
you get the impression they can be safely ignored. This we-are-not-other of realism hides 
realism's textual and graphic nature, that it holds similarities to cartoonishness itself. 
This suggests a difference between a cartoon which behaves as if it were "real", and the 
more "knowing" one that behaves like a cartoon. One of the best texts to help 
interrogate this possibility is Robert Zemeckis's film Who Framed Roger Rabbit (1988). 
Although sometimes regarded as no more than a clever piece of Hollywood 
entertainment, a "cartooney" Noir pastiche, Roger Rabbit is actually one of popular 
cinema's more astute examinations of the psychology of prejudice. This is demonstrated 
by the relationship between people and "toons" in the film. The,film concems a detective 
who hates "toons", but who is forced to work for a cartoon rabbit who is on the run after 
being "framed" for the murder of cartoonist Marvin Acme. This forces the detective, 
Eddie Valiant, to face and overcome his fear of cartoons, a fear expressed as prejudice 
throughout. 
Here we can see that the two types of cartoon correspond to the (totalitarian) 
"fascist"/non-(totalitarian) "fascist" ambivalences that we have been interrogating. I 
think that the hypermasculine or (totalitarian) "fascist" figure belongs to the first 
category, the abnegatory cartoon - he is outline and nothing more, because that more 
threatens him: he wants to be "real" and yet he pathologically fears the reality of his 
body. His interior is chaotic, holds no meaning for him, is an empty space. His personal 
boundaries are like dams that block out flows of the "other". They are solid, fortified 
outlines. Theweleit postulates that he has no psychological depth, because his armoured 
bodily outline itself forms the ego (see Theweleit 1989b, 206-225). The emphasis is on 
the primacy of the boundary, a boundary which is created as if artistically: "[t]he body 
did acquire boundaries, of course, but they were drawn from the outside, by the 
disciplinary agencies of imperialist society. We can see why fascist propaganda and 
social practice places such great emphasis on setting boundaries of all kinds" (1989a, 418 
[my emphasis - in the original, Theweleit emphasises the words ''from the outside"]). 
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Any threat to this outline draws the response of a terrible violence because it is so brittle, 
paradoxically. This cartoon - a self-caricature to which the only response is to laugh at it 
- acknowledges no intennediate spaces between itself and its other. It is cut clearly and 
finnly demarcated. In literature, the appearance of such a cartoon can be read as a point 
of critique, of complaint and of satire. It asks us to accept or reject it, to participate in its 
own project of othering. 
The obvious example of this (totalitarian) "fascist" toon is Judge Doom in Roger 
Rabbit, played by Christopher Lloyd as a human throughout the film. The Judge, who 
imposes "Law" onto the ludic chaos of the L.A. suburb of Toontown, (more than this, he 
believes he is the law) separates the toon and the real person thoroughly. His political 
agenda, in alliance with various monopolistic capitalist interests (all owned by himself, in 
a gesture toward totalisation), is nothing other than the destruction of Toontown itself, 
and the genocide of the toons as a "class" or "race". Toward the end of the film, the 
judge is unmasked, and we find out that he's actually a to on in disguise, although he tells 
us, "not just any toon", but one who has managed to "become" human and deny his 
toonhood. Under his human outline is a toon, a fact the Judge cannot accept in himself. 
Doom's fear is that laughter - which defines the toon in the movie - will lead to his 
death. He is afraid that the toon he has caged or frozen within himself, and that he does 
not recognise, will overwhelm his exterior should laughter release it. His interior has lost 
all meaning for him; his ego, such as it is, is located on the exterior and faces only 
outward. This denial of his toon-ness is expressed with his violence, and by the fact that 
Doom is dressed in the stereotyped dress of the Nazi S.S. throughout the film, and speaks 
in a kind of harsh, mid-European-influenced accent. 
In contrast to him are the toons who dwell in Toontown. They are toons who are 
comfortable with toonhood. Toontown is the site of carnivalesque freeplay. This play is 
usually extreme enough to make humans uncomfortable when they are there (toons are 
quite capable of living outside of Toontown but not many "real" people, uncomfortable 
with their "to on" within, can go into there). These toons are more open and aware of 
their place in-between. They are not entirely ludic - they can fonn boundaries and 
symbolise, and communicate with people and one another, but they don't like any order 
to fonn for so long that it becomes staid and institutional, and they are flexible enough to 
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dissolve and re-set their borders if need be. This is why they are capable of living in the 
regular Los Angeles. Toontown is a place that has little need for the (totalitarian) 
"fascist" power that Judge Doom proposes to control it with. These toons are toons of 
the second type, ones "real" people might do well to learn from, as they are both of the 
order of the toon and of the order of the real. Such a figure can use law, symbols, 
structures and paradigms while they usefully promote love, justice and good fun, and 
change to something else when the paradigms become repressive and thus useless for 
such values. Just as they can survive a piano falling on their head and bounce back to 
life, they are flexible enough to survive the "real" when it hits them. 
As Alan Cholodenko implies, the film's lesson comes specifically in the form of a 
leaming experience for Eddie Valiant (Cholodenko 1991b, 218-19). His brother having 
been killed years ago by a toon (he had a piano dropped onto his head, a crime for which 
the Judge eventually claims credit\ Valiant has come to mistrust toons, because, 
understandably, they represent death to him. But Eddie is not nearly as separate from 
toons as he would like to believe. In fact, he has toon qualities: he is flattened in a 
plunging elevator at one point in the film and recovers; he is dressed up as a cartoon 
rabbit in a photo with his late brother. So his denial of toons represents a denial of a part 
of himself, and so this denial has traces of death in it as well. His life is a mess, and his 
detective agency is badly in decline, all of which has happened since he stopped visiting 
Toontown. Added to this is the fact that he is in an unsuccessful relationship with a 
barmaid, Delores, who he constantly disappoints. Cholodenko points out that death 
hence haunts Valiant: "Death plays in the names of the brothers - Ed die (die, died, ded) 
and Teddie (with its 'T' sliding into 'D' as well as into 'T' for 'Toon). Not irrelevant 
here is the name of Eddie's girlfriend - Delores, from dolor, dolorosus, which mean 
sorrow, grief, mourning in Latin; and Valiant contains the significantly incomplete 'liv' 
and 'aliv' and a complete 'vital', etc" (219). 
Eddie finds, of course, that the Rabbit case, which he took on in part to keep his 
agency in business, necessitates his long-overdue return to Toontown, and to do this, he 
has to overcome an immense psychological barrier. Roger and Jessica Rabbit get 
3 Like any other "Soldier Male", the judge appears to meld into his (to on) "other" as he kills: he murders as 
a toon. 
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themselves into mortal danger, becoming prisoners of Doom. Quite literally the necessity 
to save life forces Eddie's hand and he makes the trip back to Toontown, and hence back 
to toonhood. Cholodenko: 
This means that Eddie Valiant is always already Roger Rabbit, Bugs Bunny, 
always already a toon, too. And this allows this narrative to be a narrative of the 
return of the repressed, of poison and cure (pharmakon), where Death, in the 
forms of Judge Doom and the Dip (bothpharmakons), 'dies' and Eddie's 'death', 
his mourning and melancholia, can 'die' so he can 'live' again (regaining his 
sexual vitality en route, his rabbitness so aptly figured in Delores' query, "is that a 
rabbit in your pocket or are you just happy to see me?"). And what returns is the 
toon in Eddie, which would parallel the return of the repressed of "animation" to 
"live action" film and its institutions, including film studies. This return has the 
ironical effect of declaring that Eddie Valiant is alive and human only to the 
degree that he is at the same time a to on, animated by the other ... (219) 
So, the Judge is a toon/human who does not acknowledge the fact, and is willing to 
commit genocide to cover up this Imowledge, while Eddie is a to on/human who, while he 
does not acknowledge the fact displays something akin to racial prejudice, but once the 
fact is acknowledged becomes a living person capable oflove and connection. 
Toward a better world 
Such a movement is implicit in Julia Kristeva's claims that love, which she 
praises, can lead in the psyche to what she calls an "open system" (1984b, 5). I'll explain 
how this can happen soon. But first, it is important to note that this development has 
already been prefigured in the film of Roger Rabbit itself. Three features of cartoon 
representation are privileged in Who Framed Roger Rabbit?: love, laughter, and 
democracy. All three work against the (totalitarian) "fascist" significations of Judge 
Doom. Doom intervenes in Jessica and Roger Rabbit's love relationship; when he has 
been defeated, they reconcile romantically. The admission to himself of a cartoon-type 
aspect of his personality also helps Eddie find love with Delores by the end of the film. 
And, perhaps most significantly, Eddie finally responds with love to Roger. From the 
time they meet, Roger annoys Eddie by occasionally kissing him on the lips. Eddie 
responds with a revulsion that is most likely a mixture of homophobia and "cartophobia", 
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a mixture that indicates Eddie's general desire to keep the other at a distance from 
himself. Once Eddie has accepted that he is both person and cartoon, though, he becomes 
capable of returning Roger's cartoon love, and demonstrates this by kissing the rabbit on 
the lips at the end of the film. 
Similarly, laughter can defeat the (totalitarian) "fascist". Doom is terrified of 
laughter, convinced that it leads to death. It does, of course, but only through laughter's 
privileged status in the discourse of the liminal - the death of the total self in the other. 
Throughout the film, cartoons are laughter. Roger cannot be a "to on" and snap out of his 
handcuffs against the laws of physics unless he does so when the act is likely to be funny. 
(Eddie, at the time denying the toon haunting his personality, does not laugh.) Such 
hilarity is associated by Doom with chaos, which we've learned to read here as a stand-in 
for the death of a certain type of masculine self by way of the threatening feminine. The 
loss of masculine self-control represented by laughter and hence the toons thus introduce 
death because it crosses the borders of the self and flirts with liminality. This is 
confirmed as a specifically (totalitarian) "fascist" viewpoint by Vineland's Brock Vond: 
Once, not too many years ago, sober, wide awake, he'd begun to laugh at 
something on the Tube. Instead of reaching a peak and then tapering off, the 
laughter got more intense each time he breathed, diverging toward some brain 
state he couldn't imagine, filling and flooding him, his head taken and propelled 
by a supernatural lightness, on some course unaccounted for by the usual three 
dimensions. He was terrified. He glimpsed his brain about to tum inside out like 
a sock but not what would happen after that. At some point he threw up, broke 
some cycle, and that, as he carne to see it, was what "saved" him - some 
component of his personality in charge of nausea. Brock welcomed it as a major 
discovery about himself - an unsuspected control he could trust now to keep him 
safe from whatever his laughter had nearly overflowed him into. He was careful 
from then on not to start laughing so easily. All around him those days he was 
watching people his age surrendering to dangerous gusts of amusement, even 
deciding never to return to regular jobs and lives .... (Vineland 278-9) 
Here it is a Liminal Process Favouring Totality, originating in an abject expenence, 
which saves Brock from the flows of the "feminine other" he has dedicated his life to 
damming. But he is quite aware of the revolutionary potential of laughter, how people 
can be caught by it and carried away in its flows, to end up in another state of being 
altogether. 
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Thirdly, once love and laughter - and hence the toon - reign supreme in Roger 
Rabbit, then democracy is realised. After the Judge's death, which represents the death 
of oppressive power, Marvin Acme's last Will and Testament is discovered, bequeathing 
Toontown to the toons. The toons thereupon find that they suddenly have control of their 
destiny, and are free of Doom's domination. The Judge wanted to steal and destroy this 
Will, so that his venture could proceed, a venture which creates capital out of thin air -
first build a transport system, and this creates a whole series of service needs and wants 
from which to profit. But the will had been hidden as a palimpsest, a writing that exists 
beneath the (totalitarian) "fascist" gaze. Like love and laughter, the form of democracy 
the toons end up with can be worked out theoretically in reference to ideas of liminality 
and open systems. 
As it happens, these three categories, love, laughter, and democracy are each 
formulated by different theorists as categories which defy the dualism that denies the 
other and favours totality. Love sets the subject into process to become an "open 
system", defying the closure caused by Liminal Processes Favouring Totality. Laughter 
is a "practice" and a "transgression" that also opens up a liminal space, but instead of 
producing totality it favours the production of the new. And radical democracy, at least 
as Emesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe theorise it, also produces the new, new 
hegemonies based on a provisional identity within a context of difference, creating an 
open political "horizon" rather than a closed and totalised one. All of these categories 
partake in the logic cartoons open up, that of a double affirmation, the being one thing 
and its other at the same time. Love and laughter, by being "open systems", may be able 
to enable plural, open democracy. 
In The Beauty Myth, Naomi Wolf suggests that male love for women as human 
beings is part of the end result if the battle against misogyny were to be won, and is also 
the best way to bring such a victory about (Wolf, 142-3). The beauty myth constantly 
keeps the sexes in conflict, constructing one as the enemy of the other, thus keeping them 
apart. It ultimately ensures the Unhappiness of both sexes, as genuine psychic love 
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becomes impossible because women remain objects for male spectatorship. Theweleit, 
meanwhile, suggests that love relationships between men and women cannot "keep the 
other at a distance", because this is "a recipe for psychological terror" (1989b, 268). Men 
must, he quotes Elaine Morgan, "come on in, the water's [femininity's] lovely" (269), but 
cannot do so without withdrawing in terror, if they do not first give up psychological 
aggressiveness: " ... the first step must be for them to explore the waters of their own 
interior. Engagement with the self is one of the key demands of the woman's moment" 
(ibid). 
Theweleit advocates non-oppressive love, a manifesto that he often conveys by 
cannily selecting his illustrations for the books. These are sometimes comic strips which 
he does not comment on directly in the text, but which push a peripheral point he wishes 
to make in a particular direction. Perhaps the best example of this lies on pages 98-99 of 
1989b. Theweleit comments in the text on the Soldier-Male's need to see himself as 
whole: "the soldier-male cannot stomach half-measures: the half is below and 
contaminates. His constant goal is to avoid the experience of fragmentation by fusing 
himself into a unity in which he remains on top" (98). The first four frames of the comic 
strip that appears at the top of 98 depict two humans with pig heads trying to engage in 
sex. The pig heads suggest that, whether the man likes it or not, he is a liminal being, a 
hybrid of self and abject, carnival other. The man is on top, and there has been no 
foreplay. This is anything but a loving connection because he is hurting her: "Ouch! 
damn - watch out, it's still dry", she says, " ... Do you have to breathe in my face? I Can't 
get any air ... not so hard!" (ibid). But when the man surrenders his position on top, 
loving sex commences, and the two lovers connect with one another, kissing 
passionately, engaging in oral sex, trying different positions. Dryness is replaced by 
wetness, complaint by "you feel wonderful" ... "you too" (99). The male, when he gives 
up his need to initiate and dominate, enters with her into an equal relationship of mutual 
pleasure. Although it would be a mistake to generalise this equation between sex and 
love, this is clearly meant as a metaphor for a loving practice where each partner's feeling 
flows into the other, and they both take pleasure from the experience. 
For Kristeva, a subject is able to attain health when he or she is open to amorous 
states, to states of love. In her book Tales of Love, she posits this as maturity, to be 
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reached only once the subject has emerged from the stage of primary narCISSIsm. 
Ultimately, in the words of John Lechte, this means "being in love involves being the 
other" (1990, 181), a state ofliminality in which identities are merged at the edges. This 
involves separation from the mother - not the brutal Oedipal separation Freud posits, but 
a fulfilling entry into a redefined symbolic order. This is fulfilling because the "father", 
the law of whom defines the symbolic, should not be the law-wielding, stem being of 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, but rather an amalgam of mother-father, a 
symbolic order which retains those maternal liminal elements (Kristeva 1984b, 41-6). 
Ultimately, then, love involves a connection to the liminal, just as the hatred that 
powers (totalitarian) "fascism" does. Kristeva posits love as resting on a previous 
narcissism (21-4). It is only through a separation from the mother that we can develop an 
ego, an identity. But this is a form of narcissism that differs from the pathological 
versions formed in response to the corps morceli. The liminal space here is left behind, 
to be sure, but into a symbolic order which still has room for the liminal maternal space 
of the abject (the abject representing the mother's body [1982, 12]). The "father", an 
identification with "him" bringing love, provides an ideal which contains abjection and 
the semiotic, so that love is substantially of the symbolic order, but an open symbolic 
order that also exhibits "poetic language" and the semiotic elements of mother-
identification. In a sense, this is a cracked mirror, one that does not present absolute 
separation from the mother as an ideal in the way that Lacan's mirror does. An identity 
formed from this ideal would thus have a more easy relationship with objects outside the 
self, because the self is partly already other and outside the self. Love, then, places the 
ego in a position to become entangled with others, instead of radically rejecting them. 
Kristeva thus posits the possibility of the psyche as an "open system", powered by 
love. Lechte says: 
To illustrate the notion of 'open system', Kristeva suggests that rather than 
thinking of the outside as a threat, or perhaps analogous to 'noise' in infoffilation 
theory, we should see it as a stimulus to change and adaptation. The 'outside' as a 
perturbation then becomes an 'event' in the life of the subject, broadening 
horizons and creating psychic space. Resistance to this event leads to an 
atrophying of psychic space and thus of love. On the other hand, when a 
perturbation is absorbed by the psychic system and does not remain a threatening 
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trauma, the psyche becomes increasingly more complex. The more complex and 
more supple it becomes, the more adept it is at coping with difference - with the 
other as difference. Now, the other ceases to be a threat and becomes, in his or 
her very individuality, a participant in my identity. This process, Kristeva also 
calls love: 
We ... know the mechanisms of this transfer which makes the human psyche an 
open system capable of self-organisation on condition of maintaining a kind of 
lillie with an other: these are the identification of primary narcissism 'revealing' 
the subject, and an idealisation of the word of the other. I have called this the 
amorous state (Lechte 183-4; Kristeva 1984b, 5). 
This gives a liminal space the chance to afford a kind of permanent openness, one 
that never gives in to the paranoia of Lacanian narcissism. The anti-(totalitarian) 
"fascist" potential of this is obvious: the love the cartoons live for in Roger Rabbit resists 
totality at every tum, and, liminal (border) beings that they are, they resist it on the same 
plain of interpellation that allows totality to form in the first place. So, just as Kristeva's 
analysis of Narcissus and Romeo and Juliet shows love growing from narcissism and 
hatred (220-5), so it does in Roger Rabbit. This reinforces the postmodem sense of one 
thing and its other at once that defines both the cartoon/not of the "cured" Eddie Valiant 
and Roger himself. Both are open systems, compared to the closed-off violence of 
human-never-toon law-giver, Doom. 
The notion of closure is an important one to keep in mind here. Buck-Morss 
prefaces her reconsideration of Benjamin with a long detour, but a justifiable one. This 
detour has to do with the original meaning of the word aesthetics, which was a word to be 
used when speaking about sensual experience, rather than cultural forms, although 
obviously the two are related. In order to regain a sense of how perception relates to 
Benjamin's pronouncements on fascism, Buck-Morss points out the sense system is not 
actually contained within the body's limits, but start and end in the world, both as 
stimulus and as action, or motor response (Buck-Morss, 12). This is very important when 
we consider that fanatical fascists have a tendency to close the body off from the world, 
and to try to become as autonomous as possible. To do this, they have to armour 
themselves. In Theweleit, this armour is the ego, a proposition that Buck Morss agrees 
with in regards to the normally functioning synaesthetic system, which is thus centred not 
inside the body but "on the body's surface" (13, n39), which means that "subjectivity, far 
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from bounded within the biological body, plays the role of mediator between inner and 
outer sensations, the images of perception and those of memory. For this reason, Freud 
situated consciousness on the surface of the body, decentered from the brain ... " (13, n39). 
Theweleit agrees with Buck-Morss in this regard. Theweleit's proto-fascists never reach 
the Oedipal stage - they remain "psychotic children" (l989b, 211-25), psychologically 
speaking, so that Freudian psychology is of little use in understanding them. Both the 
Oedipal and pre-Oedipal stages have liminal moments. Rather than suggesting that they 
should attain the patriarchal compromises of the Oedipus-as-normalisation-process, I am 
suggesting instead that liminality be utilised in the interests of open systems, laughter, 
and political transgression, so that these things are acts of love. The very stage 
(totalitarian) "fascists" are kept at to produce (totalitarian) "fascism" might also contain 
resistances to these things. I have suggested that liminal moments also produce love, 
laughter and democracy, all of these things open and pluralising rather than producing 
closure and homogenisation. So, Buck-Morss claims, "This synaesthetic system is 'open' 
in the extreme sense. Not only is it open to the world through sensory organs, but the 
nerve cells within the body form a network that is in itself discontinuous. They reach out 
towards other nerve cells at points called synapses, where electrical charges pass through 
the space between them. Whereas in blood vessels a leak is lamentable, in the networks 
between nerve bundles, everything 'leaks'" (13). Fascism is posited as the denial of these 
leaks, similar to the damming of the flows of desire within the armoured body that 
Theweleit describes. 
The ideology of the armoured body without senses has origins in the eighteenth 
century, when Kant rejected senses as a tool for aesthetic judgement in his second and 
third critiques of judgement. This was primarily a reaction to Romanticism and its 
"prevailing sentimentality" (9): "Kant's transcendental subject purges himself of the 
senses which endanger autonomy not only because they unavoidably entangle him in the 
world, but, specifically, because they make him passive ... instead of active ... , susceptible, 
like 'Oriental voluptuaries' to sympathy and tears" (9). Hence the German philosophical 
tradition, which advocated totality and closure as ideals, worked to distance people from 
empathic connection to the other. This ideology gained philosophical ground throughout 
the nineteenth century, and became mainstream in this century. 
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Such an advance coincides with the advances of industrialism in the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries, and the consequent dangers to people's perceptive apparatuses 
that Buck-Morss later documents. What was once the radically open system of the sense 
apparatus was progressively closed down by being numbed, and this was largely because 
of the widespread shock effects that this industrial culture introduces to the human brain, 
which for thousands of years had only relatively "natural" dangers to worry about. 
(Totalitarian) "fascism" represents an end point to this closure, its utility and its 
enforcement, forming the alternative "unreal" "reality" which a (totalitarian) "fascist" 
environment needs in order to form itself. 
In Kristeva love does not decide between the forces of form, the symbolic order, 
and forces of breakdown, the semiotic. It sits at a permanent tension between the two 
things, never entirely privileging one nor the other (see Lechte, 170). As such, it 
occupies that middle ground upon which the liminal is located. So, as (totalitarian) 
"fascism" springs from narcissism, so does love. This suggests that for (totalitarian) 
"fascism's" defeat, it must be necessary to traverse the risky ground of its inception. We 
can all be read as cartoons if we have an ego, just as we, even if we are a proto-fascist 
soldier, have a lower bodily stratum. The (totalitarian) "fascist" denies this 
cartoon! abj ect interior's right to exist, though, whereas the cartoon of love embraces it as 
being a part of, although in some ways necessarily separate from, the self. As we have 
noted already, the semiotic occupies a liminal space, a space previous to narcissism. A 
process, such as the one Kristeva outlines here, and as with Victor Turner, the liminal is a 
mediating stage between two states. Here the maternal phase gives over to a 
paternal/symbolic state that includes the maternal and opens the subject to the maternal 
other. In (totalitarian) "fascism", the (maternal) liminal gives way to a state of absolute 
paternal masculinity, which denies that it also includes the liminal maternal, of which it is 
(totalitarian) "fascism's" ultimate aim to close down and eliminate. In (totalitarian) 
"fascism", the abj ect maternal other's place is thus to facilitate the destruction of itself, of 
women, all mothers, and all others. Women's place is to breed sons for the master race, a 
race of narcissists without love that would prefer to bypass even that function and deny 
women a place in society altogether. 
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Laughter 
Kristeva describes the act of laughing as an incidence of "practice" which helps to 
produce an open psychological system: 
The practice of the text is a kind of laughter whose only explosions are those of 
language. The pleasure obtained from the lifting of inhibitions is immediately 
invested in the production of the new. Every practice which produces something 
new (a new device) is a practice oflaughter: it obeys laughter's logic and provides 
the subject with laughter's advantages. When practice is not laughter, there is 
nothing new; where there is nothing new, practice cannot be provoking: it is at 
best a repeated, empty act. (1984a, 225) 
Practice, for Kristeva, COlmects the subject with the object, the other. As John Lechte 
argues, it is "not simply reducible to self-conscious action (in which case it would follow 
the predictable path mapped out by the symbolic)" (139), and so "it is also a key moment 
in putting the subject in process" (139). Laughter requires being caught and surprised by 
an object, and as such involves a transgression. Roger Rabbit cannot transgress his 
boundaries unless it is funny to do so, unless it provokes laughter, and so unless he 
"becomes" in a sense laughter, or practice. Laughter allows him to overcome the 
imprisoning symbolic law, under which he is, for a time, handcuffed to Eddie, and to 
create something new, a new subject, and one who has transgressed a physical law. 
Laughter is produced at the point of these transgressions in the film: the transgression of 
the human and the cartoon worlds - reality and abject representations - upon one another. 
Jessica Rabbit says, "I'm not bad, I'm just drawn that way". A Liminal Process 
Favouring Totality produces nothing new; it produces a reinforcement of the old. It is the 
"repeated, empty act" par excellence. 
Luce. Irigaray also sees laughter as a freeing practice. "Isn't laughter the first form 
of liberation from a secular oppression?" she asks; "Isn't the phallic tantamount to 
seriousness of meaning? Perhaps woman, and the sexual relation, transcend it 'first' in 
laughter?" (1985, 163). Here, as elsewhere, the phallus represents the seriousness of 
closure and of defence against the other that can threaten closure. Laughter, and its 
partner in crime, the category of "the funny", (opposed to seriousness), leads to the 
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transgression, the transcendence, even, of the serious phallic (masculine) construct, in the 
name of its other, the feminine. Bakhtinian carnival laughter is also the laughter of 
transgression - the transgression by the underclass against the authority of the overlords. 
Less Than Zero suggests obliquely that the revival of the carnival is a key to overcoming 
the distancing, mediated world its characters exist in (Less Than Zero, 207). For Bakhtin, 
a major political feature of carnival is there are "no footlights", and so no separation 
between performer and performed, self and other, something desperately desired by Less 
Than Zero's characters, who are all "afraid to merge" (9). In their world of "repeated, 
empty acts", "something new" has the potential to produce what is radically other to the 
text and therefore absolutely central: feeling, a love which connects subject to object. 
This, surely, applies doubly to the "repeated, empty acts" of Patrick Bateman. 
Kathleen Rowe, in her book The Unruly Woman, suggests that this transgressive 
moment is liminal, and is therefore privileged in its association with the feminine. She 
posits the potential of ambivalent laughter in the figure of "the unruly woman", a figure 
that can be found in the person of the laughing hags that Bakhtin finds in Rabelais' novel, 
and in the Medusa figure in HeIeme Cixous's essay "The Laugh of the Medusa". In it, 
Cixous suggests that laughter can "shatter the framework of institutions ... blow up the 
law ... break up the 'truth'" (1976, 888). Women can, Rowe claims, cut through the 
power of the male spectacle by making a spectacle "of' themselves: "women might begin 
to re-weave the web of visual power that already binds them by taldng the unruly woman 
as a model-woman as rule-breaker, joke-maker, and public, bodily spectacle .... In acts of 
spectatorial unruliness, I believe, [ women] might examine models of returning the male 
gaze, exposing and making a spectacle of the gazer, claiming the pleasure and power of 
making spectacles of ourselves, and beginning to negate our own invisibility in the public 
sphere" (1995, 12). Hence, in her reading of the film A Question of Silence, Rowe traces 
the feminist "re-education" of a privileged female lawyer by three working-class female 
clients accused of murdering a sexist male shopkeeper. Rowe suggests that this 
awakening is only complete "when she finally 'gets' it", when she laughs at her 
understanding, at last, "that understanding patriarchy means understanding a monumental 
joke" (16). The desire behind this, for Rowe, is to imagine "a social world in which 
laughter occurs less often to 'break apart', as Cixous describes, than to bring together" 
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(21). 
The cartoon seems to function as a carnivalesque totem in just this way. The 
cartoon is nothing if not unruly laughter and nothing ifnot a performative spectacle made 
out of itself. Moreover, Rowe's suggestion that the unruly woman can "expos[e] and 
make a spectacle of the gazer" (12), applies to the (totalitarian) "fascist" gaze, the 
masculinist gaze that consigns women to "other" status, and associates her with the 
liminal, the marginal, pulp, and all the other categories that are threatening to 
masculinity. As we have seen, this masculinity can be read as a cartoon, but one which 
cannot accept its cartoon elements, because cartoons are also culturally feminised and 
othered. This is the case in a very similar way to the realisation that patriarchy is a 
"monumental joke". Exposure of the masculinist gaze as cartoonish itself, rather than 
truth-seeing, undoes its power and renders it liminal; it is a practice which can place the 
victims of this power in process. If the masculinist gazer can laugh at the spectacle he 
has become, he will be put into process (made incomplete) as well, because he would 
have accepted the cartoon in himself. If he doesn't laugh, a Liminal Process Favouring 
Totality will almost certainly ensure the shoring-up of his defences (and, like Patrick 
Bateman, he will become even more cartoon-like as he becomes more dangerous). But 
the more people laugh at a masculinist-spectacle-as-monumental-joke, as a monstrous 
joke (Rowe, 7), the less universal (totalitarian) "fascist" power will be. Arendt noted that 
once the totalitarian construct of society (its "reality") was lifted with the capitUlation of 
the Nazi Government, the German people were very quickly "cured" of their totalitarian 
instincts (364). 
Rowe suggests that for women to create a carnivalesque space of their own, they 
must be prepared to risk offending, and risk ridicule being brought upon themselves. 
Here they would offend the (totalitarian) "fascist" by exposing for all to see the fact that 
he is a cartoon, tantamount to them uncovering publicly the lower-bodily chaos that he 
has frozen within him. Their laughter will seem to him like a bodily flood, and he will 
associate it with filth, with "down there". He will find himself not on top but "at the 
bottom", the butt (of the joke), the place he fears the most. This carries with it an 
enormous risk, as his denial of the spectacle he has become may well form a violent 
backlash, a "reaction-formation". But at the very least the laughing subjects-in-process 
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that offend him will be in connection with their own cartoon others, and so are not 
themselves denying they are partially (carnivalesque) cartoons. In women's case, 
historically, such denial takes the shape of silence, for men, violence. They instead, as 
Irigaray says, liberate themselves from secular (phallic) oppression (Irigaray, op.cit). 
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Chapter ten 
The Democratic Toon 
A "single co-ordinate" 
Having discussed at some length the politics of "cartoons", I want to now turn to 
constructing the possibility of a "cartoon" politics, a politics able to side-step Liminal 
Processes Favouring Totality. Pynchon shows how this might work at various points in 
Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland. Many of the characters in Pynchon's narrative who 
resist "the Firm's" power revel in abject substances and ideas that They find 
uncomfortable, while on the most personal level, a resistance to the system the 
Counterforce members individually indulge in is the offer of small kindnesses - an initial 
reaching out to the other. 
Pynchon's novel has often been read in pessimistic lights in regard to actions to 
take in response to Them (the Finn) and to total control. Pynchon would seem to be 
ready to warn his readers about the dangers of totality, but offers us very little by way of 
how to remove the rocket suspended over all our heads. It is one thing to recognise that 
total structures are "structures favouring death" and therefore need to be resisted, quite 
another to fight the might of a totalitarian system of the sort They have imposed. This is 
especially so as the most obvious method by which to fight, from outside the system, has 
been shown as, at best, easily defeated and at worst ultimately an extension of 
(totalitarian) "fascism" itself. All these are what appear to be modest resistances: as 
Kathryn Hume intimates, Pynchon's direct solutions to the problem of Their total power 
all seem to operate at local levels, and hence are easily tamed by the totality (Rume, 
1992, 251). She points to the "abject" disruption of "Their" dinner party by Pig Bodine 
and Roger Mexico, substituting witty profanities for menu items: "snot stew", "Pus 
pudding", and so on, which has the representatives of the elect gagging into Their 
napkins (Gravity's Rainbow 713 -17) 1 • 
I Quite obviously, various passages in American Psycho partake in the abject and the camivalesque as well, 
and just as obviously, from a reading of the book's history, the same arguments of carnivalesque impulses 
supporting revolutionary impulses or providing a safety valve for the prevailing system, as discussed in 
Ames (1990) can be made. For a discussion of American Psycho and the camivalesque, see Price (1998). 
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For Julia Kristeva, the abject comprises those things which disgust us. It often 
forms, for products of Western values, from bodily substances and waste products-
excrement, decomposing food or a dead body are examples (1982, 2-3). Contact with 
abject substances causes a physical reaction, a gag or a violent turning away of the head 
(ibid); this type of reaction is usually reserved for the "lowest of the low". An 
individual's own unique store of abject things can be identified in this way. Kristeva 
explains that we react this way because abjections occupy a space of absolute otherness 
to ourselves (2). Abject states exist liminally, because they are hybrids of two discrete 
states. Organic wastes from our own bodies, for instance, imply life and life processes, 
but yet are dead matter, and so are contained and excluded. The subject reacts physically 
to the sight and smell of their own body wastes because they suggest the presence of a 
death emanating from the uncontrollable regions inside and below (2-3). This places the 
subject in a state of narcissistic crisis (14). Theweleit suggests that the more fascist a 
culture is the less it can assimilate this sort of reality into its totality. Such things 
necessitate containment because they represent a chaotic hybrid state - a liminal state in 
which life merges with its other, and not cleanly like violent, mechanical death in the heat 
of battle, but through disintegration and infection. The soldiers of the Freikorps, for 
instance, construct their victims as abj ect wastes - floods, pulps, ooze - before exploding 
into violent action against them (see 1989a, 385-408). Because of the absolute nature of 
(totalitarian) "fascist" being, anything not considered part of the self or its extensions 
(such as the regiment or the nation) forms an abjection, where in Kristeva, the abject is an 
absolute otherness, a whole scale of intermediary others failing to provoke horror in us. 
I discussed the abject fantasy of the giant adenoid in Chapter four; we saw how 
this abjection was associated with "a new preterition" (Gravity's Rainbow, 15). Later in 
the novel Pynchon introduces the satiric image of the "Toiletship", the ultimate in 
compartmentalisation and containment (448-51). This vessel represents "rationalism's" 
response to the human body, not only to control and contain waste, but also to isolate it 
from the body of the nation. Instead it is taken out to sea, associating the 
masculinist/rationalist's fear of its own interior with the "feminine" by way of male 
culture's greatest feminine symbol. The rational nature of this containment is complete 
with hierarchical waste control systems according to the status of the user. This 
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confinns, despite its grandeur, Their vulnerability to the existence of wastes. Thus the 
Toiletship allows Their culture to exclude and "pass over" a part of itself it denies. By 
doing this, the ship makes the elect's link between abject waste and the preterite for us. 
So, Bodine and Mexico's attack is well aimed. After the dinner, They have been 
temporarily defeated, hit where they hurt, so to speak. They are reeling, their 
vulnerability to such tactics exposed. But Their official history is likely to "pass over" 
the incident, so that it will be seen as an aberration if at all, courting reprisals and even 
perhaps eventually leading to an extension to Their power. Christopher Ames finds 
limited hope, though, in the barely detectable smile of the Preterite butler as he assists 
Mexico and Bodine's escape (1990, 205). This is because it links the Counterforce with 
the preterite in tenns of aims and aspirations, and makes the preterite seem like a 
potentially revolutionary class. Earlier in the novel Pynchon deliberately linked abject 
substances and the preterite. The "Negro shit", in the toilet Slothrop descends into during 
his racially-anxious sewer-journey episode, is linked to revolutionary action through the 
presence of Malcolm X (Gravity's Rainbow, 63). Shit is seen as the presence of death, 
and it is also "the colour the white folks [Slothrop definitely included] are afraid of' 
(688), (another way They have planted Their system in his brain). Ames suggests that in 
Gravity's Rainbow the "obscene utterance has become the purified language of the 
Preterite" (191), so that the abject becomes revolutionary in potential. The words "fuck 
you" (Gravity's Rainbow, 203) are a spell, and death can be told to "fuck off' (10; Ames, 
191). The novel also has many references to pigs, a privileged site of bodily ambivalence 
related to the carnivalesque (see Stallybrass and White, 44-59). This therefore associates 
many episodes with the carnival's emphasis on lower bodily strata. It seems that the elect 
find the abject difficult to face, because it represents the feminine body that fascist 
technology is geared to transcend. 
But Pynchon appears to question the ultimate usefulness of this for genume 
political action: after all, the Counterforce appears to fail in its aims, eventually pulled 
into the mainstream just as was the revolutionary culture of the 1960s in Vineland. Ames 
notes how Stallybrass and White critique Bakhtin's political claims for the carnival, 
agreeing that it could equally have been organised (licensed or at least tolerated) by the 
ruling elite as a way for the villagers to let off steam, thus disanning revolutionary 
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fervour (Ames 203; Stallybrass and White, 13-14). He also notes that "rule breaking has 
become (quoting Allon White) 'fetishised on the left as an intrinsically radical essence', 
and on the right described as 'mere licensed release'" (Ames, 203; White 1982, 60), so 
that the presence of the abject may not necessarily be subversive. This is demonstrated 
by Theweleit, when he discovers that the soldier attains a forbidden hybrid state as he 
kills, and this state, and the release it provides, allows him to maintain his martial 
libidinal organisation (1989b, 177-8). Hume notes, in addition, that "concerted effort is 
not [possible] because that would involve hierarchy and control" (251), so that according 
to the terms Gravity's Rainbow sets up, any revolution would simply reinscribe, 
ultimately, the old paradigms, only in a new arrangement. Thus the dominance of power 
itself, the possibility of "ideology", replicates itself and ensures its own survival. She 
concludes that in Gravity's Rainbow, "We can only abjure control and extend ourselves 
to do small kindnesses" (251), do what we can within the confines of a totalitarian 
structure. 
This is what Slothrop does when he mistakes a preterite woman in the ruins for a 
mythical figment of Greta Erdmann's paranoia. He realises that by identifying her as 
someone he would have "passed over" (458) in his search for people connected to the 
Zone's central myth, the Rocket, he has become a little like Them. His attempts to 
structure his environment according to the privileged truth of his own quest creates a 
situation where some figures are important to him and others are to be ignored. He 
responds by giving her "a long stub he's been saving" (459), a sacrifice which recognises 
her identification with him, not only her "otherness" to him. Thus, he hopes, his act of 
kindness will help undermine the Zone's regression toward hierarchy. Slothrop is 
generally a kind person - he is easily exploited because he is willing to do things for 
others with very little reward for himself. He delivers a message for Squalidozzi, he 
rescues the hashish for Bodine. Although he receives things in return for these tasks, he 
does not insist upon materially exact trade. When Saure Bummer admits to Slothrop that 
he wouldn't get the money that had been promised to him, he is astonished to find 
Slothrop doesn't particularly mind, Rocketman being "above all that shit" (438). In a key 
character-development episode early in the novel, Slothrop rescues a little girl from the 
rubble of a V2 strike, her request for "any gum, chum?" (24) touching him deeply. 
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These kindnesses are common among the Counterforce: "Leni, Franz, Pirate, 
Roger, Slothrop, Katje, Geli, Pig and Bianca all offer kindness, gestures meant to help 
someone", says Hume (1992, 251). When Katje first learns of the emergence of the 
Counterforce, she describes it as ~'a prophecy. A Kindness" (Gravity's Rainbow, 535). 
Initially, Hume, who is writing about Pynchon's retreat from realistic characterisation, 
makes the suggestion that character is reduced in the novel because in it large systems, 
arbitrary in nature, tum life into a game. When life is a game - Their game, specifically-
people are treated as objects, pawns. "As an agent, Katje learns that Jews are as 
negotiable as candy bars or sex, and that their lives have a departmental value equal to set 
quantities of information" (250). Tchitcherine muses on the convertibility between 
human pain and goals and is rendered uneasy by the Marxist vision of history when 
Wimpe explains how this vision makes him and everyone expendable to the greater aim, 
as in chess (Gravity's Rainbow, 701, Hume, 250). Also, "Slothrop sees how people are 
being used as counters in a game when small honesties or kindnesses from Tantivy and 
Sir Stephen get them silently removed from his purview" (ibid), Hume writes. "Pirate 
and Roger revolt at the way Slothrop is being used as a thing. Leni and Franz both rebel 
against being used as if their human feelings and concerns were of no account. In 
contrast, Pointsman and Weissmann both use their subordinates as pawns" (ibid). 
This, according to Hume, justifies Pynchon's retreat from character, because it 
focuses his concern onto humanity generally (252). The isolated acts of kindness act 
against Their game, as Hume says: "The willingness to give something without 
expectation of a return is a move meaningless within a game and hence it puts one 
outside game-board relations with others" (251). However, once again the problem of 
finding an "outside" to a (totalitarian) "fascist" structure, in order to oppose it, asserts 
itself. Once kindness becomes a category, it re-enters the game. 
The strength of poststructuralist-based democratic theory of the sort Laclau and 
Mouffe develop is that opposition can legitimately come from within the system and be 
complicit in it at the same time as opposing it. But Pynchon's retreat from character, for 
instance, necessitates his denial of the illusion· of a character's autonomy - in some ways 
he is as guilty of manipUlating his characters from a position of absolute power as They 
are. Although it may be reasonable to assume Pynchon's benevolence, his focus on an 
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aggregate "humanity" also gives his position structurally unlimited powers. At least 
realism set limits on the author, whereas Pynchon's method has the potential to be 
omnipotent as well as omniscient. The author's aping of (totalitarian) "fascist" structure 
in his novel opens out concerns about the continuing dominance of Liminal Processes 
Favouring Totality on the postmodern discourse-scape. 
There are at least two successful resistances favouring democracy in Vineland, 
both of them enveloped in popular culture. The first of these is by that commune of 
restless spirits the Thanatoids. They are both dead and alive, as their name (which 
shouldn't be taken nearly as seriously as I'm about to take it here) suggests. Thanatos, of 
course, is the Greek deity of death that dominates Gravity's Rainbow, while the suffix 
"oid" has connotations of "being". In the novel the name is described as meaning "like 
death, only different" (Vineland, 170). Hence they occupy middle ground between the 
two extremes, neither fully alive nor fully dead, but in a different state, both alive and 
dead. This can have negative consequences: the Thanatoids we meet tend to have been 
killed unjustly-many of them in Vietnam, although Weed Atman is also a Thanatoid -
and so for them death dominates. Their mission is to right the "karmic imbalance" 
(caused by the injustice of their deaths) that is preventing them fully attaining the state of 
death. They are like many people in the novel who have been "captured" by The Tube, 
and Thanatoid life is the life of the couch potato. They never sleep (it is too much like 
real death); instead they just watch. In this they can be compared to the 24fps, whose 
pure spectatorship opens the door to a fascist influence in their work. Certainly, while 
Thanatoids desire "completion", they remain passive. 
But they are not wholly victims. For one thing, they are aware of their lessened 
status, which involves awkwardness, being accident-prone, and being permanently short 
of money. Although they don't appreciate being reminded that they are technically dead, 
it is because they are not, actually, dead at all. This difference is important (and has 
confused any number of perfectly respectable Pynchon readers who, like N. Kathleen 
Hayles, assume that Weed Atman's reappearance at Thanatoid Village in the 1980s 
means he was actually only wounded by Rex, rather than murdered [1994, 26]). The 
Thanatoids understand that there are degrees of existence between the two polarities of 
life and death, and that they occupy some of this space. Although more like the Derridian 
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categories of spectre or trace than toons per se, they nonetheless occupy the same 
"excluded middle" terrain as toons, and they are linked to cartoons in two significant 
ways. The first is in their relationship to laughter - Thanatoids are notorious for telling 
jokes on themselves, surprising since "enjoyment" is not exactly their long suit: "What do 
you call a Thanatoid with 'Sir' in front of his name? Knight of the living dead ... " (219). 
These jokes, as you can see, often have to do with Thanatoids' existential predicament. 
As such, they indulge in the "practice" of laughter. 
Second is the way the Thanatoids become politically activated. In one of 
Pynchon's mythical and most hopeful episodes, towards the end of the novel, the 
Thanatoids suddenly eschew their nightly TV vigil and actually fall asleep instead. This 
break in routine coincides with the commune's tenth anniversary celebrations, a fact that 
links it in with a local Y oruk myth of the path to the land of the dead being closed for ten 
years. This story is told to Brock Vond by the "legally ambiguous" (44) tow truck team 
of Blood and Vato at the novel's climax, as they escort the FBI man to his death. In the 
morning, the Thanatoids wake up, existentially: 
In fact, out of a long memory of strange dawns, this morning in the Shade 
Creek-Thanatoid Village area would stand forth as an exception. Not only had the 
entire popUlation actually slept the night before, but they were also now wakening, 
in reply to a piping, chiming music, synchronized, coming out of wristwatches, 
timers, and personal computers, engraved long ago, as if for this moment, on 
sound chips dumped once in an obscure skirmish of the silicon market wars, 
expedited in fact by Takeshi Fumimota, as part of a settlement with the ever-
questionable trading company of Tokkata & Fuji, all playing together now, and in 
four-part harmony, the opening of lS. Bach's "Wachet Auf." And not the usual 
electronic stuff - this had soul, a quantity these troubled folks could recognize. 
They blinked, they began to tum, their eyes, often for the first time, sought contact 
with the eyes of other Thanatoids. This was unprecedented. This was like a c1ass-
action lawsuit suddenly resolved after generations in the courts. Who 
remembered? Say, who didn't? What was a Thanatoid, at the end of the long 
dread day, but memory? So, to one of the best tunes ever to come out of Europe, 
even with its timing adapted to the rigors of a disco percussion track able to make 
the bluest Thanatoid believe, however briefly, in resurrection, they woke, the 
Thanatoids woke. (324-5) 
It is as if they, guided here by a reduction in form that exists in its own right and without 
anxiety (the music in a kitsch form) awake to the life in their death, instead of seeing only 
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the death in their life. In this they are like the sacrilegious Bach which has "soul" 
nonetheless. This, of course, recalls the many characters seemingly still very much alive 
on "the other side" in Gravity's Rainbow including some, such as Brigadier Pudding, who 
work from there for the Counterforce. And this awakening is brought into relief as 
potentially anti-(totalitarian) "fascist" because it coincides with the victory over Brock, 
however minor or inconsequential it is. The Thanatoids stand outside official control 
themselves, and hence their commune is potentially subversive. It has a reason to be, too: 
the Thanatoids tend to have been murdered by or because of illegal government activities. 
Being officially dead - having accepted the death in themselves, albeit without a choice -
they are no longer citizens, and so are more of an independent People's Republic than 
PR3. They are committed to their community, a "hard-core", similar to the "for real" 
members of the counterculture Yond's chauffeur Roscoe identifies (270). And now they 
have woken up, they have also freed themselves of cultural control by the governing 
authorities. Their victory is a victory of engagement with the other: life engages with 
death; they themselves engage with an indigenous legend. The possibility that we are 
partially constituted by the other is entertained by them and accepted. This may represent 
a reduction in autonomy and form, but it reintroduces, through the reduction of the 
absolute, "soul", the force of humanity. 
Sometimes cartoons have "soul", and, like most Thanatoids, sometimes they are 
kind too. As with the examples of kindnesses to others Katherine Burne describes in 
Gravity's Rainbow Thanatoids tend, to use the words of V. 's McLintoc Sphere, to "keep 
cool, but care" (V., 366). This is a phrase Tony Tanner complains is "speech-bubble talk" 
(1971, 161), and hence not of much use as an ethics in the real world. But Vineland's 
most resistant, and along with Prairie, its most likeable character, the mature DL 
Chastain, shows that cartoons can act politically, and with impact. DL is the novel's 
resident comic Ninjette and another Thanatoid collaborator. As Stacey Olster points out, 
she is defined very deliberately in terms of her reality. She is introduced to us as a "live 
solid woman" (Vineland, 99) when Prairie first sets eyes on her, "athletic" (ibid). She 
"belongs to herself' (128), and thus represents autonomy; she is "reclaiming her body" 
(ibid), presumably from incursions of the inanimate, represented here for Olster by the 
Bionic Woman "whom Pynchon cites twice" (Olster 1994, 130). She resists "handing 
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[her body] over to those who are more qualified, doctors and lab technicians and by 
extension coaches, employers, boys with hardons, so forth ... they think people are easier 
to control that way" (Vineland, 128). She is not a person one should attempt to deceive 
or manipulate, as she is known occasionally to harass entire motorcycle gangs on her 
own. 
This strength comes from her childhood, the descriptions of her dysfunctional and 
violent family being presented in realist mode, a tragic series of episodes that contribute 
to the complexity of her character. But this "real" strength also has a cartoon side, and its 
expression tends toward the cartoonish: her placing in "the dangerous Teen Miss pageant 
in '63" (139), the interview in Soldier of Fortune, the "centrefold in Aggro World" (139), 
her vocation as a Ninjette, with all its cartoonish techniques and lore which are comic 
parodies of Hollywood Ninja culture. Moreover, as we have seen, Pynchon constantly 
describes DL in terms of cartoons. She is presented precisely as both a cartoon and as 
indisputably real, just as the preterite is in Gravity's Rainbow. And she incorporates 
these two aspects of herself into a thoroughly sympathetic and likeable character, and, as 
Olster makes clear, more subversive than the "radical" 24fps film collective. Unlike 
many of her friends, DL is never "turned". This incorporation of apparent opposites 
comes not in the form of some dialectical synthesis but rather as an acknowledgement 
that she is a real person whose reality includes her relationship with the cartoonish way 
she is represented and represents herself. She shows no terror at either her corporeality 
and sexuality or the inanimate cartoon in her. She is firmly in control of her sexuality, as 
is exemplified by her denial of Takeshi' s sexual interest until he earns her love. But this 
fact does not represent any reluctance in DL to be a sexual woman either. For instance, 
she has a love affair with Frenesi, and hence felt Frenesi's betrayal as keenly as anyone 
else in the novel. As Olster suggests, this mixture comes out politically as a healthy 
impurity, meaning that DL can engage in an effective kind of "impure guerrilla warfare" 
which stems from "an active involvement in the real" (Olster, 131-2), this corresponding 
with the sort of engagement Pynchon himself would seem to favour. 
This seems to point towards a workable "We-system", one that doesn't subsume 
difference while it makes connections. Unlike the universalised "we" of Gravity's 
Rainbow, which is justified as a grand gesture, but needs breaking down and 
200 
deconstructing, taking difference into account, before it can become a program, this "we" 
suggests alliances for specific political purposes that do not subsume the whole identity 
and hence become universalising grand systems. For instance, Takeshi and DL's 
partnership is always up for renegotiation, and while it usually just "rolls over" for 
another year, it is never suggested this is inflexible: the latest renewal dropped DL's "no 
sex" clause (Vineland, 381). DL, too, was a member of 24fps without being taken in by 
its essentialist rhetoric, because she thought it could achieve something. Some of the most 
subversive groups in the book, for instance Sister Rochelle's Ninjette retreats, operate in 
non-(totalitarian) "fascist" ways that don't simply try to exist outside the dominant 
system. They are quite happy to be anti-corporate and anti-control but to still operate on 
small scale commercial footings; in their retreat they will harbour people in trouble, but 
still expect them to pay their way, if not in money, then preferably with work, something 
which Prairie is happy enough to do. 
Overcoming polarisation in theOD! 
The question remains, however, how "healthy impurity" in the resistance can 
overcome the fear its presence might provoke. If we remember, Liminal Processes 
Favouring Totality appear in response to a threat of fragmentation. Susan Buck-Morss's 
argument is that societies that resemble fascist ones operate by producing narcissistic 
SUbjects. These people are made to feel a reliance on whole, complete forms in response 
to cultural and personal flux and fragmentation, a fragmentation suggesting pain to the 
subject (the shock of which anaesthetises him or her). This retroactivates the corps 
morceli, the fantasy of the body in pieces theorised by Lacan. Liminal Processes 
Favouring Totality operate on the desire to avoid the fragmentation suggested by the 
corps morceli. The narcissistic personality looks for literal and figurative mirrors in 
which to confirm their wholeness, because everything they encounter threatens the 
tenuous ground this self-image is built upon. When they find such a "mirror" they can 
retroactivate the pleasant feeling they expressed in their early episodes of narcissism in 
the mirror stage. The figurative mirrors envelop the cultural assumptions they have 
internalised: in the face of what they see as a dangerously fragmented social economy 
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they respond by appealing to corrective wholenesses - they are careful to maintain 
physical wholeness and support political and social systems of wholeness. 
Once again we arrive at the impasse of writing political postmodemism. 
Totalistic wholeness, related to fascism, narcissism and totalitarianism, are the target of 
both these writers. Pynchon and Ellis partly respond by privileging their opposites: 
fragmentation, incompleteness, impurity, and so on. But the original engine for 
(totalitarian) "fascism" is that fragmentation and flux is produced by the very systems 
that Pynchon and Ellis target. This surface flux, ascribed to the doings of the "other", is 
used to engineer the Liminal Processes Favouring Totality the system needs to replicate a 
deeper wholeness, the hegemony of capital and the concurrent advancement of the 
interests of the "elect". Simply recreating the conditions of flux that media-driven 
capitalism produces will not necessarily resist it, even if fragmentation itself in the base 
structure (as opposed to the superstructural appearance of fragmentation that comes with 
postmodem culture) is anathematic to that system. On the contrary: the structural 
recreation of fragmentation the texts indulge in may very well simply become another 
cultural product contributing to Liminal Processes Favouring Totality, the anaesthetising 
of the population, and therefore the strengthening of the system2• 
2 Related to this is the question of the political use of a fragmented discourse when it faces the powerful 
discourses of a totalitarianism. This argument is outlined in Chapter two. The wave of neo-conservative 
Marxist thinkers that form around Mas 'ud Zavarzadeh, Teresa Ebert and the occasional journal 
Transformation reject Laclau and Mouffe's conceptualisation of radical democracy on these grounds. 
Robert Albritton, for instance, characterises their anti-essentialism as an impossible and tenuous flux: "the 
tendency of their ontology is to make reality so fleeting that any effort to understand it in ways that would 
enable us to transform it rationally would seem to border on the impossible ... their framework offers them 
no purchase at all on theorising the economic under capitalism" (Albritton, 1995, 79). Albritton therefore 
chides them for "a peculiar falling back into essentialism" (ibid) for constructing a structure for political 
alliances. Similarly, and predictably, they are attacked for de-centring class struggle. The identity politics 
that form groups other than the economically-derived category of class (Laclau and Mouffe also 
deconstruct the centrality of economics, because it is the central place of economics which makes being a 
member of the working class the essential locus for political action) is regarded as too weak, rejecting, as 
Paul LeBlanc puts it, "the basis for a compellingly revolutionary programme" (1995, 297). Zavarzadeh, for 
instance, states that any poststructuralist theory dismantles the very idea of totality, the only theoretical 
concept that can conceive of capitalism as a "totality" (1995, 2-3). 
This discourse itself falls prey to a Liminal Process Favouring Totality. Faced with the possibility 
of fragmentation, it responds by insisting upon its own survival, intact, as a totality. As such, its targets are 
not untypical of masculinist totalities: in attempting the liberation of society's exploited, it firstly insists 
upon subsuming all of these under one privileged umbrella (the working-class) and denying the legitimacy 
of groups such as feminists (of many different types), race-based groups, and gay groups. Thus the 
structure of the totality above/the fragmented, weak, and illegitimate mass floundering below is replicated. 
The Transformation group exhibit a general denial of the legitimacy of the other within; issues such as 
racial prejudice, gay liberation and the oppression of women will become resolved once the capitalist 
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The difference this time is that now we are ready to confront this impasse with the 
"cartoon". To the extent that the processes of totalisation themselves need to be 
overcome, the difference between (totalitarian) "fascism" and radical democracy can be 
likened to that between the abnegatory and the accepting cartoon. The (totalitarian) 
"fascist" form is cartoonish in that it suppresses differences and internal others to a 
degree that it "represents" itself in a way that denies the complexity of its own "body" 
(politic). Thus it denies its applicability to the "reality" of existence, presenting a 
forcibly unified "front-line" of itself. In this way, a (totalitarian) "fascist" politics is not 
"whole". Although it seeks to enact closure, and establish its identity once and for all, it 
never can, because it does not recognise the "floods" of its diverse interior. Instead that 
interior is sutured over, its "feminine gaps" covered magically, and it becomes an outline 
with no differentiation in its interior. Radical democracy is a different sort of cartoon. It 
is a cartoon in the "negative" sense that it represents itself as an incomplete system, a 
system that does not aim to complete its own "reality" into a totality. It also represents 
the low and the profane; the mass gaining the power to rule itself. 
Laclau and Mouffe's formulation offers the possibility of a fearless resistance to 
dominant structures rooted in an understanding of the dangers of essentialism. This is 
because one structure that may be formed from the fragmented body of the people for a 
specific purpose is a political alliance, an alliance of hegemonies. This, I believe, also 
goes some distance to answering the divide-and-conquer critique of postmodernism by 
the Marxist proponents who advocate a return to materialist determinism and class-based 
essentialist discourses Laclau and Mouffe advocate abandoning. Although fragmented, 
the leftist opposition to the (totalitarian) "fascist" mode of control exhibited by 
hegemonies of corporate interests is not fragmented hopelessly. An alliance between the 
different groupings for the purpose of defeating a common enemy without suppressing 
the difference between the alliance's members (several of which might have common 
members) may have greater potential for non-(totalitarian) "fascist" politics than an 
essentialist discourse which pits the self of the proletariat against the other of the 
ideology withers away, since they are a direct consequence of alienation and ideology. That is not to say 
all of these issues are of no concern to Transformation-the contrary applies. But their goals are all linked to 
the elevated goal of class revolution. Thus no tolerance is shown to anything that threatens to dissolve the 
armoured exterior of the movement-such interior antagonisms are "sutured". 
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bourgeoisie. This is because, as we have noted, the essentialist discourse opens out the 
potential; for (totalitarian) "fascist" oppression of the people the political fight is fought 
for. However, the formation of a resistant hegemony alone does not answer the problem 
of how to avoid the re-establishment of totality in the event that such a resistance propels 
a popular, radically democratic revolution, how to prevent it becoming a (totalitarian) 
"fascist" -type movement itself, at the service of these greater aims. At the threshold of 
the new political era, a Liminal Process Favouring Totality could usher in the need for the 
hegemony to establish totality politics so that the old order cannot reassert itself. As 
Laclau notes, in a fuller version of the quote we encountered in Chapter two, 
from the fact that there is the impossibility of ultimate closure and presence, it 
does not follow that there is an ethical imperative to "cultivate" that openness or 
even less to be necessarily committed to a democratic society. I think that the 
latter can certainly be defended from a deconstructivist perspective, but that 
defence cannot be logically derived from constitutive openness - something more 
has to be added to the argument. Precisely because of the undecidability inherent 
in constitutive openness, ethico-political moves different from or even opposite to 
a democracy "to come" can be made - for instance, since there is ultimate 
undecidability and, as a result, no immanent tendency of the structure to closure 
and full presence, closure has to be artificially brought about from the outside. In 
that way a case for totalitarianism can be presented starting from deconstructive 
premises. Of course, the totalitarian argument would be as much a non sequitur as 
the argument for democracy: either direction is equally possible given the 
situation of structural undecidability. (1995, 93) 
What democratic movements require to succeed in maintaining themselves as 
democratic over time is a constant transparency of their internal antagonisms; when 
closure is artificially brought about, the arbitrariness of that closure needs to be a visible 
part of the sign of that closure. Totalistic politics attempt to suture over antagonisms and 
reduce otherness to sameness, hence (totalitarian) "fascists" "cover over" "feminine 
gaps". This suturing hides the artificial nature of the act of closure - by covering this up, 
'the act of closure becomes an act of power masked as nature. Democracy, however 
resembles far more the deconstructive gesture of continually finding the antagonisms of 
the aporia, the space that cannot be reduced to the totality of the "same-ness" of the text. 
A "metaphysical" reading of a text attempts to suture over aporias and restore the text to 
full presence. In the context of a radical democracy, what the deconstructive gesture 
204 
requires is nothing short of political labour, and it is labour without end, since the goal is 
precisely the opposite of the suturing over of antagonisms. Critchley posits democracy as 
"an ethically grounded form of political life which is continually being called into 
question by asking of its legitimacy and the legitimacy of its practices and institutions: 
what is justice? In this sense, legitimate communities are those which have themselves in 
question; and, to that extent, legitimate communities are philosophical. The political 
wisdom of democratic societies consists in their service to love, to the irreducibility of 
ethical difference" (1992, 239). The presence of the very social set-up is under erasure, 
questioned and contested without end: "Democracy does not exist; that is to say, starting 
from today, and every day, there is a responsibility to invent democracy, to extend the 
democratic franchise to all areas of public and private life" (240). Democracy does not 
simply emerge when a deconstructive critique identifies an aporia in the structure of a 
totality and demonstrates that totality is a construction rather than a reality, impossible to 
sustain. This can lead to defensive formations, the tyranny of a totality that has no rights 
to exist and so will destroy rather than risk losing the power it hides. Democracy is 
impossible too, only this anxiety is absent; indeed it is the reason for its own existence. 
And democracy has to be made, re-created, not as an ideal but as a tool, a self-reflexive 
convenience which happens to be very weak but also happens to be a construction 
allowing people to live with other, different (antagonistic, even), people in relative peace. 
Lac1au rej ects the notion that there is nothing in between absolute, essentialist 
stability and total flux. "We live as bricoleurs in a plural world", he writes, "having to 
take decisions within incomplete systems of rules (incompletion here means 
undecidability) ... It is because of this constitutive incompletion that decisions have to be 
taken, but because we are faced with incompletion and not with total dispossession, the 
problem of a total ethical grounding - either through the opening to the otherness of the 
other, or through any similar metaphysical principle - never arrives" (1995, 94). This 
represents a movement away from absolute flux, a flux Pynchon is suspicious of as well 
("a condition not many of us can bear for long" [Gravity's Rainbow, 434]). The 
"cartoonness" inherent in the system creates the need for a decision, arbitration: "because 
of this constitutive incompletion ... decisions have to be taken ... " (Lac1au, 94). This 
differs from many conceptions of the postmodern, which suggest the continuous 
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resistance of these decisions and commitment to a position or the moment at which 
interpretation or politics has to be announced. What is at fault here is the injunction that 
just because postmodemist critiques of knowledge do indeed suggest that this moment 
can forever be deferred because the final stand or interpretation is at bottom an arbitrary 
construction, such a stand is impossible or even undesirable. People have been making 
them since before anyone thought to write them down. 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak understands how the failure of some of her 
poststructuralist colleagues to make decisions and commit themselves politically and 
ethically is in fact a failure that can be seen to result from a Liminal Process Favouring 
Totality (although she does not case it in these terms): "You pick up the universal that 
will give you the power to fight against the other side, and what you are throwing away 
by doing that is your theoretical purity. Whereas the great custodians of the anti-
universal are obliged therefore simply to act in the interests of a great narrative, the 
narrative of exploitation, while they keep themselves clean by not committing themselves 
to anything. In fact they are actually run by a great narrative even as they are busy 
protecting their theoretical purity by repUdiating essentialism" (1990, 12). So, anti-
universalists and anti-essentialists must speak in universals and essences or they actually 
risk reinscribing universalism and essentialism, the oppressive types of discourses they 
have decided to oppose in the first place. As Rey Chow puts it, they must be "fearless" in 
regards to speaking the universal, but it must be "a fearlessness that is firmly grounded in 
an understanding of the dangers of essentialism and metalanguage" (1993, 9). 
There is actually no reason, therefore, why a person committed to radical 
democracy cannot theorise capitalism as a totality in order to understand and fight its 
current manifestations. Or, theorise it as an incomplete system, a system of hegemonies 
with a will to power, dedicated to totalising. Deconstructed language is, as Laclau says, 
an "incomplete set of rules (incompletion here means undecidability)" (op-cit), but as 
such it is a set of rules, a system which can generate (incomplete) understanding and 
(incomplete) sense. What this means is that if economics and class are discovered by a 
political hegemony to be the most effective way to combat the exploitation and 
oppression of people, then that is the front upon which the fight for democracy should 
occur. This, though, does not delegitimatise the claims of people oppressed in the many 
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other ways that (totalitarian) "fascist" systems oppress people. And the decision to attack 
a total system on this front should be premised upon the fact that it is merely a tactical 
choice of one possibility among others. In the spirit of hegemony, the tactical 
privileging of class interests need not end internal debates concerning the interests of 
other groups, groups whose claims for rights may ultimately be delayed until the 
dominant paradigms the alliance formed to defeat have been overturned. If these 
differences are suppressed, the internal chaos of the hegemony's body will be denied by 
the privileged group and covered over, and the accepting cartoon hegemony becomes 
instead a abnegatory cartoon, a hegemony as it is more commonly understood, dedicated 
to same-ness. 
The provisional 
What the examples from Pynchon suggest, then, is a strength of the cartoon: the 
provisional. As Laclau says, incompleteness does not have to imply radical openness but 
merely incompleteness. Cartoons have an identity: Daffy Duck, Bugs Bunny, Roger 
Rabbit, Bart Simpson, DL Chastain are all characters we can recognise if we see them. 
As such, they are reasonably consistent entities over time. They are also incomplete and 
subject to revision and redrawing. They are capable of transgressing their boundaries and 
taking on other forms as they need to. As with Slothrop in Gravity's Rainbow, before he 
scatters, they can shift identities but are still mostly recognisable. Yet this does not imply 
an essential identity, because often what viewers recognise under a proper signifier (Bart 
Simpson, say) may shift around too. Both the Simpson family and the characters of 
Gravity's Rainbow have a tendency to break into song and dance routines. They are still 
Bart, or Marge, or Osbie, or Slothrop, but there is no reason for them to be absolutely 
consistent (and no reason for them not to be if that suits them), to be the same Bart, 
Marge, Osbie or Slothrop. Homer Simpson has, at various times, been a generic cave 
man, a Hebrew at the time of Moses, and the Neanderthal whose tossed bone segues into 
the space station at the start of Kubrik's 2001: A Space Odyssey. Slothrop spends much 
of Gravity's Rainbow as an accepting cartoon: aside from an awareness that often his 
actions are not straightforwardly his own, he acts like a cartoon: he transgresses identity; 
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he "becomes" Rocketman and the Pig-hero. He and his friends often break into song, all 
of which suggests that he leads a self-consciously cartoonish life. Not that he is without 
human fears and doubts and desires and anger - he is both cartoon and human. This, 
however, is the case until part four of the novel, during which Slothrop is "dismantled" 
and scattered at a crossroad. Initially it might seem as if They have beaten him and 
replicated Their system by forcing him into the impotent position of anti-paranoid non-
identity: the Slothropian nuisance loose in the Zone is liquidated. Hope, however, 
remams. Despite his dispersal, a provisional Slothrop still haunts the narrative. In one 
guise, for instance, it is suggested he appears on the cover of an obscure psychedelic rock 
album from the late 1960s, a guest instrumentalist playing that most cartoonish of 
instruments, the kazoo. Pynchon's narrator appropriately leaves it open as to whether or 
not this really is Slothrop, or whether we are instead still acting as paranoid readers and 
looking for signs of him that are not there (or following a paranoid narrator). But if it is 
him, he has taken a provisional identity with an appropriate name - he is identified on the 
cover as "a friend". 
Such an identification of provisional identity with friendship is very apt, 
especially in light of Slothrop's and various members of the Counterforce's history of 
kindnesses. It is this care for the plight of the other that is implicated in the semiotics of 
the accepting cartoon (an act oflove to Toontown inhabitants), and it is the same care for 
the other and ability to love which characterises the labour required for perpetuating the 
provisionality required for the survival of radical democracy. In short, Pynchon 
anticipated the theorisations of cartoons within this thesis, and saw their potential for 
political change. The cartoon traits of love, laughter and radical democracy can each be 
found in Gravity's Rainbow, and are all vital as tools with which the figure of Patrick 
Bateman in American Psycho might be read into the oppositional political sign I believe 
he is, rather than an offensively monstrous creation. A sense of Slothrop can, even now, 
be resuscitated. His mistake was to isolate himself, become not a (provisionally) 
committed member of a provisional hegemony but "a friend", in a situation that 
demanded commitment for resistance to be possible. In the language of the late 1960s, he 
"drops out", scattered under the pressure exerted by the totality he was dangerous to. 
They no longer allow him an identity, and he no longer resists this wish, although it is 
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true that he foiled their attempt to castrate him, so that he still has some potential power. 
His ability to empathise with the plight of others and to show care are traits the 
Counterforce needed; Slothrop needed the temporary shelter of a provisional hegemony 
to remain a threat to Them, and to do so by constructing his own identity, away from 
Their attentions. The Counterforce does not give up the possibility of political change. 
Instead they plan to use provisional tactics, ones that undermine their opposition and ones 
that die as they are no longer required. These tactics may be fictions, but they are useful 
ones. 
The provisional is the acknowledgement of the other: it acknowledges the 
existence ofthe total in the non-total, of closure in an open system, of the symbolic in the 
semiotic, of (totalitarian) "fascism" in anti-(totalitarian) "fascist" discourse. Hence 
discourses opposing the we-are-not-other of (totalitarian) "fascism" must acknowledge 
the complicity they have with (totalitarian) "fascism". Fascism is their cartoon: it is the 
element which prevents it from closing totally, from purifying and completing itself 
against the other. Instead, a political system that admits it is incomplete and cartoonish 
can construct a self-aware fiction for its own identity, based perhaps on the fiction that it 
already has to have an identity in the first place, one which will give it the strength, 
power and analytic tools it needs to struggle for its position, a position based around a 
cartoon analysis which constructs its position as provisionally "rational". 
This is similar to the position Donna Haraway adopts in her essay "Situated 
Knowledges". She writes that "my problem and our problem is how to have 
simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and 
knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognising our own 'semiotic technologies' for 
making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world, 
one that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide projects of finite freedom, 
adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness .... We 
need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in 
order to deny meanings and bodies, but in order to live in meanings and bodies that have 
a chance for a future" (1991, 187). Haraway argues that dominant knowledge presents 
itself as transcendent knowledge, based upon a metaphor of vision that claims to see 
everything, but from a position of exactly nowhere - from outside history. As such it 
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claims objectivity for itself. Yet this is a "God trick", an illusion of perspective (189). 
To the contrary of this, Haraway claims that objectivity can actually only come about 
when perspective is embodied. "So not so perversely, objectivity turns out to be about 
particular and specific embodiment, and definitely not about false vision promising 
transcendence of all limits and responsibility. The moral is simple: only partial 
perspective promises objective vision. This is an objective vision that initiates, rather 
than closes off, the problem of responsibility for the generativity of all visual practices" 
(190). This theorisation leads again to the possibility of provisional hegemonies: "Such 
preferred positioning is as hostile to various forms of relativism as to the most explicitly 
totalising claims to scientific authority. But the alternative to relativism is not totalisation 
and single vision, which is always finally the unmarked category whose power depends 
on systematic narrowing and obscuring. The alternative to relativism is partial, locatable 
critical knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in 
politics and shared conversations in epistemology" (191). 
Hence part of the work in creating a situated knowledge, which may be called 
provisional objectivity, involves exactly an attempt to see things from the position of the 
other. This does not mean that the situated agent can speak for the other, but rather that 
they have the responsibility to temper their position with the position of others, to take 
others into account. Hence Derrida speaks of cares and responsibilities toward the other3, 
and hence kindnesses are offered and accepted in Gravity's Rainbow. A situated 
knowledge does not necessarily imply the weakening of that knowledge's validity or its 
utility, because its utilisation is premised upon the fact that a hegemony accepts it as a 
provisional description of the world. As such it, and the people who construct and act 
upon it, are implicated in their own history: the knowledge, as well as the hegemony of 
related groups, is produced by specific historical conditions, which need themselves to be 
theorised as a part of the knowledge. For instance, the exploitation of women as a 
working class by a patriarchy is a set of conditions for which a situated, provisional 
response might form. The response could theorise the conditions in a way which makes 
sense of those conditions, so that a way to overcome them can be formulated. This 
3 See Derrida (1988), "The Politics of Friendship", for instance. For a discussion, Champagne's overview 
of Derrida' s work (1995) treats this aspect of deconstruction more fully than most general discussions. 
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theorisation and its consequent political response must remain provisional, however. It 
must not attempt to apply its description to all instances of exploitation, because to do so 
it would have taken a position outside of history and forgotten about its own provisional 
construction. Nor, for the same reason, can it explain the conditions which afflict every 
member of a class regardless of differences (race, or sexual orientation, or other, less 
apparent differences). It must remain self-aware as a generalisation, a convenient schema 
produced through democratic assent, which can serve as the basis of social change, but 
which cannot promise the end to struggle. To promise this would be for the rule of the 
underclass to position itself as an overclass which can end politics. This would 
reintroduce exploitation and domination. 
Hence part of the labour of producing self-aware cartoon knowledges and political 
hegemonies involves the labour of constant self-inquisition. This is what Derrida 
describes as "yet another effort" (1992, 108), and what Simon Critchley means when he 
says that "starting from today, and every day, there is a responsibility to invent 
democracy, to extend the democratic franchise to all areas of public and private life" 
(240). It never makes it: democracy can never be fully extended; but the radical feature 
of democracy is that it is built on a knowledge of its own such impossibility and 
continues extending the franchise of that impossibility anyway, the franchise of the need 
to keep that impossibility alive. Structures might take on their own lives and try to enact 
closure; democracy ensures that they remain provisional. This requires labour, 
continuous analysis, reflexivity, constant questioning of the basis of any structure, for that 
knowledge's construction, baselessness. The cartoon-ness of a knowledge is contained in 
its aporias, in its gaps, incompleteness, and discontinuities. A hegemony must have its 
structural basis in antagonism. The very basis of that hegemony's existence must always 
remain in question or its success will become undermined by its (totalitarian) "fascist" 
"instincts". 
Engagement with liminal space that leads to the provisional 
A privileged distinction between a Liminal Process Favouring Totality and its 
antithesis, which I propose to tentatively describe as Engagement with Liminal Space that 
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Leads to the Provisional, is that the former is managed from a position above in order to 
dominate a below it cannot aclrnowledge, while the latter is an event generated by the 
democratic struggle of each individual who experiences it. Both events are formed by 
desire: the one by a desire for the stability that transgression into liminal space seems to 
abandon, the other by a desire for freedom for the other, and for the subject as other to the 
other. Perhaps a liminal moment that leads to provisional structure should be called an 
expression: an expression of the desire to end domination and exploitation. This 
translates into a desire to include and accept the other into the boundaries of the self. It is 
also a desire for politics and history, despite both their constructed natures (or because of 
them, even). 
This result of liminality more closely resembles the liminal process the 
anthropologist Victor Turner describes in The Ritual Process, because it forms new social 
arrangements, rather than radically reinforcing old ones. But for this to happen requires 
work and concentration. A decision has to be reached which expresses a spirit, a political 
will to avoid (totalitarian) "fascism" in all its guises. This decision will be a provisional 
one because, ironically, structure, form and identity, which are associated with the total, 
has to ground the decision of the hegemony of movements to put an end to totality. To 
me, this suggestion takes us back to Douglas Keesey's comment on Pynchon, that "It is 
characteristic of [him] to show how the very weapon by which self and other will be 
destroyed has that within it which, if recognised, could save them both" (1986,90). Such 
form, structure, or identity is radically constructed and understood as such, but it grounds 
political discourse nonetheless. This provisional grounding satisfies the nostalgia for 
wholeness which Liminal Processes Favouring Totality manipUlate: it has the potential to 
answer and allay the fear of the body lying in pieces (corps morcele,) because the subject 
is able to legitimately construct a provisional body which is not in pieces. On the other 
side of this construct lies the work to overcome the fear of fragmentation itself by way of 
a culture of imperfect mirrors: the understanding that wholeness is not pleasingly real but 
that instead it ultimately leads to a destructive series of processes culminating in early 
death. Anti-(totalitarian) "fascist" movements have as part of their labour to continue in 
perpetuity to crack and warp ideological mirrors including their own. To do this is to 
invent democracy, to invent a politics of incompletion, every day. 
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How, then, does this connect to the metaphor of the cartoon? The identification of 
the cartoon nature of a dominant power-structure requires the identification of an aporia, 
a fissure or gap in its surface perfection and self-identification. As we have discussed 
earlier, the gap, the edit, the space is where the cartoon exists. In the case of a total 
structure, a gap opens at the moment of its totalisation, at the point it seems most 
powerful, for that is the point at which its dependence on its cartoon - childlike, 
incomplete - other becomes exposed. In the act of totalisation, the total structure must 
move to finally annihilate the other, and in doing so it annihilates its own interior, the 
"belly" in which the constituting other resides. The chaos within the body, the one that 
produces surplus and waste, is thus abjected from the system. This leaves it as an outline 
that denies it is an outline; it is a reduced form, and so acts as if it were complete. It is a 
body that can never close itself off completely but has nostalgia for complete closure and 
a delusion that such closure is possible. 
It is at this point that the "other's" relation to the total structure can become 
something other than being totality's victim. Laughter partially defines the cartoon 
because it puts the subject into process, a "regression" from his or her assumption of their 
own completion. Totality is, among other things, a monumental (monstrous) joke. As it 
has arguably resulted in a great number of deaths, it is both a joke of monstrous 
proportions and the joke of a monster that has created a steady stream of monuments. 
Laughter is a practice that can diffuse totality. Politically, a spectacle can be made of 
totality in all its forms, so that the sight of the total will produce laughter. From the 
openness, the process, of this laughter, an amatory spirit can emerge, the love born of a 
connection between open systems. Love is another characteristic of the open cartoon, the 
cartoon that knows it is a cartoon. And, politically, anger at the dominating, total system, 
and a desire to overthrow it and change it, can come of the consciousness that laughter at 
totality can produce. Politically, this desire to change the total can take the form of 
political groups with the same (provisional) interests - a provisional hegemony between 
groups made "other" and thus victims of the oppression of totality. The fact that, as 
Laclau and Mouffe say, the political horizon is an open one, no matter how concentrated 
a totality'S attempt to close it may be, is the best hope for this alliance. The alliance and 
the groups it consists of can be provisional, and yet remain identities. Decisions for 
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political action can be made, or no political action could possibly take place. As 
identities, such an anti-(totalitarian) "fascist" "counterforce", and the groups it comprises, 
may be required to look and act a little like the totalities they oppose, but this act can be a 
masquerade, performed with laughter at what the self might become. These groups keep 
in sight the fact that they are cartoons of political movements and realise that their status 
as provisionalities, as accepting and open cartoons, and as groups dedicated to keeping 
the basis of their own identity "impossible". Thus they are groups dedicated to keeping 
the political horizon open and politics alive because to not do so would be to invite a 
return to exploitation, oppression, fascism, and war. They realise that their existence 
requires them to unravel, as Osbie Feel realises this for the Counterforce in Gravity's 
Rainbow. Otherwise they claim an essential association with the higher ground, which 
expresses a desire to be "on top", and they will have lost sight of their own cartoon status, 
falling prey instead to Liminal Processes Favouring Totality. This would reinforce the 
position ofPynchon's category of elect. 
This continued opening of a cartoon space by way of Engagement with Liminal 
Space that Leads to the Provisional, the laughter at the total as a cartoon, a joke, will 
unite (totalitarian) "fascism's" opponents, and may split away members of totalities, 
because of Engagements with Liminal Space that Leads to the Provisional. If they can be 
made to see the joke, and be made to see that they eventually will become victims of the 
(totalitarian) "fascism" themselves, and hence then appreciate the cartooning of the 
totality, they might be made to break ranks. This is true especially if they are less 
successfully conditioned members of their totality. Some members of dominance-
seeking (or dominant) political groups will undergo a Liminal Process Favouring Totality 
at the offence caused by the exposure their group has suffered (see Rowe, 18-19, on male 
reviewers' reactions to A Question of Silence, for instance). But for the less fanatic 
members, love and psychic health is not beyond them; in Theweleit's language, full birth 
remains possible for them. They could once more be open to the world, and to others. If 
this could happen, then the dominant group will shrink, and could eventually lose its 
dominant position on the political horizon to a plural, radically democratic hegemony. 
This can only happen through praxis and political agitation. Such agitation can never 
cease, or democratic movements would risk the closure of the horizon, making them lose 
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sight of their cartoon skeleton again; this would signal the dominance once again of the 
Liminal Process Favouring Totality. 
If deconstruction radically destabilises the ground upon which all identities are 
made, how can political identities fonn strongly enough to be capable of tackling a 
totality? It seems likely to be on the basis, at least initially, of the grounds that are 
impossible but which nonetheless are there and working in the interests of the dominant 
totality. Opposition to totality, at least as I see it, is likely to effectively come from 
within totality, just as an amatory spirit is built upon a prior narcissism. The oppositional 
hegemony can gain an identity, a tool it requires, from its opponent. This allows it to 
fonn, but it means that, initially, the identity it is likely to take will be built along the 
same cartoon political lines as the totality itself. The fact that it "opposes" totality 
suggests, after all, that it may mirror totality, and that it would therefore fonn upon 
dichotomous lines. If this is the case, it is at this point that the hegemonies opposing 
totality are at most danger of totalising themselves, and suffering Liminal Processes 
Favouring Totality. To avoid this, its new identity must remain a cartoonish version of 
the totality's: the cartoon must remain in the open, and not sutured over. It may be 
fonned on its cartoon other's back (the cartoon of the totality, which because it is a 
totality loses sight of its being a cartoon), but must acknowledge, must de-purify itself 
with, the cartoon other's part in itself. It should not close itself off from the impulse for 
totality within it. But this impulse must be kept sight of, for if it is to escape, then the 
antagonism its trace causes will suture over, and this liminal moment will favour totality. 
As the provisional basis for a hegemony threatens to become a total basis, as time goes 
on, provisionality can only be rescued by political agitation from within the group, based 
upon and in opposition to the totality-favouring identity that the group has slumped into. 
As with before, new hegemonies fonn from within the old structure they oppose. 
Ultimately it is impossible to predict what fonn new groupings such as these might 
eventually take, but such an evolution, if it is to remain democratic, has to accompanied 
by the groups' continued commitment to deconstructing its own ideals and its own 
decisions, continuing to foreground the impossibility of the decisions they nonetheless 
make. 
Politics, if this path is followed, will tend to morph continuously into provisional 
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fonns and identities which break open and change when they start to become pennanent 
and self-validating, something that may be signalled by an attempt to limit dissent. But 
they will only continue to commit to democracy if the desire to stay open to the other 
remains, and what work will be required for this commitment in the future is impossible 
to predict. This sort of movement does not happen naturally or necessarily, but only if 
the horrors of totality are not lost sight of and if the will for them to never return remains 
the majority will. Nonetheless, for now, provisional fonns seem to me capable of 
satisfying the nostalgia for wholeness and ideals that fascism exploits. With 
Engagements with Liminal Space that Leads to the Provisional, people do not have to 
give up identity, but rather can fonn their own accepting one. After all, totalistic 
identities are powerful despite being ultimately fonned on impossible grounds 
themselves. 
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Chapter eleven 
The Rabbit's Handcuffs: Tying the Toon to the Real 
Anelypsis into the "real" scene 
Not to love der fuhrer 
Is a great disgrace 
So ve go heil! heil! 
Right in der fuhrer's face! 
-Spike Jones 
We have seen how both Ellis in American Psycho and Pynchon in Gravity's 
Rainbow construct their readership in a way that it may recognise that "we" collectively 
are as much victims of the "system" as the characters in the fictions. Ellis gives the 
reader little opportunity to oppose Bateman's interpretation of events, forcing the 
grounds for readerly resistance outside of the text itself and into the world of the book 
and reader. Pynchon takes his entire readership and sits them in a theatre before 
rhetorically firing a rocket at them. Ellis plays with the pornographic, a type of 
representation that physically affects its readers in a manner few others do. Once he has 
established a pornographic fantasy space in American Psycho, he brutally destroys its 
"utopian" elements by establishing a space for brutal violence with exactly the same 
detached tone and diction, thereby suggesting the two spaces occupy the same ground. 
Similarly, the novel depicts a "pornography" of consumer living, where everything 
anyone could possibly desire is within easy reach. But this too is undercut as Bateman 
conflates this utopia with the power to murder with impunity. 
If we remember, Walter Benjamin wrote, regarding fascism's "aestheticisation 
of politics", "Communism responds by politicising art". While it is clear that this must 
relate to Benj amin' s analysis of film in his essay, the direct connection is absent. Susan 
Buck-Morss ends her discussion of the "Artwork Essay" by suggesting how this 
response might work. Buck-Morss refers to the camera because this is Benjamin's own 
concern in his essay: 
The camera can aid us in knowledge of fascism, because it provides an 
"aesthetic" experience that is nonauratic, critically "testing", capturing with its 
"unconscious optics" precisely the dynamics of narcissism on which the politics 
of fascism depends, but which its own auratic aesthetics conceals.... Such 
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knowledge is not historicist. The juxtaposition of photographs of Hitler's face 
and Darwin's illustrations [which Buck-Morss used to demonstrate how Hitler 
used the Nuremberg rallies to reflect an image of wholeness back to a mass in 
narcissistic crisis] will not answer the complexities of von Ranke's question of 
"how it actually was" in Germany, or what determined the uniqueness of its 
history. Rather, the juxtaposition creates a synthetic experience that resonates 
with our own time, providing us, today, with a double recognition - first, of our 
own infancy, in which, for so many of us, the face of Hitler appeared as evil 
incarnate, the bogeyman of our own childhood fears. Second, it shocks us into 
awareness that the narcissism that we have developed as adults, that functions as 
an aestheticising tactic against the shock of modem experience - and that is 
appealed to daily by the image-phantasmagoria of mass culture - is the ground 
from which fascism can again push forth. To cite Benjamin: "In shutting out the 
experience [of the inhospitable, blinding age of big-scale industrialism], the eye 
perceives an experience of a complimentary nature, in the form of its 
spontaneous after-image". Fascism is that afterimage. In its reflecting mirror 
we recognise ourselves. (41) 
The camera has the potential to create, Buck-Morss suggests, a non-auratic 
spectacle of Hitler, the man who took it upon himself to embody German fascism. 
Normally, the dynamics of narcissism, the Liminal Process Favouring Totality, are 
concealed by an aura, which naturalises the wholeness fanaticized retroactively during a 
narcissistic crisis. The aura, then, creates the illusion that totalisation is possible and 
desirable, and so it represents the suppression of the other. It gives us all an attractive 
way to "get the better of' the "chaos" we perceive around us every day. An abnegatory 
cartoon denying its incomplete identity is auratic, in this sense, because it aestheticises 
politics. It gives a political function (the removal of chaos from society) to an aesthetic 
ideal (the achievement of the perception of perfect form). It tries to "complete" itself. 
If we remember, for the rocket in Gravity's Rainbow, which represents a state of 
perfection, completion such as this requires it to destroy itself. A cartoon that admits to 
its cartoon element is non-auratic, is critically "testing". It continually calls attention to 
the gaps between "itself' and "reality", "reality" in this sense being a completion, or an 
aestheticisation (the fabled "third dimension"). The accepting cartoon is more 
"realistic" because it does not place an aestheticised ideal and a reality in the same 
representational space. It never tries to "complete" itself in any final, irreversible way. 
The mirror of a consumer society produces the after-image of Patrick Bateman. 
We may not recognise ourselves in his acts of murder and torture, but some of us may 
do, if we were honest, in our desire to be able to purchase and consume anything we 
want from food to sex, or to consume items so that we can establish or keep social 
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status, or to keep up an "image". These things represent attempts by us to make up for 
a lack, to complete the image we have of ourselves that does not match our own 
experience. We may recognise ourselves also in any compulsions we discover we have 
to occasionally "get the better of' someone, to cut their speech off with an acerbic retort 
("verbal machine gunning .... They identify their own faults in others with punctilious 
brilliance and mercilessly annihilate them", says Theweleit [1989b, 277-8]). 
Gravity's Rainbow ends on the note of an after-image, 
The last image was too immediate for any eye to register. It may have been a 
human figure, dreaming of an early evening in each great capital luminous 
enough to tell him he will never die, coming outside to wish on the first star. 
But it was not a star, it was falling, a bright angel of death. And in the 
darkening and awful expanse something has kept on, a film we have not learned 
to see ... it is now the close-up of the face, a face we all know-" (760) 
Might that face be Hitler's? Nixon's? Our own, each individually? Is the 
Orpheus Theatre an equivalent to Nuremberg, where we are tricked by a 
phantasmagorium into experiencing wholeness as part of a crowd while being prepared 
at the same time for literal fragmentation (Buck-Morss, 35)? (The aestheticisation of 
politics, to Benjamin, can lead only to war). In the Orpheus theatre, the audience is 
being prepared to enjoy as an aesthetic event the preparations for its own destruction by 
the rocket, being "taken in love" so that it will become "blindingly one", perhaps. 
Vineland posits two types of "after-image", the technologically mediated 
"ghosts", the Thanatoids, and Brock Yond. The Thanatoids represent the pacification 
of America's people and the pacification of the once-rebellious 1960s. They represent 
thus Their control over the revolutionary movements that could have potentially 
produced a change in the order, but were defeated. They suggest that "we" are now a 
totally subdued popUlation in a totalitarian society. Yond is also a return, an after-
Image. While Yond appears frequently in the narrative, it is largely by way of 
flashback sequences; the re-active V ond of 1984 is only ever glimpsed from a distance, 
or his presence felt by the actions of his men. Together, the Thanatoids and Yond 
represent the armoured extemalised ego of America and the people frozen within it, 
bound in front of the "Tube". 
However, this passive "national" interior shows some SIgns of activity in 
Vineland. The Thanatoids awaken, while the citizens of Vineland County find 
themselves abuzz at all the activity around them. The ones who knew Yond from the 
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1960s, such as DL and Ditzah, are even partially activated again. One possible 
explanation for this thawing is that the annoured exterior is under pressure. Although a 
/ 
surprise to the reader, the kind of budget cuts that tenninate Vond's project are often 
predictable for those involved. The possibility of "decommissioning" may have 
become real to Vond. Footsoldiers such as Vond are kept under pressure from above as 
much as below. An ambitious one like Vond, who desires elect status, is likely to adopt 
a reaction formation if threatened with enforced inactivity. He might find a battle to 
fight, one which allows him to release the pressure that has built Upl. For this to 
happen, paradoxically, the soldiers require an enemy, so to find one, they encourage the 
activity of the interior. Once its "thaw" reaches a critical point, the "threat" it poses can 
be dealt with. Although this may lead to the soldier male asserting greater control after 
they have experienced a Liminal Process Favouring Totality, it does give those allied 
with the "interior" an opportunity to recognise their situation and politicise, to fonn a 
"we" hegemony. 
Politicising the spectacle/ seizing the means o(interpretation 
The obvious difference between German fascism as embodied in Hitler's body 
and "the image-phantasmagoria of mass culture" that appeals daily to "the narcissism 
that we have developed as adults, that functions as an aestheticising tactic against the 
shock of modem experience" is that the latter has no specific leader to embody it. 
Although political leaders may have more or less influence (Reagan and Nixon in 
Vineland controlled the "repressive state apparatus", but the degree to which they used 
the spectacle, and to which the spectacle exerts control independent of the state 
apparatus altogether, is open to debate. The spectacle is, after all, not subject to the 
vote). 
In Gravity's Rainbow and Vineland, Pynchon provides us with "synthetic 
experiences" as Buck-Morss describes them, cartoons which, the author hopes, will 
help readers recognise the mechanics of their subjection, the fact of their subjection, 
and therefore their complicity in their own .subjection. James Hans concludes, in 
regards to Gravity's Rainbow, "If we open our codes to the scrutiny Pynchon places 
them under, the confusion does indeed give way to wonder, both because we see the 
I For the proto-fascist's hatred of "bourgeois" inactivity and the non-mobilised life, see Theweleit 1989b 
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world as alive rather than as a big dumb rock and because the novel itself comes to be 
seen in the same light. It is not an ossified structure that we can passively consume ... ; it 
is an attempt to jar us out of our passivity, to remove us from the world of the glozing 
neuter in which we spend most of our lives" (280). According to Hans, Pynchon's 
intention is to politicise the reader and to make him or her active, to get them out of the 
theatre and onto the streets, so to speak. This is something Gravity's Rainbow shares 
with his next novel. Vineland is unsubtle in its insistence upon juxtaposing two 
traditional opposites - "free" U.S. society and (totalitarian) "fascism" - and discovering 
that the valorised one is merely an extension of the abjected one. Pynchon here shares 
with Ellis the sense of a continuity of what initially seemed like opposites. Both 
Vineland and Gravity's Rainbow juxtapose "cartoon" America with a "real" political 
America, with similar results. Because fascism is so abj ect in our culture, this is 
designed to affect a shock-into-action on the part of a receptive reader. It is designed to 
"affect" its readers. But Pynchon does not employ this tactic as spectacularly as Ellis, 
which may be why Pynchon never suffered the book-burning threats Ellis did over 
American Psycho2. 
In American Psycho, Patrick Bateman's behaviour swmgs between the 
childishly petty and the appallingly violent. He sulks when he finds he has a 
"mediocre" business card in comparison to his companions. He only grudgingly 
apologises to McDermott for "insulting the pizzas at Pastals" (109) after McDermott 
"proves" that Donald Trump likes them: '''if the pizza at Pastals is okay with Donny' ... 
hating to admit this to McDermott.. .. 'It's okay with me'" (110); he's fiercely 
competitive about dress etiquette. This shows a glimpse of our childhood, the 
narcissism of childhood by way of "cartooned", satirised adult behaviour, and so shocks 
us into a recognition that that behaviour - in this book always in the context of 
spectacle capitalism - is the "ground from which" Bateman's violence pushes forth. 
The juxtapositions he creates function in the way Buck-Morss outlined; we suddenly 
recognise our daily culture, our assumptions, to be continuous with Bateman's, as with 
Ellis's undercutting of pornographic discourse and language with violence. A reader 
388-98. The theme also intrudes into much of 1989a, 3-228. 
2 Part of the reason for this may be that "fascism" as an accusation or description can be itself accused of 
banality, even if it is deployed accurately in a technical sense. It is too common in social discourse to 
describe something you don't like as "fascist". A conflation of the consumer impulse with torture-
murder, however, is somewhat more outrageous. 
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who has responded physically to the pornographic sequences in the novel will feel their 
complicity with its violence physically, his or her body reacting to the change. 
The effect of such a juxtaposition works in an edit, a gap between obviously 
unreal "fun and games" and overly real violence, in the time between the narrator 
describing Christie's costume and an injured Elizabeth running from the room 
(American Psycho, 289; see 11-12 above). This gap is also liminal: in this scene 
Bateman only kills after experiencing a Liminal Process Favouring Totality. After 
orgasm, where he experiences a loss (as we are experiencing the loss of narrative in the 
edit between the sexual and the violent stages of the episode), he is suddenly on the 
rampage. The loss we feel, however, "cartoons" us; the "edit" manipulates us from 
above, making us pawns of the manipUlative text. It is as if the book physically 
interferes in "the real world", making readers perform a kind of "song and dance act" 
for it. Readers are prompted by this juxtaposition to realise we are equivalent to a 
"cartoon", to become aware of our diminished autonomy, and our loss of dimensions. 
The violent part of the episode cartoons the pornographic; individually there is a 
blindness working in each, in the subtle manipUlations of the spectacle (personified by 
Bateman) in the first, in the crazed result of Bateman's Liminal Process Favouring 
Totality in the second. But the shock the second gives readers who were aroused by the 
pornographic content of the first has the potential to make them act as self-aware 
cartoons, as we are shocked into critically reading them for the origins of the power we 
have become subjected to. Rather than passive spectators of an entertainment, as we 
might be if we read regular non-violent pornography, we now have an interest in 
discovering the processes behind the manipUlation. Ellis here takes a significant, if 
calculated, series of risks, not the least of which is the very real possibility of provoking 
among his readership Liminal Processes Favouring Totality. If this happened they 
might form in two possible directions: firstly, readers might become like Bateman, 
share his attitudes to a degree, or secondly, as a reaction-formation against Ellis, against 
men, or against the system. The novel may be seen by one readership as a misogynistic 
tract; the possibility holds that some of the descriptions might be copied in a real life 
murder. Hence the book is hated; some people want it burned. But this reading 
experience might also lead to an Engagement with Liminal Space that Leads to the 
Provisional; it may allow readers to escape their society and the book's power. 
As we have seen, Laura Tanner notes that Bateman resists interpretation. This 
impacts both on how the character sees himself (and drives his [totalitarian] "fascism", 
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as we saw m Chapter five), and on how he is seen by readers. Bateman's very 
representation of self mocks that self and the processes that form it. His presentation of 
self itself makes the self he presents impossible to maintain, not despite of but because 
of the fact that this self is a (totalitarian) "fascist" one. He is a non-auratic spectacle 
and a personification of Liminal Processes Favouring Totality once readers learn to see 
him as such. (Those susceptible to Liminal Processes Favouring Totality themselves 
may experience him as auratic.) He can be non-auratic because he is a cartoon; he is 
not presented realistically, a fact many critics have complained about. His violence is a 
radical, narcissistic response to weaknesses the "system" keeps opening in order to 
elicit just such responses, these "closed" responses that help to perpetuate a system we 
can understand as (totalitarian) "fascist". Bateman's murders are his attempt to 
complete himself, or at least, since he is so ephemeral, to establish, to assert himself as 
an entity. To do this, his ideology demands that he drive from himself the spectre of his 
incompleteness, a spectre that the ideology views as feminine. As an abnegatory 
cartoon, he desires the destruction of the cartoon within him and that he denies (instead 
projecting outward, into the world). Bateman, however, can be so obviously cartoonish 
that maintaining his borders becomes impossible for him. The act of destroying this 
cartoon, tortuously, makes him cartoonishly incomplete, as we saw in Chapter one (13). 
He knows he is sketchy, a cartoon with no depth or centre, but this knowledge gives 
him nothing but pain, which he then drives outwards. He cannot accept that he is 
necessarily cartoonishly empty, that he is a reflex, an automaton, "a killing machine 
that happens to be in the form of a man", as Rey Chow put it (op cit). 
Bateman is the afterimage of spectacle capitalism. We can see this figure very 
clearly: unfulfilled, unfulfillable, desperately unhappy, reeling towards disaster. The 
comparison we made between Bateman and the Freikorps members in Chapter five 
show clearly that this afterimage is fascism. At the same time he is presented 
physically and socially as desirable and as a masculine ideal - handsome, rich, in 
excellent physical shape - he is just what we are constantly told we desire to be 
ourselves. However, Bateman's banal narcissism, and the fact that it so obviously 
forms his psychosis - it is the American Psychosis - shocks us "into awareness that the 
narcissism that we have developed as adults, that functions as an aestheticising tactic 
against the shock of modem experience - and that is appealed to daily by the image-
phantasmagoria of mass culture - is the ground from which fascism [or, if we don't 
recognise this, then evil, say] can again push forth". By being forced by the text into a 
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position of our own deterioration of self, our manipulation by a higher power, we are 
forced to identify with the Bateman cartoon, and hence with our own (totalitarian) 
"fascism". In Bateman we recognise ourselves. This is particularly if we are masculine 
or put some stock in various masculinist practices, or if we are highly competitive and 
need to be "on top". Bateman's ability to use the capitalist social totality as an ego 
extension, allowing him to fade into the background and continue killing, as we 
discussed in Chapter five as well, also suggests the complicity between our own society 
and (totalitarian) "fascism". 
This ought to shock us. And it is this which simply renders moot the debates 
over whether Bateman's acts are true or merely textual events, or fantasies. When all is 
said, it doesn't actually matter whether Bateman "really is" a murderer or not in the 
fictional world of the novel. The murders are still a logical, if extreme, outcome of the 
pathology of the ideology Bateman embodies, the practices of his narcissism and his 
capitalism. And this ideology is, as Kaplan notes about fascism, exemplified in "banal" 
everyday life (50-52): in Bateman's distance from and appalling treatment of the 
women he doesn't murder, in his and his friends' casual misogyny, in the way he treats 
(and is treated by) people he regards as other to himself and his social grouping, in the 
way he, for example, acquires a tanning bed when he finds out his compatriot has one, 
in the way he knows the dress code for "yuppie" fashion better than everyone else, in 
the way he cannot abide anything but physical perfection in women, in the way he and 
his friends try to one-up each other like children. The purpose of almost everything 
they do is to position themselves on top: they get the best designer clothes, are seen at 
the right clubs and restaurants, desire the most prestigious accounts to broker. 
The Bateman figure shows all of this up as a ludicrous grotesque, often funny, 
as often terrifying and sickening. He is a cartoon. He is a cartoon, though, who cannot 
abide being one. Tanner suggests that the novel itself acts in this way: it is a reaction 
formation on its own, that "our control over the act of interpretation seems to disappear 
beneath the force of a text that naturalises itself as an object even as it appropriates the 
participation of its readerly subjects" (114). If a reader is unmoved by Ellis's 
manipUlation of pornographic structures in the example I gave before, he or she will fall 
prey in other ways. The book's repetition, banality, gruesome detail, and lack of 
realistic characterisation mean that it acts on a reader in a similar way to Bateman 
acting upon one of his victims, when he forces her to watch a video of a previous 
murder. Bateman's "goal is not only to torture and murder [a victim] but to make her 
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see that torture and murder as an inevitable, necessary conclusion. Insofar as the novel 
terrorises the reader, it is because it denies the reader's subjectivity in just such a way" 
(111). She calls for "oppositional reading ... [opposing] the very terms of readership 
implicit in the text" (114), and indeed just such a strategy is called for. In the context of 
this novel, traditional terms of readership promote Liminal Processes Favouring 
Totality, and give readers the feeling that if we are not on top we are nowhere at all. 
The fact that, if Tanner is right, all readers are rendered victims of the psycho, gives us 
all an interest in overthrowing him, because we are othered and negated by the text, and 
so othered by the narcissistic structure Bateman rests upon. 
Tanner's argument for the existence of the absolute closure of the text rests upon 
Bateman's impossibility, the difficulty of placing him somewhere: his own self-
deconstruction. This "authorises not the reader's right to resist but the reader's 
powerlessness to interpret knowledgeably" (110). The reader is thus placed in the same 
position as a silent woman discussed by Kathleen Rowe; we are "conned" by the loss 
caused by our predicament into experiencing a Liminal Process Favouring Totality, 
only our belief in totality is negative, favouring silence and submission to the awesome 
and powerful totality that has fonned itself at our expense. Momentarily, though, 
Tanner forgets that absolute closure is impossible, and that the liminal moment can both 
deny us from interpreting Bateman or free us to interpret creatively or, if necessary, 
aggressively. By denying us so vehemently, Bateman slips. The Liminal Process 
Favouring Totality necessary for Bateman to complete his act of totalisation also makes 
that completion impossible, because we, in the Liminal moment, experience the limits 
of the system, we see a place where nothing need be true, where we can break down 
and re-form. 
The way Bateman represents himself reminds careful readers of the cartoon, 
and, as we have discovered, cartoons represent, as a cultural meaning, various types of 
incompleteness. Both the abnegatory and the accepting cartoon are incomplete -
totality is as incomplete as non-totality. Engagement with Liminal Space that Leads to 
the Provisional can be seen in this light, an expression of self that embraces this 
incompletion. But cartoons do have identity- by embracing incompletion, they take 
their other, the total, into them as a part of them, albeit a part to regard with suspicion. 
What this means is that they can fonn, but incompletely, provisionally, temporarily, or 
with a recognition that fonn will slip and change. But it also means that there is an 
aspect to their selves that tends toward totalisation, and that desires totalisation. 
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Engagement with Liminal Space that Leads to the Provisional provides an 
oppositional reading in the manner that Tanner calls for. Despite Bateman's 
impossibility, we can nonetheless construct him knowledgeably; we can construct a 
provisional knowledge based on the tools and the information we have. Because we 
face incompletion, readers have to intervene, venture an interpretation and argue for a 
position. All of this is on the understanding that any decision will be provisional, 
subject to change as conditions in the shifting text do. It will be a cartoon knowledge, 
and cartoon information, but nonetheless something that can be used. This is 
particularly as the deeper-set structures of Bateman's (totalitarian) "fascism" are far less 
ephemeral than his surface personality. Liminal Processes Favouring Totality, although 
a self-abnegatingly incomplete system of management, are nonetheless rather constant 
here - easily constant enough to be flagged theoretically, and so for resistances to 
orgamse against them. And as readers oppressed by Bateman, we have a strong 
political interest in resisting and opposing him, rather than simply indulging in 
aesthetically distanced ludic reading pleasures. We are interested in action, action 
moreover, which lies outside the scope of the book. Rather than anger directed at the 
book, which might be interpreted as a "safety valve" the system can use to tame 
subversive material, one can instead become angry at the totality the book cartoons. 
American Psycho therefore has the potential to create a community of interest against 
totality, against the attempt to totalise, and hence against the Liminal Processes 
Favouring Totality themselves. That is why he is an "American" psycho and not 
merely a psychopath. He "represents" figuratively, the psychosis of an America 
managed by a (totalitarian) "fascist" ideology. And because it is the preposterous figure 
of Bateman that personifies and embodies these processes of management, the system's 
ambitions for total management are revealed, in American Psycho, to be a joke, and a 
very sick one. 
One of the most disquieting aspects of Ellis's book is that it is a comedy. 
Bateman's banal day-to-day behaviour, and that of his compatriots - the behaviour that 
reveals the extent of Bateman's ideological interpellation - is often very funny. The 
"yuppies'" constant misrecognition of one another is comic; the banality of their 
conversations (entire conversations on the art of discerning good brands of mineral 
water from bad); their attitudes (for instance the scene where the waitress's minutely 
imperfect knee comes to be seen as a major disfigurement). They are all paid 
preposterous amounts of money but seldom seem to do any work - another of Ellis's 
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jabs at the young executive classes of the 1980s. Other scenes played by Ellis for 
laughs include Bateman's disbelieved confessions, his encounter with Bono when he's 
in the front row at a U2 concert and isn't listening, and his ongoing encounters with 
Luis Corruthers, the closeted stockbroker who is attracted to Bateman (he takes 
Bateman's attempt to strangle him as a caress, surprising Bateman into not finishing the 
job). The cartoonness of the characters' personalities is also written as ajoke, although, 
significantly, these are jokes none of the characters can admit to and "get". One major 
constant in the book is that the characters all take themselves deadly seriously, 
something that tends to generate comic situations. The best example is one I have cited 
already, where Bateman finds himself lunching with Christopher Armstrong, a 
compatriot at Bateman's firm P&P. Armstrong has recently returned from the Bahamas 
(at least so he claims). He tells Bateman about his trip, but his conversation is pure 
travel catalogue: 
Travellers looking for that perfect vacation this summer may do well to 
look south, as far south as the Bahamas and the Caribbean islands. There are at 
least five smart reasons for visiting the Caribbean including the weather and the 
festivals and events, the less crowded hotels and attractions, the price and the 
unique cultures .... Water sports are of course the leading attraction. But golf 
courses and tennis courts are in excellent condition and the pros at many of the 
resorts are made more available during the summer. Many of the courts are lit 
for night playing as well .... As for dining out, the Caribbean has become more 
attractive as the island cuisine has mixed well with the European culture .... 
Sightseeing is highlighted by the European culture which established many of 
the islands as regional fortresses in the seventeen hundreds.... (American 
Psycho, 137-140) 
Bateman becomes extremely angry during this episode, possibly because 
Armstrong is discomforting him by revealing cartoon-ness too obviously. (Armstrong 
has no inkling he is doing this, however.) Before Bateman loses his sense of self 
altogether (the episode is cut off mid-sentence, suggesting this) he begins associating 
Armstrong with a bloody pulp - Armstrong has become other and is thus associated 
with the body's interior, and also with its lower regions: Bateman describes Armstrong 
as an "asshole" (140). 
At other times, however, the comedy in American Psycho is very grim indeed. 
His cleaners clean the blood and remains off his clothes and his apartment walls, yet he 
is never apprehended for any of his crimes. Real estate agents prefer to quietly cover 
over evidence of a double murder in case it affects sales. Bateman at one point attempts 
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to cook and eat one of his victims, but his lack of cooking skills lets him down. He is 
glimpsed, sobbing, "I just want to be loved" (345) over the mess he creates. All these 
things are not only patently preposterous, but appeal as strangely plausible as well. 
They are consistent with the pre-eminent logic of capital and the commodity, with the 
dehumanisation materialism creates. Ellis has drawn this rampantly commodified 
world convincingly, and hence reveals it as a huge and monstrous joke, a joke on all 
that live in it. The "aura" of such a system withers under this satiric gaze. Patrick 
Bateman exists to be laughed at. His murders are not; his acts of killing are not funny 
at all (even if the aftermath sometimes is). But the banal manifestations of Bateman's 
(totalitarian) "fascism" are, as is his complete lack of self-awareness. Bateman is a 
joke, just as the patriarchy is for Rowe, and he is a joke which, just as Rowe suggests 
with the patriarchy, should also make the people he oppresses angry. Among these 
people number his entire readership, a group who have the potential to form a "we" 
hegemony that can provisionally oppose what Bateman is, and oppose him in his 
manifestations in the real world, the world outside the novel. And we can get angry at 
what Bateman is, which is the tendencies of capitalist patriarchy. He can act as a 
catalyst to make people first laugh at (this represents a change in consciousness) and 
then get angry at having to live in a system of (totalitarian) "fascism". If enough people 
realise that the structures naturalised as rightly dominant in society are just a joke, a 
joke that holds massive power over them, then this "de-auratised" system would present 
itself as vulnerable, suddenly. If enough people become righteously angry as a result, 
particularly when it becomes obvious that that system "devours" or "consumes" people, 
that it is there for the benefit of an elite at the expense of everyone and everything else, 
then a powerful provisional hegemony might form. This is what I take to be the 
political lessons of Pynchon and Ellis. In these circumstances the spirit for change 
might begin to prevail. If it is recognised that totality must be opposed, but opposed 
powerfully, that change will involve recognition of the provisional, and recognition of 
the power of the "excluded middle". It would mean the hegemony would continue to 
test its assumptions and acknowledge its unstable foundations and incomplete nature. It 
would break up when it had succeeded, and its components could then re-form around 
other points of action. 
By characterising, m their cartoonish way, society as being (totalitarian) 
"fascist" in nature, both Pynchon and Ellis "up the stakes" for their readers. They both 
suggest that the readers of their novels are victims or potential victims of the system -
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we are all in NixonlZchlubb' s theatre with Rocket 00000 plummeting onto us, a very 
real possibility in the midst of the nuclear build up in the cold war. Alternatively we are 
all victims of Patrick Bateman's psychosis, of his murderous ways. Even though 
(totalitarian) "fascism" might seem a system in which one might survive, either to 
prosper or fall, both writers suggest that it will ultimately destroy us all. They thus give 
"us" reason to organise against it, and Pynchon, with his suggestion of the potential 
politics of the cartoon, suggests how non-(totalitarian) "fascist" political responses 
might eventually be formed. The resistance comes from within the system, from its 
chaotic interior, if you like; it may, tactically, say "heil! ", but "right in the Fuhrer's 
face". It depends upon communication among the masses, the "all of us", discussion 
between us as to the danger we are in, so that political hegemonies against the 
established order can increase in size and power. The leak in the belly of the 
(totalitarian) "fascist" system may then become a flood, a movement from the excluded 
middle, on behalf of a half-formed "cartoon" that the system simply can no longer 
contain or re-co-opt: a provisionally based, participatory, radically democratic politics. 
There is urgency about these novels which suggests a pressing political need. 
Yet these are postmodern texts. Although they seem to display all the postmodern 
trappings of fragmentation, elusiveness of meaning, radical open-ness, self-
referentiality, and loss of character SUbjectivity, there is nonetheless a (provisional) 
"subject" to these books, the critique of current postmodern politics fleshed out above. 
How are postmodern artists to respond to a world living its postmodernity in totalitarian 
conditions? If they are willing to posit powerful provisional meanings - they are 
writing, after all, in a relatively permanent form - then we as readers should be willing 
to take the books on the terms they are offered and construct provisional meaning from 
them. There is a "spirit" in which the novels depict what we can construct as the state of 
the world as their authors "see it", notwithstanding the fact that meaning refuses 
closure, and that therefore an author should not be considered the only definitively 
authoritative arbiter of meaning in a text. Such statements, though, are not just gestures 
- postmodern concerns such as the deconstruction of authoritative voice are "central" to 
the dismantling of (totalitarian) "fascism". Pynchon, clearly, and Ellis, I'm suggesting, 
wish to see the world experience its postmodern phase in a state of radical democracy. 
Reaching this state requires action and intervention, as well as a theoretical inquiry into 
the power of those in authority. These novels offer this. But by making their audience 
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feel that power, and our own status in relation to it, in both the gut and in the bloodflow, 
they hold out the possibility of "real" action, a response in "reality". 
But such a "real" response represents, paradoxically, not a loss of our own 
reality, but a recognition that we are not as autonomous, as "real" as we might have 
believed. Here, I describe the "diminished" state that results as a cartoon. The cartoon 
is certainly not the only metaphor that can be used to describe this state, it is just the 
metaphor suggested by Pynchon's two novels and applied here to Ellis's one. It is a 
metaphor that gets us, with the categories of abnegatory and accepting cartoons, some 
way to finding a postmodern politics that can recognise difference within its system and 
still remain a viable tool. There is no magic switch that governs liminal processes and 
experiences, which can ensure that an experience of liminal space will lead to the 
provisional rather than the total. Once the dominant, non-democratic or (totalitarian) 
"fascist" ideology has been rejected, ideology itself is not transcended. In a purely 
democratic state, there would be no ideology. But that state does not exist, and cannot 
exist - democracy never arrives, therefore ideology will always be with us. Avoiding 
Liminal Processes Favouring Totality requires nothing less than active work, in each 
instance, so that as many of "us" see the joke, and see that we are implicated in the 
joke, and become detennined to resist the power of that joke. Between them, the 
implication of all the texts under discussion here is that we must accept the rabbit 
within us, and if we can, one by one, then when the moment is right, we may be capable 
of taking our hands from the cuffs. But only once enough of us have learned to see the 
film ... 
230 
References 
Albritton, Robert (1995). "The De(con)struction of Marx's Capital." Post-Ality: 
Marxism and Postmodernism (ed) Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, Teresa L. Ebert and Donald 
Morton. Washington DC: Maisonneuve Press, 76-97. 
Althusser, Louis (1971). Essays on Ideology. London: Verso. 
Ames, Christopher (1990). "Power and the Obscene Word: Discourses of Extremity in 
Thomas Pynchon' s Gravity's Rainbow". Contemporary Literature 31 :2, Summer, 
191-207. 
Ames, Winslow and David Kunzle (1978). "Caricature, Cartoons, and Comic Strip." 
Encyclopaedia Brittannica, 15th ed. Chicago: University of Chicage Press, 3: 909-
922. 
Anderson, Perry (1984). In the Tracks of Historical Materialism. Chicago: University of 
Chicage Press. 
Araton, Harvey (1996). "Spoofing a Game That's Already Cartoonish". New York 
Times, June 2, final late ed, sec 2, 11. 
Archer, Wes (1994). "Itchy and Scratchy Land" written by John Swartzwelder. Directed 
by Wes Archer. The Simpsons, created by Matt Groening, 20th Century Fox, 
episode 2FO 1. 
Arendt, Hmmah (1967). The Origins of Totalitarianism 3rd ed. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Baker, Jeffrey S. (1993). "A Democratic Pynchon: Counterculture, Counterforce and 
Participatory Democracy." Pynchon Notes 32-33, Spring-Fall 1993, 99-131. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail (1984). Rabalais and His World (tr) Helene Iswolsky. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Barthes, Roland (1974). S/Z (tr) Richard Miller. New York: Noonday. 
Barthes, Roland (1982). "The Reality Effect". French Litermy Theory Today: A Reader 
(ed) TsvetanTodorov. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11-17. 
Bataille, Georges (1985). "The Psychological Structure of Fascism." Georges Bataille, 
Visions of Excess (tr) Allen Stoekl with Carl R. Lovitt and Donald M. Leslie, Jr. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 137-160. 
Baudrillard, Jean (1983). "The Ecstasy of Communication" The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays 
on Postmodern Culture (ed) Hal Foster. Port Townsend, Bay Press, 126-134. 
231 
Baudrillard, Jean (1984). "The Precession of Simulacra" Art After Modernism (ed) Brian 
Wallis. New York: Museum of Contemporary Art, 253-281 
Baudrillard, Jean (1987). The Evil Demon of Images. Annandale: Power Institute. 
Baudrillard, Jean (1988). America. New York: Verso. 
Bauerlein, Mark (2001). "Social Constructionism: Philosophy for the Academic 
Workplace". Partisan Review LXVIII:2. 
www.partisanreview.orglarchive1200112/bauerlein 
Bawer, Bruce (1988). Diminishing Fictions: Essays on the Modern Novel and its Critics. 
St.Paul: Graywolf. 
Baxter, Tara and Nikki Craft (undated internet page). "There Are Better Ways of Taking 
Care of Bret Easton Ellis than Just Censoring Him." 
http://www.nostatusquo.comiACLU/PornlEllis1.html 
Beardsworth, Richard (1996). Derrida and the Political. New York: Routledge. 
Benjamin, Walter (1970). "The Work of Ali in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction". 
Illuminations (ed) Hannah Arendt. London: Cape, 217-251. 
Berger, James (1995) "Cultural Trauma and the 'Timeless Burst': Pynchon's Revision of 
Nostalgia in Vineland". Postmodern Culture 5:3, May. 
http://www.themodernword.comlpynchonlpapers _ berger.html#anchor1212020 
Bersani, Leo (1989). "Pynchon, Paranoia and Literature". Representations 25, Winter, 
99-118. 
Brooker, M. Keith (1993). "America and Its Discontents: The Failure of Leftist Politics 
in Pynchon's Vineland." LIT 4,87-99. 
Buck-Morss, Susan (1992). "Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Banjamin's Artwork 
Essay Reconsidered". October 62, Fall, 3-41. 
Bumas, E. Shaskan (1995). "The Utopian States of America: The People, The Republic, 
and Rock and Roll in Thomas Pynchon's Vineland." Arizona Quarterly 52:3, 
Autumn, 148-175. 
Butler, Judith (1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New 
York: Routledge. 
Cameron, James (1984). The Terminator written by James Cameron and William 
Wisher, Jr. Directed by James Cameron, Carolco Pictures, inc. 
Champagne, Roland (1995). Jacques Derrida. New York: Twayne. 
Chilwell, Jan (1994). "Medium of Mayhem". New Zealand Listener, October 22,42. 
232 
Cholodenko, Alan (1991 a). "Introduction". The Illusion of Life: Essays on Animation 
(ed) Alan Cholodenko. Sydney: Power Productions, 9-36. 
Cholodenko, Alan (1991b). "Who Framed Roger Rabbit, or the Framing of Animation". 
The Illusion of Life: Essays on Animation (ed) Alan Cholodenko. Sydney: Power 
Productions, 209-242. 
Chow, Rey (1993). "Ethics After Idealism". Diacritics 23:1, Spring, 3-22. 
Chow, Rey (1995). "The Fascist Longings in Our Midst." ARIEL: A Review of 
International English Literature 26:1 Janurary, 23-50. 
, 
Cixous Hel~me (1976). "The Laugh of the Medusa." Signs 1:4, 875-93. 
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 8th ed. (ed) R.E. Allen. Oxford: 
Clarenden Press, 1990. 
Critchley, Simon (1992). The Ethics of Deconstruction. Oxford: Blackwell. 
D'Evelyn, Thomas (1990). "Life in II-Minute Segments". The Christian Science 
Monitor, March 7. 
Debord, Guy (1977). The Society of the Spectacle. Detroit: Black & Red. 
DeLillo, Don (1986). End Zone. New York: Penguin [1972]. 
DeLillo, Don (1986). White Noise. London: Picador [1984]. 
DeLillo, Don (1991). Ratner's Star. New York: Vintage [1976]. 
Derrida, Jacques (1974). Of Grammatology (tr) Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Derrida, Jacques (1977). Limited Inc. (tr) Samuel Weber. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
Derrida, Jacques (1981). "Plato's Phannacy". Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (tr) 
Barbara Johnson. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 74-139. 
Derrida, Jaques (1982). "Ousia and Gramm [ e]: Note on a Note From Being and Time" 
Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (tr) Alan Bass. Chicago: University of 
Chicage Press, 29-68. 
Derrida, Jacques (1988). "The Politics of Friendship" (tr) Gabriel Motzkin. Journal of 
Philosophy 85, November, 632-44. 
Derrida, Jacques (1992). The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (tr) 
Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
233 
Dijkstra, Brarn (1996). Evil Sisters: The Threat of Female Sexuality and the Cult of 
Manhood. New York: Knopf. 
Dugdale, John (1990). Thomas Pynchon: Allusive Parables of Power. New York: St. 
Marten's Press. 
Easthope, Anthony and Kate McGowan (eds) (1992). A Critical and Cultural Theory 
Reader. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Ellis, Bret Easton (1986). Less Than Zero. London: Picador [1982]. 
Ellis, Bret Easton (1991). American Psycho. London: Picador 
Foster, Hal (1983). "Postmodernism: A Preface". The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture (ed) Hal Foster. Port Townsend, Bay Press, ix-xvi. 
Foster, Hal (1991). "Armor Fou" October 56, Spring, 64-97. 
Frecero, Carla (1997). "Historical Violence, Censorship and the Serial Killer: The Case 
of American Psycho". Diacritics 27:2, Summer, 44-58. 
Friedrich, Carl J., et. al (1969). Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views with 
Michael Curtis and Benjamin R. Barber. London: Pall Mall Press. 
Habermas, Jurgen (1983). "Modernity - An Incomplete Project". The Anti-Aesthetic: 
Essays on Postmodern Culture (ed) Hal Foster. Port Townsend, Bay Press, 3-15. 
Hans, James S. (1988). "Gravity's Rainbow and the Literature of Renewal". Essays in 
Literature 15:2, Fall, 267-284. 
Haraway, Donna (1991). Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. 
, New York: Routledge. 
Hayles, N. Katherine (1994). "'Who was saved?': Families, Snitches, and Recuperation 
in Pynchon's Vineland". The Vineland Papers (ed) Geoffrey Green, Donald J 
Greiner and Larry McCaffery. Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 14-30. 
Heller, Amanda (1976). "Ratner's Star by Don DeLillo". Atlantic Monthly 238, August, 
86. 
Herron, Jerry (1993). "Homer Simpson's Eyes and the Culture of Late Nostalgia." 
Representations 43, Summer, 1-26. 
Heyler, Ruth (2000). "Parodied to Death: The Postmodern Gothic of American Psycho". 
Modern Fiction Studies 46:3, Fall, 725-746. 
Hill, Steven (undated internet page). "American Psycho by Bret Easton Ellis". 
www.nostatusquo.com.ACLU/PornJEllis2 
234 
Hite, Molly (c1983). Ideas of Order in the Novels of Thomas Pynchon. Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press. 
Hite, Molly (1994). "Feminist Theory and the Politics of Vineland". The Vineland 
Papers (ed) Geoffrey Green, Donald J Greiner and Larry McCaffery. Normal: 
Dalkey Archive Press, 135-153. 
Holden, Stephen (1996). "How Baseball Becomes an Irrational Pastime". New York 
Times, August 16, final late ed, section C, 3. 
Horkheimer, Max and Theodore Adorno (1993). The Dialectic of Enlightenment (tr) 
John Cumming. New York, Continuum. 
Hume, Kathryn (1992). "Repetition and the Construction of Character in Gravity's 
Rainbow." Critique 33:4, Summer, 243-54. 
Hutcheon, Linda (1988). The Poetics of Post modernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New 
York: Routledge. 
Irigaray, Luce (1985). This Sex Which is Not One (tr) Catherine Porter with Carolyn 
Burke. Ithica: Cornell University Press. 
Irwin, Mark (1991). "A Note on 'Porky Pig and the Anarchist' in The Crying of Lot 49 
and Gravity's Rainbow". Pynchon Notes 28-29, Spring-Fall, 55-57. 
James, Caryn (1995). "Sylvester Stallone, Judge. Uh oh". New York Times, June 30, 
final late ed, section C, 3. 
Jameson, Fredric (1983): "Postmodernism and Consumer Society". The Anti-Aesthetic: 
Essays on Postmodern Culture (ed) Hal Foster. Port Townsend: Bay Press, 111-125. 
Jameson, Fredric (c1991). Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Jencks, Charles (1987). The Language of Post Modern Architecture. London: Academy. 
Jones, Charles M. (1953). "Duck Amuck" written by Michael Maltese. Directed by 
Charles M. Jones, Warner Brothers Pictures. 
Kakutami, Miichiko (1995). "They're Liars, and That's Just the Least of Their 
Problems". New York Times, May 26, final late ed, section C, 28. 
Kaplan, Alice Yaeger (1986). Reproductions of Banality: Fascism, Literature, and 
French Intellectual Life. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
Keesey, Douglas (1986). "Nature and the Supernatural: Pynchon's Ecological Ghost 
Stories." Pynchon Notes 18-19, Spring-Fall, 84-95. 
Kellner, Douglas (1989). Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and 
235 
Beyond. Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell. 
Korten, David C. (1995). When Corporations Rule the World. West Hartford: Kumarian 
Press. 
Kristeva, Julia (1980). Desire in Language (tr) Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, Leon S. 
Roudiez. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Kristeva, Julia (1982). The Powers o/Horror (tr) Leon S. Roudiez. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Kristeva, Julia (1984a). Revolution in Poetic Language (tr) Margaret Waller. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Kristeva, Julia (1984b). Tales o/Love (tr) Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Kunzle, David (1973). The History o/the Comic Strips: The Early Comic Strip. Berkely: 
University of California Press. 
Kunzle, David (1990). The History o/the Comic Strip: The Nineteenth Century. 
Berkely: University of California Press. 
Lacan, Jacques (1977). Ecrits: A Selection (tr) Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock 
Books. 
Lac1au, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. New 
York: Verso. 
Lac1au, Ernesto (1990). New Reflections on the Revolution o/Our Time. New York: 
Verso. 
Lac1au, Ernesto (ed) (1994). The Making 0/ Political Identities. New York: Verso. 
Lac1au, Ernesto (1995). "The Time is Out of Joint" Diacritics 25:2, Summer 1995, 86-96. 
Le Blanc, Paul (1995). "Culture, Identity, Class Struggle: Practical Critique of the 
Discourse on Post-Marxism." Post-Ality: Marxism and Postmodernism (ed) Mas'ud 
Zavarzadeh, Teresa L. Ebert and Donald Morton. Washington DC: Maisonneuve 
Press, 290-301. 
Lechte, John (1990). Julia Kristeva. London: Routledge. 
Lefort, Claude (1986). The Political Forms a/Modern Society: Bureaucracy, 
Democracy, Totalitarianism (ed and introduced) John B. Thompson. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Lummis, C. Douglas (1996). Radical Democracy. Ithica: Cornell University Press. 
236 
Lyotard, IF. (1984). The Postmodern Condition (tr) Geoffrey Bennington and Brian 
Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Mackey, Louis (1981). "Paranoia, Pynchon and Preterition". Sub Stance 30, 16-30. 
Maslin, Janet (1995). "Showgirls". New York Times, September 22, final late ed, section 
C,l. 
McDonald, William (1996). "Brothers in a Movie World of Their Own". New York 
Times, March 3, final late ed, section 2, 1. 
Melley, Timothy (1994). "Bodies Incorporated: Scenes of Agency Panic in Gravity's 
Rainbow". Contemporary Literature 35:4, Winter, 709-738. 
Michels, Pete (1999). "Homer to the Max" written by John Swartzwelder. Directed by 
Pete Michels. The Simpsons, created by Matt Groening; 20th Century Fox, episode 
AABF09/SI-I009. 
Moore, Rich (1991). "Stark Raving Dad" written by Al Jean and Mike Reiss. Directed 
by Rich Moore. The Simpsons, created by Matt Groening; 20th Century Fox, 
episode 7F24. 
Morawski, Stefan (1996). The Troubles With Postmodernism. London: Routledge. 
Morley, John David (1996). "All Germans Look Alike". New York Times, April 21, 
final late ed, section 7, 41. 
Mouffe, Chantel (ed) (1992). Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, 
Community. London: Verso. 
Mouffe, Chantel (1993). The Return of the Political. London: Verso. 
New Concise Collins Dictionary of the English Language, New Zealand ed. (ed) Ian A. 
Gordon. Auckland: Collins, 1982. 
Newsom, Robert (1988). A Likely Story: Probability and Play in Fiction. New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Olderman, Raymond M. (1983). "The New Consciousness and the Old System". 
Approaches to Gravity's Rainbow (ed) Charles Clerc. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 199-228. 
Olster, Stacey (1994). "When You're a (Nin)jette, You're a (Nin)jette All the Way- Or 
Are You?: Female Filmmaking in Vineland". The Vineland Papers (ed) Geoffrey 
Green, Donald J Greiner and Larry McCaffery. Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 
119-134. 
Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary (ed) Joyce M. Hawkins and Robert Allen. 
237 
Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1991. 
Pool, Gail (1987). "William T. Vollmann's You Bright and Risen Angels: A Cartoon". 
New York Times Book Review, June 21,10. 
Price, David W. (1998). "Bakhtinian Prosaics, Grotesque Realism and the Question of 
the Carnivalesque in Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho". Southern Humanities 
Review 32:4, Fall, 321-346. 
Pynchon, Thomas (1975). Gravity's Rainbow. London: Picador [1973]. 
Pynchon, Thomas (1979). The Crying of Lot 49. London: Picador [1966]. 
Pynchon, Thomas (1991). Vineland. London: Minerva. 
Pynchon, Thomas (1995). V. London: Vintage [1963]. 
Pynchon, Thomas (1997). Mason & Dixon. London: Cape. 
Rowe, Kathleen (1995). The Unruly Woman. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Safer, Elaine B (1994). "Pynchon's World and Its Legendary Past: Humour and the 
Absurd in a Twentieth Century Vineland." The Vineland Papers (ed) Geoffrey 
Green, Donald J Greiner and Larry McCaffery. Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 46-
67. 
Schapiro, Leonard (1972). Totalitarianism. London: Pall Mall Press. 
Seltzer, Mark (1992). Bodies and Machines. New York: Routledge. 
Seltzer, Mark (1995): "Serial Killers (II): The Pathological Public Sphere." Critical 
Inquiry 22:1, Autumn 1995,122-149. 
Shirer, William L (1991). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. London: Manderin. 
Siegel, Mark (1978). Creative Paranoia in Gravity's Rainbow. Port Washington: 
Kennikat Press. 
Sklar, Robert (1978). "An Anarchist Miricle: The Novels of Thomas Pynchon." 
Pynchon: A Collection of Critical Essays (ed) Edward Mendelsen. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 87-96. 
Slade, Joseph W. (1994). "Communication, Group Theory, and Perception in Vineland". 
The Vineland Papers (ed) Geoffrey Green, Donald J Greiner and Larry McCaffery. 
Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 68-88. 
Small, Edward S. and Eugene Levinson (1989). "Toward a Theory of Animation". The 
Velvet Light Trap 24, Fall 1989, 67-74. 
238 
Solomon, Eric (1994). "Argument by Anachronism: The Presence ofthe 1930s in 
Vineland". The Vineland Papers (ed) Geoffrey Green, Donald J Greiner and Larry 
McCaffery. Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 161-166. 
Somerville, Ross (1996). "The Virtual Woman". New Zealand Listener, December 7, / 
48. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1990). The Post Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, 
Dialogues (ed) Sarah Harasym. New York: Routledge. 
Stallybrass, Peter and Allon White (1986). The Politics and Poetics o/Transgression. 
London: Metheun. 
Stern, J.P. (1973). On Realism. London: Routledge. 
Stevens, H. Brenton (1997). "'Look! Up in the Sky! It's a Bird! It's a Plane! It's ... 
Rocketman! ': Pynchon's Comic Book Mythology in Gravity's Rainbow". Studies in 
Popular Culture 19:3, April, 37-48. 
Tabbi, Joseph (1994). "Pynchon's Groundward Art". The Vineland Papers (ed) Geoffrey 
Green, Donald J Greiner and Larry McCaffery. Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 89-
100. 
Tanner, Laura E (c1994). "American Psycho and The American Psyche: Reading the 
Forbidden Text". Laura E. Tanner, Intimate Violence: Reading Rape and Torture in 
Twentieth Century Fiction. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 96-116. 
Tanner, Tony (1971). City o/Words. London: Cape. 
Tanner, Tony (1982). Thomas Pynchon. London: Methuen. 
Teachout, Terry (1996). "Scoundrel Time". New York Times, June 23, final late ed, 
section 7,34. 
Theweleit, Klaus (l989a). Male Fantasies Volume 1: Women Floods Bodies HistOlY (tr) 
Stephen Conway in collaboration with Erica Carter and Chris Turner. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Theweleit, Klaus (1989b). Male Fantasies Volume 2: Male Bodies: Psychoanalysing the 
White Terror (tr) Erica Carter and Chris Turner in collaboration with Stephen 
Conway. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Tucker, Ken (1991). "The Splatterpunk Trend, And Welcome to It." New York Times 
Book Review, March 24, 13-14. 
Turner, Victor (1969). The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure. London: 
Routledge and K. Paul. 
239 
Udovitch, Mim (1991). "Intentional Phalluses". Village Voice, March 19, 1991,65-66. 
Vonnegut, Kurt (1979). Slaughterhouse Five. London: Triad/Grenada [1969]. 
Waugh, Patricia (1992). "From Modernism, Postmodernism, Feminism: Gender and 
Autonomy Theory". Postmodernism: A Reader (ed) Patricia Waugh. London: 
Edward Arnold, 189-204. 
Weisenburger, Steven (1988). A Gravity's Rainbow Companion. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press. 
White, Allon (1982). "Pigs and Pierrots: The Politics of Transgression in Modem 
Fiction". Raritan 2:2,51-70. 
Wolf, Naomi (1990). The Beauty Myth. London: Vintage. 
Wolitzer, Meg (1987). "Review". New York Times Book Review, January 4, 10. 
Wood, Ellen Meiksins (1995). "What is the 'Postmodern' Agenda? An Introduction". 
Monthly Review 47:3, Summer, 1-12. 
Young, Elizabeth (1992). "The Beast in the Jungle, the Figure in the Carpet: Bret Easton 
Ellis's American Psycho." Elizabeth Young and Graham Caveney, Shopping In 
Space: Essays on American "Blank Generation" Fiction. London: Serpent's Tail, 
85-122. 
Zaller, Robert (1993). "American Psycho, American Censorship, and the Dahmer Case". 
Revue Franr;aise D 'etudes Americaines 57, July 1993, 317-325. 
Zavarzadeh, Mas'ud (1995). "Post-Ality: The (Dis)Simulations ofCybercapitalism." 
Post-Ality: Marxism and Postmodernism (ed) Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, Teresa L. Ebert 
and Donald Morton. Washington DC: Maisonneuve Press, 1-75. 
Zemeckis, Robert (1988). Who Framed Roger Rabbit? written by Gary K. Wolf, Jeffrey 
Price and Peter S. Seaman. Directed by Robert Zemeckis, Touchstone Pictures. 
